Teleology important for science

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Aristotle left the whole question of “nous” in nature hanging up in the air …

(to reenforce the punning) 😃
 
The problem with materialism and the intellect, this intentionality or aboutness I am writing about, is in one manner very simple, and in another not something that clicks very easily. The point is that material representations have no aboutness intrinsic to them. That is, no neural pattern in my brain is ever actually about France, or about a cat, or about anything else.
You nailed it!!

What “about” the “about”?

Leibniz said it sometime ago: when you open the brain, and see this material part affecting that material part, you still haven’t explained “perception”. That is, why would these material activities “produce” perception, awareness. This is all very “mysterious”.
 
Thank you! Though I want to clarify that I’m not just speaking of perception or what are called qualia.
 
Just an historical note.

For Aristotle, “ends” are not “designs” or “purposes”. Natural beings have ends in the absence of a designer.

We know this because Aristotle’s God is blissfully unaware of the rest of the universe (i.e., is not a Creator). And Aristotle’s other non-human “intelligences” seem to be also blissfully unaware, at least of sublunar beings.

In other words, Aristotle left the whole question of “nous” in nature up in the air.

On the other hand, there’s always Plato (with his demiurge - some say myth, some say not so fast).

Regardless, it’s still important to distinguish between “ends” and “designs”, or “ends” and “purposes”.
I am not so sure it is that easy to peg Aristotle. His understanding of ends were something like “final causes” which means the ends for which things exist in some sense “caused” those things to exist. That does not eliminate “designs” or “purposes” from his concept of “ends” because his view of ends were not merely where things end up, but as the “causes” in some sense of the things that end up there.

Final causation answers “why things exist” in the sense of being the explanation or reason for their existence. How can an “end” be an explanation or “reason for” unless there is some prior-ness to or dependence upon the existence of the reason or explanation. That a final cause cannot be an ad hoc or explanation after-the-fact would seem a proper implication.
 
Well, I’ve said my piece to Tony so let’s get on with it. Regarding squirrels: you may not have noticed but one regular poster on CAF recently claimed X-ray pictures were taken before they were even invented, and another outed himself as a communist imperialist sympathizer. So imho squirrels are the least of our problems.

Regarding X and Y: You’re asking a religious question. Not sure of this as I’m not Catholic, but it seems to me that for your purposes here you could speak of transubstantiation or the Incarnation. If the bread is only physical, how does it become the body of Christ? It’s a miracle, a mystery. How can a physical man be Christ? It’s a miracle, a mystery.
You are deflecting again. You are attempting to sideline my point by directing it towards transubstantiation when I never even brought it up.

This is merely the kind of standard Christology that Lewis would call “mere Christianity.” Christians, including Baptists, as far as I know, believe that the second person of the Trinity (God) became the man Jesus. Jesus was fully human, fully divine.

The question isn’t “How can a physical man be Christ?” The question is: How can God become “fully human” if what it means to be “fully human” is reducible to nothing more than a specific agglomeration of neuro-chemicals? There is nothing for God to become because “fully human” is fully explicable as a formulation of those chemicals.

Catholics aren’t the ones claiming that to be a “physical man” is nothing more than being a collection of chemicals. You are the one claiming that, so you can’t deflect from answering by insisting that Catholics have to answer for YOUR problematic notions.

By the way, the understanding of transubstantiation is not that God mysteriously or miraculously becomes merely physical bread. Catholics don’t believe that. Catholics claim that God is fully present and fully divine under the outward appearance of bread. Essentially, the Eucharist is no longer bread, but has substantially become God even while appearing to be bread.

The other issue is that “bread is only physical” isn’t a proper depiction of Thomistic metaphysics because neither Thomists (nor Catholics) claim that the essence of what bread is is reducible to the mere physical accidents of what bread appears to be – its quantifiable properties. That is applying your materialistic framework to the theological understanding, which completely misrepresents it.
Now I realize that might be a problem for Thomists, as they seem to expect everything can be rationally explained, but I’m not a Thomist, so squirrels to them. Metaphysically of course.
No, Thomists don’t have that problem because they aren’t the ones insisting that things like bread or human beings are reducible to their physical properties or accidents. You are.
As far as the mind is concerned, all the evidence, and that’s mountains and mountains of evidence, is that there’s no immaterial substance involved, so squirrels to Descartes.
The “mountains and mountains of evidence” is worth nothing more than squirrel nuts since it presumes only tangible physical evidence can serve as evidence in the first place. So discounting the “immaterial” as an essential part of your method will not even permit, let alone produce, anything immaterial within the process of collecting evidence. It is called turning your method into your metaphysics.
And if all substance is physical, if there is no other kind of substance, logically that’s the end of it, the fat lady sings. The soul is the form of the body - the mind arises from the configuration of physical processes. Just like bread is a configuration of physical processes.

Can’t see the problem. I mean really, can’t see the problem logically, evidentially or biblically.

No squirrels were harmed writing this post.
Again, this is pure deflection because I am not asking you to explain how Thomists might explain things, I am asking you to explain how you can legitimately hold a materialistic metaphysic at the same time as claiming God became man in Jesus.

Or are you denying that God did become man in Jesus?

If not, then kindly stop deflecting to what Thomists propose or fat ladies do or to the harming of squirrels, and answer the straightforward question: How do YOU reconcile your belief that God became man in Jesus with your belief that to be a man means nothing more than arranging a collection of chemicals in a particular way?

Did God merely become a bunch of chemicals – and nothing more – in Christ?

Is that what you believe? That God turned himself into molecules, proteins, minerals, and assorted other chemical constructs?

NOTE: It will NOT do – neither in response nor to deflect once more – to ask whether Catholics believe Christ becomes wheat flour, salt, oil and water. That isn’t what Thomists or Catholics believe.
 
I am not so sure it is that easy to peg Aristotle. His understanding of ends were something like “final causes” which means the ends for which things exist in some sense “caused” those things to exist.
I was just distinguishing “end” from “purpose”. The “end” of medicine, for example, is good health but the “purpose” of an individual doctor might be to make a lot of money.

This is a philosophical distinction like “essence”/ “accident”.

“End” is closely tied to the Aristotelian notion of “nature”. As such, “end” is independent of the subjective intentions of human beings.

In other words, we are not the source of natural “ends”, of “natures”. So we cannot change the “ends”.

What makes Aristotle particularly problematic is that, on the one hand, he sees there is “nous” (the Greek word for “mind”) in nature, i.e., embodied in natural ends, while, on the other hand, there is no owner of “nous”, no divine designer.
 
This is actually a question instead of a statement. Why is, or is, teleology important for science? I feel like science can move along just fine without believing in God. Can someone give an example where this is not the case? …
Yes. Any claim by scientists to do “science” on any thing other than what humans transcend in being is junk science.

Medical science limited to man’s physical body is science since man transcends his physical body. IMHO, psychology – the “science” of the soul – and its ilk are beyond the methods proper to science. If you cannot measure it then you cannot “science” it.
 
I was just distinguishing “end” from “purpose”. The “end” of medicine, for example, is good health but the “purpose” of an individual doctor might be to make a lot of money.

This is a philosophical distinction like “essence”/ “accident”.

“End” is closely tied to the Aristotelian notion of “nature”. As such, “end” is independent of the subjective intentions of human beings.

In other words, we are not the source of natural “ends”, of “natures”. So we cannot change the “ends”.

What makes Aristotle particularly problematic is that, on the one hand, he sees there is “nous” (the Greek word for “mind”) in nature, i.e., embodied in natural ends, while, on the other hand, there is no owner of “nous”, no divine designer.
I am not clear that Aristotle actually comes out and says there is no owner of nous and no divine designer. That sounds like a later addendum. Not saying something does not entail Aristotle didn’t think it.

On the other hand, that he develops the theory of the four causes as causes means that things are caused in a fully explicable way, which seems to point to designer, though not a human one. Perhaps this was Aristotle’s way of steering clear of the Greek gods as projections of human beings to the supernatural.

Regardless, I would think it proper to view truth as the final cause of reasoning. Human beings, and thinking beings – beings with minds, in general – possess the faculty of reason in order to arrive at the truth. In that sense, Aristotle would be correct in not ascribing a faculty like the ability to reason to God because God doesn’t need to arrive at the truth, he is Truth. He would have to be. And if he is truth he must be Mind or Nous – in that sense God or Nous has no owner above him or superintending him. God must BE Nous or Mind, not have nous or mind.
 
The proper argument isn’t that materialists deny that the mind and person exists, but that materialist assumptions ultimately lead to that conclusion by necessary logic. Whether a materialist recognizes it is moot
Hmmm. In the above, change “deny that the mind and person exists” to “deny there’s a world conspiracy”. Then change “materialist” to the name of an ethnicity. Bingo, the Nazi manifesto.

I mean come on, are you really so naive? Are you really so wondrous that you know what others believe better than they do themselves?

Therefore if you have any encouragement from being united with Christ, if any comfort from his love, if any common sharing in the Spirit, if any tenderness and compassion, then make my joy complete by being like-minded, having the same love, being one in spirit and of one mind. Do nothing out of selfish ambition or vain conceit. Rather, in humility value others above yourselves, not looking to your own interests but each of you to the interests of the others. - Phil 2
though at least something can be said if they understand the problem of intentionality (regarding whether material can explain our thoughts being about anything) and at least try to address it.
Of course they do. You’re talking about a large proportion of the world’s professional philosophers (see survey linked earlier), and scientists, etc. etc.

You think you, posting on an internet forum, has twigged something they haven’t?

Really?
 
I don’t think I’ve stumbled onto anything. These are arguments put forth by dualists (not necessarily Cartesian) against materialist philosophies. Some materialists even agree with the dualists on this point and so deny the mind.

So rather than just dance around the issue and post articles that do nothing to address dualist concerns with intentionality, perhaps you could try to understand the dualists’ point of issue, because materialists that continue to consider the mind and intentionality to be an emergent property have, far from addressing said concerns, have only said “we’ll discover it eventually” while not even addressing the dualists’ concern that it’s not just that they haven’t explained it, but that it’s logically impossible to explain the mind as an emergent whole given materialist assumptions. It’s that materialist assumptions are too narrow to allow for it.
 
All material substances are not simply material. Material is only one cause to their existence. They also have formal, efficient, and final causes. When Thomists speak of material they aren’t speaking of just the matter or substance that exists vs. some ghostly soul, but of limiting that substance to just material causes. It’s not like the form is removed and matter is left behind. All of these things are causes or principles of existence without which a material substance cannot actually be in being, not separate substances that merge together to make a living being or anything else, or come into being separately. Squirrels to Descartes indeed.

That said, any acknowledgement of angels seems to imply an acknowledgement of intellects and minds existing absent any material processes. It’s an acknowledgement of non-material substances. Why we must object to humans have intellects not fully explainable by efficient material causation, I don’t know.
I think you need to do more philosophical work to separate that from Cartesian dualism, as an acknowledgement of non-material substances is an acknowledgment of Cartesian dualism, and there’s no logical necessity for non-material substances, no evidence for them, and nothing in the intellect that Cartesian dualism alone can explain.
 
Yes. Any claim by scientists to do “science” on any thing other than what humans transcend in being is junk science.

Medical science limited to man’s physical body is science since man transcends his physical body. IMHO, psychology – the “science” of the soul – and its ilk are beyond the methods proper to science. If you cannot measure it then you cannot “science” it.
According to materialists the soul doesn’t exist nor does the mind nor does free will! The body reigns supreme in the scientific world because that is the location of the human brain which has succeeded in understanding itself and potentially all that exists - if we are to go by Stephen Hawking who claims that God is not needed to answer the questions of why there is something rather than nothing, why there is the current set of laws and not another, and why we exist at all. According to him, enough is known about M-theory to see that string theory points to the existence of a multiverse and this multiverse coupled with anthropic reasoning will suffice! It seems that the more knowledge scientists possess the more presumptuous they become but that is not surprising because persons, virtues and vices do not exist in their scheme of **things. 😉 **
 
The problem with materialism and the intellect, this intentionality or aboutness I am writing about, is in one manner very simple, and in another not something that clicks very easily. The point is that material representations have no aboutness intrinsic to them. That is, no neural pattern in my brain is ever actually about France, or about a cat, or about anything else. There is no intrinsic meaning to it that points to any concept beyond itself. Ultimately, it only ever actually can be about things in a derived way if it is interpreted to mean something by a mind. But we run into an issue here: If the mind is just material, and if material can’t be about anything, then any given material process that interprets another material process is itself not about anything, at pains of infinite regress. That is, a mind is something that can grasp meaning and concepts of things that in no way materially come to be anywhere in the mind. The concept of sitting, or of love, or of triangularity, or of dogginess. So either we deny that it’s impossible for the mind or thoughts to ever actually come to grasp or be these concepts, to be about anything that’s not self-referential, or we accept that material alone is not self-sufficient to explain an intellect in which thoughts can be directed to things outside itself. The human being is a substance that has a power to grasp these concepts in its mind, and if that is so, then physicalism is an insufficient explanation to account for this. Any by physicalism and materialism I’m not just speaking of physical events or material, but a dogmatic worldview that attempts to explain everything through quantifiable efficient causes and nothing more.
Have you limited yourself to the thoughts of armchair philosophers? If so then you would need to look at the scientific literature to appreciate how limited they are in their attempted explanations.

For example, have a look at this work - bbc.com/future/story/20141111-the-code-that-may-treat-blindness

One of the interesting things is that the only pathway from the eye into the brain is the optic nerve, and the signals are digital, meaning that the mind constructs everything you see from bit patterns, from 1000111010110100011…, which it does more-or-less in real time.

Just one small example of how the thoughts of armchair philosophers are not nearly imaginative enough. Note also that the research is motivated by a wish to cure illness. The scientific materialist purpose, far from the silly propaganda claims, is not just to recognize persons, but to help persons. This is one reason why fanatical propaganda saddens me, because the fanatics have no interest whatsoever in persons or in helping persons.

Edit - I can see you’re posting responses faster than I can keep up but sorry, must leave for today.
 
I think you need to do more philosophical work to separate that from Cartesian dualism, as an acknowledgement of non-material substances is an acknowledgment of Cartesian dualism, and there’s no logical necessity for non-material substances, no evidence for them, and nothing in the intellect that Cartesian dualism alone can explain.
We can allow for non-material powers of the human substance without requiring a composition of a material substance and immaterial substance. We could follow scholastic arguments for four types of causality, but really there’s no need. The logical necessity and evidence for a non-material power of the human mind is the human mind itself. As I wrote previously, materialist assumptions don’t explain it, from which it logically follows they are wrong or that, if correct, humans don’t have actual minds that can refer to things outside themselves.

At some point the mind understands something external to the material that makes up the brain or the body, but at no point does the material take on any such meaning. I think CAT, but my material brain doesn’t take on the meaning cat. Any such meaning is derived from something that gives it meaning, that interprets it, and whatever does that can’t be material, fir the same reason just discussed. If thoughts are about things, and thoughts are entirely reducible to neurons, then the neurons are about things, but that’s absurd, as no material pattern or sequence of neurons objectively means cats, and even if we say that the neurons really do carry such meaning, such an admission impljes that there is something qualitative and not quantitative to the material, which itself is not allowed under a materialist philosophy.
 
Have you limited yourself to the thoughts of armchair philosophers? If so then you would need to look at the scientific literature to appreciate how limited they are in their attempted explanations.

For example, have a look at this work - bbc.com/future/story/20141111-the-code-that-may-treat-blindness

The interesting thing is that the only pathway from the eye into the brain is the optic nerve, and the signals are digital, meaning that the mind constructs everything you see from bit patterns, from 1000111010110100011…, which it does more-or-less in real time.

Just one small example of how the thoughts of armchair philosophers are not nearly imaginative enough.
Sense perception or qualia aren’t the issue. Your article has nothing to do with dualist objections.
 
According to materialists the soul doesn’t exist nor does the mind nor does free will! The body reigns supreme in the scientific world because that is the location of the human brain which has succeeded in understanding itself and potentially all that exists - if we are to go by Stephen Hawking who claims that God is not needed to answer the questions of why there is something rather than nothing, why there is the current set of laws and not another, and why we exist at all. According to him, enough is known about M-theory to see that string theory points to the existence of a multiverse and this multiverse coupled with anthropic reasoning will suffice! It seems that the more knowledge scientists possess the more presumptuous they become but that is not surprising because persons, virtues and vices do not exist in their scheme of **things. 😉 **
It is quite rare for materialists to believe in God but those who do don’t take materialism to its logical conclusion. If science can in principle explain everything the Creator becomes superfluous and is literally a deus ex machina! One could say it’s the mechanistic principle gone awry…🙂
 
Ultimately, the point is that materialist assumptions limit us to material, which means that any meaning within the mind is within the material, which means that you are claiming that an arrangement of neurons has real meaning beyond itself. THIS arrangement of THESE neurons means cats. We don’t need anybody to interpret it, mind, that is just the qualitative meaning of this arrangement! This arrangement, if we take these neurons firing in this sequence throughout the entire brain, that holds the meaning of love. It’s not a pointer to that meaning, it has that meaning in the material itself. (Or the other option is that it’s never there or anywhere)

That in itself probably sounds absurd, and for good reason. But materialists have a further issue in that everything is quantifiable and not qualitative, which makes the idea of the meaninv being in the material itself even more absurd.

Ultimately any regress you do runs into the same issue. It’s not just THAT neuron sequence, but put together with the whole something emerges . . . Well, that’s just material, too, and so you’re proposing this broader network of neurons truly holds this meaning within its material?

There’s no room for thoughts to be actually about anything, meaning that the mind (as something able to do that, without radically redefining thought, mind, etc . . .) can’t exist in such a framework. If all things are quantifiably material, then any meaning in our thoughts must be quantifiable and material, not just in general, but pointed to and specifically, and not just interpreted as such by another mind, but meaningful in itself, buf that’s absurd given materialistic assumptions.
 
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