Supernatural epistemology?

[Shike]

No matter if the electrons are miniature planets. or not. They do move. and there is no need to assume a “pusher”. And even one molecule would exhibit some movement, unless its temperature is exactly zero Kelvin.

Well it is important for scientific accuracy. But you think that the movement of an electron disproves #2 because there is no outside pusher? You are confused about the principle. There is no requirement of locality, the movement could originate within the object in question as long as it has a composition of parts (whether that be parts that are really separable or only in principle). If you were paying attention, my example about an animal being a self-mover would have answered your objection. You haven’t brought anything new to the table here.

Randomness played no part in what I said.

Fine.

Too generic. If metaphysics does not reflect physical reality, then it is pure speculation. If it is pure speculation, there is no objective way to find out if the proposition is true or not.

First, I keep saying that metaphysics does reflect reality. Did you take notice of #1 in Aquinas’ first way? Do you realize that #1 reflects reality, or do you wish to claim otherwise? And second, why does metaphysics have to use the scientific method in order to reflect reality? That is an assumption that you have not justified in this entire thread.

But, really. Let’s stop beating around the bush. What is your suggested method to find out if the soul was created at the moment of conception and if it is immaterial and immortal? All these attempts to derail this question are getting pretty tiresome.

Do you not remember the flow of the conversation? You asked for a method of verification for an entity that falls under your category of the supernatural. A First Cause would satisfy your definition because it would be immaterial. Therefore, I gave the answer that philosophy and metaphysics is one suitable method that meets your conditions. I then proceeded to give a summary of Aquinas’ first way. I appreciate your objections, but so far you haven’t provided one that cannot be answered.

So what more do you want? Nothing less than asking for another proof for some other immaterial entity. And I might answer your second question once we fully exhaust the first; focus and patience is required. So I ask you, have I proven my point with Aquinas’ first way? And if not, then why?

 

[hecd2]

I think we’re going too far if we say there is absolutely no “objective epistemic method” to answer these questions. I agree that the bible or other religious books do not provide this type of knowledge. But there is still religious experience which I would argue is such a method.

Religious experience can provide knowledge in a similar way to how sensory experience can provide knowledge. While it is less reliable than the methods you’re comparing it to, that doesn’t mean it is not an epistemic method.

It has these problems:

• different people come up with different answers to the same question - not very objective
• some people don’t seem to get any answers and give up trying
• it can take years or a whole lifetime to get an answer

I think that this is a very fair assessment of religious experience as a reason for having particular beliefs, but I don’t see how it can be called an objective method. If personal revelation, which is private to the individual, is not subjective then I don’t what is. I don’t see how you distinguish between an experience which correctly reflects reality and leads you to accept what is true, and one that is illusory and leads you to accept what is false. And, as you have very fairly pointed out it is not accesible to everyone, so it rather falls short of the question of how can *we *tell whether particular propositions are true or false. Furthermore, it seems to me that this sort of religious experience is generally focused around certain kinds of questions - it is not suitable for determing the truth status of many sorts of supernatural propositions.

But in spite of the problems, I argue that there is still an objective epistemic method here.

• While different people tend to get different answers, people who pursue these methods (religious practice) as their primary job tend to arrive at the same answers to at least some of the questions. I believe there is some value in comparing the common conclusions of religious people. There may be some value in exploring which personality types come up with unusual conclusions, and determining if they can be ruled out.

Fair enough - I think that that is a very interesting approach, as I am fascinated by the understanding that mystics or the contemplative have for one another. On the other hand, we should not rule out the possibility that the common answers are already present in embryonic form through common cultural conditioning and religious education (or simply through common physiology - there is a very interesting book by the art historian David Lewis-Williams about common experiences under certain conditions of shamans and mystics and how they are expressed in cave art - and of course humans are notorious at seeing agency everywhere).

• Apparently different answers may actually be different ways of explaining the same truths to people whose perspectives are very different. Some analysis of people’s assumptions about the world and their personalities may give insight to this.

This method might be difficult to use, and might require more understanding before it can be used reliably. But I wouldn’t rule it out completely.

Again, this is by far the best answer provided to the actual OP question. I see huge problems with applying it practically myself; and I think the case is far from made that it gives answers that are congruent with reality, nevertheless it is at least an honest attempt to answer the actual question.

One example of a conclusion I think we can take from this method, is that an individual will fare better if he does good to others than if he does harm to others. This seems to be a common finding of people who devote themselves to prayer/meditation.

It is also a finding of game theory and evolutionary biology .

Also among mystical people, there are standard rules for evaluating things learned in prayer. This would have to be part of the method as well.

What are the rules, and how have they been validated to be rules that reliably evaluate things learned in prayer? - that is really exactly what the OP and I are looking for - how can we distinguish true from false propositions about the supernatural.

Alec
evolutionpages.com

 

[Fr_of_Jazz]

As a theist, part of and identifying with a religious tradition stretching back to time immemorial, I am convinced that I have reliable contact with God in my religious experience.

By religious experience I not only mean (à la William James) individual religious experience. I mean all that one experiences in a religious tradition over time including a collective connection with God in community, ritual prayer, applying ones experience in service to fellow human beings, individual prayer and meditation, connection with nature, etc. It is in all of these over time that the ontological status of God is given in a kind of intuition or perception.

The domain of religious experience is not primarily one of a physical or metaphysical explanation of objects, but of an encounter and relationship between subjects (divine and human). Consequently, approaching religious experience and traditions (in view of some adjudication) a priori and detached like the naturalist observing the Geico Gecko in the commercials is not methodologically consistent with the subject matter. And if I may exaggerate, given thepersonal nature of God to snap ones fingers and imperiously point to the ground basically saying “God—right here, right now” is probably not going to work real well either.

Methods of verification must be suitable to their object. Even in the natural sciences methods vary somewhat. How one verifies the discovery of a new species differs from how one verifies the quantum properties of light or sub-atomic particles.

The dependability of my religious experience as an avenue to the reality of God is tested and substantiated by traditional methods of verification. It is thought through within the philosophical tradition of Plato, Aristotle, Cicero, Augustine, and Aquinas; discussed and subjected to evaluation by experienced guides; lived out in the tradition of service going back to early hospitals, orphanages, schools, and outreach to the poor; and it is appraised by the effects in my life on a day to day basis. By this classic spiritual method my sense of God’s reality, presence, and action in my life and in the world is tested, interpreted, born out, and verified.

Why should this approach be justified?

(1) There are many situations in life where someone makes a statement based on experience to which at the time we have no access, say, in sports, or medicine, marriage, a trade, or living in general. We cannot always get sufficient evidence a priori to judge it. We must trust them, live it out in faith, take it on their word; and then the reasons reveal themselves a posteriori . . . or not. Some things in life cannot be understood until they are lived through from within, intrinsically. It is not less reasonable to expect that one can approach RE and traditions for purposes of evaluation in this way.

(2) Also, there are some domains of truth and reality that will be hidden from us unless we go half way to meet them. For example, in a relationship, the question “Do you like me?” If I insist on maintaining an extrinsic posture of maximum detachment and suspicion, it’s very likely I will forfeit the chance of a positive answer/outcome.

(3) One does not deduce their way a priori to the experience of empathy, romance, sexual attraction, artistic inspiration, or grief. Yet these are rightly accepted as legitimate domains of human experience, entered into intrinsically, and reflected upon by reason. On the other hand, the encounter with God in religious experience which enters consciousness in the same way–i.e., one does not deduce their way to it, but experiences it as a datum in life–is rejected a priori and not tested in a manner consistent with its subject matter, intrinsically and phenomenologically as a participant observer, and then adjudicated by reason.

(4) It seems that inherent in the extrinsicist method is the position that “it is better to risk the loss of truth than to make an error.” I don’t see that this is more reasonable than “better to risk making some errors than to lose whole domains of truth and reality.”

(5) Billions of people today and additional billions in history are or have been certain of an encounter with God in their religious experience over time. That ought to give one pause who after a few attempts doesn’t get an answer or an acceptable experience.

 

[DPMartin]

I’m not sure I understand exactly where you’re coming from here, whether its a philosophical issue with what I said or a religious issue? I’ll rephrased more clearly what I’m trying to say:

A person can have no personal direct experience of God, and yet hear the stories about Christ and believe in them. You could say that this person then “knows of” Jesus. But that isn’t the same as knowing that the stories are true. This is faith. It’s also a judgement call, where you form an opinion based on something less than strict knowledge.

This person can move further along and come to know Jesus in prayer. At some point the belief (faith) could turn into knowledge, if you gain first-hand experience of Christ in prayer.

Is that what you were getting at?

Neil_Anthony
thanks for the reply

Nether, specifically, to come to know of, in any case is to be informed, to believe or trust to act on that know of is faith with expectation of a result. If some one tells you buy X stock, you invest in, act on that information if you believe it, or trust the information to be true. No different in religion or philosophy. Therefore you must discern whether the info is the truth or not. Its not a judgement, though in your view you see it as that. The result of the truth is the judgement, no matter what you may have decided as far as whether to invest or not. If the info isn’t true, then what’s the judgement of trusting that which is not true? It would have to be the result. In the days when Israel saw the Lord their God as the Lord of hosts. They knew the judgement was the result on the battle field.

 

[Oreoracle]

First, it is important to keep in mind that events don’t strictly speaking cause other events. It is things that act on other things.

I think you’re just playing with semantics here. “A thing acting on another thing” is an action that requires some duration of time to elapse. It would be, by definition, an event. If that event were excluded from a causal chain, the following links of the chain would be different. Therefore events do cause other events.

These kind of causal chains are the most fundamental. It is true that there exist causal chains ordered “per accidens” (father), but if you keep digging deeper you will always find the threads of a causal chain ordered “per se” (train). For instance, although the son can exist here and now without the father, he cannot exist here and now without say, the strong nuclear force that binds the nucleus of an atom together.

But how do you know that the strong nuclear force, or any aspect of nature, for that matter, is part of a “per se” chain? Indeed, the scientific community seems to agree that the nature of the universe (along with its fundamental laws) was determined by the initial conditions of the Big Bang. Further, science also seems to allow for the possibility that the current form of the universe is not the only form that has ever existed. There may have been a form in the past (present before the Big Bang) that was characterized by a different set of laws of physics. For all we know, even the things we hold to be most fundamental are actually contingencies rather than necessities.

And of course, if everything is contingent and therefore part of a “per accidens” chain, then it’s possible that history is just an infinite series of contingencies.

 

[Shike]

I think you’re just playing with semantics here. “A thing acting on another thing” is an action that requires some duration of time to elapse. It would be, by definition, an event. If that event were excluded from a causal chain, the following links of the chain would be different. Therefore events do cause other events.

To some degree you are correct (not about playing with semantics). But how exactly do you define the beginning and ending points of one event with another event? Hume’s analysis of causality used arbitrarily defined events; there was no reason not to combine his two events into a single event or even many, many different events. That led him into some absurd territory that I was only vaguely trying to help you avoid. Plus it is important to be precise in these matters as they could help you see the truth of Aquinas’ claims.

So yes, if you like we can say an event causes another event provided that we realize that the determining factor of the scopes of the events, whether the events happen simultaneously (the conjunction of two consecutive parts of a per se causal chain) or after the passage of some duration of time, are none other than the objects themselves.

But how do you know that the strong nuclear force, or any aspect of nature, for that matter, is part of a “per se” chain?

Well in that example it was already an example of a per se causal chain. It included me and the strong nuclear force.

Indeed, the scientific community seems to agree that the nature of the universe (along with its fundamental laws) was determined by the initial conditions of the Big Bang.

I don’t really have a problem with that and that is very scientifically interesting. I don’t deny the necessity of such initial conditions of the Big Bang either. But we are looking for the chain of simultaneous causes. Just as my hand causes a book to slide across the table while another book is being pushed by the first, here and now.

Further, science also seems to allow for the possibility that the current form of the universe is not the only form that has ever existed. There may have been a form in the past (present before the Big Bang) that was characterized by a different set of laws of physics. For all we know, even the things we hold to be most fundamental are actually contingencies rather than necessities.

And that is no problem for Aquinas’ first way. In fact, Aquinas didn’t think he could prove that the universe had a beginning, he thought that was something to be held on faith through revelation. His arguments do not care whether the universe has a beginning or stretches back infinitely into the past.

And of course, if everything is contingent and therefore part of a “per accidens” chain

I think here you are a bit confused. It doesn’t seem that a contingent being would have to be part of a per accidens chain. Though a contingent being must be part of a per se causal chain because of it’s composition. Contingency includes the notion of dependency, but dependency doesn’t say how something is dependent, whether per se or per accidens dependent.

Good questions, keep them coming! By the way, I have a book recommendation on this subject if you are interested…

 

[Neithan]

I have been asking these questions, within threads, and no one, ever attempted to give an answer. So I am devoting a thread to this problem. The question is simple:

**How do we know if a proposition concerning the supernatural is true or false? **In other words, what are the means or methods of supernatural epistemology?

It is asserted that the supernatural (God, souls, angels, whatevers) are not physical, and therefore they cannot be verifed empirically, by observation. (Of course there is a question then, how do these entities interact or influence the physical world. But that is a side problem at this moment.) Concentrate on the main question: “what is the supernatural epistemology?”. How do we gain knowledge about the supernatural?

Supernatural epistemology is limited to propositions “whether it is” and cannot know “what it is” (Summa Theologica I, 12, xxii).

Knowledge of supernatural existence is gained by a posteriori demonstration of sound arguments deducing causality (Summa I, 2, ii).

Is there an objective, repeatable method, which would allow to separate the wheat from the chaff, which does not necessitate the a-priori acceptance of the claim (in other words, which can be used by a non-believer)?

A combination of correspondence and strict consistency: you can empirically verify the premises to establish correspondence, then verify the strict consistency of the conclusion.

 

[James224]

The Catholic Church asserts dogmatically that God’s existence can be known by reason alone, without any reference to faith. Unfortunately neither in the dogmas, nor in the catechism does it tell us (explicitly and in the necessary details) just how can this happen. In other words it tells us that there is a supernatural epistemology, but leaves it at that.

I was hoping that someone can “fill in the gaps”. So far it did not happen. It looks like that all the believers have a supernatural metaphysics - God exists - but no supernatural epistemology telling us, how can that be known? Of course you don’t need it, after all you have your faith, but you are supposed to be able to bring the “good news” to the rest of the world. Strange that God never gave you the proper tools to do that.

Hello Spock,

I cannot explain it probably to your satisfaction but here’s a start. Aquinas explains his first of the five proofs, the Argument from Motion, this way: the term “Motion” to us today means “Change”. There are two kinds of series of causes and effects, “Accidentally Ordered” Causes and “Essentially Ordered” Causes. Accidentally ordered causes would be like one generation begetting another on back to the first generation. We see the connection. Essentially ordered causes is concerned with a series of causes or activities of humans existing here and now and not about tracing backwards but, rather, downwards in the present moment. In this series of causes, each cause is dependent on the previous cause. Each cause has no power to move it from Potentiality to Actuality so this series of causes must terminate in a first mover with moves all the others. This series of causes stops only with a being that is Pure Actuality (Pure Act) with no admixture of Potentiality. Having no Potentiality to realize or actualize, such a being could not possibly move or change. This shows that there is a First Unmovable Mover. There can only be one Being who is Pure Act which is, by definition, God. Aquinas doesn’t define God as a bearded man sitting on his throne in heaven. He describes him as Pure Being or Pure Existence, distinct from the material world.

 

[Oreoracle]

To some degree you are correct (not about playing with semantics). But how exactly do you define the beginning and ending points of one event with another event?

It doesn’t really matter. Time is continuous; there will be infinitely many events given any duration of time, just as any line segment is composed of infinitely many line segments.

Well in that example it was already an example of a per se causal chain. It included me and the strong nuclear force.

Well, clearly I don’t fully understand what you mean by “per se” or “per accidens”. So let’s try something else: Please explain to me the difference between a per se chain and a per accidens chain in completely unambiguous terms. No ancient terminology/languages. No analogies. Just a plain-English explanation.

And to make it even clearer for me, describe what must occur for each of those chains to exist. What would cause each chain to cease?

His arguments do not care whether the universe has a beginning or stretches back infinitely into the past.

I’m hoping that by clearly explaining the difference between the two chains you can give me some way of understanding the reconciliation of that quote with this:

1. The chain of causes can’t go back to infinity.

I don’t know if I’m expected to look at that statement upside-down while squinting or something, but it seems to me that Aquinas is clearly stating that the universe cannot stretch back “infinitely into the past”, hence the phrase “can’t go back to infinity”. Unless you changed the phrasing of the original quote significantly, I don’t see how you reconcile these two quotes.

P.S. Thanks for the book recommendation, but I’m not interested at the moment.

 

[fred_conty]

I have been asking these questions, within threads, and no one, ever attempted to give an answer. So I am devoting a thread to this problem. The question is simple:

**How do we know if a proposition concerning the supernatural is true or false? ** In other words, what are the means or methods of supernatural epistemology?

It is asserted that the supernatural (God, souls, angels, whatevers) are not physical, and therefore they cannot be verifed empirically, by observation. (Of course there is a question then, how do these entities interact or influence the physical world. But that is a side problem at this moment.) Concentrate on the main question: “what is the supernatural epistemology?”. How do we gain knowledge about the supernatural?

The foreseeable answer: “by revelation” is not acceptable. Most of us never get a revelation, no matter how fervently and honestly we pray for one. The second possible answer would be: “by testimonials” - which is also unacceptable, since it would only push the problem one step back. How would we decide if the testimonial is without error, since we are fallible human beings?

Is there an objective, repeatable method, which would allow to separate the wheat from the chaff, which does not necessitate the a-priori acceptance of the claim (in other words, which can be used by a non-believer)?

God can be proven thru natural reason from the empirical method.
There is such a thing as a closed mind on a subject.

 

[Spock]

Alright I think I basically get the idea.

If you have more questions, I will be happy to answer then.

While I agree with your example (which covers math theorems in mine) you haven’t really addressed all the examples I gave. So, can the human intellect ascertain truths about reality in the case of the examples I gave beyond reporting sense impressions? Can the human intellect grasp the operation of causality?

Sure. Causality is the exchange of elementary particles. It is a physical phenomenon.

Can the SM be justified epistemologically?

Only a-posteriori - based upon the fact that it works. No basic principle can be justified a-priori. The laws of logic cannot be “justified”, because they are the very basics of coherent thinking.

Can the intellect grasp the principle of sufficient reason as a truth about reality and human reasoning?

The PSR has several ways to formulate it. Which one do you mean? (By the way, can you apply this principle to itself?)

The word “soul” refers to the spiritual or immaterial part of a human being, often regarded as eternal, usually thought to consist of one’s consciousness and personality, and generally synonymous with the mind or the self. It is often used as a correlative term with “body,” the physical part of the human being: we are body and soul. (Encyclopedia Britannica, s.v. “soul”)
It is the immaterial essence, animating principle, or actuating cause if an individual life. (Merriam-Webster)

Yes, of course we can create all sorts of linguistic constructs to make a description. But that does not make them “meaningful”. The “mind” cannot be the same as the “soul”. The mind is the activity of brain. the activity will cease when the brain goes dead. If the soul is the same, why have two words for the same concept? The “actuating cause” means nothing to me. Here is another propostion: “the perfect color of the sound of middle-C is sweet and soft to the touch”. Every word is meaningful, yet the composition is meaningless.

Now these definitions are considered meaningful and intelligable by both of these recognized sources of info for the public. They have also been meaningful and intelligable to millions of great philosophical, literary, and historical minds in history and millions of others less trained.

Actually, I recall the “emperor’s new clothes”, when the millions of spectators are to scared to exclaim: “the emperor is naked!”. Just because there are millions of people who agree that does not lend credence to the concept.

Hopefully they help; but if they are nonsense to you, the only course of action I can recommend for the discussion to move forward is for you to think about them until you get the idea. Not assent to it, but understand it enough to discuss it.

To clarify my problem, here comes another example. People keep talking about “spiritual” essence. I have no idea what they mean? It is sheer gobbledegook for me.

 

[Spock]

As a theist, part of and identifying with a religious tradition stretching back to time immemorial, I am convinced that I have reliable contact with God in my religious experience.

That is fine. Can you pass on the method over to me, so I can emulate what you expereinced? Keep in mind, that I was religious (most especially when I was a child) that my faith was as pure and honest as ony a child can have, and I never (and I mean: NEVER) experienced anything even remotely akin to be “close to God”. I asked for “favors” again as honestly as only a child can ask, and they never got fulfilled.

Methods of verification must be suitable to their object. Even in the natural sciences methods vary somewhat. How one verifies the discovery of a new species differs from how one verifies the quantum properties of light or sub-atomic particles.

You got that right. But if we generalize from the particulars to the generic, there is no real difference. Make predictions, and see if they are borne out the actual events. That is all.

The dependability of my religious experience as an avenue to the reality of God is tested and substantiated by traditional methods of verification. It is thought through within the philosophical tradition of Plato, Aristotle, Cicero, Augustine, and Aquinas; discussed and subjected to evaluation by experienced guides; lived out in the tradition of service going back to early hospitals, orphanages, schools, and outreach to the poor; and it is appraised by the effects in my life on a day to day basis. By this classic spiritual method my sense of God’s reality, presence, and action in my life and in the world is tested, interpreted, born out, and verified.

Too generic. Atheists can engage in creating hospitals (etc…), does that lend any credence to the atheistic worldview?

(1) There are many situations in life where someone makes a statement based on experience to which at the time we have no access, say, in sports, or medicine, marriage, a trade, or living in general. We cannot always get sufficient evidence a priori to judge it. We must trust them, live it out in faith, take it on their word; and then the reasons reveal themselves a posteriori . . . or not.

Again, partially agreed. It is impractical to verify personally each and every claim. We need to trust the testimony of others. So far I agree with you. However, there is a fundamental difference (and I hope this is not news to you), namely, that there is an end of the chain in the case of physical sciences, where the “testimony” is not evoked any more, when the actual demonstration takes place. In other words, in the physical sciences, the reference to an authority is merely an epistemologial shortcut and not epistemology itself. No matter which religious authority I would go to, the final claim will be: “you must accept it on faith, becuase I cannot demonstrate it”.

(2) Also, there are some domains of truth and reality that will be hidden from us unless we go half way to meet them. For example, in a relationship, the question “Do you like me?” If I insist on maintaining an extrinsic posture of maximum detachment and suspicion, it’s very likely I will forfeit the chance of a positive answer/outcome.

Maybe, or maybe not. Besides, we are deal here with intrinsic states of the mind, and not objective facts.

(3) One does not deduce their way a priori to the experience of empathy, romance, sexual attraction, artistic inspiration, or grief. Yet these are rightly accepted as legitimate domains of human experience, entered into intrinsically, and reflected upon by reason. On the other hand, the encounter with God in religious experience which enters consciousness in the same way–i.e., one does not deduce their way to it, but experiences it as a datum in life–is rejected a priori and not tested in a manner consistent with its subject matter, intrinsically and phenomenologically as a participant observer, and then adjudicated by reason.

I don’t want to hurt you, but it sure sounds like the request of a snake-oil peddler: “trust me”. You need to trust first, because if you do not trust (a-priori) then the phenomenon will not happen. Does the name of Uri Geller ring a bell?

(4) It seems that inherent in the extrinsicist method is the position that “it is better to risk the loss of truth than to make an error.” I don’t see that this is more reasonable than “better to risk making some errors than to lose whole domains of truth and reality.”

I don’t see the relevance.

(5) Billions of people today and additional billions in history are or have been certain of an encounter with God in their religious experience over time. That ought to give one pause who after a few attempts doesn’t get an answer or an acceptable experience.

Please. The “argumentum ad numeram” is an ancient - but not respectable fallacy.

 

[Shike]

It doesn’t really matter. Time is continuous; there will be infinitely many events given any duration of time, just as any line segment is composed of infinitely many line segments.

It’s true that in principle it’s possible to slice up a duration of time into an infinite amount of parts. But is it really true that you can do the same with an event? What defines an event? If change defines an event then change requires at least two entities to act on each other. So if you divide an event into a part so short in duration that it excludes one of the entities in the cause/effect relationship (for example any per accidens causal chain), do you still have an event? It’s definitely not an event in the same sense that was started with.

Well, clearly I don’t fully understand what you mean by “per se” or “per accidens”. So let’s try something else: Please explain to me the difference between a per se chain and a per accidens chain in completely unambiguous terms. No ancient terminology/languages. No analogies. Just a plain-English explanation.

That’s okay, I will try again: “per se” means “by or in itself; intrinsically”. When applied to a causal chain of things per se means that each of the members must be continuously present for the chain to continue.
“per accidens” is the opposite of per se and means “indirectly”. When applied to a causal chain of things per accidens means that each of the members do not have to be continuously present for the chain to continue. Hence the analogies of the train and the father, respectively.

And to make it even clearer for me, describe what must occur for each of those chains to exist. What would cause each chain to cease?

To have a per se causal chain you only need a causal chain where each object depends upon the continual presence of the previous object. For instance, my hand pushing a book across the table which is touching another book that is being moved by the first book. Remove one member, any member from a per se causal chain and the rest of the chain ceases to exist immediately. For instance, if I remove the first book, then there is a gap between my hand and the second book, and therefore, the second book will cease to move.

To have a per accidens causal chain you only need a causal chain where each object depends upon the presence of the previous object, but not continuously. For instance, my hand pulling the trigger of a gun which sends the bullet across a field into a brick wall. Remove one member, any member from a per accidens causal chain and it is not necessarily the case that the rest of the chain will cease to exist, whether immediately or after some duration of time. For instance, if I remove my hand from the gun by dropping it, the bullet will continue to travel towards the brick wall.

His arguments do not care whether the universe has a beginning or stretches back infinitely into the past.

I’m hoping that by clearly explaining the difference between the two chains you can give me some way of understanding the reconciliation of that quote with this:

1. The chain of causes can’t go back to infinity.

They are reconcilable because #3 is talking about per se causal chains and not per accidens causal chains. If Aquinas spoke of just causal chains in general, then it would seem that he would be wrong. But because he gave #2, it is implied that he is talking about per se causal chains rather than per accidens causal chains. Chalk it up to his summary, I don’t know. Though in his other works he devotes many pages to expounding his arguments.

Well, I can’t force you to be interested in my book recommendation. Really, all of this is basic stuff (not saying that it is always easy to grasp) that is addressed in an introductory work on the matter (or at least should be).

And again, thank you for the questions.

Ciao,
Michael

 

[Shike]

I don’t want to hurt you, but it sure sounds like the request of a snake-oil peddler: “trust me”. You need to trust first, because if you do not trust (a-priori) then the phenomenon will not happen. Does the name of Uri Geller ring a bell?

The method is not that strange. For instance, if you don’t trust experience in general you will logically be led to a gross skepticism and many absurdities (for instance, Mr. Descartes).

That is all.

 

[Neithan]

Keep in mind that only God (‘the divine’) is supernatural. Angels are praeternatural. The soul (the mind) is natural.

How about something like this:

1. Start with the proposition ‘it is’ (this is the only possible proposition).
2. Observation of natural phenomena.
3. Make a new speculation (attempting to explain causality). Developing an argument.
4. Test the soundness of the argument by correspondence to the phenomena.
5. If the argument is unsound, abandon it.
6. If the argument is sound, verify its strict consistency.
7. If the above succeeds, we have a new proof.

 

[Spock]

The method is not that strange. For instance, if you don’t trust experience in general you will logically be led to a gross skepticism and many absurdities (for instance, Mr. Descartes).

No that is not the point. To trust experience is very different from trusting someone else’s word.

 

[Shike]

Okay. But it seems like you were arguing with the method in general rather than pointing out degrees of difference.

Move along.

 

[Oreoracle]

So if you divide an event into a part so short in duration that it excludes one of the entities in the cause/effect relationship (for example any per accidens causal chain), do you still have an event?

I define an event simply as a duration of time–an event need not contain a cause and an effect. Rather, if I were talking about causes and their effects, I would take each to be a separate event, with the “effects” being those events which are dependent on their respective “causes”, which are also events.

That’s okay, I will try again: “per se” means “by or in itself; intrinsically”. When applied to a causal chain of things per se means that each of the members must be continuously present for the chain to continue.

So would you say that Aquinas believed the history of the universe should be seen as a per se chain rather than a per accidens chain? I mean, did he believe the entire chain of events would simply end if certain entities weren’t present?

To have a per se causal chain you only need a causal chain where each object depends upon the continual presence of the previous object.

Suppose hypothetically that the universe began as a combination of three objects: A, B, and C. They all appeared simultaneously. Further, A must exist for B to exist, B must exist for C to exist, and C must exist for A to exist. Would this be a per se chain?

If so, per se chains need not be hierarchical, which was what you initially contended. This is because hierarchies are linear, but I think there’s a possibility, at least, that chains may be cyclical rather than linear in the case of objects that appear simultaneously. But this seems like an open question because of our ignorance of how the universe works–we don’t know whether fundamental laws, for example, sustain each other or are sustained by some other entity.

Further, science doesn’t offer us a way of determining which entities, if any, are necessary for the universe to persist. Take the point you mentioned about the strong nuclear force, for example. You were right in saying that a person could not exist without such a force holding the nuclei of his atoms together. But we don’t know if this thinking can be extended to the entirety of the universe. What has to fail to exist for all causal chains (i.e., all interactions in the universe) to cease? How could we prove that such a condition is the case?

They are reconcilable because #3 is talking about per se causal chains and not per accidens causal chains.

And this leads to the next question: Why can’t per se chains extend backward indefinitely? It’s certainly counterintuitive, perhaps even more counterintuitive than the notion of an infinite per accidens chain. However, I don’t see how the existence of such a thing would lead to a contradiction unless you make more assumptions.

So to summarize, I have three objections:

1. Per se chains could possibly be infinite.
2. Per se chains could be cyclical with no definite “first” entity.
3. We don’t have a scientific way to demonstrate that the universe is part of a per se chain. It might be the case that the universe could exist no matter which entities are absent.

 

[Groucho_Marx]

I have been asking these questions, within threads, and no one, ever attempted to give an answer. So I am devoting a thread to this problem. The question is simple:

**How do we know if a proposition concerning the supernatural is true or false? **In other words, what are the means or methods of supernatural epistemology?

It is asserted that the supernatural (God, souls, angels, whatevers) are not physical, and therefore they cannot be verifed empirically, by observation. (Of course there is a question then, how do these entities interact or influence the physical world. But that is a side problem at this moment.) Concentrate on the main question: “what is the supernatural epistemology?”. How do we gain knowledge about the supernatural?

The foreseeable answer: “by revelation” is not acceptable. Most of us never get a revelation, no matter how fervently and honestly we pray for one. The second possible answer would be: “by testimonials” - which is also unacceptable, since it would only push the problem one step back. How would we decide if the testimonial is without error, since we are fallible human beings?

Is there an objective, repeatable method, which would allow to separate the wheat from the chaff, which does not necessitate the a-priori acceptance of the claim (in other words, which can be used by a non-believer)?

The proper use of logic and reason is the method…once your belief has satisfied both then it becomes a matter of faith.

 

[Fr_of_Jazz]

I submit that you misunderstand my stated intentions in both posts. Further, let me state a general principle that will clear up the air in both.

In neither post am I at this stage offering a formal proof for the existence of an object. I am establishing the definition of terms here; and advancing a method of “testing” for God in religious experience =RE] in the other.

Therefore my appeal to the voice of the majority of mankind or the common estimation of mankind in whatever relevant group does not fall under the fallacy ofargumentum ad numeram. I am advancing these as motivation or warrant for giving serious consideration to something =MGSC]. In my world the voice of the relevant majority of mankind on something does motivate me to give it serious consideration.

Look at it this way, millions of physicists understand the math involved in quantum mechanics: they say it makes sense, advances legit definitions and draws valid conclusions. They say it’s legit. But it’s all gibberish to me right now. Does their cumulative voice means nothing regarding the meaningfulness or intelligibility of the math? Not the fact that it proves something validly, but it’s meaningfulness. When faced with their cumulative testimony, that would motivate me to try harder to understand it: maybe it does make sense. It’s absurd in that case to claim I committed the argumentum ad numeram fallacy.

Re Causality
OK, so the intellect can grasp what causality is. Further I note that you employ abstract concepts: “elementary particles” and “physical phenomenon.” But, to the point, what you give does not explain it because causality is also directional: it’s not any ole’ exchange. If an investigator says they found the cause of the plane crash, and you ask in a moment of abstract wonder ask “what do you mean you found the cause?” and they said “we found that there was an exchange of elementary particles” they would not have adequately answered your question.

If the answer were “the cause means we found the set of events and/or circumstances that made the crash happen” that would more adequately answer it. This the operative definition in scientific journals and research design. This is how it is defined and understood by millions of researchers and philosophers. So is that in insight by the intellect into the nature of reality beyond reporting sense impressions?

Also causation in science is not limited to bare interaction between elementary particles. There is the causation by magnetic fields, gravitational fields, forces like momentum, and light (not being an atom or part of an atom).

Re SM
You are speaking about a pragmatic justification (works for technology) for the SM and not epistemic justification (why the SM yields true statements about physical reality) like you want regarding God. How can you articulate the intellectual foundations supporting why the SM yields truth about reality? Or do you think it doesn’t?

E.g., what is the epistemic justification for assenting to scientific statements about a new species of frog in New Guinea? Answer: direct observation: the evidence of sense experience. And work up through the sciences to quantum properties. So again I ask, is such a justification possible?

Re PSR
Our reasoning is based on two great principles: the first, that of Contradiction. . . . And the second, the principle of Sufficient Reason, in virtue of which we believe that no fact can be real or existing and no statement true unless it has a sufficient reason why it should be thus and not otherwise. [Gottfried Leibniz, *The Monadology, 31-32.]

It is self-evident like the three logical principles you advanced. I assent to this definition of self-evident propositions: “A proposition is self-evident if, necessarily, anyone who understands it correctly understands it to be true, and it is possible for someone to understand it.”
[Alexander R. Pruss, *The Principle of Sufficient Reason: A Reassessment. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006, p. 190]

Re Credence
We’re way before issues of credence. We’re talking about understanding the topic of discussion, before we even look for evidence of its existence. It is defined (not proven, and not demanding assent) by legitimate, established authorities at defining terms and explaining concepts; and billions of people understand or have understood the definition whether they agree with it or not. The proposition you advance would be understood by virtually no one. That would say something to me in any subject: try harder. MGSC for attempting to understand a definition, not a formal proof.

So, like I said, the only course of action I can recommend for the discussion to move forward is for you to think about the definition until you get the idea. If not we’re stuck here.