T
Thomas_White
Guest
Agreed. And it is what you are asking, i.e., whether a person has a moral obligation to perform a particular act. The short answer is no.It can be debated whether one (ever) has a moral obligation **to act **in a positive way, as opposed to a moral obligation to refrain from a wrong act.
I’ve quoted it multiple times in reply to comments that question its truth. It means just what it says, but also because, by personal experience, I know its truth. Whether or not there is intrinsic evil does not resonate in this way. Evil is evil, whether it would be intrinsic or otherwise.Sorry if I misread you. You quoted that section of the ccc multiple times and from the perspective that it is clear and definitive. I took that as “strong adherence” - perhaps I was wrong? In any event, there seems to be a stark contrast between your acceptance of that teaching and your position on the existence of intrinsically evil acts, the latter also being taught by the Church, and with considerable force - in Veritatis Splendor and numerous references in the ccc. Seems to me that it would be more straightforward to view conscience as the unequivocal arbiter of the “right” choice if there are no intrinsically evil acts. Because if there are instrinsically evil acts, conscience being in conflict with the prohibition on such an act may be hard to resolve. [My personal resolution is that I may not act contrary to the red light of conscience nor contrary to the red light of what is definitively taught.
I have in life and work encountered a number of sociopaths. In my experience, they typically know (intellectually) the social norms re right and wrong. Their distinguishing characteristic is the absence of guilt or remorse when they act in ways they have learned that society views as wrong. There is an absence of empathy, and they literally do not care about other persons. This involves conscience and concerns feeling. The world is very fortunate this is not the norm and that conscience is a reality.
If abortion were an intrinsic evil, why would you ask the questions about the doctor’s behavior? The fact is the same questions arise as they would for any other human act. To question the idea of intrinsic evil is speculative, and it concerns the source of evil–i.e., would God have created evil? Or, as Augustine argued, does evil result from man’s misuse of the good?
(in deference to unequivocal doctrine) or to follow her conscience and abort babies? Your answer is a little vague - simply saying “she is not obligated to do anything”. OK, but does the teaching (re: murder of innocents) obligate her to refrain? It’s a yes or no question.Actually, I asked 2 very specific questions:
*If while knowing this [the teaching re: murdering innocents], Dr Perl felt her conscience tells her to abort babies (see the link in post #129 for the reason and circumstances) would Dr Perl be obligated to refrain from abortion *
Again, she did not have to act. Conscience would only tell her whether to act was right or wrong. It that way, the question does not have a yes or no answer. A person could know that it would be good for him to receive communion on a given day, but typically he is not morally obligated to do so. This involves theoretical reason–the knowledge it would be good were he to do so. Practical reason concerns praxis, or acting, and this is the answer to your question.
**Your response appears clear: It could and would be correct to act to abort **[your post #164, citing ccc1800]. However, I’m not sure you answered the question I intended - I was not asking whether to abort was a “good” act, but rather whether her conscience could in fact exhort her to commit an act the Church has declared to be intrinsically evil?
- If it is Perl’s testimony that she acted on the guidance of conscience, could that in fact be correct, or must it be the case that she was driven by something else?
It could be but does not necessarily have to be the case that she was motivated by something else. In my post #164, I was replying to your comment: “If it is Perl’s testimony that she acted on the question of conscience, could that in fact be correct, or must it be the case she was driven by something else?” In reply, I quoted CCC1800, meaning that ‘yes’ it could in fact be correct that, in acting, she obeyed the certain judgment of her conscience. Must it be the case that she was driven by something else? Clearly this was not necessarily the case.
The certain judgment of her conscience, which concerns the act in itself (i.e., abortion) does not compel her to act. It only tells her whether to perform the act (i.e., to perform abortions) would be right or wrong in the circumstances. There are a multitude of things a person could do that would be good, but obviously not every person invariable acts on all such judgments. In fact, it would probably be impossible.
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