“If the claim is about the physical reality, I demand a repeatable, objective, empirically verifyable test. If the claim is about a formal, axiomatic system, I demand the logical proof, based upon the axioms.”
Or what? The claim is meaningless, or we can’t have rational justification for the claim? Just trying to see what you are saying, but I think it is one or the other. If our statements are meaningless if not verifiable empirically, then they can’t have or lack rational justification, due to their being meaningless. If they are just epistemically unwarranted but capable of having epistemic warrant, then they’re not meaningless.
I think Shike and Levinas seem to be on the right track. The idea would be that we do philosophy. Say what you will about it; we agree it’s not science, but that doesn’t make it illegitimate, just non-science. But you have your answer as to how it would hypothetically work. In particular, with regard to matters of natural theology, we can deduce our conclusions from propositions about the general nature of reality. For example, here are a few. Call the following the set of propositions A:
- There are no gods, spirits, or immaterial minds.
- Gods, spirits, or immaterial minds cannot exist.
- The universe is causally closed and there are no miraculous events.
- There is a world which exists whether or not we believe it exists.
- Something cannot both be and not be at the same time and in the same respect.
- Some things can come to exist out of nothing
- Nothing can come to exist out of nothing.
- Some things change and remain the same objects throughout their change.
Presumably you accept at least a few of these propositions. These propositions belong to the field of philosophy called metaphysics. In support of theism we might assert two metaphysical premises such as these:
(1) Whatever begins to exist has a cause.
(2) The universe (defined as the totality of space, time, energy, and matter) began to exist.
And derive from these by the rules of logic:
(3) Therefore the universe has a cause.
Accept or deny the premises, but they are either true or not true. We can infer that the cause has some of the attributes in this way, by more logical rules:
Suppose that
(1*) The external cause of the universe is material or in time.
Now, we said that the universe is the totality of space, time, energy, and matter. Hence,
(2*) Whatever is material or in time is a part of the universe.
Therefore,
(3*) The external cause of the universe is a part of the universe.
But this is plainly contradictory; how can the external cause of the universe be a part of the universe? Since this is a contradiction it follows
(4*) The external cause of the universe is neither material nor in time.
My point isn’t to start an argument about whether the argument’s premises are true. It’s simply to show you how it works, since you’re asking. And there you go, we’ve just proven an immaterial and timeless cause with some rather weak principles about the general structure of reality. Now my question is: What are you saying? That general principles like these are not knowable insofar as they can’t have epistemic justification, or that they are meaningless?
I don’t think it can be the former. Even you accept some general principles about reality, I would contend. For instance, some of those contained in our set A. Also, the fact that these arguments might work is because you believe metaphysical propositions about systems of logic: that classical logic, for instance, maps onto the structure of reality; if you accept rules such as ~(p&~p) and use them in your proofs, and expect them to bring you to true results given the premises, this is because you believe this system of logic accurately models what the world is like. And that’s a grand proposition indeed!
But then our metaphysical propositions can’t be simply unknowable epistemically speaking. After all, we do know some, either materialist or “supernatural” ones, as well as propositions about the relationship between certain logics and reality. So they aren’t unknowable. Hence, according to you they must be meaningless. But I don’t think they’re meaningless. We know them, so they can’t be meaningless.
Now, it’s an interesting question as to how we know these general propositions about reality. However, I’ve written enough as it is, so that now there’s something to chew on. Hence I won’t go on and explain my “meta-metaphysics.” However, I hope that I’ve at least explained the general route which one would hypothetically take in order to carry out some sort of natural theology.
I also think there’s something to be said for religious experiences, but I won’t go into that. Sorry if I don’t come into the discussion again and this is all I have to say. I’m actually in school now, so I don’t have all that much leisure time. If I do reply again it will probably be on the weekend, and even then I will likely be discouraged to reply due to the fact that this thread will have grown to be seven pages larger. I tend to be less than consistent with these forums unfortunately, so I hope that if I leave for another three months or whatever, you’ll at least find something interesting in the little essay I’ve gone on and written for you.