The 5th dubium: the conscience

[Blue_Horizon]

The voice of God’s law inscribed on the heart is a spiritual thing. There is both reason and belief, or faith. The later is of the heart and not the head. .

I understand what you are trying to say but attempting to paraphrase Aquinas type thinking with more modern/colloquial philosophy of man hasn’t quite come off methinks.

Faith is primarily a virtue/act of the intellect/head in Aquinas if I recall correctly.
If by “heart” you are echoing the faculty of the will re faith then the above is less than accurate.

Raw faith is more of the head, only formed faith heavily involves the will/heart as well for Aquinas.

I always avoid the use of the word “feelings” in these sorts of discussions myself. The meaning is so ambiguous. Feelings can come from bodily emotions, from concupiscence, from emotions of the soul, from unconscious recognitions of the mind.
It’s a quagmire trying to explain scholastic philosophy of man/knowledge.

 

[Blue_Horizon]

It is not as though the fullness of official teaching is literally inscribed on the heart, but first I have a question. Is it that only that those who have a full understanding of the CCC may have a “formed conscience”? What of every other human being? Do they not have a conscience that knows right from wrong?

But to the point: What does it mean that “Conscience is a judgment of reason…” (CCC 1778).

Let us consider CCC 1780. It will be quoted in consecutive part. It begins as follows:

“Conscience includes the perception of the principles of morality (synderesis)…”

Synderesis is the natural ability of human beings to apprehend intuitively the law inscribed by God on man’s heart. This follows Plato.

“…their application in the given circumstance by practical discernment of reasons and goods…”

This is praxis. As such, it concerns practical reason, and practical reason is the intuitive ability to apprehend the law inscribed within the conscience (synderesis). Practical reason differs from speculative reason, the mere consideration of truth. Practical reason concerns truth in consideration of action (praxis).

“…and finally judgment of concrete acts yet to be performed or already performed.”

Again, this is the intuitive judgment of practical reason. It differs from speculative reason, which is of the intellect. I believe this is at the root of the misunderstanding.

Agreed.
All moral acts follow a quasi syllogistic “reasoning” with two basic steps.
The first involves a major speculative universalized type premise/judgement… eg all fornication is wrong.
Then comes the proposition/judgement of practical reason…what I am here and now doing is called fornication.
Then comes the conclusion that what I am about to do is wrong.
Then comes the final decision of the will to either command the act be done or not.

Conscience, and it’s prior formation, seems to be heavily involved in much of the above.
Feelings may be involved at various stages and from various powers whether of soul or body. But reason and intellect is also very heavily involved.
And in fact in such fast moving praxis the mind often tells us it’s clear conclusions by conceptual feelings rather than by calm armchair reasoning and well thought out syllogistic conclusions!
Feelings come from the mind too.

 

[Thomas_White]

Agreed.
All moral acts follow a quasi syllogistic “reasoning” with two basic steps.
The first involves a major speculative universalized type premise/judgement… eg all fornication is wrong.

Yes. It is what Kant terms a synthetic a priori judgment. In this, I was actually following Kant and his Categorical Imperative rather than Aquinas…but, no matter. The terms vary, but it is prescriptive.

Then comes the proposition/judgement of practical reason…what I am here and now doing is called fornication.
Then comes the conclusion that what I am about to do is wrong.
Then comes the final decision of the will to either command the act be done or not.

The first two propositions are judgments of practical reason. The final proposition is not a judgment and is indeed of the will. That the act is wrong is already judged by the second proposition.

Conscience, and it’s prior formation, seems to be heavily involved in much of the above.
Feelings may be involved at various stages and from various powers whether of soul or body. But reason and intellect is also very heavily involved.

This may be confusing in that both the conscience and what is learned by the intellect, as objective knowledge, may be in play. We may speak of objective knowledge as “forming” the conscience, but this is incorrect. Objective knowledge is memory of what is learned and is not innate, as is the voice one hears deep within the heart. It would be like, “Yes, that would be wrong. And I can also tell you why it would be wrong–chapter and verse.”

And in fact in such fast moving praxis the mind often tells us it’s clear conclusions by conceptual feelings rather than by calm armchair reasoning and well thought out syllogistic conclusions!
Feelings come from the mind too.

There are indeed those situations where a person must decide how to act right here, right now, and in those common situations simply knowing right from wrong is the proper role of conscience (though of course conscience is not limited to such situations). The conclusion is both a feeling and a judgment of practical reason. In this sense, feelings could be said to come from the mind, but they could not originate in the mind. That is, the voice of the law inscribed on man’s heart is, plainly and simply, of the heart and not the head. Nevertheless, conceptual feeling makes sense when it refers to the process.

 

[Thomas_White]

I understand what you are trying to say but attempting to paraphrase Aquinas type thinking with more modern/colloquial philosophy of man hasn’t quite come off methinks.

There was no conscious attempt to paraphrase Aquinas. I thought mainly of Aristotle, from which the philosophy of Aquinas is largely derivative. For the discussion of conscience, Kant and his concepts of the Categorical Imperative and practical reason, i.e., of synthetic a priori judgments would be the primary reference.

Practical reason is intuitive. It is also transcendental. This is helpful for an understanding of CCC 1780, I think, and why the conscience is spiritual.

Faith is primarily a virtue/act of the intellect/head in Aquinas if I recall correctly.
If by “heart” you are echoing the faculty of the will re faith then the above is less than accurate.

In Aquinas, virtue is objective knowledge and this follows Classical Greek philosophy. However, will is a different thing than practical reason. It was Augustine who first attempted to present an Asiatic religion in a manner understandable to the Western World, and the influence of Classical Greek philosophy in this endeavor should not be discounted. The primacy of the head (mind) became the traditional way of philosophers and theologians, but there is a separate tradition in the Church. It is the way of mysticism and of many Catholic Saints–and not the way of reason and the intellect.

To be clear, the influence of Greek philosophy should not disturb us. Surely, man has always had a conscience.

Raw faith is more of the head, only formed faith heavily involves the will/heart as well for Aquinas.

I disagree, though not with Aquinas. In the classical metaphysical dichotomy of mind/body, faith is of the latter, i.e., of the emotions.

I always avoid the use of the word “feelings” in these sorts of discussions myself. The meaning is so ambiguous. Feelings can come from bodily emotions, from concupiscence, from emotions of the soul, from unconscious recognitions of the mind.
It’s a quagmire trying to explain scholastic philosophy of man/knowledge.

I do not know what “emotions of the soul” might mean. It seems a contradiction of terms. “Unconscious recognitions of the mind” are just that–unconscious recognitions of the mind. Well…maybe not. The conscience transcends…so, perhaps it transcends that classical dichotomy of metaphysics, that of mind/body. I can see this as a possible advance in understanding.

I appreciate your comments. So take my replies in the spirit of our similar backgrounds, in the days when we could freely argue with the Brothers during high school without anyone getting so bent out of shape they were ready to bail.

 

[Rau]

The duty to obey the certain judgement of conscience is not an obligation to accept as good what it sanctions, but an obligation to reject that which it tells us is evil.

With this understanding, the conflict referenced in the OP is eliminated.

 

[goout]

How does practical reason (intellect) arrive at the principles of morality?

The very short answer is that God is the good, and he reveals himself, and a person(s) apprehends the good. By reason we develop “principles of morality” based on that revelation.

If God did not speak, there would be no conscience as such. There would be no good to apprehend and nothing or nobody to know. Instead of reason you would have un-reason.

 

[Ender]

The duty to obey the certain judgement of conscience is not an obligation to accept as good what it sanctions, but an obligation to reject that which it tells us is evil.

With this understanding, the conflict referenced in the OP is eliminated.

There may be no obligation to accept as good what is sanctioned by the conscience, but there is the obligation to accept that it is not bad. Regarding (e.g.) abortion, if it is allowed by the conscience it must mean that abortion cannot be per se immoral. If it is not a positive good it must be neutral at least in this particular case.

I don’t see how this resolves the conflict in the OP. Is the individual justified (that is, he will not be held accountable for errors of conscience) when his conscience leads him to act contrary to church doctrine?

Ender

 

[Ender]

How does practical reason (intellect) arrive at the principles of morality?

Practical reason cannot operate in a vacuum; it must start from basic postulations, assumptions that are accepted as true without proof. I think this entire argument goes to the question of truth. Where is it found? Is it in the individual conscience? Clearly that cannot be the case as the extreme diversity of belief in what constitutes moral behavior demonstrates.

If you and I disagree about X - where I believe it is immoral and you believe it is acceptable - how do we determine which of us is right? That is, can we discover the truth of the matter? If we cannot determine what is true then for all practical purposes truth does not exist…and neither does morality.

So on what basis can you claim that your position regarding X is true and mine is false?

Ender

 

[Thomas_White]

There may be no obligation to accept as good what is sanctioned by the conscience, but there is the obligation to accept that it is not bad. Regarding (e.g.) abortion, if it is allowed by the conscience it must mean that abortion cannot be per se immoral. If it is not a positive good it must be neutral at least in this particular case.

I don’t see how this resolves the conflict in the OP. Is the individual justified (that is, he will not be held accountable for errors of conscience) when his conscience leads him to act contrary to church doctrine?

Ender

Is abortion a question of conscience for a person (e.g., a male) who could never have an abortion? Perhaps, but he would have to be involved in some manner in the act itself. Similarly, the same would apply to the controversy concerning AL. Unless a person is in an irregular marriage and must decide whether or not he will receive communion (the act), it does not seem this is a question of conscience either, for where would be the guilt?

A person is justified if he obeys the certain judgment of his conscience, to that extent, but it does not mean that his act is necessarily good. And if it is bad, he may be culpable for it.

 

[Thomas_White]

Practical reason cannot operate in a vacuum; it must start from basic postulations, assumptions that are accepted as true without proof. I think this entire argument goes to the question of truth. Where is it found? Is it in the individual conscience? Clearly that cannot be the case as the extreme diversity of belief in what constitutes moral behavior demonstrates.

What if practical reason begins with postulates and assumptions that are true, i.e., with what God has inscribed in man’s heart? I cannot see how the teaching on conscience could be understood without accepting this premise. The premise is belief and not objective knowledge.

If you and I disagree about X - where I believe it is immoral and you believe it is acceptable - how do we determine which of us is right? That is, can we discover the truth of the matter? If we cannot determine what is true then for all practical purposes truth does not exist…and neither does morality.

So on what basis can you claim that your position regarding X is true and mine is false?

Ender

Simply stated, I cannot know why something may be acceptable for you. Conscience concerns the acts of an individual person. Consequently, there would be no basis for my claim that my position is true and yours false. What I determine by practical reason could be “askew” by not having clearly heard the voice of conscience, while yours may be in accordance with God’s law.

I think that not acknowledging that God has inscribed natural law on the heart of man results in the attempt to understand the conscience as a process involving objective knowledge, i.e., external knowledge that is learned.

 

[Thomas_White]

The very short answer is that God is the good, and he reveals himself, and a person(s) apprehends the good. By reason we develop “principles of morality” based on that revelation.

If God did not speak, there would be no conscience as such. There would be no good to apprehend and nothing or nobody to know. Instead of reason you would have un-reason.

Yes. God is the source of divine revelation. But there is a difference between Apostolic preaching and the conscience. Truth is truth, but it is apprehended in different ways. Reading scripture is a different experience from hearing the voice of conscience. The one is learning (objective) the other is innate (interior).

 

[goout]

What if practical reason begins with postulates and assumptions that are true, i.e., with what God has inscribed in man’s heart? I cannot see how the teaching on conscience could be understood without accepting this premise. The premise is belief and not objective knowledge.

Simply stated, I cannot know why something may be acceptable for you. Conscience concerns the acts of an individual person. Consequently, there would be no basis for my claim that my position is true and yours false. What I determine by practical reason could be “askew” by not having clearly heard the voice of conscience, while yours may be in accordance with God’s law.

I think that not acknowledging that God has inscribed natural law on the heart of man results in the attempt to understand the conscience as a process involving objective knowledge, i.e., external knowledge that is learned.

In God, objective knowledge and the personal conscience are drawn toward unity.

That is the point of God’s revelation and our expression of it through doctrine. Doctrine or objective knowledge (as I think you are saying) inform our conscience and so draws us into unity with God and each other.
To the extent that we are deaf to his voice, we have disunity.

The expression of conscience shouldn’t lead to disunity.
If you read through Veritatis Splendor for instance, St JP2 speaks of the harmony of faith and life and how the unity of the Church is affected therein.

 

[Blue_Horizon]

The duty to obey the certain judgement of conscience is not an obligation to accept as good what it sanctions, but an obligation to reject that which it tells us is evil.

With this understanding, the conflict referenced in the OP is eliminated.

I agree this is likely the case most of the time but sometimes not doing the good conscience identifies can be a sin of ommission due to limited options?

 

[Ender]

A person is justified if he obeys the certain judgment of his conscience, to that extent, but it does not mean that his act is necessarily good. And if it is bad, he may be culpable for it.

With this I don’t see where we differ. I was objecting to the perception that if a person followed his conscience he would by definition not be culpable for any error he made. Since you recognize that following one’s conscience does not automatically exculpate us, our difference is not as great and I thought.

I agree with you at least to this extent: if we do something we believe is good, and it turns out to be evil, we may be held culpable. Following our conscience does not shield us from that effect. I would add that if we reject a church doctrine - and the church is wrong - we will not be punished for rejecting an erroneous doctrine. If, however, we reject a doctrine that is true, we will in all likelihood be held accountable. So before one rejects what the church teaches he had better turn out to be right, because the “primacy of conscience” argument will offer little protection if he is wrong.

Ender

 

[Blue_Horizon]

If God did not speak, there would be no conscience as such. There would be no good to apprehend and nothing or nobody to know. Instead of reason you would have un-reason.

Depends what you mean by “speak”.
If you mean revelation I do not think so.
If you mean as in nature… then one has the distortions of the medium written into and the “playing back” thereof.

 

[Rau]

There may be no obligation to accept as good what is sanctioned by the conscience, but there is the obligation to accept that it is not bad. Regarding (e.g.) abortion, if it is allowed by the conscience it must mean that abortion cannot be per se immoral. If it is not a positive good it must be neutral at least in this particular case.

I don’t see how this resolves the conflict in the OP. Is the individual justified (that is, he will not be held accountable for errors of conscience) when his conscience leads him to act contrary to church doctrine?

Ender

IMHO:

If his conscience tells him Act X (say, to contracept as a means to have sex with wife and avoid Zika) is OK, but the Church teaches NOK, then do not act. There is no compulsion to act. Clearly understood Church teaching and Conscience ought to function like a logical AND gate. Neither may offer a Red light to a contemplated act.

Uncertainty about church teaching is akin to the Church red light not working. One is left with only conscience to guide and one will not suffer for choosing to act if that single light is green, but one morally errs if acting against the red light of conscience.

Wrong understanding of church teaching may obligate us to obedience in error, it may cause us not to act when we could have licitly done so (subject to conscience concurring).

 

[goout]

Depends what you mean by “speak”.
If you mean revelation I do not think so.
If you mean as in nature… then one has the distortions of the medium written into and the “playing back” thereof.

Does it also depend on what you mean by “God”? :whacky:

Where do you envision a scenario in which God does not speak?

1776 "Deep within his conscience man discovers a law which he has not laid upon himself but which he must obey. Its voice, ever calling him to love and to do what is good and to avoid evil, sounds in his heart at the right moment. . . . For man has in his heart a law inscribed by God. . . . His conscience is man’s most secret core and his sanctuary. There he is alone with God whose voice echoes in his depths."47

I. THE JUDGMENT OF CONSCIENCE

1777 Moral conscience,48 present at the heart of the person, enjoins him at the appropriate moment to do good and to avoid evil. It also judges particular choices, approving those that are good and denouncing those that are evil.49 It bears witness to the authority of truth in reference to the supreme Good to which the human person is drawn, and it welcomes the commandments. When he listens to his conscience, the prudent man can hear God speaking.

 

[Blue_Horizon]

Does it also depend on what you mean by “God”?

Where do you envision a scenario in which God does not speak?

When you actually engage we might take this further goout.

 

[Rau]

I agree this is likely the case most of the time but sometimes not doing the good conscience identifies can be a sin of ommission due to limited options?

You have to be more concrete to make such an argument. One could mistakenly think you are saying one may do evil (though conscience says good), presumably for good intention or similar, just because options are limited.

 

[goout]

When you actually engage we might take this further goout.

Please address the material instead of baiting and condescending.