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Charlemagne_III
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Exactly. If atoms are all that exist, we are just 100% atoms and nothing more despite all appearances and instincts to the contrary.There is no room for purpose in science because it doesn’t cater for persons and “we” don’t even exist!
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thinkandmull
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Aquinas says they are two different substances. So does the Church.
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Wesrock
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Hylemorphic dualism is not the same as substance dualism. The form and matter division does not fall along the same lines Descartes would use, and form and matter are co-principles of a material being, not separately existing things in their own right, for the most part. The matter of the human body has form whether or not it’s joined to some immaterial ghost of the person (I refrain from the word soul intentionally). This is a very important distinction when it comes to discussing philosophy of the mind, as many people dismiss Thomism (incorrectly) based on their understanding of substance dualism.
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thinkandmull
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Substance dualism says that the soul is simple and the body is not the soul. Same as Aquinas. Matter and form has to do with the body, not a distinction between the soul and the body
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Wesrock
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Our soul is our form in hylemorphic dualism; they are the same thing. The soul is the form of the body, not a distinct substance in its own right. A human being is one substance, not two interacting with each other. This is different than Cartesian dualism.
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thinkandmull
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Death proves they are different substances. I’ve never understood the charge against Descartes on this. I read his Meditations and his replies. He says the body and soul form “as it were one substance”. At least that is his published works. Someone told me he said something like occasionalism in a letter once, but I have yet to see that
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Wesrock
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Then you are in disagreement with Aquinas. The form of an angel is basically its immaterial intellect. The form of all non-human material beings is all material. Humans have a foot on both sides of this. Our intellect has immaterial operations associated with this. These immaterial operations are part of the form or soul of a human being, but is not a whole substance in its own right. When our body dies, this part of the intellect persists.
It’s like a dog without a tail: it’s still a dog. It’s a dog if you go on to remove a leg, or two, or three, or four, or make other (depressing) mutilations to it. Likewise, our intellect is still a human absent the body, albeit one missing most everything that is normal to the substance of a human. This actually jives well with the Resurrection, as it restores us to a whole substance again.
But this is not Cartesian dualism, and insistence that a human person is two substances is not what Aquinas taught.
edwardfeser.blogspot.com/2008/10/interaction-problem.html?m=1
edwardfeser.blogspot.com/2009/04/interaction-problem-part-ii.html?m=1
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thinkandmull
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The soul is a substance that needs a body, the body is a substance that needs a soul. So there are TWO substances that are made for each other, which is what Descartes said
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Wesrock
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And it’s not what Aquinas said (and what I’m trying to relay).
And that’s fine. It’s just not Aquinas.
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thinkandmull
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To illustrate, Aquinas is affected by the “interaction problem” as any Cartesian
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thinkandmull
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you can’t logically deny that the soul and the body are substances if they exist separate.
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Wesrock
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Soul and matter are metaphysical co-principles of a single substance. Hence why there is debate among Thomists about whether the soul after death can even be said to be a human substance or not before the resurrection.
But the soul is the form in Thomism. The form informs the matter. Cartesian dualism is not the same as hylemorphic dualism, and I provided links to discussion from a prominent Thomist today who speaks to some of the differences.
All I’m trying to say is that Thomas Aquinas was not a Cartesian Dualist and it’s incorrect to call him one. And it certainly isn’t helpful to Thomist’s trying to explain that the mind-body problem created by Descartes isn’t an issue in hylemorphic dualism.
But the soul is the form in Thomism. The form informs the matter. Cartesian dualism is not the same as hylemorphic dualism, and I provided links to discussion from a prominent Thomist today who speaks to some of the differences.
All I’m trying to say is that Thomas Aquinas was not a Cartesian Dualist and it’s incorrect to call him one. And it certainly isn’t helpful to Thomist’s trying to explain that the mind-body problem created by Descartes isn’t an issue in hylemorphic dualism.
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thinkandmull
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i don’t think Descartes was un-thomistic. The soul is united to the body. Does saying “it informs the body” truly add anything of meaning? The body pumps blood, the soul prays with the bodies imagination playing a role. The soul separates from the body and goes to heaven. Descartes even complained about too much subtlety in the scholastics and this is a perfect example. Descartes said nothing that was different from Aquinas except he didn’t use the word form, which doesn’'t add anything to our knowledge anyway
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thinkandmull
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Substance dualism seems to follow this picture:
-------------------------------- soul
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while you are saying that the soul is more in the body. My point is that this is just an imagination issue and has no substance in philosophical terms, as I showed in my last post. I don’t read fesser on these issues. Its goblidigosh
-------------------------------- soul
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while you are saying that the soul is more in the body. My point is that this is just an imagination issue and has no substance in philosophical terms, as I showed in my last post. I don’t read fesser on these issues. Its goblidigosh
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Wesrock
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The body is a body (as opposed to prime matter) because it is informed by the form/soul. The form makes it what it is. Matter always has form. A human body is not just matter, it is matter and form and could not exist unless both co-principles of matter and form were there. The soul is not a ghost piloting the body. That is not what Aquinas meant by soul. To Aquinas, soul was just the technical term for the form of any living thing, animal or plant. It’s only the intellectual power of the human soul that persists after death, and it retains the form of a human, the same way that a dog missing all its legs retains the form of a dog.
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Wesrock
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Aquinas would not separate soul and body.
Soul + matter = living human body.
And sorry you feel that way about Feser, but if you can’t understand him I’m not sure why you insist you know Aquinas and form and matter and soul and such to a high enough degree to insist that he was a Cartesian dualist.
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thinkandmull
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The example of a dog missing a tail is misleading because a human body could conceivably exist without the soul being infused
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Wesrock
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It no longer has the form of a human being, but all the matter still has form (cells, molecules, atoms, or what have you).
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thinkandmull
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Again, how can a soul make the body do anything. Aquinas has the interaction problem as well, because it is in essence the same doctrine. The difference of form and matter in non-humans has never been proven either by the way. A chair is a chair. There is no need to postulate two principles converging as Descartes said (about non-human things)
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