Teleology and natural law: a secular argument against homosexual activity.

[jonathan_hili]

Hi all, was musing about how little natural law theory is respected these days, even though everyone still appeals to it in practice (kind of like the atheist shouting, “Oh My G…!” when afraid).

I wondered whether a more teleological approach using natural law, based on the purpose of our physiology, could be used to derive general moral principles which undermine homosexual activity.

For example, the evident purpose of the eye is to see and the evident purpose of the ear is the hear. An eye that sees poorly and an ear that hears poorly we consider disordered and attempt to restore to full health in some way. Likewise, not only human body parts but human actions, like eating, have a primary purpose to nourish the body. If we see that this is not occurring (for instance, during a famine or when someone is just eating junk food), we consider there is a disorder in the action of eating and also attempt to fix the problem.

No-one will deny, I’m sure, that human organs can be multi-functionals and human actions have more than one purpose, however, both body parts and actions have a primary purpose, the removal of which destroy its very reason for being. Thus, an eye which sees can also be used to stare at a person to unnerve them; an action of eating for nutrition can also be a pleasurable action. Yet, the staring and pleasure are secondary and incidental; without them, the body part and action still function and fulfill a self-evident purpose. Take away the primary purpose, however, and it is unclear why the organ or action are there at all.

Now, we come to homosexual activity. This activity seems to violate the primary purpose of both body parts (sex organs) and human actions (unitive procreation), and base itself solely on secondary effects: pleasure, intimacy, etc.

I guess the argument would run like this: if we can recognise the disorder in other human organs and actions that violate their primary teleology and attempt to fix them, shouldn’t we (the moral principle) do the same with regards to homosexual activity?

I welcome your criticisms.

 

[sowinskija]

sounds right:shrug:

 

[jonathan_hili]

I know, but look for something wrong with it.

I think one thing we need to get better at is not coming up with good arguments (I think we tend to have most of the good arguments when it comes to moral issues), but coming up with better rebuttals.

 

[john78]

having to try to come up with any kind of secular or logical reasons why homosexual
"activities " is immoral, or wrong, is like trying to explain why someone should not beat themself in the head with a hard object just because it feels good.

 

[MarkThompson]

Hi all, was musing about how little natural law theory is respected these days, even though everyone still appeals to it in practice (kind of like the atheist shouting, “Oh My G…!” when afraid).

I wondered whether a more teleological approach using natural law, based on the purpose of our physiology, could be used to derive general moral principles which undermine homosexual activity.

For example, the evident purpose of the eye is to see and the evident purpose of the ear is the hear. An eye that sees poorly and an ear that hears poorly we consider disordered and attempt to restore to full health in some way. Likewise, not only human body parts but human actions, like eating, have a primary purpose to nourish the body. If we see that this is not occurring (for instance, during a famine or when someone is just eating junk food), we consider there is a disorder in the action of eating and also attempt to fix the problem.

No-one will deny, I’m sure, that human organs can be multi-functionals and human actions have more than one purpose, however, both body parts and actions have a primary purpose, the removal of which destroy its very reason for being. Thus, an eye which sees can also be used to stare at a person to unnerve them; an action of eating for nutrition can also be a pleasurable action. Yet, the staring and pleasure are secondary and incidental; without them, the body part and action still function and fulfill a self-evident purpose. Take away the primary purpose, however, and it is unclear why the organ or action are there at all.

Now, we come to homosexual activity. This activity seems to violate the primary purpose of both body parts (sex organs) and human actions (unitive procreation), and base itself solely on secondary effects: pleasure, intimacy, etc.

I guess the argument would run like this: if we can recognise the disorder in other human organs and actions that violate their primary teleology and attempt to fix them, shouldn’t we (the moral principle) do the same with regards to homosexual activity?

I welcome your criticisms.

As a strong believer in divine law, but a fairly strong disbeliever in so-called “natural law” (i.e., divine-law-for-agnostics), here are a few things one might say in response.

First, the fact that something evolved for a specific purpose, which is to say to fulfill a specific function in nature, simply has no bearing on whether it is appropriate to use it for other things. Even if I don’t say “evolved” but rather “was created” (though natural law properly ought not rely on any conception of God stronger than Deism) that fact holds. The chicken egg evolved (or was created) to allow birds to reproduce, but it does not follow that using it to make an omelet or a quiche is an immoral perversion of the natural order. The fight-or-flight response in man developed to protect us from danger; it does not seem immoral to trigger it deliberately for pleasure in a non-dangerous circumstance such as watching a horror movie or riding a roller coaster. Etc.

Second, a homosexual might say, even if you were right that the overriding purpose of their sex organs were for reproduction though opposite-sex intercourse, the plain fact is that they don’t want to have opposite-sex intercourse and are not going to do it. Since celibacy is not immoral, you can hardly object to that. But then it is better that the organs should be used to fulfill one or more of their evident secondary purposes – providing pleasure, strengthening interpersonal bonds – than not to be used at all.

Third, and I suppose this is really an abstraction of the first point, you are still left with the fundamental problem of getting from “is” to “ought.” The necessary assumption – which can roughly be said to be the proposition that it is immoral to use something other than for its telos – is highly non-obvious. What makes it immoral? If you posit God, then perhaps “God says so,” but now you have left natural law and arrived at a theory of divine command. If you bracket God, then you are left to grope around for arguments about utility or whatever else, but that project, getting from “is” to “ought” on purely naturalistic grounds, has always been doomed to failure.

 

[jonathan_hili]

Thanks for the critique, Mark, it’ll give me something to chew on.

By the way, don’t you know that the Church teaches “natural law” theory and that it is very scriptural?

First, the fact that something evolved for a specific purpose, which is to say to fulfill a specific function in nature, simply has no bearing on whether it is appropriate to use it for other things. Even if I don’t say “evolved” but rather “was created” (though natural law properly ought not rely on any conception of God stronger than Deism) that fact holds. The chicken egg evolved (or was created) to allow birds to reproduce, but it does not follow that using it to make an omelet or a quiche is an immoral perversion of the natural order. The fight-or-flight response in man developed to protect us from danger; it does not seem immoral to trigger it deliberately for pleasure in a non-dangerous circumstance such as watching a horror movie or riding a roller coaster. Etc.

I agree with you when you say: “the fact that something evolved for a specific purpose, which is to say to fulfill a specific function in nature, simply has no bearing on whether it is appropriate to use it for other things”. However, the whole point of what I was saying that the use it is put to is inappropriate. So, the primary use of legs, let’s say, is mobility, to move around, so we have both the organ (legs) and the action (walking, running, etc.). However, you could also use your legs to dance. Fine, that’s an appropriate function and doesn’t violate the primary one. However, the primary use of genitalia is, apart from going to the loo(!), intercourse and procreation. Now, you could certainly use this genitalia for pleasure, provided it doesn’t violate the primary purpose. Now, homosexual acts do this with regards to both the organs and the actions. It would be like saying that a morally right use of your legs would be to break them with a sledgehammer.

Second, a homosexual might say, even if you were right that the overriding purpose of their sex organs were for reproduction though opposite-sex intercourse, the plain fact is that they don’t want to have opposite-sex intercourse and are not going to do it. Since celibacy is not immoral, you can hardly object to that. But then it is better that the organs should be used to fulfill one or more of their evident secondary purposes – providing pleasure, strengthening interpersonal bonds – than not to be used at all.

Good point. However, on the one hand, whether someone “wants” to do something or not, it doesn’t make it morally right. On the other, celibacy does not violate the primary purpose of either the organ or the action with regards to intercourse because celibacy is not an action that uses the organ; it’s essentially “doing nothing”. Likewise, closing your eyes to sleep doesn’t violate the use of your eyes, even though you are not using them for sight. However, blinding your eyes would do this.

Third, and I suppose this is really an abstraction of the first point, you are still left with the fundamental problem of getting from “is” to “ought.” The necessary assumption – which can roughly be said to be the proposition that it is immoral to use something other than for its telos – is highly non-obvious. What makes it immoral? If you posit God, then perhaps “God says so,” but now you have left natural law and arrived at a theory of divine command. If you bracket God, then you are left to grope around for arguments about utility or whatever else, but that project, getting from “is” to “ought” on purely naturalistic grounds, has always been doomed to failure.

I don’t think there is a problem with getting an “ought” from an “is” in this case because we recognise that the body has a teleology and to interrupt this is wrong. All you need to do is appeal to someone’s desire to fulfill what is in the best interests of their physiology, and hardly anyone will disagree with that. More people are likely to not care about what God says than to not care about what is good for their bodies.

 

[Iron_Donkey]

I agree with you when you say: “the fact that something evolved for a specific purpose, which is to say to fulfill a specific function in nature, simply has no bearing on whether it is appropriate to use it for other things”. However, the whole point of what I was saying that the use it is put to is inappropriate. So, the primary use of legs, let’s say, is mobility, to move around, so we have both the organ (legs) and the action (walking, running, etc.). However, you could also use your legs to dance. Fine, that’s an appropriate function and doesn’t violate the primary one. However, the primary use of genitalia is, apart from going to the loo(!), intercourse and procreation. Now, you could certainly use this genitalia for pleasure, provided it doesn’t violate the primary purpose. Now, homosexual acts do this with regards to both the organs and the actions. It would be like saying that a morally right use of your legs would be to break them with a sledgehammer.

Further, you might add that the procreative and pleasure aspect of the act are fundamentally inseparable, and that the procreative action follows directly from the pleasure action.

As someone said in a rather long, but good, debate that I will try to find a link to if I can, the uses of the mouth for speaking and eating are separate. You do not eat a hamburger, and then say “oh man, this hamburger is not going to be any good unless I can give a short speech,” or the other way around, the giving of a speech does not naturally lead to you eating a hamburger. Whereas the link clearly exists in sex.

EDIT: The link: blog.newadvent.org/2012/10/video-atheist-and-catholic-debate-same.html Long, but I highly recommend watching it in full.

 

[MarkThompson]

By the way, don’t you know that the Church teaches “natural law” theory and that it is very scriptural?

Regrettably, yes. That does not make it good philosophy, however. It can be partly salvaged by folding it into divine command theory, as e.g. when people say that God imprinted a conscience upon man’s nature to point us toward the right, but otherwise I do not think it is good for very much.

However, the whole point of what I was saying that the use it is put to is inappropriate. … Now, you could certainly use this genitalia for pleasure, provided it doesn’t violate the primary purpose.

This is begging the question. What makes violating the telos of something morally wrong? (Please assume a natural, not a divinely ordained, teleology.)

Now, homosexual acts do this with regards to both the organs and the actions. It would be like saying that a morally right use of your legs would be to break them with a sledgehammer.

You might have a better case on this one if homosexual sex destroyed the sex organs, which it does not. And come to think of it, making an omelet does destroy the eggs. Immoral?

Good point. However, on the one hand, whether someone “wants” to do something or not, it doesn’t make it morally right. On the other, celibacy does not violate the primary purpose of either the organ or the action with regards to intercourse because celibacy is not an action that uses the organ; it’s essentially “doing nothing”. Likewise, closing your eyes to sleep doesn’t violate the use of your eyes, even though you are not using them for sight. However, blinding your eyes would do this.

Again, homosexual sex does not destroy the sex organs. And, on the other hand, it does further some of (what would seem to most people to be) the natural purposes of sex in general, of which I gave two examples previously.

I don’t think there is a problem with getting an “ought” from an “is” in this case because we recognise that the body has a teleology and to interrupt this is wrong.

This is still begging the question. What is there about nature that could make it morally wrong to defy or even twist it? I suppose the telos of the Chicago River was to drain part of northern Illinois into Lake Michigan; was it a violation of natural law to reverse its flow to drain Lake Michigan into the Mississippi? The telos of the virus that causes yellow fever is to … well, you get the picture.

All you need to do is appeal to someone’s desire to fulfill what is in the best interests of their physiology, and hardly anyone will disagree with that.

The proposition that it is immoral to go against the best interests of your physiology is far from self-proving. Anyway, a homosexual would argue that homosexual sex is physically harmless and thus does not go against the best interests of their physiology. As a fallback, the homosexual could even say that, to the extent it might conflict with the best interests of the body (as by having an increased possibility vis-à-vis celibacy of disease transmission), this is outweighed by the emotional and psychological benefits. In just the same way, he would argue, playing football or climbing mountains offers a severely elevated risk of damage to the body versus inactivity (or doing equivalent exercise in the safety of a gym), but we are not inclined to say as a consequence that these activities go against “the best interests of [one’s] physiology” and so must be judged immoral.

 

[jonathan_hili]

Regrettably, yes. That does not make it good philosophy, however.

Why don’t you see it as good philosophy, Mark? I get the importance of Divine command theory but I find it difficult to use with those who aren’t believers, it doesn’t seem to fit the evidence of our moral lives, and furthermore, it tends to suggest that unbelievers cannot be saved (which goes against the teaching of the Church as well), since they would have no real sense of right and wrong and therefore could not pursue the good in their lives.

This is begging the question. What makes violating the telos of something morally wrong? (Please assume a natural, not a divinely ordained, teleology.)

I’m not saying violating a telos is morally wrong, but that it is irrational and not in-keeping with the function of our physiology. To do something that is irrational and harmful to oneself is morally wrong, however. I’d say that’s self-evident, hence the appeal to natural law.

You might have a better case on this one if homosexual sex destroyed the sex organs, which it does not. And come to think of it, making an omelet does destroy the eggs. Immoral?

But whether the actual part is destroy or not is irrelevant, it is the function that is destroy which is relevant. Whether you break you legs with a sledgehammer, or concrete yourself to the floor, or decide never to walk again for the sake of it, we can all recognise a problem here because you are violating what your legs are for, i.e. movement.

I don’t get the omelette example? An egg’s function for reproduction is not always actualised, with either chickens or humans. But for a human to break a chicken egg that is not fertilised doesn’t make it immoral because it doesn’t impair a function.

Again, homosexual sex does not destroy the sex organs.

Destruction is irrelevant, impairment of teleology is. As for the “natural purpose of sex”: the primary purpose isn’t pleasure; pleasure is secondary and complementary.

This is still begging the question. What is there about nature that could make it morally wrong to defy or even twist it?

It might seem like begging the question but I contend it’s not: that we all know as part of our nature and reflection upon it, that to subvert proper and primary human teleology is wrong, that is, immoral. I guess I could come up with some moral principles that we’d all agree on as true, for instance, it is always better to prefer health to harm, or function to disfunction, but I’m not sure that’s necessary.

In the examples of a river or virus, we are talking about external entities, not ourselves, and they do not seem to be the subjects of moral action the way human beings are. For example, it is morally okay to eat a chicken but not a human being; it is okay to tie up your dog while you go into the shops, but not your baby brother; and it is fine to swat a fly for being irritating, but not poison your mother-in-law (though I’m fussy on this last one).

In the with case with a river, that depends, since they are often part of an ecosystem that functions in a delicate manner. Some changes to this system, for instance, damming a river, can seriously impair the ecosystem and may even be more immoral.

As for a virus, well, we have competing functions: the virus attempting to replicate itself, our bodies to defend itself against the virus.

The proposition that it is immoral to go against the best interests of your physiology is far from self-proving.

Are you sure? I’d like to see at least one example where somebody would say it is morally better, all these being equal, to go against the physiological primary function of an organ or action.

Anyway, a homosexual would argue that homosexual sex is physically harmless and thus does not go against the best interests of their physiology. As a fallback, the homosexual could even say that, to the extent it might conflict with the best interests of the body (as by having an increased possibility vis-à-vis celibacy of disease transmission), this is outweighed by the emotional and psychological benefits. In just the same way, he would argue, playing football…

But again, things like playing sport or mountaineering are not equivalent to homosexual actions because they don’t violate the primary function of either organs or actions.

I’m not sure how it could be argued that homosexual activity is physically harmless when it violates the purpose of the sex organs and actions associated. But even if this could be maintained, it doesn’t follow that something physically harmless is morally right, just like playing tennis with little kittens instead of tennis balls is physically harmless but it doesn’t make it moral.

Now, it’s true, the argument could be made that there are emotional and psychological benefits, and I think that’s valid as far as it goes - which is, that one can preferably choose homosexual activity for this reason, but it doesn’t show that one can morally choose homosexual activity for this reason. Likewise, I might want to rape a woman because it will fulfill my sexual urge and function and may, to some degree, have emotional or psychological benefits, but that doesn’t mean I am morally right to do so.

Thanks again for the intelligent responses. They’re appreciated.

 

[MarkThompson]

Thanks for your reply, Jonathan. I’ll answer in a couple of parts to keep this from becoming unmanageable.

Why don’t you see it as good philosophy, Mark? I get the importance of Divine command theory but I find it difficult to use with those who aren’t believers, it doesn’t seem to fit the evidence of our moral lives, …

I feel convinced that it is impossible to get from “is” to “ought” on purely naturalistic terms. Atoms and molecules simply don’t have moral properties, and they will never get them no matter how you arrange them. (Speaking of which, I’m a skeptic about mereology too, but I need to give it much more consideration and this is neither the time nor the place to bring it up.)

Indeed, in a (posited) atheistic world, I find the concepts of “right” and “moral” to be meaningless as predicates, unless they are to be taken as shorthand for “maximizing utility” or “generally approved of by society,” or whatever one’s pet theory might be. I cannot conceive of any legitimate account of what “right” and “moral” are that does not ultimately rest upon some non-naturalistic principle such as God. It is of course true that atheists talk about and even feel things to be “right” or “wrong,” but this is either based on feelings due to evolved human nature, or to culturally-instilled conceptions, or to their mistaken adoption of flawed moral philosophies; it would not withstand rigorous scrutiny.

… and furthermore, it tends to suggest that unbelievers cannot be saved (which goes against the teaching of the Church as well), since they would have no real sense of right and wrong and therefore could not pursue the good in their lives.

People might pursue the good for lots of reasons other than awe of God. For instance human nature (taboo against incest is evidently biological), culture (your parents taught you not to lie or cheat), or even incorrect philosophies (a utilitarian should feed the starving to maximize world utility).

I’m not saying violating a telos is morally wrong, but that it is irrational and not in-keeping with the function of our physiology. To do something that is irrational and harmful to oneself is morally wrong, however. I’d say that’s self-evident, hence the appeal to natural law.

I don’t find it self-evident at all. Here is your problem:

1. X is irrational.
2. ???

---

→ 3. X is wrong.
It’s questionable, firstly, whether “irrational” is even a meaningful term in the sense in which you’re using it here. Is it a stand-in for “does not maximize utility”? Assuming that you could give a thoroughgoing, naturalistic account of what is and isn’t “rational,” I still can’t see how one makes the leap to morality. “It is wrong to be irrational” just isn’t tenable as a fundamental axiom. The same is true even of “It is wrong to injure yourself.” Your objector, of course, is going to reject your axioms not by saying that these things are right, but simply that they are events in the natural world that do not have any moral valuation at all, just as winning the lottery or dying in an earthquake is not “right” or “wrong.”

 

[Iron_Donkey]

I don’t find it self-evident at all. Here is your problem:

1. X is irrational.
2. ???

---

→ 3. X is wrong.
It’s questionable, firstly, whether “irrational” is even a meaningful term in the sense in which you’re using it here. Is it a stand-in for “does not maximize utility”? Assuming that you could give a thoroughgoing, naturalistic account of what is and isn’t “rational,” I still can’t see how one makes the leap to morality. “It is wrong to be irrational” just isn’t tenable as a fundamental axiom. The same is true even of “It is wrong to injure yourself.” Your objector, of course, is going to reject your axioms not by saying that these things are right, but simply that they are events in the natural world that do not have any moral valuation at all, just as winning the lottery or dying in an earthquake is not “right” or “wrong.”

Just to step in on this part, I think the argument if you don’t take this as self evident is as follows: Start with something like “harm towards people is a bad thing.” (People does not specify other people, harm done to anyone is a bad thing.) But not all bad things are absolutely prohibited, so that is not enough. One can cause harm to people (self or others) if there is a rational reason by which one determines that the harm is a necessary (or appears to be necessary after due consideration) though regrettable side effect. But absent such a thing which makes harm acceptable, because it is a bad thing, it is morally prohibited.

Eg it is wrong to murder someone for no purpose, but it is not wrong to kill in self defense as a last resort.

Thus “it is harmful” and “there is no justifying reason (irrational)” implies that it can’t be done. It’s not that either by itself is sufficient, but that the conjunction of the two are.

 

[MarkThompson]

But whether the actual part is destroy or not is irrelevant, it is the function that is destroy which is relevant. Whether you break you legs with a sledgehammer, or concrete yourself to the floor, or decide never to walk again for the sake of it, we can all recognise a problem here because you are violating what your legs are for, i.e. movement.

But homosexual sex does not “destroy” the function of the sex organs any more than complete abstinence does. A person who says “I simply don’t want to have sex at all” is “deciding never to walk again for the sake of it,” in your terms. I take it that you don’t consider perfect abstinence immoral, though. Come to think of it, would you say that a person who voluntarily decided never to walk again was behaving immorally (ceteris paribus, of course; let’s assume he’s not inconveniencing his family or anything but just opting not to use his legs for their “purpose”)? I don’t think I would, not without more.

And so, to continue with your terms, a person who eschews heterosexual for homosexual sex is not smashing his legs, but simply deciding (1) not to use them to walk, and then (2) as long as they’re idle, to use them for something enjoyable.

It might seem like begging the question but I contend it’s not: that we all know as part of our nature and reflection upon it, that to subvert proper and primary human teleology is wrong, that is, immoral. I guess I could come up with some moral principles that we’d all agree on as true, for instance, it is always better to prefer health to harm, or function to disfunction, but I’m not sure that’s necessary.

There are certainly very good reasons for preferring health to harm or function to dysfunction, but I don’t know how you are going to get from that to a moral, evaluative judgment, other than by positing another one of your axioms. You have to give a (noncircular) account of what the world “moral” means before you can hope to show that violating a telos is immoral.

Incidentally, your very phrase “proper teleology” seems to imply an ex ante evaluative judgment that you have not spelled out.

In the examples of a river or virus, we are talking about external entities, not ourselves, and they do not seem to be the subjects of moral action the way human beings are.

Why not? Why should the parts of my body have a telos while the parts of a dog, or a tree, or a mountain do not? Are humans so special because God created us with a telos in mind? Does your teleology rely on the singularness-of-mankind as another axiom?

In the with case with a river, that depends, since they are often part of an ecosystem that functions in a delicate manner. Some changes to this system, for instance, damming a river, can seriously impair the ecosystem and may even be more immoral.

I am not talking about impairing the ecosystem, just about violating the telos of the river. Likewise, you would grant that even if homosexual sex does not physically damage or impair the body or the sex organs, it violates their telos.

Are you sure? I’d like to see at least one example where somebody would say it is morally better, all these being equal, to go against the physiological primary function of an organ or action.

As I said above, a person would not say that it is morally better, but merely that it is a naturalistic event devoid of moral content. Or a typical person might say that such a thing (like starving yourself, to take an example) it is immoral to the extent it harms other people, stupid to the extent it harms you, and that whether it harms the metaphysical purpose of your stomach is not even a valid question.

 

[MarkThompson]

Start with something like “harm towards people is a bad thing.” … One can cause harm to people (self or others) if there is a rational reason by which one determines that the harm is a necessary (or appears to be necessary after due consideration) though regrettable side effect.

This does not work. If we are trying to build our moral system on the basis of teleology, then we cannot predicate our teleology upon moral judgments or principles, especially the two non-obvious principles on which you would have us rely. Why should we pick your second principle over any other alternative, such as, for instance, “One can cause harm to people (self or others) if there is a rational reason by which one determines that it will maximize utility”? You cannot appeal to still further moral or evaluative reasons in deciding between the contestants hoping to serve as the axioms for the teleology on which we intend to build our morals (can you?). So if somebody rejects your axioms as unsound, where will you turn for support?

 

[Iron_Donkey]

This does not work. If we are trying to build our moral system on the basis of teleology, then we cannot predicate our teleology upon moral judgments or principles, especially the two non-obvious principles on which you would have us rely. Why should we pick your second principle over any other alternative, such as, for instance, “One can cause harm to people (self or others) if there is a rational reason by which one determines that it will maximize utility”? You cannot appeal to still further moral or evaluative reasons in deciding between the contestants hoping to serve as the axioms for the teleology on which we intend to build our morals (can you?). So if somebody rejects your axioms as unsound, where will you turn for support?

Well yes, I was kind of assuming you had a binding moral system you were working within and not building one from scratch. If you’re building one from scratch, to be consistent, such would be fine. Of course, consistency is not enough to make it a binding moral system, for that it needs to originate from a higher power (the existence of which is guaranteed by natural reason, via Aquinas etc).

To expand then:

Now, if our moral system does so originate, then what is moral must follow from the nature of that power. Natural reason tells us that to exist is generally good (Aquinas, the essence of the higher power is existence, this is a natural reason fact), and things (harm) which goes against this are generally bad. Thus, without further examination, such things for their own sakes generally need to be avoided.

The question is then “are there circumstance in which the things that need to be generally avoided for their own sakes are actually permissible?” And again, assuming we’re working with a moral system that originates from this power (and without reference to anything this power may or may not have said, to keep it natural) a partial answer would be, without going into detail, “if there are actions that involve things that are bad but which are nevertheless acceptable, then they must at least have some rationalization which make the action as a whole for the good.” That is, things which are contrary to existence (are harmful, go against the natural source of our morality) overall are definitely bad, so things which involve bad and are still contrary to existence overall must still be bad.

There may be things within that set of actions (involve bad, overall favor the good) which are or are not permissible, but all things that involved bad things yet are permissible are within that set. So the fact that homosexual acts are irrational (there is no justification by which they, by themselves, can be said to favor the overall good) makes them not in that set, and hence, since they involve a bad thing (are harmful, go against existence, which is the naturally known standard from which morality flows), they can not be allowed.

Now I’ll admit I’m a total amateur here, but I’m pretty sure this works.

 

[jonathan_hili]

Hmmm something to chew on.

I feel convinced that it is impossible to get from “is” to “ought” on purely naturalistic terms. Atoms and molecules simply don’t have moral properties, and they will never get them no matter how you arrange them. (Speaking of which, I’m a skeptic about mereology too, but I need to give it much more consideration and this is neither the time nor the place to bring it up.)

Indeed, in a (posited) atheistic world, I find the concepts of “right” and “moral” to be meaningless as predicates, unless they are to be taken as shorthand for “maximizing utility” or “generally approved of by society,” or whatever one’s pet theory might be. I cannot conceive of any legitimate account of what “right” and “moral” are that does not ultimately rest upon some non-naturalistic principle such as God. It is of course true that atheists talk about and even feel things to be “right” or “wrong,” but this is either based on feelings due to evolved human nature, or to culturally-instilled conceptions, or to their mistaken adoption of flawed moral philosophies; it would not withstand rigorous scrutiny.

I don’t disagree with you. Yet appealing to natural law isn’t precisely the same as what you are saying, although I do believe to be legitimate, natural law theory does need to be grounded in God, or some kind of transcendent yet imperatival moral force.

I think natural law is a kind of indirect Divine Command theory, in that, God’s commands are rooted in our nature and reason. I would be trying to derive an “ought” from an “is” if I didn’t believe that natural law was an objectively true and that we all know it is.

People might pursue the good for lots of reasons other than awe of God. For instance human nature (taboo against incest is evidently biological), culture (your parents taught you not to lie or cheat), or even incorrect philosophies (a utilitarian should feed the starving to maximize world utility).

That might be true, but if that’s the case their pursuit of goodness would be incidental. They couldn’t honestly say: “I’ve tried to live a good life” but rather “I’ve tried to follow my culture’s/philosophy’s standard of good, whereas you Nazis are doing the same” thus rendering morality relativistic. Yet, natural law is universally binding, so I think that’s the advantage it has.

I don’t find it self-evident at all. Here is your problem:

1. X is irrational.
2. ???

---

→ 3. X is wrong.
It’s questionable, firstly, whether “irrational” is even a meaningful term in the sense in which you’re using it here. Is it a stand-in for “does not maximize utility”? Assuming that you could give a thoroughgoing, naturalistic account of what is and isn’t “rational,” I still can’t see how one makes the leap to morality. “It is wrong to be irrational” just isn’t tenable as a fundamental axiom. The same is true even of “It is wrong to injure yourself.” Your objector, of course, is going to reject your axioms not by saying that these things are right, but simply that they are events in the natural world that do not have any moral valuation at all, just as winning the lottery or dying in an earthquake is not “right” or “wrong.”

It is not just that X is irrational, but that it is harmful, that is, does not fulfill the evident purpose of a human organ and/or action. What is self-evident, I think, is that deliberately harming oneself or doing something obviously contrary to the body. Now, that doesn’t mean that people won’t do this and try to rationalise their behaviour.

I guess it’s the same as saying that all people are equal. That seems self-evident. Yet why? With natural law, you can’t really get much further than this. You can come up with reasons based on utility, for instance, but they just substantiate what’s already known by reason and nature. I think all of morality is in this boat, Divine Command theory too.

I mean, if you say X is good because God’s commands it, the sceptic will reply: “Why I should I obey God?” and then you have to appeal to some form of utility, as far as I can see.

 

[jonathan_hili]

Just to step in on this part, I think the argument if you don’t take this as self evident is as follows: Start with something like “harm towards people is a bad thing.” (People does not specify other people, harm done to anyone is a bad thing.) But not all bad things are absolutely prohibited, so that is not enough. One can cause harm to people (self or others) if there is a rational reason by which one determines that the harm is a necessary (or appears to be necessary after due consideration) though regrettable side effect. But absent such a thing which makes harm acceptable, because it is a bad thing, it is morally prohibited.

Eg it is wrong to murder someone for no purpose, but it is not wrong to kill in self defense as a last resort.

Thus “it is harmful” and “there is no justifying reason (irrational)” implies that it can’t be done. It’s not that either by itself is sufficient, but that the conjunction of the two are.

Good point, but I think it goes slightly beyond that. By “harm” I don’t just mean “is painful” or “damaging” but “impairing to the function of evident design”. Killing a person (or anything: let’s say, causing death upon life), in this case, is wrong prima facie because the function of a living thing is to continue living. Justifications need to be made to substantiate the killing to make it moral, as can be the case in self-defense. Therefore, as you point out, a rationalisation is needed.

Now, I think with homosexual actions, we just don’t have that rationalisation.

Some other examples might help:

• You amputate a limb (impair the organ and function) because of disease, so stop the destruction of the whole.
• You have your appendix removed (impair the organ and function) because if it bursts it threatens the safety of the whole.
• You might have a hysterectomy for a similar reason, to stop a cancer from spreading.
• etc.

(Sorry am in a bit of a rush this morning.)

I just don’t see how this can apply to homosexual actions.

 

[Iron_Donkey]

Good point, but I think it goes slightly beyond that. By “harm” I don’t just mean “is painful” or “damaging” but “impairing to the function of evident design”. Killing a person (or anything: let’s say, causing death upon life), in this case, is wrong prima facie because the function of a living thing is to continue living. Justifications need to be made to substantiate the killing to make it moral, as can be the case in self-defense. Therefore, as you point out, a rationalisation is needed.

Now, I think with homosexual actions, we just don’t have that rationalisation.

Some other examples might help:

• You amputate a limb (impair the organ and function) because of disease, so stop the destruction of the whole.
• You have your appendix removed (impair the organ and function) because if it bursts it threatens the safety of the whole.
• You might have a hysterectomy for a similar reason, to stop a cancer from spreading.
• etc.

(Sorry am in a bit of a rush this morning.)

I just don’t see how this can apply to homosexual actions.

Agree. I was actually trying to make more or less the same point you just did, in response to a post that said “irrational and harmful may not necessarily imply morally wrong.”

 

[jonathan_hili]

Agree. I was actually trying to make more or less the same point you just did, in response to a post that said “irrational and harmful may not necessarily imply morally wrong.”

Your dog looks like Cujo!

 

[Iron_Donkey]

Your dog looks like Cujo!

I had to google Cujo, but there is a striking resemblance. In my dog’s defense, she only has a few of the symptoms of rabies - and it has been ages since she last ate anyone.

 

[jonathan_hili]

I had to google Cujo, but there is a striking resemblance. In my dog’s defense, she only has a few of the symptoms of rabies - and it has been ages since she last ate anyone.

I’m glad of that!