Templeton prizewinner Alvin Plantinga

[Rhubarb]

If philosophy we’ve got a thing called the Principle of Charity. Look it up. This is different than being charitable on these forums, which you are not being.

It isn’t nonsensical, and your attitude would get you thrown out of a colloquium talk. Allow me a counter example, and then I’ll step out of the conversation until you remember your manners.

I have a moderate infection in my body (an actual one) and I’m picturing a severe infection in my imagination. You can have one or the other. Which will you choose? I’ve scored a hole in 1, and am picturing sinking the ball in 3 strokes in my imagination. You can have one or the other. Which will you choose? Existence isn’t on its face preferable. Bigger isn’t always better.

You’re throwing around value judgements. These are normative claims. Do you know what that means? I don’t know what your background in philosophy is, but that’s a pretty basic notion. What one values isn’t set in stone or self-obvious. You hear these points every time this comes around… But you haven’t said anything beyond “nuh-uh!” Being a contrarian isn’t helping your case. Argue the point. Preferably with some grace and civility.

 

[HarryStotle]

If philosophy we’ve got a thing called the Principle of Charity. Look it up. This is different than being charitable on these forums, which you are not being.

Well, now you are clutching your pearls.

Calling an argument or a point nonsensical is, I suppose, being uncharitable to the argument. Now you can choose to stand with the nonsensical argument or you can abandon it when you realize how nonsensical it is. That is your choice. I am concluding or saying nothing about you when I call a presented argument nonsensical. It is just that.

It isn’t nonsensical, and your attitude would get you thrown out of a colloquium talk. Allow me a counter example, and then I’ll step out of the conversation until you remember your manners.

I have a moderate infection in my body (an actual one) and I’m picturing a severe infection in my imagination. You can have one or the other. Which will you choose?

Not sure what you are getting at here. I would sooner have an imaginary infection no matter how severe than a real one, precisely because imagined things don’t actually exist. Infections are not great things to have in the first place, so what is your point here? There doesn’t seem to be one, except showing that it makes a huge ontological difference whether infections, or things generally, do actually exist.

I’ve scored a hole in 1, and am picturing sinking the ball in 3 strokes in my imagination. You can have one or the other. Which will you choose? Existence isn’t on its face preferable. Bigger isn’t always better.

What is your point here? What actually occurred is to be taken with far more weight and gravity than what is only imagined as possible – which proves my point. Existence or actuality is a great-making property. You wouldn’t brag about an imagined hole in one or one you only possibly scored, would you? If imagined or possible things are equally weighted to actual things, you should be congratulated equally whether you score the hole in one in your imagination or in actuality. You aren’t are you? Try it some day! Go around bragging about your magnificent hole in one and see how people’s reactions change when you tell them it was ONLY a possibility in your imagination and it didn’t actually happen.

Still nonsensical.

 

[HarryStotle]

You’re throwing around value judgements. These are normative claims. Do you know what that means? I don’t know what your background in philosophy is, but that’s a pretty basic notion. What one values isn’t set in stone or self-obvious. You hear these points every time this comes around… But you haven’t said anything beyond “nuh-uh!” Being a contrarian isn’t helping your case. Argue the point. Preferably with some grace and civility.

I suppose calling me “uncharitable” then is only a “normative” claim which I don’t need to take very seriously since it is only “throwing around value judgements.”

As the hole in one rebuttal shows, there is a huge ontological difference between actually existing things and merely possible things. Even your infection example proves that. This isn’t “throwing around value judgements,” it is acknowledged deeply in the rational sense of any reasonable person. Which is why your point remains nonsensical. It is contrary to sound rational sense on the subject. You can continue to defend nonsense, if you wish. That is your option, but that has nothing to do with me. So don’t get angry with me merely because I am pointing out the empress isn’t wearing any clothes. Or should we spare the empress’ feelings just because she is easily offended?

I suppose these are only “value judgements” so they need not be considered very seriously, in any case. So not knowing whether you are actually offended or only feigning offense should make no difference to me either, since according to your position whether things actually happen or are mere possibilities makes the entire question irrelevant. And since “value judgements” have no basis in reality, your state of “being offended” shouldn’t be taken very seriously in any case.

There you go then. The problem is completely cleared up for me by your own reasoning on the issue.

 

[Scowler]

However, necessity of existence is not a quality of dogs, per se.

And it is not the quality of anything else, either. You try to define the “necessary being” into existence.

You are clutching at straws here by giving the same lame canned response, as if merely repeating it, incantation-like, is sufficient to make it true.

Look into the mirror… since that is exactly what you are doing.

 

[Scowler]

What you are forgetting is that to be a “possible world” at all would require appropriate metaphysical conditions.

What are those “appropriate metaphysical conditions”? Precisely, please. And I am not talking about “metaphysically possible worlds”, but “PHYSICALLY possible worlds.”

The critical question, that you keep evading, is: What necessary and sufficient conditions would be required to make any world at all a real possibility?

There are no such conditions, except that the world cannot contain logically contradictory elements. This is the definition of the “possible world”. We start with our existing world, which is obviously “possible”, since it exists. Then we start the thought experiment of changing this world in some respect or other - adding or removing some elements. As long as the resulting world does not contain a logically nonsensical state of affairs, it is STILL a possible world. We can “strip” pieces from this world, and the resulting world will still be without a logical contradiction. With this procedure we can arrive at two, physically possible worlds, which have nothing in common, therefore there is no being that exists in all possible worlds. Q.E.D.

I’ve heard this claim every time the argument is brought up and it still is irrelevant.

It only means that you don’t comprehend the significance of it. When the “MGB” was first suggested by Anselm, he committed a fundamental error assuming that “existence” is merely a property, which may or may not be present, and then asserted that it is “greater” to have something that actually exists, rather than being a mere imagination. That concept has been found incorrect, and not even Christian philosophers maintain it any more.

Furthermore the whole concept of “greatness” is nonsensical. Greatness would be a “composite” attribute, defined at anyone’s fancy. Your concept of “greatness” can differ from someone else’s concept of “greatness”.

 

[HarryStotle]

And it is not the quality of anything else, either. You try to define the “necessary being” into existence.

I suppose it is in the nature of EVERY argument that they function to define things into existence, or out of existence, merely by the fact that words are used.

So the following would apply equally to your posts…

Look into the mirror… since that is exactly what you are doing.

Which is why I don’t take your supposed objection very seriously.

My point was that any true a priori argument would have an equally true a posteriori argument to reflect it.

In this case, Plantinga’s modal ontological argument (a priori) is the inverse of a number of equally true cosmological arguments (a posteriori), for example Edward Feser’s five proofs. Ergo I am not merely “defining things into existence.” What I am claiming is that necessary being would need to necessarily exist precisely because it can be proven to exist. That means there is clear symmetry between the existing reality (a posteriori) and the definition of that reality (a priori). In particular, when we try to understand what grounds that reality.

 

[HarryStotle]

What are those “appropriate metaphysical conditions”? Precisely, please. And I am not talking about “metaphysically possible worlds”, but “PHYSICALLY possible worlds.”

Physically possible worlds would have to be metaphysically possible, unless, of course, you also want to circumvent the question of why anything is possible at all and replace it with the rather dogmatic refrain that “Physical things exist. End of story. Get over it.”

So this question falls equally upon both of us…

What are those “appropriate metaphysical conditions”?

You just choose to disregard it, hoping it will go away if you ignore it for a long enough time.

 

[Scowler]

I suppose it is in the nature of EVERY argument that they function to define things into existence, or out of existence, merely by the fact that words are used.

Actually, no. The new concepts are presented for consideration, but they are not automatically accepted as correct.

In this case, Plantinga’s modal ontological argument (a priori) is the inverse of a number of equally true cosmological arguments (a posteriori), for example Edward Feser’s five proofs.

Since the argument of Plantinga is PROVEN to be incorrect, and Feser’s (Aquinas’) five ways are also incorrect, you have no leg to stand on. But here we only talk about Plantinga’s attempt to establish a “necessary being”.

The trouble is not with the believers in general. It is with those who try to establish their belief on rational grounds. If any one of them would succeed (not yet!), it would invalidate the necessity for “faith”. And the church considers “faith” superior to reason. You chop off the branch you try to stand on.

 

[Scowler]

Physically possible worlds would have to be metaphysically possible, unless, of course, you also want to circumvent the question of why anything is possible at all and replace it with the rather dogmatic refrain that “Physical things exist. End of story. Get over it.”

Metaphysics is speculation. Nothing more. If you wish to rely on it, it is your duty to elaborate what is that “metaphysically possible” whatever. Yes, we must start with the existing physical world.

You just choose to disregard it, hoping it will go away if you ignore it for a long enough time.

No, I have absolutely no idea what those “appropriate metaphysical conditions” might be. And I am asking you, because you are the one who brings it up. Can you explain?

 

[HarryStotle]

There are no such conditions, except that the world cannot contain logically contradictory elements. This is the definition of the “possible world”.

No actually. This is only a negative impediment. It defines what a possible world cannot have. It doesn’t define what makes a possible world truly possible, or actual, for that matter.

For actual possibility to exist, a number of antecedent conditions must obtain. So the question becomes: Are there any antecedent conditions which must obtain in EVERY possible world?

That is where arguments for necessary conditions from the contingency of things come in.

Books can be and have been written on the subject. You don’t really want me to dump a book-length diatribe onto this thread at the moment, do you? Which is why you can hide behind claims that no such conditions exist. In order to spell out those conditions and build the case, that would involve people reading and thinking about lengthy treatments on the subject.

I can point you towards a number of those, but I sincerely doubt you would be interested, since your mind is already made up according to the way you want things to be, (given also your dismissal of Feser before even giving his arguments due consideration,) not the way they really are.

 

[HarryStotle]

Metaphysics is speculation. Nothing more.

And your claim about metaphysics is speculation. Nothing more.

 

[HarryStotle]

Since the argument of Plantinga is PROVEN to be incorrect, … you have no leg to stand on. But here we only talk about Plantinga’s attempt to establish a “necessary being”.

PROVEN incorrect? Where? Here? By you?

I suppose you have “presented that assertion for consideration,” and that is about all you have done… made plenty of assertions.

Since the argument of …Feser’s (Aquinas’) five ways are also incorrect, you have no leg to stand on. But here we only talk about Plantinga’s attempt to establish a “necessary being”.

I doubt you have even read Feser’s Five Proofs since you ASSUME they are the same as Aquinas’ five ways. Hint: they are not.

That implies you are prone to dismiss arguments before you read them because of your metaphysical presumptions which you hold a priori. Meaning you hold your position without regard to possible proofs against it. Speaking of defining reality.

You are speaking through your hat, and your hat is making bald assertions that your brain needs to call it on.

Yes. Yes. I know. I am being uncharitable to your hat.

 

[HarryStotle]

The trouble is not with the believers in general. It is with those who try to establish their belief on rational grounds. If any one of them would succeed (not yet!), it would invalidate the necessity for “faith”. And the church considers “faith” superior to reason. You chop off the branch you try to stand on.

No the Church does not consider faith “superior” to reason. They are completely different facets of the human experience and both are necessary.

Before you go saddling the Church with what you think it teaches, you need to do a little more research. Read John Paul II’s Faith and Reason (Fides Et Ratio). Put this second on your list after reading Feser’s Five Proofs.

Again, your presumptions are causing you grief.

 

[HarryStotle]

The trouble is not with the believers in general. It is with those who try to establish their belief on rational grounds. If any one of them would succeed (not yet!), it would invalidate the necessity for “faith”.

To be clear, it is the Church’s infallible teaching that the existence of God can be shown by natural human reason. So apparently, the Church, according to you, itself “invalidates” the need for faith.

Either that, or you have completely misunderstood the position of the Church on this.

I suspect the latter.

I am quickly losing faith in your capacity to resolve issues where sound rational grounds must be established.

 

[Scowler]

No actually. This is only a negative impediment. It defines what a possible world cannot have. It doesn’t define what makes a possible world truly possible, or actual, for that matter.

Possible vs. Truly Possible? A Scotsman vs. a True Scotsman? Is that some kind of a wrestling match? Sheesh! But, whatever. What is physically possible, must be “truly possible” or “metaphysically possible” (whatever that means). The proof I presented is physically possible. Case closed.

For actual possibility to exist, a number of antecedent conditions must obtain.

That was the question you keep on avoiding: “What are those conditions?”

PROVEN incorrect? Where? Here? By you?

Yes. Go back and read it. There are two kinds of proofs: “existential” and “constructive”. You can read about them here: “Constructive Versus Existential Proofs”. The proof I presented is “constructive”, not merely “existential”. It gives you the method of who to start from the existing (and therefore TRULY possible world) and arrive at two (also TRULY possible worlds) which have no element in common - and therefore it is a mathematical proof for the nonexistence of “necessary” beings.

 

[HarryStotle]

Possible vs. Truly Possible? A Scotsman vs. a True Scotsman? Is that some kind of a wrestling match? Sheesh! But, whatever. What is physically possible, must be “truly possible” or “metaphysically possible” (whatever that means). The proof I presented is physically possible. Case closed.

More like potentially real (truly possible in the sense of all antecedent conditions can realistically be spelled out and obtained to make what is merely potential an actuality) as opposed to can be conjured in someone’s imagination (where flying spaghetti monsters can create whole universes.)

What “proof” did you present? I don’t recall one.

You mean the one where anything not logically self-contradictory is possible? And, therefore, a world without a necessary cause is possible?

That was a proof? I thought it was “presented for consideration, but …not automatically accepted as correct.” It becomes a proof because it has been asserted?

Gee, proving stuff is far easier than I supposed.

 

[Scowler]

What “proof” did you present? I don’t recall one.

More like you did not understand it. I proved that there is no “necessary” being. Nothing more, nothing less. I gave you a constructive proof of how to start with the actual reality, and how to reach two physically possible worlds, which have nothing in common. And since the definition of a “necessary being” is that it exists in all the possible worlds, the proof is complete.

You still did not answer the question, “what are the necessary metaphysical conditions, which make a world “truly” possible”? But I don’t expect an answer.

 

[Kei]

To me it seems obvious that if something is necessary then it is necessary. The point is that a maximally great Being is not only contingent but necessary. In essence, if plausible, then necessary due to the maximally great concept. A maximally great dog is not a maximally great being, and thus does not fall under the same category, due to the “dog” aspect, which is not a component of a maximally great being.
I am not an expert in modal logic or anything though.
That said, congrats to Plantinga.

 

[HarryStotle]

More like you did not understand it. I proved that there is no “necessary” being. Nothing more, nothing less. I gave you a constructive proof of how to start with the actual reality, and how to reach two physically possible worlds, which have nothing in common. And since the definition of a “necessary being” is that it exists in all the possible worlds, the proof is complete.

Oh, you mean this one…

On the other hand the refutation is very simple. It is easy to present two possible worlds without intersection, which would get rid of this nonsensical “necessary being” once and for all. Just for the fun of it, here is one example: “World A contains one ‘up’ quark - nothing else”, and “world B contains one ‘down’ quark - nothing else”. None of these two worlds contain anything else, so they are possible worlds, AND have no intersection. So this is a mathematical / logical proof that there is no “necessary” being. Good bye, God.

I thought you were joking. I didn’t realize you proposed it as a serious argument.

How do you propose this ‘up’ quark in World A and ‘down’ quark in World B came to exist? They just popped into being magically? Yea, sure. This is “physically possible?” Like “possible” as in stretching the idea of possible beyond the bounds of credulity. This passes as a “mathematical/logical proof” where you live?

In another imaginary possible world where logic, mathematics and the laws of physics do not apply – and not an actual world – I suppose.

And you questioned my idea of necessary metaphysical conditions? Now it makes sense, you require no metaphysical conditions in order to construct a purported “proof.”

You still did not answer the question, “what are the necessary metaphysical conditions, which make a world “truly” possible”? But I don’t expect an answer.

The answer would be anything even slightly more stringent than the complete lack of conditions you propose would permit any possible world (like World A or World B) to exist. How about whatever would bring an ‘up’ quark into existence without completely trivializing or nullifying the idea of causal antecedents.

Explicating the necessary and sufficient conditions for anything at all to exist would be a more complete answer.

Feser does as good a job as anyone I’ve read. But, of course you aren’t interested in going that deep in search of an answer, since it is far easier not to require any explanation at all. That way, you can dismiss all attempts at explanation as inadequate, then turn around and propose worlds of single quarks with no explanation at all.

 

[HarryStotle]

The proof I presented is physically possible. Case closed.

In what reality is a world made up of one solitary quark and absolutely nothing else “physically possible,” let alone metaphysically possible?

Of course, that possible world is dependent upon your imagination to make it so, and your imagination is dependent upon your brain to create the visual representations and your brain is dependent upon a whole host of other very real antecedent conditions. Ergo, even your imagined “possible” world has physical and metaphysical underpinnings in order to make it conceivable as “physically possible.”