Summa's logic on "marital debt", isn't it flawed?

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What you say is current teaching. But in these passages from the Summa, as I understand them, unification seems actually to be excluded (“signification” of anything not being enough to make a marital act “honest”, just the narrowly understood debt and procreation), and in order to create a venial sin, the gratification sought does not seem to need to be the exclusive motivation of the spouse who seeks sex, it seems enough that he or she is seeking sex for pleasure (or not even that! basically just not having a good enough reason to have sex, as it seems), even if he or she isn’t excluding the blessings. The way I read it, the lack of a specific intent either to beget a child (and bring it up in the Catholic faith, since desiring only the begetting is not enough, one needs to direct that desire also toward bringing up the child in the faith) or to “prevent fornication” in the other spouse, results in a venial sin from the marital act. Therefore, anything about unity, celebration of being joined together (“signification”), things like emotional support and a sense of closeness, none of these things would seem to avoid venial sin.
Of course, St. Thomas is trying to nail down motivation, which is a very tricky thing. And we have to remember he was a theologian, not the Magisterium. What he wrote certainly informed the Church, but his was not the end all and be all of Catholic teaching, hence the Church clarifying St. Thomas thought, perhaps finishing it might be the better word, in teaching that unification is reason enough for a married couple to engage in the marital act.

When theologians wrestle with these things they sometimes come to conclusions that seem logical, but which don’t take into consideration the whole mind of the Church. It is enough to know that St. Thomas was urging couples to think of marriage not as mere a license for sex–as our modern society sees it, but for what it truly is, a sacrament meant to bring new souls into existence for eternal life and to show the unity of Christ and his Church.
 
Not exactly, I don’t think. He’s asking the question whether it’s sinful to have sex with your spouse if your intent is anything other than procreation or for the good of the marriage – that is, if your intent, essentially, is lustful. His answer is that, if you’re intending the act in order to procreate, or to make good on your marriage promises, you’re safe. Otherwise, look out…
But is it really lustful to intend the act other than specifically to procreate (I’m talking about the actual, specific intent of that particular act, as opposed to general or habitual intention underlying someone’s marital behaviour) or perform the obligation? The Author rejects the idea that the obligation should be treated as unpleasant and pleasure rejected. However, desire for your spouse, desire to consummate the marriage, all of that seems to be not good enough to prevent venial sin. It seems clear that unless you want to prevent the danger of your wife cheating, or (specifically) to procreate, then you’re being lustful and sinning venially in seeking the act.
If you’re doing it to help your spouse avoid sinning, then great; if you’re saying, “honey, come to bed, so that I don’t run off and find someone else to jump in the sack with”, then that’s sinful.
So it basically comes down to helping your spouse avoid sinning. You aren’t allowed to desire your spouse and be happy about it and desire to be close and experience the mutal gift from and to each other… nope. It must be only so that the other spouse would avoid sinning. So if you have a spouse so honourable that will not cheat no matter how starved, you basically don’t have a good reason to have sex other than specifically intended procreation.
Because* your spouse* can intend it to help keep you from sin!!!
Yes, and the only legitimate intent, other than specifically intended procreation, is the specifically intended “prevention of fornication” in the other spouse. You can’t have sex because you’re married and love each other and have made the gift. You can only have sex because otherwise one of you might start cheating.
 
That doesn’t seem to be what’s in play here: he’s asking whether marital sex, when it’s not for procreation or the good of the marriage, but only for pleasure, is sinful. His answer dovetails nicely with John Paul II’s notion on lust in marriage: if you were to have anonymous sex with some random person, then the reason you would be doing it is purely for the sake of the pleasure it generates in you. That’s sinful. Now, if you approach your spouse in the same way, intending only to look to your own lustful needs, and not to express your love for your spouse, then you’re in a state of sin. If you’re doing it out of lust, it’s a mortal sin; if you’re doing it only because you’re trying to avoid walking out the door and jumping the first person you see, it’s still a venial sin. I don’t think there’s any intent in this answer to address the notion of contraception. Is there something you see there that leads you to that conclusion?
Let’s get some clarity: according to the Author of that part of the Summa: anonymous/random = mortal. For pleasure but would in no case go a different woman still means a sin, although this time "only venial. And you can’t have sex to please your wife or keep her satisfied or anything of that sort. It must be “prevention of fornication”. If she were in no danger of fornication and if you had no specific intent to procreate through that very individual act of intercourse, then you’d be sinning venially in having that intercourse.

In JP2’s view, it looks like if you focus on yourself but neglect the spouse’s needs, especially if a man gets his climax (ejaculation) but neglects his wife’s (orgasm), the that’s an offence against justice. But this applies to how the act is carried out. It doesn’t relate to what intention makes the act sinful, venially or mortally. It may well be limited to the idea that if you do have sex (for a non-sinful or venially sinful reason), you do need to satisfy your wife and not only yourself. Doesn’t necessarily mean you can have sex to enjoy the mutual gift of self or anything like that.
Aah… but offspring aren’t exclusively the blessings of marriage! see Q49, Art 1, Objection 1 – Lombard identifies the goods as “faith, offspring, and sacrament”.
But see the detailed elaboration, which I already quoted above. The only “blessings” (goods of marriage in modern terminology) which justify intercourse are the legitimate payment of debt (under the good of faith) and specifically intended procreation (under the good of offspring). He clearly excludes sacrament as justifying the act. I believe we’ve already visited this several points above.
No – I think it means that it’s possible to be lustful, but to act on that lust in order to avoid going outside of the marriage for sex (i.e., to continue to be faithful). That’s still a venial sin, but it’s an act with a view to avoiding a greater sin (unfaithfulness).
Yes, but that means that it’s lustful to have sex for any reason other than specifically intended procreation or specifically intended preventing of cheating by the spouse. Otherwise it’s at least a venial sin. I have substantive issues with that view, in addition to not liking the logic. It seems the Author believe that apart from specifically intended procreation and specifically intended prevention of spousal betrayal (!), the marital act is superfluous… which seems to be necessarily stemming from the idea that the marital act must be limited to what’s absolutely necessary and minimal… even if the Author specifically disclaims believing that the act is sinful! He seems to think not that the act must be kept in moderation but that it must be kept to a minimum. St. Augustine expressly stated that kind of belief.
I don’t see where you’re getting this. You can enjoy the act for the sake of the good of the marriage – in the answer to Q49 art.6, “pleasure in a good action is good”. If your desire is for the good of the marriage – for the unitive aspect of the marriage (although this language isn’t yet present for Aquinas), then that’s fine.
Nope, look when he says that only offspring and debt payment avoid venial sinfulness. And debt payment is reduced to prevention of fornication (health was excluded somewhere along the way).
You’re enjoying the good act of building the unitive aspect,
Yes, except the unitive aspect was specifically said not to remove the venial sin from the act (“on account of some signification”). He said it made marriage itself honest but not its act.
 
Pardon? It’s not “only non-sinful for her to ask when she wants to ‘avoid fornication in him’”! Article 2 talks about the wife asking (as well as not asking, but wanting). So, I’m not sure what you’re getting at, here…
At a contradiction. Because the wife is apparently asking or wanting it for lustful reasons.
Yes. Here’s the scene: the woman asks, but the man can’t rise to the challenge. If it’s because he’s still recovering (ahem), then there’s “no right to ask again”. If it’s for some other reason, then it depends on the reason: if it’s a good reason (e.g., he’s injured while working, or whatever), then he’s not required to say “yes” (and, in fact, she shouldn’t ask), but if it’s not a good reason (e.g., he just left the maid’s room (again, ahem)… or he was injured in the commission of a sin… or maybe he’s too drunk… or whatever), then he sins by virtue of not being able to perform (ahem) when asked; moreover, if, due to his unlawful incapacity, she goes off and sins with the pool boy, then he’s at least partially at fault.
Yes, but supposing the Author did not presume her to be venially sinning (in asking for the debt because she wanted to avoid cheating), she must have been asking in order to prevent her husband from cheating. And now the focus is somehow shifted from that onto the prevention of cheating in her. To me this seems inconsistent.
You’re too hung up on “preventing fornication in her husband”. If a wife places unreasonable demands on her husband, he doesn’t sin in deferring.
The point is the demands seem to be justified only if her specific goal is to prevent the husband from cheating (not to keep him satisfied, let alone keep herself satisfied, not even to maintain a normal sexual relationship) or to get pregnant.
Thomas is allowing the wife to ask, and is telling the husband that even if his wife is trying to be polite and not ask (but he can tell that she’s making eyes at him), he should “man up” and do his duty…!
The Author isn’t Thomas but his student. The Author basically allows you to ask but if you ask for any other reason than either specifically wanting to beget a child (and bring it up in the faith etc.) or specifically wanting to prevent your spouse from cheating, then you are venially sinning. And so her making eyes at him must be classified as a venial sin according to the Author’s logic because she’s wanting to be satisfied, not to get an opportunity either to get pregnant or to reinforce her husband’s resolve to stay away from cheating. Likewise, if he woos her into bed for any other reason than specifically to get her pregnant or prevent her from cheating, or comply with her request, or because she seems needy, he’s sinning.
Your thought on “danger” seems reasonable. These are different grounds, though – here, the wife isn’t asking, but the husband is obliged to notice that she’s put on her fanciest nightgown and expensive French perfume, so he’s obliged to help her avoid sin.
Yeah, but she’s already venially sinned in doing so. He’s at least materially cooperating with that venial sin. I have trouble seeing her as venially sinning by putting on that fancy nightgown and smaller-than-Texan perfume so that her husband would notice her.
There’s no request from the wife, so your case doesn’t hold.
Disagree. There is a request but a non-verbal one. There’s most likely some intentional form of “seduction”. Perhaps just being needy and failing to conceal it would qualify as lack of a sin. But would still be classified as some form of lust anyway due to the absence of a sufficiently good reason for desiring intercourse. This gets very close to equating sexual desire with lust, as in acting on sexual desire in any way would be lust.
I don’t think that article 2 is talking about “infinite continence”. If your wife isn’t asking, you shouldn’t presume she’s interiorly wishing for a night of passion… unless she gives signs that she really is hoping for a night of passion.
…in which case she’s venially sinning. (Not like I necessarily agree with the view.)
At that point, “it would be foolish of him to (think she’s not interested) if he does see such signs”. That’s it; take it at face value. Don’t overthink it…
I don’t disagree with that statement. But there is a contradiction because here the husband is required to notice that it doesn’t please his wife to stay continent. But just because it doesn’t please you to stay continent, it’s not a good enough reason to approach your wife. Likewise she shouldn’t be approaching you (intentionally giving signs being no different from framing a verbal request).
 
Consumation is not equivalent to “celebration”. Certainly, at least, not to the modern concept of celebration, which is simply a more-or-less licentious indulgence.
The old concept seems to be that if you indulge in any way regarding marital sex = you sin.
I suspect therefore that it is not Saint Thomas, but your thinking in regards to marriage, that is flawed here: The “wedding night” (as you refer to it) is not a “celebration”, because that solemn celebration has, presumably, already happened (viz., in the Sacrament of Matrimony and the usual traditions and customs associated with it. It would be utterly redundant to celebrate yet again a marriage that was just celebrated.) Again, the “wedding night”, as you call it, is necessary to effect the marriage: without consumation there is no marriage. There exists, therefor, a duty or a debt or an obliation or some pressing need that requires satisfaction for the marriage. That, perhaps, is rather more close to what the Scholastics and canonists mean when they make reference to the marriage debt.
  1. I was using the word “celebration” loosely (and apologise for the ensuing confusion), in a birthday party sense. You could call it consumption.
  2. Consummation is not necessary for a valid marriage. A non-consummated marriage is valid and sacramental, although it can be dissolved by the Pope (Can. 1142, which is the inheritor of the mediaeval compromise between German and Italian canonists (where Italians insisted on the verbal oath, while Germans had a system where sex between engaged people was the beginning of marriage unless intended otherwise): For a just cause, the Roman Pontiff can dissolve a non-consummated marriage between baptized persons or between a baptized party and a non-baptized party at the request of both parties or of one of them, even if the other party is unwilling.) Wishing to make one’s marriage immune to canon 1142 dissolution does not strike me as something the Author of Supplement to Part Three would qualify as not venially sinful. Therefore even on the wedding night, barring a specific intent to procreate or prevent the spouse from cheating, to have sex would be to indulge in lust, which is a sin.
 
The Author basically allows you to ask but if you ask for any other reason than either specifically wanting to beget a child (and bring it up in the faith etc.) or specifically wanting to prevent your spouse from cheating, then you are venially sinning.
You keep saying this.:rolleyes: Look – there’s more to it than those two reasons! The obligation “to pay the debt” does not mean “want to prevent your spouse from cheating”!

Therefore, “to pay the debt” entails more than the one single case of venial sin that you keep coming back to! “To pay the debt”, in Thomas’ time, speaks to the legal right to the other’s body that was part and parcel of consent (today, we look at marriage a bit differently in the canons, but historically, that’s what was going on back then). Now, your contention about “wanting to prevent your spouse from cheating” comes up in a particular context: what if you don’t want to achieve one of the goods of marriage, but only are acting out of lust? In that context, the conjugal act can be a sin. It’s not the case that, in all considerations of the act, the only choice is “pregnancy or sin”! He says that a number of times, and we’ve gone over them!
And so her making eyes at him must be classified as a venial sin according to the Author’s logic because she’s wanting to be satisfied
No. The context here isn’t physical satisfaction or pleasure: it’s “paying the debt”. The wife has a right to her husband’s body, whether or not she explicitly asks. There is no implication of venial sin in the discussion at this point. None. How do you take “the debt may be demanded in two ways” to mean “the wife doesn’t want to become pregnant or help her husband’s avoidance of sin, and therefore, she wants pleasured in a sinful way”?* That’s just not there in the text.*
Disagree. There is a request but a non-verbal one.
No. “The husband knows by certain signs that the wife would wish him to pay the debt”. It’s his knowledge that’s in play; she’s not making a request.
…in which case she’s venially sinning. (Not like I necessarily agree with the view.)
Gahhhh! Here we go again! No… there’s no implication of intent – just an acknowledgement of the “debt”. No venial sin attaches, in this particular argument.
But there is a contradiction because here the husband is required to notice that it doesn’t please his wife to stay continent.
It’s important to note that it doesn’t please his wife at that moment. In general, there’s the expectation that they aren’t perpetually continent. Therefore, the husband is noticing that, at this particular moment in time, she wouldn’t mind if they make good on their mutual obligation to each other.
But just because it doesn’t please you to stay continent, it’s not a good enough reason to approach your wife.
I’m confused by your wording here. I, as a husband, don’t want continence at this particular moment (i.e., I would like to assert my rights as a husband, vis-a-vis my wife’s body.) That’s not a good enough reason to approach my wife and ask for “paying the marriage debt”? Where do you see that in the text?
(intentionally giving signs being no different from framing a verbal request).
Please show me where you see that in the text. He’s not asserting that “showing signs” is the same as “framing a verbal request”; in fact, he explicitly distinguishes between the two, so we explicitly know that they’re different cases!
 
Let me also suggest a different tack.

Chevalier, you seem to be engaged in two distinct projects: understanding the logic present here in the Summa, and grasping the Church’s understanding of marriage. Because, of course, the understanding of Aquinas, as present here, is not what the Church settled on in her official understanding of marriage (in particular, I’m thinking about the meaning of consent, as well as the Church’s later canonical understanding of the nature of marriage as covenant rather than as contract).

So – are you looking for a practical understanding of what the Church says about marriage? Or are you engaged in the historical / academic project of understanding this particular text?
 
Part 1 of 3.

I will take advantage of this thread to share the study that I have just done of this subject. The criteria I followed was:
  • Church Magisterium trumps St. Thomas.
  • St. Paul trumps St. Thomas.
  • Use logic and reason to interpret authoritative sources, e.g. St. Paul.
First of all, there are two Thomasian texts that deal with this subject:

a. Question 49 of the Summa Theologica Supplement to the Third Part.
newadvent.org/summa/5049.htm

Regarding this text, we should keep in mind the corresponding Editor’s comment:

“The remainder of the Summa Theologica, known as the Supplement, was compiled probably by Fra Rainaldo da Piperno, companion and friend of the Angelic Doctor, and was gathered from St. Thomas’s commentary on the Fourth Book of the Sentences of Peter Lombard. This commentary was written in the years 1235-1253, while St. Thomas was under thirty years of age. Everywhere it reveals the influence of him whom St. Thomas always called the Master. But that influence was not to be always supreme. That the mind of the Angelic Doctor moved forward to positions which directly contradicted the Master may be seen by any student of the Summa Theologica. The compiler of the Supplement was evidently well acquainted with the commentary on the Sentences, which had been in circulation for some twenty years or more, but it is probable that he was badly acquainted with the Summa Theologica. This will be realized and must be borne in mind when we read the Supplement, notably TP, Q[62], A[1]; also Q[43], A[3], ad 2 of the Supplement.”

b. The Commentary on the First Epistle to the Corinthians.
josephkenny.joyeurs.com/CDtexts/SS1Cor.htm#71

While the base for the Supplement was an early Thomasian work, the commentaries on the Pauline Epistoles were composed in the latter half of St. Thomas career. The “Tabula chronologica operum D. Thomae” dates the commentary on the Fourth Book of the Sentences of Peter Lombard to 1254-1256, and the commentary on the Epistles of St. Paul to 1269-1273.

I begin my study by presenting an article on the subject by Mgr Cormac Burke, a recognized orthodox theologian who specializes in the area of marriage and has served as Judge of the Roman Rota: “A Postscript to the `remedium concupiscentiae´”. «The Thomist» 70/4 (2006) 481–536.

cormacburke.or.ke/node/932

While the section 3 of the above article, which I quote below, is available separately in this page:

cormacburke.or.ke/node/965

the whole article is needed to look up the references in the text.

[start of quote]
3. Saint Paul and 1 Corinthians 7:1-9

The first verses of this chapter have had extraordinary (and possibly disproportionate) importance in the development of Christian moral thought concerning conjugal relations. Bringing the full text before our mind can help us consider to what extent Augustine’s and parallel subsequent interpretations are justified. Augustine of course wrote in Latin, so for key passages we reproduce parenthetically the Latin version which has been in common use over the ages - the Vulgate translation of his contemporary, St. Jerome.

“It is well for a man not to touch a woman. But because of the temptation to immorality [fornicationes], each man should have his own wife and each woman her own husband. The husband should give to his wife her conjugal rights, and likewise the wife to her husband. For the wife does not rule over her own body, but the husband does; likewise the husband does not rule over his own body, but the wife does. Do not refuse one another except perhaps by agreement for a season, that you may devote yourselves to prayer; but then come together again, lest Satan tempt you through lack of self-control. I say this by way of concession, not of command [Hoc autem dico secundum indulgentiam, non secundum imperium]. I wish that all were as I myself am. But each has his own special gift from God, one of one kind and one of another. To the unmarried and the widows I say that it is well for them to remain single as I do. But if they cannot exercise self-control, they should marry. For it is better to marry than to be aflame with passion” [Melius est enim nubere quam uri]. (1 Cor 7:1-9 [RSV])

Our attention for the moment centers on the words “Hoc autem dico secundum indulgentiam, non secundum imperium.” Augustine translates as “secundum veniam” what Jerome renders as “secundum indulgentiam,” and understands “venia” in the sense of pardon or forgiveness for what carries guilt.[29] Augustine’s argument in fact rests wholly on this rendering, for he holds that if something requires a “venia” it necessarily involves a fault that qualifies as a sin.[30]

It is not clear, however, that Augustine is justified in his ren-dering; if he is not, his whole argument can of course be questioned. To suggest that in this passage St. Paul proposes to condone sin seems by all lights to force the original text. The Greek word used by St. Paul, suggnome, means “allowance” or “concession.”[31] Saint Paul’s mind is surely not that concession can be made to people so as to sin, but rather that allowance can be made to follow a less perfect way. This is precisely what he goes on to say in the following verse: “I wish that all were as I myself am. But each has his own special gift from God, one of one kind and one of another.” It is clear that Paul regards the celibacy he has chosen as a more desirable way; at the same time, however, he presents marriage too as a “gift of God.”

The thrust of St. Paul’s thought seems rather to pass from a simple ascetical counsel for married people (it could be good to abstain for a time from conjugal relations), to a clarification that he regards his own choice of celibacy for God as higher than the married state, to the concession (with an “indulgent” outlook) that those who choose marriage also choose a gift of God.

If we turn to Saint Thomas, we find that he reads 1 Corinthians 7:6 according to the Vulgate “secundum indulgentiam” and not “secundum veniam,” but seems to interpret the passage in much the same way as Augustine.[32] Elsewhere, however, he modulates his position more. Quietly observing that the Apostle appears to be expressing himself “a bit carelessly” (inconvenienter), inasmuch as he seems to imply that marriage is sinful,[33] Thomas comes up with two possible readings. In one “secundum indulgentiam” would refer to a permission not for sin but for what is less good; that is, Paul says it is good to marry, but less good than to remain celibate.[34] This seems to me the better interpretation. However, Thomas does allow another reading according to which sin may be present in marital intercourse: namely, when it is engaged in out of lust, albeit lust restricted to one’s spouse. In this case there is venial sin, which would become mortal if one were indifferent whether the object of one’s lust were one’s spouse or not.[35]
[end of quote]

References [33] and [34] come from St. Thomas’ Commentary on the First Epistle to the Corinthians, from which I quote (emphasis mine):

[start of quote]
328. – But the Apostle seems to be speaking in an unsuitable manner, for concessions are concerned only with sin. Therefore, by the fact that the Apostle says he is speaking by way of concession, he seems to express that marriage is a sin. But this can be answered in two ways. In one way so that the concession is taken for permission. But there are two kinds of permission: one is concerned with a lesser evil, as in Matthew (19:8): “For your hardness of heart Moses allowed you to divorce your wives,” that is, to avoid the murder of one’s wife, to which they were prone. Such a permission is not found in the New Testament on account of its perfection, according to Hebrews (6:1): “Let us go on to perfection.” Another permission is about the lesser good, namely, when a man is not compelled by precept to a greater good. This is the sense in which the Apostle makes a concession here, that is, permits matrimony, which is a lesser good than virginity, which is not commanded and is a greater good. In another way, concession can be taken as regarding guilt, as Isaiah (26:15) says: “But thou hast increased the nation, O LORD, thou hast increased the nation.” In this sense, concession refers to the conjugal act, accordingly as it has venial guilt attached to it along with the good of matrimony, without which it would be mortal.
[end of quote]

Thus, St. Thomas himself in a later work offered an alternative to the view presented in ST Suppl. Q. 49.
 
Part 2 of 3

Now I will examine the controversial view expounded in the ST Supplement to the Third Part, Q. 49, Article 5 against the Pauline text:

[start of quote]
Hence when married persons come together for the purpose of begetting children, or of paying the debt to one another (which pertains to “faith”) they are wholly excused from sin.

Consequently there are only two ways in which married persons can come together without any sin at all, namely in order to have offspring, and in order to pay the debt. otherwise it is always at least a venial sin.

Reply to Objection 2. If a man intends by the marriage act to prevent fornication in his wife, it is no sin, because this is a kind of payment of the debt that comes under the good of “faith.” But if he intends to avoid fornication in himself, then there is a certain superfluity, and accordingly there is a venial sin, nor was the sacrament instituted for that purpose, except by indulgence, which regards venial sins.
[end of quote]

Let’s assume that begetting offspring is out of the question for a time, e.g. as during pregnancy, and that neither spouse wants to commit venial sin. Therefore each spouse waits for the other to request payment of the debt, explicitely or implicitely. But as no spouse asks for that payment, the logical result is that they will not have conjugal relations until they decide to procreate. Therefore, a marital life clear of venial sin, assuming having a child every two years, involves having conjugal relations during just one or two weeks every two years, with NFP being used in the opposite way as usual, i.e. to spot the fertile week in the wife’s period, and with the second week of relations every two years taking place only if conception was not already achieved in the fertile week of the previous month.

Let’s then compare this logical outcome with the advise from St. Paul: “Do not refuse one another except perhaps by agreement for a season, that you may devote yourselves to prayer; but then come together again, lest Satan tempt you through lack of self-control [incontinentiam].” (1 Cor 7:5) First of all, as we saw above, this specific advise is not what St. Paul refers to in the next verse: "I say this by way of concession [indulgentiam], not of command " (1 Cor 7:6). Rather, this verse refers to what Paul has said in the whole previous passage, 1 Cor 7:2-5, i.e. the allowance that people follow a less perfect way than celibacy. Therefore for the married people to whom the advise in 1 Cor 7:5 is addressed, that advise is not a concession but a command.

Now, this Pauline command is clearly incompatible with the logical outcome of the decision by both spouses not to commit venial sin in the framework presented in Q. 49 Art. 5, which as we just saw implies having conjugal relations one week every two years, which is obviously not the time span meant by St. Paul in “for a season”. Therefore the framework proposed here necessarily implies that the Apostle commands married people that, in order to avoid mortal sin, one of them (the asker) commits venial sin. Which is exactly what the Art. 5 says at the end of the Reply to Objection 2, according to its interpretation of “indulgentiam” in 1 Cor 7:6. But as we saw, the preferred interpretation of “indulgentiam” in 1 Cor 7:6 is not indulgence to commit venial sin, as held here, but permission to follow a way that, though still good, is less good than celibacy, and moreover St. Thomas himself presented that alternative interpretation in a later work, the Commentary on the First Epistle to the Corinthians. Therefore, in that preferred alternative interpretation the restrictive view of Q. 49 Art. 5 does not hold.

Further contrasting the statement in Q. 49 Art. 5 with the Pauline advise to married people:

St. Paul: “But because of the temptation to immorality [fornicationes], each man should have his own wife and each woman her own husband.” (1 Cor 7:2)

Q. 49, Art. 5, Reply to Obj. 2: “Sure, but each spouse should use marriage to avoid the temptation to fornication only in the other, not in himself. Using marriage to avoid fornication in himself is rather superfluous.”

Me: This is just preposterous, against all common sense. How could possibly be superfluity in using marriage to avoid fornication in oneself and not be in using marriage to avoid fornication in the other? Are not both spouses in basically the same condition? And if they are, should not each spouse pursue his or her own good (in this case avoidance of fornication) as well as the good of the other? Is not the second most important commandment “Love your neighbor as yourself”? Because this would seem to imply that it is “Love your neighbor but not yourself”.

St. Paul: “The husband should give to his wife her conjugal rights, and likewise the wife to her husband.” (1 Cor 7:3)

Q. 49, Art. 5: “Sure, and when a spouse gives the other her or his rights (“pays the debt”), he or she commits no sin. It is the asker who commits venial sin. Basically, he or she who blinks first, sins.”

Me: See next.

St. Paul: “Do not refuse one another except perhaps by agreement for a season, that you may devote yourselves to prayer; but then come together again, lest Satan tempt you through lack of self-control [incontinentiam].” (1 Cor 7:5)

Q. 49, Art. 5: “Sure, a spouse must not refuse to pay the debt whenever the other asks, and he or she who pays the debt commits no sin by doing that. It is the asker who commits venial sin. Basically, he or she who blinks first, sins. And if no one sins, it will just be a very long season.”

Me: By commanding spouses to “give” and to “not refuse”, the Apostle is obviously assuming that the other spouse will ask. Furthermore, the advise “then come together again” actually encourages that a spouse takes the inititative and asks. Therefore viewing this action as committing a venial sin is preposterous, and against what the Apostle says in Rom 6:11-18. And assuming that two years could fit for the “season” referred to by St. Paul is against common sense.
 
Part 3 of 3

Now I will contrast the view in Q. 49 with relevant magisterial texts, starting with Pius XII’s 1951 Allocution to Midwives:
ewtn.com/library/PAPALDOC/P511029.HTM

[start of quote]
“(God) has also decreed that in this function the parties should experience pleasure and happiness of body and spirit. Husband and wife, therefore, by seeking and enjoying this pleasure do no wrong whatever. They accept what the Creator has destined for them.
Nevertheless, here also, husband and wife must know how to keep themselves within the limits of a just moderation. As with the pleasure of food and drink so with the sexual they must not abandon themselves without restraint to the impulses of the senses. The right rule is this: the use of the natural procreative disposition is morally lawful in matrimony only, in the service of and in accordance with the ends of marriage itself. Hence it follows that only in marriage and observing this rule is the desire and fruition of this pleasure and of this satisfaction lawful.
(L’uso della naturale disposizione generativa è moralmente lecito soltanto nel matrimonio, nel servizio e secondo l’ordine dei fini del matrimonio medesimo. Da ciò consegue che anche soltanto nel matrimonio e osservando questa regola, il desiderio e la fruizione di quel piacere e di quella soddisfazione sono leciti.)
[end of quote]

So, what are the ends of marriage (not to be confused with its goods, values or properties)? They have been variously stated by the magisterium during the XX century. First classifying them as primary and secondary:

Primary:
1917 CCL #1013: “the procreation and education of offspring”
Pius XI 1930 CC: just quotes 1917 CCL #1013
Pius XII 1951 Alloc: “the procreation and education of the offspring”

Secondary:
1917 CCL #1013: “mutual help and the remedy of concupiscence”
Pius XI 1930 CC: “such as mutual aid, the cultivating of mutual love, and the quieting of concupiscence”

And lately without ranking them:
Vatican II GS: “the begetting and educating of children” + “other purposes”
1983 CCL #1055: “the good of the spouses and the procreation and education of offspring”
CCC #1601: just quotes 1983 CCL #1055
CCC #2363: “the good of the spouses themselves and the transmission of life”

As clearly “the good of the spouses” includes “mutual aid, the cultivating of mutual love, and the quieting of concupiscence”, nothing was lost in the current formulation of the ends of marriage. Let’s then use this formulation to apply the rule stated by Pius XII in the quoted text to a conjugal act taking place at a time known by the spouses to be naturally infertile. Clearly the only extent to which the end of procreation can be taken into account is by ensuring that the act remains open ‘per se’ to the transmission of life, as there can be no intention to procreate in these circumstances. Thus the only end that can be intentionally willed in and through the act is the good of the spouses themselves. But since according to St. Thomas, as quoted in CCC #1766, “To love is to will the good of another”, we are dealing with just an instance of the second most important commandment: “Love your neighbor as yourself”. And the key point is that this commandment pressuposes that one loves oneself, in line with the statement in CCC #2264: “Love toward oneself remains a fundamental principle of morality.” Therefore each spouse can and must legitimately will and seek, at the same time and to the same extent, his or her own good and that of the other spouse, in this case in so far as that good can be achieved in and through the conjugal act. Which further proves wrong the restrictive view in Q. 49 Art. 5 of the only two intentions with which a conjugal act can be approached in order to be free of venial sin.

As a postscript, I want to mention that, while researching on this subject, I found a blog article which featured an interesting discussion thereof in its combox:
darwincatholic.blogspot.com.ar/2012/05/friday-linkage-virtuous-sex-edition.html

There a blogger defended St. Thomas’ view on Q. 49 Art. 5 by arguing that “the only way to have sex virtuously is to do so consistently with love of God or love of neighbor”. To which the straightforward answer is that stated above: as the commandment is to “love your neighbor as yourself”, it assumes that one loves oneself. Which applies particularly to a human relationship like conjugal love which, like friendship of which it is a special form, essentially presupposes reciprocity. As Paul VI said in Humanae Vitae of conjugal love:

“It is a love which is total, that is a very special form of personal friendship, in which husband and wife generously share everything, allowing no unreasonable exceptions and not thinking solely of their own convenience. Whoever really loves his partner loves not only for what he receives, but loves that partner for the partner’s own sake, content to be able to enrich the other with the gift of himself.” (Note “not … solely” and “not only”.)
 
Legalizing the Sacrament of Matrimony is the whole reason why we are in the mess we are in today in terms of marriages.
 
Embarrasing typo: in my “2 of 3” post, it was “wife’s cycle”, not “wife’s period.”

For some reason I cannot edit my posts.
 
This thread is very interesting, but how to sum up the real and true teaching of catholic church without being too simple and simplistic.

The marital act is only for married persons (one male and one female);
The marital act is an contractual obligation toward the other spouse, but also a contractual right toward the other spouse; The marital act is, in addition, an institutional duty of the state of marriage. Marital act is a mutual and reciprocal obligation, a mutual and reciprocal right and a mutual and reciprocal duty.

All this means that there are different types of obligations for each spouse: to give, not to give, to do, not to do and let to do, not let to do, let to give and not let to give. There are two parts the active obligations and the passive obligations of each one. It is the sexual cooperation for leading the union of bodies in the respect of the natural law of the human being (body and soul with their corollaries).

About the marital act, there are the intentions and the materiality of act itself with their own rules coming from the natural law: the materiality of act and the intentionality of act.

Are you okay with me?

I will keep going my thought the next time
 
It has been a while. I would like to thank everybody for participation. The reason I did not myself continue to participate was that I simply could not restrict my emotional reaction to the perceived injustice in the restriction, so I basically needed a cooldown period. In fact, I am still not exactly cool about the subject right now. It’s a source of distress to me, not as an actual stakeholder because I’m not married, but as: 1) someone who believes in love (that being a form of friendship, a special affection, some kind of fascination… philia, storge and the like, I’m not a theologian, so bear with my lack of proper jargon), 2) a lawyer myself who believes that legalism taken too far is legalism taken too far… and there are some other reasons I can’t all nail down and name. For the record, I must confess that I am not a great fan of putting procreation ahead of the unitive aspect (that being the adiutorium mutuum among other things but I would see the psychic and emotional aspects of love here, basically the affective-volite part of our personality being feelings, and it’s a pain one can’t use simple English to talk about something so closely related to life rather than to putting on a labcoat and dissecting a frog) and of the lack of regard that feelings receive, or even that particular friendship of spouses that JP2 actually managed to put forth and even in the form of a proper academic work that holds its own under analytical fire.

The problem with Aquinas here being how extolled his views are on every step by pope after pope, not to mention crowds of theologians.

Now to answer what Gorgias asked me:
Chevalier, you seem to be engaged in two distinct projects: understanding the logic present here in the Summa, and grasping the Church’s understanding of marriage. Because, of course, the understanding of Aquinas, as present here, is not what the Church settled on in her official understanding of marriage (in particular, I’m thinking about the meaning of consent, as well as the Church’s later canonical understanding of the nature of marriage as covenant rather than as contract).
I’m going back to Aquinas:
Just as the marriage goods, in so far as they consist in a habit, make a marriage honest and holy, so too, in so far as they are in the actual intention, they make the marriage act honest, as regards those two marriage goods which relate to the marriage act. Hence when married persons come together for the purpose of begetting children, or of paying the debt to one another (which pertains to “faith”) they are wholly excused from sin. But the third good does not relate to the use of marriage, but to its excuse, as stated above (Article 3); wherefore it makes marriage itself honest, but not its act, as though its act were wholly excused from sin, through being done on account of some signification. Consequently there are only two ways in which married persons can come together without any sin at all, namely in order to have offspring, and in order to pay the debt. otherwise it is always at least a venial sin.
(sourced in my OP)

The rest is footnotes, although there is a definition of debt payment.

I understand the above as a statement that unless you 1) specifically intend to procreate some children to bring up as good Catholics or 2) intend to do something which fits into the juridical concept of debt payment, then you venially sin.

That juridical concept of debt payment is indeed that you must be focused on the “prevention of fornication” in the spouse. Please note that, “But the third good does not relate to the use of marriage, but to its excuse, as stated above.” This means you can use love, adiutorium mutuum, friendship, bonum coniugum, whatever you term it as, as an excuse to enter into matrimony but not to “use it”. So you can marry for bonum coniugum but bonum coniugum doesn’t justify having sex.

In other words, you can’t have sex with your wife to:
  1. basically enjoy your mutual companionship and attraction (one would think after the Song Songs that this would be licit but nope)
  2. strengthen the bond between the two of you
  3. derive some kind of health benefit
  4. express or affirm her attractiveness or desireability to you
  5. and so on and so forth.
Nope. In essence, it’s got to be the “prevention for fornication in the spouse”, which was defined as the only ever one and single good reason for asking for the debt: “If a man intends by the marriage act to prevent fornication in his wife, it is no sin, because this is a kind of payment of the debt that comes under the good of ‘faith.’”

Basically you can’t make love with your wife because you desire her company or because you want to make her feel desired etc. (Song of Songs style.) You need to reframe your mind to make it your goal to prevent her from cheating on you. Which is almost a penitentiary motivation.

You could try and claim that Aquinas only referred to the making of the debt collection request, leaving non-debt sexual relations outside of the analysis. But that doesn’t seem to be the case when you read into it. He does say that procreation and debt payment are the only two ways in which engaging in the marital act can be justified. If you read into the arguments you will encounter the passage from St. Augustine where “we say Our Father” for the venial sin of having a non-necessary sexual intercourse.
 
And I’m not talking here about trying to exclude procreation from the encounter or anything of the sort. Aquinas is neither. He talks about the specific motivations which are to be the actual reasons which direct our actions. Simply not excluding procreation from the act doesn’t put the act under the heat of “procreation”. Same way, simply acknowledging the matrimony, sharing in the companionship etc. 1) does not fall under the head of “debt”, 2) seems to fall under the other goods of marriage which justify “marriage itself but not the use of it”. I fail to see how this could be explained away. There doesn’t seem to me to be a way to do this.

Now on to Parvulus: Thank you. Regarding the intention of, “prevention of fornication in oneself,” I see why a spouse should be disallowed from making a binding request on the other spouse for sexual relations. On the other hand I fail and refuse to see why it would be unlawful to ask politely, citing this reason. How it could be a venial sin is beyond me. I could reluctantly accept the label of imperfection here, but sin?

This said, I’m also troubled by how St. Paul, who as you said trumps St. Thomas, doesn’t seem to be making room for any reason to have relations other than “lest Satan tempt you”. So you can’t enjoy the gift you’re exchanging with your spouse (which Burke gives a lot of space to, and, for the record, I think I’ve read all of his judgements that were in English and a good deal of the articles), you need to get yourself into the penitential mood of only doing this because otherwise Satan would tempt you. This does seem to exclude whatever “frui” (as opposed to “uti”) J2P wrote about in Love and Responsibility and the Magisterium seems to include nowadays.

One obvious association that comes to my mind is the penitential rite the Orthodox employ when celebrating a second marriage, when the crowning of the spouses is not done but instead there is that penitential rite. So you can proceed with that marriage but even in the wedding ceremony itself ash is put on your head.

The same would follow with having sexual relations in a Catholic marriage under Aquinas’s logic: unless you’re actually specifically intending to bring those children about and bring them up as good Catholics, then you can only do it with the express intention of preventing your wife or husband from seeking sexual satisfaction outside your marriage. In which you’re fulfilling the gloomy duty of correction of a sinner, in effect. No place for joy. Possibly a reason to be apologetic and embarrassed about the whole thing. So you can’t even actually aim to satisfy your spouse per se. You can only aim to satisfy your spouse lest he or she commit adultery. The only thing that matters here is the prevention of that adultery by your spouse. His or her happiness, satisfaction etc. are irrelevant.

St. Paul doesn’t seem to contradict this. In fact, he can be read as supporting the idea.

On the side, this is very different from any sort of “good news about sex” that we are focusing on nowadays. In a way, modern theology on this topic seems to diverge a lot from centuries of seeing marital intercourse as a necessary evil and very shameful thing that’s best avoided and the world would be better without it.

Please forgive the lack of acceptable academic rigour, I was very tired when writing these 2 posts.
 
Aquinas, as brilliant as he was and as holy as he was was not and is not the Magisterium nor does he supercede canon law. Theologians raise many questions and propose many answers because that is what they do, but they are not the final word, the Church is. So, when we read any theologian, no matter how great or small, we have to keep this in mind. We lay people need only go by the Catechism and canon law. If it ain’t there, then don’t let it worry you. 🙂
 
The problem with Aquinas here being how extolled his views are on every step by pope after pope, not to mention crowds of theologians.
True – but this high regard for Aquinas does not imply that everything he wrote is held in high regard. This is one of the areas that doesn’t make the cut…
Now to answer what Gorgias asked me:
I’m going back to Aquinas:
In other words, you can’t have sex with your wife to:
2) strengthen the bond between the two of you
Nope. In essence, it’s got to be the “prevention for fornication in the spouse”, which was defined as the only ever one and single good reason for asking for the debt
40.png
Della:
Aquinas, as brilliant as he was and as holy as he was was not and is not the Magisterium nor does he supercede canon law.
This. 👍

Yes, Aquinas says what you say he says. But no, the Church hasn’t adopted this rationale for its take on marriage. As you mention, JPII’s theology has something vastly different to say about the unitive aspect of the sexual act within marriage. That (and other magisterial expression) trumps Aquinas, as brilliant and as highly regarded as he is. 🤷
 
If the day of marriage one of spouse excludes the marital act (unilateral refusal by personal will) the declaration of nullity is easy to get;

If the day of marriage two spouses exclude the marital ac (bilateral will), I think, I am not sure, that the declaration of nullity is easy to get.

If after day of marriage, two spouses are okay not to practice the marital act for time or forever, it is okay for the validity of marriage. But, if one of spouses wants the marital act, the other has to practice it (the moral obligation): the refusal is wrong and can be very sinful. And perhaps permits to get a declaration of nullity or, best a** dissolution from Pope for no marital act.** The spouse, who is asking for sex,** is not wrong, it is its right.**
 
After a long while I revisited this thread and read the replies to my comments. I see that Chevalier in #35 raised an important issue that I may be able to help solve.
This said, I’m also troubled by how St. Paul, who as you said trumps St. Thomas, doesn’t seem to be making room for any reason to have relations other than “lest Satan tempt you”. So you can’t enjoy the gift you’re exchanging with your spouse (which Burke gives a lot of space to, and, for the record, I think I’ve read all of his judgements that were in English and a good deal of the articles), you need to get yourself into the penitential mood of only doing this because otherwise Satan would tempt you. This does seem to exclude whatever “frui” (as opposed to “uti”) J2P wrote about in Love and Responsibility and the Magisterium seems to include nowadays.
While I fully agree with Chevalier’s trouble with his interpretation of 1 Cor 7:5, I do not agree with the interpretation itself. That is, in my view St. Paul is NOT saying that avoidance of temptation is the ONLY morally valid reason for “coming together again” after “a season” of mutually agreed abstinence. Rather, it is the reason that warrants his command to do so, just as maintenance of physical health would be the reason that would warrant a morally-binding command to have meals at adequate intervals, but it is certainly not the only, or even main, morally valid reason which motivates people in normal circunstances to have a meal.

It is important at this point to recall from my comment #29 that the advise in 1 Cor 7:5 is not what St. Paul refers to in the next verse: "I say this by way of concession [indulgentiam], not of command " (1 Cor 7:6). Rather, this last verse refers to what Paul has said in the whole previous passage, 1 Cor 7:2-5, i.e. the allowance that people follow a less perfect way than celibacy. Therefore for the married people to whom the advise in 1 Cor 7:5 is addressed, that advise is not a concession but a command.

My point is, then, that St. Paul mentions only the motive of avoidance of temptation because that, and only that, is the critical enough motive that warrants his command to “come together again” after “a season” of mutually agreed abstinence. But this does not mean that it is the only morally valid motive for having conjugal relations. This can be most easily seen by including procreation into the picture. Nobody, certainly neither Augustine nor Aquinas, would say that attempting to procreate is not a morally valid motive for having conjugal relations! The point is that it is not the motive that warrants the command in 1 Cor 7:5, since clearly a couple can achieve maximal procreation by having sex just one week per year.

Therefore, just as the mention of only avoidance of temptation in 1 Cor 7:5 does not exclude procreation as a morally valid motive for having conjugal relations, it does not exclude the motives that Chevalier lists in his comment #34.

An analogy with eating may be helpful. The reason that would warrant a morally-binding command to have meals at adequate intervals is that failure to do so would cause the person to become weak and sick, which would be against the 5th commandment. But people in good psychological conditions (I refrained from saying simply “normal people” as e.g. deeply depressed people are not abnormal) do not eat in the penitential mood of doing that ONLY because otherwise they would get weak and sick. Rather, they eat because it is good and enjoyable.

The main difference between eating and having conjugal relations is that the former activity does not have an intrinsic inter-personal dimension, therefore eating some food just for pleasure is wholly morally licit, as long as the food taken is healthy and within the person’s nutritional needs. In contrast, conjugal relations have an intrinsic inter-personal dimension, therefore if a spouse has conjugal relations for individual pleasure only, he or she commits a venial sin. Rather, just as an instance of “love your neighbor as yourself”, each spouse should will and seek, at the same time and to the same extent, his or her own good and that of the other spouse, in this case in so far as that good can be achieved in and through the conjugal act. And that the good in question is not restricted to avoidance of temptation can be seen in two magisterial texts.

First Gaudium et Spes #49:

“these acts signify and foster that mutual self-giving, by which spouses enrich each other with a joyful and grateful mind.”

(donationem mutuam significant et fovent, qua sese invicem laeto gratoque animo locupletant.)

Then Humanae Vitae #16:

“And when the infertile period recurs, they use their married intimacy to express their mutual love and safeguard their fidelity toward one another.”
 
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