Teleological suspension of the ethical?

[Leela]

You said species are “no longer thought of as static or clear cut” … but by whom? And why should I automatically believe those people (if that’s what you’re suggesting)?

Now when you say that the lines between species are “arbitrary” to some extent, this could mean different things. This could either mean that …

1. We impose distinctions on a reality that actually has no real distinctions (the ultimate consequence being that reality is meaningless)
2. We grasp a reality that does have real distinctions but commonly with inexact mental detail (the ultimate consequence being that reality in itself is meaningful but that our understanding of it is not … though our mental distinctions can come closer and closer to real distinctions with ongoing observation)

The first one is more of an idealist view, the second is a realist view. To assume the first one is to ultimately reject reality and live in your mind, whereas the second view is a admittance that our mind isn’t perfect but that it can improve by looking outside itself.

I’m a realist, and this is because I think reality is … well … real.

As a pragmatist, I can grant that nature is “out there” for us to describe, but I don’t presuppose that nature hands us the categories that we must impose upon it. We make distinctions that are useful for certain human purposes and there are no descriptions of reality that we ever make which float free of such concerns.

“Evolutionary theory” says no such thing, unless you are referring to Evoluntionism or something like that. There are plenty of evolutionists who believe in essence. In fact, any evolutionist that acknowledge the existence of cats would thus believe in essence. To deny the existence of essence would be to deny that there is no difference between a cat and a dog. Every scientist I’ve ever come across has acknowledged there is such a difference.

Acknowledging a useful distinction between cats and dogs is not to endorse the metaphysical view that in addition to all the cats in the world there is something else called “the essence of catness.” (I’m no expert on Aristotle (far from it), but I think this was something like his critique on Platonic forms.)

This does typify honest evolutionism (though not necessary the theory of evolution), but it doesn’t really make sense. If you don’t acknowledge the existence of real distinctions, then everything is the same … i.e. static. Essences must exist for there to be change.

This was the number one topic discussed by the Pre-Socratics (the earliest Greek philosophers in recorded history). And the conclusion was that there must be real distinctions for there to be change … or else change is a mere illusion and reality is completely static.

This was considered to be an important question for the Pre-Socratics. In a post-Darwin world, I think we can say that the only constant is change. We don’t need to measure change relative to some eternal form but only compare the present to the past.

You see, as Aristotle said (and this makes a lot of sense), everything has a static nature (termed a “substantial form”), as well as changeable attributes (termed “accidental forms”). A deer, for example, has a static form (the form of a deer), as well as changeable attributes (like its posture, colors, actions, etc.). If the substantial form is lost (e.g. if the deer is destroyed), then that thing is no longer the thing that it was … it’s no longer a deer. However, for a deer to be a deer, it has to have a static form as long as the deer exists … because as soon as that substantial form changes … it’s not a deer anymore.

And yet, no one has ever found this “substance” that properties are thought to adhere to. I don’t see how it means anything to say that it does or does not exist.

Now, since there is this substantial form that exists as long as the thing is the thing that it is, there is thus a consistent standard for that thing. Yet the thing does not always live up to that standard because its accidents (which are changeable but nonetheless a part of the thing) can change and even be in conflict with the right functioning of the substantial form.

I don’t think that in addition to all the tables in the world, there is a “substantial form” of tableness that all tables need to try to conform to. I never need to ask whether or not my descriptions of tables or anything else is adequate to the essence of unchanging tableness or The-Way-Things-Really-Are but only to ask whether or not I’ve been imaginative enough to come up with better more useful descriptions for whatever my purposes are at the moment or build a better table.

Best,
Leela

 

[Leela]

Are you trying to justify your inconsistencies by condemning consistency? I don’t know why you’re saying this, I apologize.

Trying to justify inconsistencies would seem inconsistent. I support self-consistency as an intellectual virtue. My point is that it only gets you so far. Reasoning is only as good as the premises upoin which it is based, and reality does not hand us premises. There are lots and lots of self-consistent theological and philosophical systems out there. How do we choose among them? I wonder if we even have to choose among them or bother with them at all when it comes to ethics, since we judge such systems according to how well they fit our ethical intuitions rather than the other way around. If we end up based on some system (like utilitarianism or Kant’s categorical imperative) drawing conclusions we can’t abide, we go back and check our premises. We reject the proposed system rather than our intuitions when a system suggests that, say, rape is justifiable or lying is unjustifiable even when the Nazi’s are knocking on the door looking for the Jews who are hiding in your closet.

I’m not sure why you (and a lot of people I meet) say stuff like this. When I’m having a discussion with someone, commonly the person will say, “Well, I’m not going to be convinced by you, and you’re not going to be convinced by me.” What?! Do they deny that “being convinced by something” is possible?

I am one who believes that people have the ability to be convinced by reasonable arguments sometimes … but maybe I’m just a dreamer.

I’m not denying that people can be convinced, but only people who can be convinced by rational arguments get convinced by rational arguments. In the case of mathematics, that includes most of us. In the case of ethics, it includes few of us. I don’t think that, for example, you are going to convince a Nazi not to persecute Jews by arguing philosophy of ethics. If you have any hope of convincing him at all, it will happen, for example, when he reads a book about a Jewish family where the author is able to get him to expand his moral imagination about what is human and inhumane by humanizing the family of Jews in a way that the Nazi can relate. In the philosophical debate, however, the Nazi will simply deny your premise that the Jews are human.

Do we even have a duty to anything human? Because if you deny essence, then there are no humans.

In my view, humanity is not understood as an essence but rather a promising project–a work in progress.

Best,
Leela

 

[Leela]

Hi Areopagite,

I said, “I often hear that for atheists there is something important lacking–a needed philsophical foundation–in not having an answer to this question so suposedly satisfying as “because God says you ought to.””

And this shows that atheism is ultimately unreasonable. It lacks a philosophical foundation. The things they believe in come from no where without any reason. And if they believe in something without reason … then they are by definition unreasonable.

I’ll start a new thread to discuss this part.

Best,
Leela

 

[Areopagite]

As a pragmatist, I can grant that nature is “out there” for us to describe, but I don’t presuppose that nature hands us the categories that we must impose upon it. We make distinctions that are useful for certain human purposes and there are no descriptions of reality that we ever make which float free of such concerns.

I agree that “description” is completely subjective. However, I’m talking about our “concepts” of reality (which is objective), not the mere signs and symbols that we (sometimes) arbitrary relate to real things. This is an important distinction. It is possible for radically different symbols to point to the same thing (though I am not denying that certain symbols are more useful for pointing to certain kinds of concepts). There are different ways to describe mathematical truths, for example, but they can point to the same concept(s).

Also, though I am no expert in pragmatist claims at all, it seems that one must understand human nature before one figures out what is “useful” or “pragmatic” for it. If we don’t know the end/goal of human well-being, then there is no hope judging what is “useful” for attaining it.

Acknowledging a useful distinction between cats and dogs is not to endorse the metaphysical view that in addition to all the cats in the world there is something else called “the essence of catness.” (I’m no expert on Aristotle (far from it), but I think this was something like his critique on Platonic forms.)

Aristotle said that the essence of catness exists in the cats themselves. Plato denied this and claimed what we called “cats” are mere shadows and imitations of some eternal unchanging form of “catness” floating in immaterial reality. The Scholastics in some sense reconciled these two views in the theory of Exemplarism, saying that essences DO exist in things themselves, but that the essence first existed immaterially in the mind of God.

In any case, Aristotle said essence of catness DOES exist, if at least one cat exists. If two exist, the essence of catness nonetheless stays the same between them otherwise they would not both be cats. We nonetheless claim that two different cats are both cats, but what you seem to advocate, as a result of denying essence, is that they are completely different … and that not even one of them is a cat. Everything is nothing. With essence gone, nothing really exists. Not even atoms. Even atoms, I suppose, are supposedly so radically different from each other that we can’t even call them all atoms …

Unless, of course, it’s “useful” to us. But is that even an illusion? Once again, to find out what is useful to us, we must first understand us, and to understand us, we can’t simply figure out by asking “What is useful for us?” Pragmatism thus fails.

Unless I am totally misrepresenting the principles of pragmatism, which I might, because I haven’t studied it very much.

This was considered to be an important question for the Pre-Socratics. In a post-Darwin world, I think we can say that the only constant is change.

Under no circumstance can we say that change is the only constant. It is a self-contradictory claim.

What’s required for a change is one individual essence to be destroyed to be replaced by a different individual essence. If there are no such things as essences, then you cannot have change.

We don’t need to measure change relative to some eternal form but only compare the present to the past.

If there is nothing to distinguish the present from the past, then there can be no comparison … well, we can only say, “They’re the exact same.”

And yet, no one has ever found this “substance” that properties are thought to adhere to. I don’t see how it means anything to say that it does or does not exist.

If you agree that properties cannot exist by themselves, then you must acknowledge the existence substance (the definition of which is “a thing that exists in itself” as opposed to an accident/attribute/property which is “a thing that exists in substance”). Do you believe properties do not need to be properties of something. My dictionary, at least, saying a property is “an attribute of something.”

I don’t think that in addition to all the tables in the world, there is a “substantial form” of tableness that all tables need to try to conform to. I never need to ask whether or not my descriptions of tables or anything else is adequate to the essence of unchanging tableness or The-Way-Things-Really-Are but only to ask whether or not I’ve been imaginative enough to come up with better more useful descriptions for whatever my purposes are at the moment or build a better table.

I don’t know what you mean by “useful descriptions.” The only think I can think of here is that it is useful to call something a “table” because it corresponds to the essence of “tableness.” Usefulness requires the existences of essence.

Trying to justify inconsistencies would seem inconsistent. I support self-consistency as an intellectual virtue. My point is that it only gets you so far. Reasoning is only as good as the premises upoin which it is based,

Yes … if you define “reasoning” as merely “logic.”

Sometimes, “reasoning” is used to also to include the simple apprehensions and judgments leading up to inference.

 

[Areopagite]

… and reality does not hand us premises.

It hands us sensory images, after which time, our intellect abstracts the objective meaning (or concept) of the objects depicted in the images. Then our intellect and compare/relate different acquired concepts in the form of judgments (which include premises). Then we can compare/relate different judgments together in the form of reasoning.

This is a commonly accepted view of how reasoning works.

Where people disagree is whether the concept that is abstracted from the senses has anything to do with the thing perceived by the senses. A realist would say that the concept accurately corresponds to the thing sensed, whereas an idealist … not so much.

In any case, since I am a realist, I would say that indirectly, through this process, reality does hand us premises. If not, then we cannot know reality in itself. Kant said this … and yet he made all sorts of claims about reality (about the “noumena” as he called it). Most people, even if they deny it, make implicit and sometimes very explicit indications they reality can be known in itself. Hence, realism is the more tenable position.

There are lots and lots of self-consistent theological and philosophical systems out there.

Theoretically, there could be. However, I’ve only found only consistent theological system so far. As for philosophy, I’ve found … two … ish.

How do we choose among them? I wonder if we even have to choose among them or bother with them at all when it comes to ethics, since we judge such systems according to how well they fit our ethical intuitions rather than the other way around.

This is often true but not always. Personally, there have been systematic arguments that have shown me that some of my intuitions were wrong (or at least were inconsistent with some of my other intuitions).

If we end up based on some system (like utilitarianism or Kant’s categorical imperative) drawing conclusions we can’t abide, we go back and check our premises. We reject the proposed system rather than our intuitions when a system suggests that, say, rape is justifiable or lying is unjustifiable even when the Nazi’s are knocking on the door looking for the Jews who are hiding in your closet.

Some people would, some people wouldn’t. There have been plenty of people who have changed their minds about reality when presented with a new ethical system. It happens all the time. If there is no way to rationally and systematically get at the truth about good and evil, then there is no way to correct people. I guess it becomes “might makes right” or something like that. Personally, I’m not a fan.

I’m not denying that people can be convinced, but only people who can be convinced by rational arguments get convinced by rational arguments. In the case of mathematics, that includes most of us. In the case of ethics, it includes few of us. I don’t think that, for example, you are going to convince a Nazi not to persecute Jews by arguing philosophy of ethics. If you have any hope of convincing him at all, it will happen, for example, when he reads a book about a Jewish family where the author is able to get him to expand his moral imagination about what is human and inhumane by humanizing the family of Jews in a way that the Nazi can relate. In the philosophical debate, however, the Nazi will simply deny your premise that the Jews are human.

Maybe, maybe not. Perhaps most Nazis were as you say and would likewise only be convinced in the way you propose. On the other hand, perhaps some Nazis were more intellectually and abstractly inclined and would thus be more swayed by systematic arguments … which would not be too surprising, since Germans are very systematic. But yes, perhaps some would intuit the truth more vividly (but less clearly) by reading a book about a Jewish family. I wouldn’t condemn either possibility.

I think it’s time for me to ask you what you mean by “moral imagination” … I’m not entirely sure what you mean by that.

In my view, humanity is not understood as an essence but rather a promising project–a work in progress.

But a progress towards what? Nothing in particular, right? It’s like evolution and “fitness” (as you said) … it doesn’t really mean anything because there is no goal.

Obviously, you do have some goal in mind, however vague it might at present. You acknowledge some standard of goodness even if it’s buried in your subconscious right now. Otherwise, you would not have this sense “progress” or “promise.” Am I wrong?

I said, “I often hear that for atheists there is something important lacking–a needed philsophical foundation–in not having an answer to this question so suposedly satisfying as “because God says you ought to.””

I’ll start a new thread to discuss this part.

Sounds good.

 

[Areopagite]

The upshot of your answers is that we are obliged to obey our conscience - which is our ultimate authority - and that only God is entitled to decide whether our decision is correct.

Well … it depends what you mean.

It’s only God who can make a necessarily true judgment whether you honestly followed your conscience or not.

However, I can still condemn an objectively immoral action of someone … like I can condemn someone’s act of rape. But I cannot judge whether the rapist was honestly following his conscience or not.

Does that clear it up?

In that case if I saved an entire city from destruction by a nuclear device by killing one man I would hardly be condemned and punished by any power with the authority to** protect **society…

I can’t say for sure. They could. You may be punished lightly for “alleviating circumstances” or something. But it’s quite conceivable that they could punish you if you broke both civil and natural law (e.g. if you murdered someone).

Therefore we should obey our conscience rather than the Pope’s decision…

You should not obey the Pope’s decision if by doing so you go against your conscience. The two are not necessarily opposed though. For a Catholic, there is a good chance a person will an ill-formed conscience might reconsider his judgments upon being excommunicated and perhaps then come to an understanding that he was wrong (and that his conscience was malformed).

You have agreed that even though we are in error we cannot be in sin - when we are obeying our conscience.

If we obey our conscience, we cannot sin, i.e. we cannot reject sanctifying grace (in that sense of sin … because “sin” can be used in many ways). However, that error, depending upon what it is, will inhibit us from accepting more grace and may even incline us (or another person) to sin.

Yes! Wouldn’t you tell lies, rob, imprison, plunder, destroy property or even physically harm a man if it were necessary in order to save people’s lives?

I need some concrete examples to understand what exactly you’re talking about.

If there is no other way of defeating the enemy…

I would not directly kill innocent people even if I saw there was no other way of defeating the enemy. I would, however, do things that would indirectly cause their deaths by double effect if I thought it was greatly needed for a terrible enemy’s defeat.

It was argued that the atomic bombs were dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki to end the war quickly and prevent much more suffering and bloodshed but I reject that argument.

I reject it too. I really reject it because Hiroshima and Nagasaki were the only two Catholic cities in Japan. Thanks to those mushroom clouds, Catholicism there was pretty much wiped out.

This principle applies to killing a train driver if** our primary intention** is to stop the train to prevent a nuclear holocaust. We hope our bullet won’t kill him but we foresee that it probably will…

Hmm. Without thinking too much about it, I think it might work. Perhaps if you just aimed to incapacitate him … it might be legit. I’ll have to think about that one more.

 

[Betterave]

1. Who determines whether I have a poorly formed conscience?
2. Who determines whether I am morally culpable?
3. Who determines whether I am depraved?
4. Who denies that my conscience is my ultimate authority?

It seems that the spirit of the Inquisition is alive and well… What would be my punishment for shooting one man in order to save thousands of people? Would it stop at excommunication? Would I be condemned to hell?

I don’t really need to add much to Areopagite’s apposite comments, but I will answer your questions:

1. Whoever is in a position to.
2. Ditto.
3. Ditto.
4. Conscience is your “ultimate authority” with respect to your own immediate evaluation of an action, that’s it. It is not ultimate with respect to the morality of that action or with respect to your own subjective moral culpability regarding that action. Never has been, never will be.

Recommended reading: On Conscience by Joseph Cardinal Ratzinger (Pope Benedict XVI)

 

[tonyrey]

1. Who determines whether I have a poorly formed conscience?
2. Who determines whether I am morally culpable?
3. Who determines whether I am depraved?

1. Whoever is in a position to.
2. Ditto.
3. Ditto.
   Can you name any possible "whoever"s?

1. Who denies that my conscience is my ultimate authority?

4. Conscience is your “ultimate authority” with respect to your own immediate evaluation of an action, that’s it. It is not ultimate with respect to the morality of that action…

I have already pointed that out more than once…

… or with respect to your own subjective moral culpability regarding that action.

How can we be morally culpable if we are obeying our ultimate authority - our conscience - to the best of our ability? How can our moral culpability not be subjective?

You have not explained why the principle of the double effect is not applicable in the case of killing a train driver if our primary intention is to stop the train to prevent a nuclear holocaust…

[/QUOTE]

 

[tonyrey]

In that case if I saved an entire city from destruction by a nuclear device by killing one man I would hardly be condemned and punished by any power with the authority to protect society…

I think you are being unrealistic here - when we consider that a holocaust on the scale of Hiroshima has been prevented…

Therefore we should obey our conscience rather than the Pope’s decision…

You should not obey the Pope’s decision if by doing so you go against your conscience. The two are not necessarily opposed though. For a Catholic, there is a good chance a person will an ill-formed conscience might reconsider his judgments upon being excommunicated and perhaps then come to an understanding that he was wrong (and that his conscience was malformed).

I have discussed this matter with other educated Catholics and most of them share my view that it would be a greater evil to do nothing to prevent such a horrific disaster.

Wouldn’t you tell lies, rob, imprison, plunder, destroy property or even physically harm a man if it were necessary in order to save people’s lives?

I need some concrete examples to understand what exactly you’re talking about.

Any of these actions may be necessary to prevent a nuclear holocaust if you are in a building occupied by terrorists and innocent people…

I would not directly kill innocent people even if I saw there was no other way of defeating the enemy. I would, however, do things that would indirectly cause their deaths by double effect if I thought it was greatly needed for a terrible enemy’s defeat.

Would blowing up a building in which there are innocent people be an indirect cause?

It was argued that the atomic bombs were dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki to end the war quickly and prevent much more suffering and bloodshed but I reject that argument.

I reject it too. I really reject it because Hiroshima and Nagasaki were the only two Catholic cities in Japan. Thanks to those mushroom clouds, Catholicism there was pretty much wiped out.

I’m sure non-Catholics would not be impressed by that argument…

This principle applies to killing a train driver if our primary intention is to stop the train to prevent a nuclear holocaust. We hope our bullet won’t kill him but we foresee that it probably will…

Hmm. Without thinking too much about it, I think it might work. Perhaps if you just aimed to incapacitate him … it might be legit. I’ll have to think about that one more.

Let me simplify the case for you - and make it more difficult for me. You are at such a distance that only the driver’s head is visible and you know it is highly probable he will be killed. Would you be justified in firing one or **more **bullets at him knowing that if the train does not stop there will be a nuclear holocaust?

 

[ThomasToo]

I have discussed this matter with other educated Catholics and most of them share my view that it would be a greater evil to do nothing to prevent such a horrific disaster…
I’m sure non-Catholics would not be impressed by that argument.

I must ask, educated how? Theologically?

And I’m sure a lot of Catholics aren’t impressed either.

 

[Betterave]

Betterave;6536607:

Can you name any possible "whoever"s?

Whoever has had a chance to observe you and probably converse with you and who has a well-formed conscience is more or less in a position to make these determinations.

I have already pointed that out more than once…

Don’t take one line out of context and respond to it one way…

How can we be morally culpable if we are obeying our ultimate authority - our conscience - to the best of our ability? How can our moral culpability not be subjective?

…before going on to respond to the whole thought in another.

We can be morally culpable for the malformation of our conscience. In this case, we are immediately bound to follow our malformed conscience, but remain culpable for the evil that arises therefrom. And again, you’re missing the point that conscience is not our ultimate authority in any ultimate sense; and that is one of the most important and basic truths apprehended by any well-formed conscience. (Moral culpability can’t be not subjective - the “subjective” was thrown in for emphasis/clarity.)

You have not explained why the principle of the double effect is not applicable in the case of killing a train driver if our primary intention is to stop the train to prevent a nuclear holocaust…

True; but I think VC has.

 

[tonyrey]

I must ask, educated how? Theologically?

We are not all expected to be theologically educated in order to make valid moral decisions…

And I’m sure a lot of Catholics aren’t impressed either.

Indeed!

 

[Areopagite]

I think you are being unrealistic here - when we consider that a holocaust on the scale of Hiroshima has been prevented…

You asked whether you would be punished by the authorities if you murdered someone in order to prevent a nuclear explosion.

Once again, if that person was not innocent but involved in terrorist plot, then you should not be punished.

But if it was an innocent person, and your direct murder of him/her somehow prevented the explosion, then punishment would be warranted. And it is conceivable that an earthly authority might issue some kind of punishment too … but I would predict something very light “considering the circumstances” … maybe just a couple months in jail. I don’t know.

I have discussed this matter with other educated Catholics and most of them share my view that it would be a greater evil to do nothing to prevent such a horrific disaster.

Inaction, I believe, can be worse than an evil action. However, that doesn’t mean you should commit that evil action (i.e. directly murder an innocent person in order to prevent a nuclear explosion). You need to attempt a good action to try and prevent the disaster. You may fail.

It’s always evil to do evil. Hence, it’s immoral to even choose the lesser of two evils because the lesser evil is still evil. That’s what it’s called evil.

If evil happens as an indirect result of an action, then it is possible that such an action could still be moral.

Any of these actions may be necessary to prevent a nuclear holocaust if you are in a building occupied by terrorists and innocent people.

Would blowing up a building in which there are innocent people be an indirect cause?

Yes, it would be an indirect. It could thus be very moral to blow up a building with nuclear-armed terrorists inside, even if there are innocent people there. That is because the death of those innocent people are not the cause of prevention of the nuclear explosion.

I’m sure non-Catholics would not be impressed by that argument…

I wasn’t putting that forward as an “argument.” It was merely another reason why I think Nagasaki and Hiroshima were bad ideas. I don’t expect non-Christians to agree with me on that.

Let me simplify the case for you - and make it more difficult for me. You are at such a distance that only the driver’s head is visible and you know it is highly probable he will be killed. Would you be justified in firing one or **more **bullets at him knowing that if the train does not stop there will be a nuclear holocaust?

Yes, I think it’s possible to argue that could be moral (though I am open to correction). It’s possible to incapacitate with a head shot and thus achieve the intended result … though death may be more likely to happen.

 

[tonyrey]

Whoever has had a chance to observe you and probably converse with you and who has a well-formed conscience is more or less in a position to make these determinations.

In that case there should be Catholics on this forum who are prepared to state whether my conscience is well-formed or not in view of the detailed arguments I have presented. Are you prepared to do so?.

Don’t take one line out of context and respond to it one way…

If you prefer:

It is not ultimate with respect to the morality of that action or with respect to your own subjective moral culpability regarding that action.

I have already pointed that out more than once our conscience is not ultimate with respect to the morality of that action but we cannot be morally culpable if we are obeying our conscience to the best of our ability - which implies that we have investigated the issue thoroughly.

We can be morally culpable for the malformation of our conscience. In this case, we are immediately bound to follow our malformed conscience, but remain culpable for the evil that arises therefrom. And again, you’re missing the point that conscience is not our ultimate authority in any ultimate sense; and that is one of the most important and basic truths apprehended by any well-formed conscience.

I am not missing it at all. You are implying that my conscience is** malformed **without explaining why… The most effective way would be to show how my use of the principle of the double effect is not applicable in my hypothetical example.

You have not explained why the principle of the double effect is not applicable in the case of killing a train driver if our primary intention is to stop the train to prevent a nuclear holocaust…

True; but I think VC has.

You are forgetting that **the primary intention **is not to sacrifice a life but to stop the train to prevent a disaster. It is not certain the driver will be killed by the bullet. It is a risk one is entitled to take in view of the horrific consequences of inaction. One may not even be certain the driver is not an accomplice. Civilians are killed in wartime because it is not always possible to know whether they are assisting or shielding their military forces.

Jesus did not come to encourage us all to be martyrs. He came to liberate us from evil, violence and bloodshed. We are not always expected to turn the other cheek whenever we are confronted with hatred and injustice. Our task is to minimise the amount of suffering in the world by using our judgment as to the most effective ways to combat evil. We have an obligation to defend the lives of innocent people against terrorist attacks even though it may entail losses on our side. To make our primary objective our own salvation is a form of self-love opposed to the teaching of Jesus. If we are afraid to act out of fear we shall go to hell we are failing to obey His command to love others… We should be more concerned about their well-being and safety than whether our conscience is well-formed…

 

[Betterave]

In that case there should be Catholics on this forum who are prepared to state whether my conscience is well-formed or not in view of the detailed arguments I have presented. Are you prepared to do so?

Are you saying you disagree with my claim? “Whoever has had a chance to observe you and probably converse with you and who has a well-formed conscience is more or less in a position to make these determinations.” …or are you just being fractious? To answer your question, you give indications of malformation of conscience, but I’m not in a position where I can say so with any great degree of confidence. Your asking this question, though, suggests to me you’re taking this personally rather than trying to understand the issue under discussion.

If you prefer:

I have already pointed that out more than once our conscience is not ultimate with respect to the morality of that action but we cannot be morally culpable if we are obeying our conscience to the best of our ability - which implies that we have investigated the issue thoroughly.

Okay, I’ve “investigated the issue thoroughly” - now I can do no wrong. My individual conscience has become an ultimate moral authority. – This is the position you want to espouse?

I am not missing it at all. You are implying that my conscience is** malformed **without explaining why… The most effective way would be to show how my use of the principle of the double effect is not applicable in my hypothetical example.

I think I did explain why and you missed it. Your conscience is malformed, it seems, insofar as you seem to make exaggerated claims about the “ultimate authority” of your own conscience, as I have been trying to explain. But let’s not make this about you; let’s discuss conscience in general, and I leave you with yours to sort out your own self-evaluation.

Jesus did not come to encourage us all to be martyrs. He came to liberate us from evil, violence and bloodshed. We are not always expected to turn the other cheek whenever we are confronted with hatred and injustice. Our task is to minimise the amount of suffering in the world by using our judgment as to the most effective ways to combat evil. We have an obligation to defend the lives of innocent people against terrorist attacks even though it may entail losses on our side. To make our primary objective our own salvation is a form of self-love opposed to the teaching of Jesus. If we are afraid to act out of fear we shall go to hell we are failing to obey His command to love others… We should be more concerned about their well-being and safety than whether our conscience is well-formed…

This is messed up. Now you’re suggesting we should just try to save other people from physical evil and not worry about whether we do so in a morally licit way, i.e., don’t worry about acting in accordance with a well-formed conscience. You are far from having a well-formed understanding of Catholic teaching (which, from a Catholic perspective, is the objective norm grounding a well-formed conscience) if you sincerely mean what you wrote here.

 

[tonyrey]

Whoever has had a chance to observe you and probably converse with you and who has a well-formed conscience is more or less in a position to make these determinations.

“more or less” gives the game away! Is that a sound basis on which to reach your conclusion?

…or are you just being fractious?

No. I am disputing your baseless insinuation that my conscience is malformed…

To answer your question, you give indications of malformation of conscience, but I’m not in a position where I can say so with any great degree of confidence.

Then why make the assertion at all? With equal facility I could assert that you give indications of moral pusillanimity…

Your asking this question, though, suggests to me you’re taking this personally rather than trying to understand the issue under discussion.

If you were confronted with the unproven insinuation that your conscience is malformed you would hardly ignore it…

I have already pointed that out more than once our conscience is not ultimate with respect to the morality of that action but we cannot be morally culpable if we are obeying our conscience to the best of our ability - which implies that we have investigated the issue thoroughly.

Okay, I’ve “investigated the issue thoroughly” - now I can do no wrong.

Your sarcasm misrepresents my view. Do you deny that we cannot be **morally culpable **if we are obeying our conscience to the best of our ability?

My individual conscience has become an ultimate moral authority. – This is the position you want to espouse?

That is obviously a rhetorical question which fails to advance the discussion one jot.

You are implying that my conscience is malformed without explaining why… The most effective way would be to show how my use of the principle of the double effect is not applicable in my hypothetical example.

I think I did explain why and you missed it. Your conscience is malformed, it seems, insofar as you seem to make exaggerated claims about the “ultimate authority” of your own conscience, as I have been trying to explain. But let’s not make this about you; let’s discuss conscience in general, and I leave you with yours to sort out your own self-evaluation.

After stating that I give indications of malformation of conscience you conveniently wish to change the subject… Pusillanimity?

Jesus did not come to encourage us all to be martyrs. He came to liberate us from evil, violence and bloodshed. We are not always expected to turn the other cheek whenever we are confronted with hatred and injustice. Our task is to minimise the amount of suffering in the world by using our judgment as to the most effective ways to combat evil. We have an obligation to defend the lives of innocent people against terrorist attacks even though it may entail losses on our side. To make our primary objective our own salvation is a form of self-love opposed to the teaching of Jesus. If we are afraid to act out of fear we shall go to hell we are failing to obey His command to love others… We should be more concerned about their well-being and safety than whether our conscience is well-formed…

This is messed up. Now you’re suggesting we should just try to save other people from physical evil and not worry about whether we do so in a morally licit way, i.e., don’t worry about acting in accordance with a well-formed conscience.

Another blatant misrepresentation. You have devoted more time and energy to discussing whether my conscience is malformed than whether we would be justified in defending innocent people against a terrorist attack. You have completely ignored my point that in a just war we accept the fact that there will be losses on our own side. Is the war against terrorism not just? Do there have to be clearly delineated military positions for there to be a just war?

To live in a moral ivory tower is positively immoral when one is faced with the likelihood of a repetition of the Twin Towers disaster. The victims would not have wasted time discussing whether their consciences were malformed if they had had the opportunity to prevent the loss of so many lives. It pays to have a sense of perspective and to be able to judge precisely what we are entitled to do in such a situation… Your solution seems to be to do nothing in order to have a clear conscience. Much of the suffering in the world is caused by negligence and the failure to act when others are in desperate need of help and protection…

You are far from having a well-formed understanding of Catholic teaching (which, from a Catholic perspective, is the objective norm grounding a well-formed conscience) if you sincerely mean what you wrote here.

Instead of pursuing the matter of my conscience why not concentrate on whether the principle of the double effect is justified in attempting to stop the train to prevent a nuclear holocaust? It is only necessary for you to demonstrate that my understanding of Catholic teaching is malformed in that respect. Remember that **the intention is not to kill **but to save…It is as simple as that. We were not created to sit on the fence and maintain our moral purity while the world disintegrates around us…

 

[ThomasToo]

Do you deny that we cannot be **morally culpable **if we are obeying our conscience to the best of our ability?

Yes. If, for example, Saddam Hussein thought he was truly acting rightly when he committed genocide against ethnic Kurds, would you say he was not morally culpably if he was obeying his conscience? Or any number of serial killers? I don’t think that acting according to one’s conscience gets one completely off the hook of moral culpability.

Another blatant misrepresentation. You have devoted more time and energy to discussing whether my conscience is malformed than whether we would be justified in defending innocent people against a terrorist attack. You have completely ignored my point that in a just war we accept the fact that there will be losses on our own side. Is the war against terrorism not just? Do there have to be clearly delineated military positions for there to be a just war?

As someone who has been told he is going to hell many time I think the claims your conscience is malformed are truly offered out of love but I try to give people the benefit of the doubt.

The war against terror is not a war by any meaningful definition and is certainly not a just one. The opposition has no legitimate legal authority for one and we certainly have not tried to sit down with Al-Qaeda so this “war” is not the final option. Even if, however, we grant for a moment your point that this is a war and suppose it is a just one one of the bedrock points of the just war theory is that non-combatants (which would include this unwitting train driver) cannot be intentionally targeted (i.e. non-combatant immunity).

Instead of pursuing the matter of my conscience why not concentrate on whether the principle of the double effect is justified in attempting to stop the train to prevent a nuclear holocaust? It is only necessary for you to demonstrate that my understanding of Catholic teaching is malformed in that respect. Remember that **the intention is not to kill **but to save…It is as simple as that. We were not created to sit on the fence and maintain our moral purity while the world disintegrates around us…

As someone has said above, the principle of double effect does not and cannot apply here. In fact, the principle of double effect is pointless if you reject the notion of intrinsically evil acts since the first condition of the principle is that the act not be intrinsically evil. Further, the bad effect–killing this person–is the means by which the good effect follows so the principle fails there as well.

 

[Betterave]

“more or less” gives the game away! Is that a sound basis on which to reach your conclusion?

Tony, the “more or less” is *part of *my conclusion. Did you miss that?

No. I am disputing your baseless insinuation that my conscience is malformed…

Yes, you’re being fractious!

Then why make the assertion at all? With equal facility I could assert that you give indications of moral pusillanimity…

Good one.

If you were confronted with the unproven insinuation that your conscience is malformed you would hardly ignore it…

I wouldn’t take it personally, like you; I’d try to understand the reasons behind the “unproven insinuation.” This is because I do my best to care about the state of my conscience more than my ego.

Your sarcasm misrepresents my view. Do you deny that we cannot be **morally culpable **if we are obeying our conscience to the best of our ability?

How is that sarcasm? I’m trying to discuss your view and point out why I think it’s wrong. Can you try to get beyond your defensiveness here? To answer your question, I do deny it *and *I’ve explained why.

That is obviously a rhetorical question which fails to advance the discussion one jot.

False.

After stating that I give indications of malformation of conscience you conveniently wish to change the subject… Pusillanimity?

Pusillanimity? How so? Why would you suggest this? Do you really want this discussion to be about you? Do you really think that’s the subject here? It’s not. The subject is conscience and I didn’t change it; you seem to be trying to, to yourself.

Another blatant misrepresentation. You have devoted more time and energy to discussing whether my conscience is malformed than whether we would be justified in defending innocent people against a terrorist attack. You have completely ignored my point that in a just war we accept the fact that there will be losses on our own side. Is the war against terrorism not just? Do there have to be clearly delineated military positions for there to be a just war?

Tony, it’s very nice rhetoric to say “blatant misrepresentation,” but did you even try to see the real basis in your comments for my representation here? You should, then you should respond in a relevant way with an explanation/clarification of what you wrote, detailing *how *what I wrote misrepresented it.

To live in a moral ivory tower is positively immoral when one is faced with the likelihood of a repetition of the Twin Towers disaster.

Tony, seriously, what is that even supposed to mean? The only way I can fathom to read it is that you think we don’t need to bother with rigorous moral analysis in our response to such disasters.

The victims would not have wasted time discussing whether their consciences were malformed if they had had the opportunity to prevent the loss of so many lives. It pays to have a sense of perspective and to be able to judge precisely what we are entitled to do in such a situation… Your solution seems to be to do nothing in order to have a clear conscience. Much of the suffering in the world is caused by negligence and the failure to act when others are in desperate need of help and protection…

I’m sorry, where are you getting this from? What is “my solution”? I have no idea what you’re talking about here.

In any case, regardless of what you’re referring to, your claims here are obviously a red herring. We are not faced with the imminent need to take drastic action here that prevents us from discussing whether our consciences are malformed. If you have something to take care of that is more urgent than discussing conscience formation (and hopefully it won’t involving shooting any innocent train drivers in the head), why don’t you go take care of it and come back to continue this discussion when you’ve finished.

Instead of pursuing the matter of my conscience why not concentrate on whether the principle of the double effect is justified in attempting to stop the train to prevent a nuclear holocaust? It is only necessary for you to demonstrate that my understanding of Catholic teaching is malformed in that respect. Remember that **the intention is not to kill **but to save…It is as simple as that. We were not created to sit on the fence and maintain our moral purity while the world disintegrates around us…

Why insist that I focus on PDE? Is malformation on the application of PDE the only kind of malformation of conscience that interests you for some reason? And why on earth do you keep associating the concepts of “sitting on the fence” and “maintaining moral purity”?

 

[AndyF]

Leela:

We learned it from psychological research on the consequences of beating our children as compared to those of using other means to teach our children.

The example doesn’t just apply to children but to adults. Disciplinary corporal measures are also an effective way to control behavior, this has been proven.

But you are making an assumption. You assume the results of God’s commands always play out in a timetable convenient for us to see(experiential). The danger in this case is if the timing is wrong and not allowed to fruition, then we are truncating at a milestone in his plan. We may have the power to preempt what God has designed, the result being a failure of the plan has a whole.

Recall another moral decision was made not by one person who we could claim erred in his judgment, but millions of pensive minds who concluded by decree that it was appropriate for children to hand over their parents to the Gestapo.

Andy

 

[tonyrey]

If, for example, Saddam Hussein thought he was truly acting rightly when he committed genocide against ethnic Kurds, would you say he was not morally culpably if he was obeying his conscience? Or any number of serial killers?

There is no evidence that Saddam attempted to justify his genocide on moral grounds. Nor that serial killers do so…

I don’t think that acting according to one’s conscience gets one completely off the hook of moral culpability.

Have I made that assertion? If one is acting according to a well-established moral principle - like that of the double effect - the likelihood of being morally culpable is considerably diminished.

As someone who has been told he is going to hell many times I think the claims your conscience is malformed are truly offered out of love but I try to give people the benefit of the doubt.

So do I but you will agree that your critics were often mistaken, did not want to admit it or were too sure of themselves. The acid test is the validity of their argument, not the claim that the other person’s conscience is malformed. That is a red herring…

The war against terror is not a war by any meaningful definition and is certainly not a just one.

Are you saying we are not justified in fighting terrorists? Do we have to wait for definitions to save people’s lives?

The opposition has no legitimate legal authority for one and we certainly have not tried to sit down with Al-Qaeda so this “war” is not the final option.

I am not referring to the war in Pakistan but the war against terrorism on our own soil.

Even if, however, we grant for a moment your point that this is a war and suppose it is a just one one of the bedrock points of the just war theory is that non-combatants (which would include this unwitting train driver) cannot be intentionally targeted (i.e. non-combatant immunity).

1. We cannot be sure that the train driver is not an accomplice.
2. Non-combatants cannot be intentionally targeted but if they happen to be in the vicinity of a nuclear device planted by terrorists we are justified in taking the risk of killing them because they would almost certainly die if it explodes.
3. The intention is not to kill the train driver but to stop the train.

As someone has said above, the principle of double effect does not and cannot apply here. In fact, the principle of double effect is pointless if you reject the notion of intrinsically evil acts since the first condition of the principle is that the act not be intrinsically evil.

When and where have I rejected the notion of an intrinsically evil act?

Further, the bad effect–killing this person–is the means by which the good effect follows so the principle fails there as well.

1. You are taking it for granted that the train driver will be killed.
2. If he were only wounded and the nuclear holocaust were averted what would be your reaction then?
3. If the bullet missed him completely but made him stop the train would one still be unjustified in having taken the risk of killing him?