The 5th dubium: the conscience

[Thomas_White]

The will and its acts are primarily the subject of moral good and evil. The interior acts of the intellect and will is where morality begins. The external acts of the body are simply the commands of the will and because the body is a part of man it participates in the moral good or evil of the interior acts of the intellect and will. Accordingly, the moral acts of humans are both interior (or subjective if you will) and exterior. A human action is never entirely exterior because for it to be a human action the action must proceed from the interior acts of intellect and will. The interior act and the exterior act such as eating is considered one complete act.

This analysis results in the dichotomy of mind and body, where moral acts are described as both of the interior (mind) and of the exterior (body). That is fine. It is the classical philosophical position, but I do not believe it is what Verititis splendor and the CCC mean by intrinsically evil acts, which I believe describe a more phenomenological (modern philosophical) description of moral behavior. Without going into it here, there are good reasons for saying this.

I believe the act is the object. The object chosen is the action we are doing such as eating, drinking, working, praying, fasting, murder, stealing, adultery, fornication, etc. The object chosen involves, I believe, the various kinds of actions humans can engage in such as the ones I just listed. If the action we are doing is the same as the object chosen and its a bad action such as stealing, then I don’t see any difference in calling either the action or the object that which is intrinsically evil. A bad action may involve external things or people such as in adultery which people or things are not in themselves intrinsically evil but they are not suitable objects in a morally bad action. In the sphere of morality, the act of adultery which is a species of human actions (the object chosen it seems to me), is an evil and bad act, a sin, and as such is called an intrinsically evil act by reason of the object (sexual relations with somebody else’s wife or husband).

You say you believe the act is the object, then list a mixture of verbs and nouns as objects. However, as I understand it, intrinsic evil, as described in both Verititis splendor and the CCC, is entirely in the consciousness of a person–to be sure, not the conscience but consciousness.

The three sources of morality the CCC talks about is about the morality, good or evil, of human actions. So, we are talking about human acts not particularly the being of external things though human acts may involve the right or wrong use of external things. The object chosen involves then in my estimation, as I said above, the very kind of action we are performing which involves in many instances other people such as almsgiving or inanimate things such as material for building a house.

With all due respect, I don’t understand what you are trying to say here. But I think there is a confusion of subject and object. External things are objects, and it is correct that human acts may involve the right or wrong use of them. This is the classical understanding of subject/object and mind/body. But it does not answer the question about intrinsic evil.

What I am trying to explain is that modern philosophy, particularly 20th century philosophy, has a radically different understanding of all this, and this is evident in certain modern teachings of the Church. This is not criticism. Simply stated, in this view moral acts occur internally, in the consciousness of the person. It could be said, as a shorthand explanation, that it is the argument that “perception is reality” where the “being” of the external object cannot really be known and is merely one’s imperfect perception of it.

 

[Blue_Horizon]

I stand by my statement Blue.

I am not arguing with you but trying to give you a better insight into Aquinas.

If you see nothing of value that’s fine, but I believe you will continue to misunderstand Aquinas on intrinsic evil.

The object cannot be intrinsically morally evil.
It can “anchor” a moral evil" but in itself is only a “physical” evil, not a moral evil.

Moral theologians often distinguish the two evils by calling that in the object simply a “disorder”.

 

[Rau]

I am not arguing with you but trying to give you a better insight into Aquinas.

If you see nothing of value that’s fine, but I believe you will continue to misunderstand Aquinas on intrinsic evil.

The object cannot be intrinsically morally evil.
It can “anchor” a moral evil" but in itself is only a “physical” evil, not a moral evil.

Moral theologians often distinguish the two evils by calling that in the object simply a “disorder”.

If you are not arguing with me, then I am less confused, since I could not discover what in my statement you rejected.

Certainly it cannot always be distinguished by observation whether an act is merely physical evil or morally evil. The person who breaks down my door provides an example. Was he a vandal? Or was he acting to rescue me as my house went up in flames? [Regardless- breaking down a door is not intrinsically evil.]

A more contentious (I’ve observed) example is an act to kill in self-defence. Is it OK to deliberately choose -** as a means **of self-defence - to kill the aggressor?

 

[Blue_Horizon]

If you are not arguing with me, then I am less confused, since I could not discover what in my statement you rejected.

Certainly it cannot always be distinguished by observation whether an act is merely physical evil or morally evil. The person who breaks down my door provides an example. Was he a vandal? Or was he acting to rescue me as my house went up in flames? [Regardless- breaking down a door is not intrinsically evil.]

A more contentious (I’ve observed) example is an act to kill in self-defence. Is it OK to deliberately choose -** as a means **of self-defence - to kill the aggressor?

"It is not right to describe the object as something observable, to the extent that observation by a third party is not definitive as to what is happening. "
Wonder who wrote that then.

One indeed does seem able to describe the object to the extent that a 3rd party cannot know what is happening. You just provided two examples above. ie is this object self-defence or murder?

 

[Rau]

"It is not right to describe the object as something observable, to the extent that observation by a third party is not definitive as to what is happening. "
Wonder who wrote that then.

One indeed does seem able to describe the object to the extent that a 3rd party cannot know what is happening. You just provided two examples above. ie is this object self-defence or murder?

I wrote it. Poor English I agree. I was trying to say that the object cannot be reliably identified through a physical observation.

 

[Blue_Horizon]

I wrote it. Poor English I agree. I was trying to say that the object cannot be reliably identified through a physical observation.

OK, now that I understand your position, I tend to disagree.

Its a discussion we had about a month ago, but maybe not involving you.
Its about how we define/name “behaviour” (the observable object) that is of ethical concern.

(A) Is it to be finally defined by its active cause (ie the reasonably judged intention of the subject at the time)?
Thus we cannot finally decide whether a killing behaviour is self-defence or murder until we judge intention.
Traditionally this is the philosophy of the Church, Aquinas and indeed Aristotle.

(B) Or is it to be finally defined by its physical effects (ie just the object) alone? (ie Oedipus and Abraham both committed immoral adultery despite the fact they thought they were marital acts).
This is the philosophy of Descartes, the Enlightenment, Science, and indeed by osmosis most 1st world lay persons and even Catholics who have never seriously studied the Greek roots of their faith.

This is why all our discussions on contracepting, adultery, killing etc etc are so frought.
Even Catholics use these ethically potent words very differently when it comes to the relevance of the agent’s intention.

Thomas White for example does not accept that one can accidentally and blamelessly commit adultery. The very word, for him, by definition includes knowing intent and is therefore always actually mortal sin. Yet the CCC does not define “adultery” in this way.
The CCC defines adultery as simply a physical act of coitus with one who is not your wife.
It doesn’t matter whether you know that or not.

Therefore the Church in fact uses such words in two different ways:
(a) “the human act of adultery” (always actually mortal)
(b) “the physical act of adultery” (always intrinsically disordered/evil)

If the adultery is not a fully “human act” then it is still adultery but is not fully culpable and the sin is only in the object - “material sin”

If it is a fully human act then it is “formal sin”.

Both versions are validly called “sin”, but only "formal sin is unqualified sin.
Both contain malum poenae
Only one contains malum culpae.

 

[Rau]

OK, now that I understand your position, I tend to disagree.

Its a discussion we had about a month ago, but maybe not involving you.
Its about how we define/name “behaviour” (the observable object) that is of ethical concern.

(A) Is it to be finally defined by its active cause (ie the reasonably judged intention of the subject at the time)?
Thus we cannot finally decide whether a killing behaviour is self-defence or murder until we judge intention.
Traditionally this is the philosophy of the Church, Aquinas and indeed Aristotle.

(B) Or is it to be finally defined by its physical effects (ie just the object) alone? (ie Oedipus and Abraham both committed immoral adultery despite the fact they thought they were marital acts).
This is the philosophy of Descartes, the Enlightenment, Science, and indeed by osmosis most 1st world lay persons and even Catholics who have never seriously studied the Greek roots of their faith.

This is why all our discussions on contracepting, adultery, killing etc etc are so frought.
Even Catholics use these ethically potent words very differently when it comes to the relevance of the agent’s intention.

Thomas White for example does not accept that one can accidentally and blamelessly commit adultery. The very word, for him, by definition includes knowing intent and is therefore always actually mortal sin. Yet the CCC does not define “adultery” in this way.
The CCC defines adultery as simply a physical act of coitus with one who is not your wife.
It doesn’t matter whether you know that or not.

Therefore the Church in fact uses such words in two different ways:
(a) “the human act of adultery” (always actually mortal)
(b) “the physical act of adultery” (always intrinsically disordered/evil)

If the adultery is not a fully “human act” then it is still adultery but is not fully culpable and the sin is only in the object - “material sin”

If it is a fully human act then it is “formal sin”.

Both versions are validly called “sin”, but only "formal sin is unqualified sin.
Both contain malum poenae
Only one contains malum culpae.

Funny, a moment ago you confirmed I just gave 2 examples demonstrating the very point I’m making. I don’t find merit in the debate you introduce concerning word meanings.

 

[Rau]

Blue, I don’t find merit in the debate you introduce concerning word meanings, eg. Adultery. The church has no moral observation to make about a man sleepwalking into a sex act with his married (and for sake of argument, sleepwalking) sister in law. When the church speaks of adultery it envisages an act of a particular moral tenor, regardless of what one feels is the literal meaning of the word. I understand the distinction you want to make, but in a discussion of morality, why introduce acts with no moral content? I guess on this point i sister with Thomas White.

A man sleep walking has no rational will (not a functional one at that time). He is incapable of a human act. But the churches is moral teaching addresses only human acts.

 

[Ender]

How is an object the action part of the act? If this is so, then an object is what Aquinas calls a phantasm, which is an abstraction of the intellect.

The word “object” has a non-standard meaning in 1750. Yes, an object is a noun, a person or thing, but that is not its meaning in this case. In this case it is the action taken that is referred to as the object chosen.

How do you explain “the end does not justify the means” with the terms used to describe the fonts of a moral action? Doesn’t “the end” refer to the intent, and doesn’t “the means” refer to the object chosen? (The consequences are not referred to here.) The end, the objective, the motivation is the outcome we expect to achieve from a particular action. The means are the concrete actions we take to achieve our objective.

The object (the thing done/the action taken) is objectively observable behavior, e.g., Mr. Doe (subject) was murdered (object and noun). What then is the object that is intrinsically evil if it is not the murder (noun) of Mr. Doe?

Murder is both a noun and a verb depending on its use. In “Bob’s death was ruled a murder” it is a noun, but in “Bill murdered Bob” it is a verb. The murder, the act of killing Bob, is an action, a means of achieving some end, and in the case of 1750 it is referred to as “the object chosen”. Murder, the verb, is an intrinsically evil action.

Ender

 

[Thomas_White]

The word “object” has a non-standard meaning in 1750. Yes, an object is a noun, a person or thing, but that is not its meaning in this case. In this case it is the action taken that is referred to as the object chosen.

"In contrast to the object, the intention resides in the acting subject" (CCC 1751).

emphasis added

How do you explain “the end does not justify the means” with the terms used to describe the fonts of a moral action? Doesn’t “the end” refer to the intent, and doesn’t “the means” refer to the object chosen? (The consequences are not referred to here.) The end, the objective, the motivation is the outcome we expect to achieve from a particular action. The means are the concrete actions we take to achieve our objective.
Murder is both a noun and a verb depending on its use. In “Bob’s death was ruled a murder” it is a noun, but in “Bill murdered Bob” it is a verb. The murder, the act of killing Bob, is an action, a means of achieving some end, and in the case of 1750 it is referred to as “the object chosen”. Murder, the verb, is an intrinsically evil action.

Ender

Motivation is not the end, objective, or outcome (noun). It is internal to the subject who acts toward an end, but in accordance with CCC 1751 the object is external.

 

[Ender]

"In contrast to the object, the intention resides in the acting subject" (CCC 1751).

Yes, the object is the concrete action taken. The intent is internal to the person taking the action. It is the motivation behind the action.

Motivation is not the end, objective, or outcome (noun). It is internal to the subject who acts toward an end, but in accordance with CCC 1751 the object is external.

True, motivation is not outcome, but our intent causes us to act in a certain way. I want to break a glass so I drop it on a rock. The action - the object chosen - is dropping the glass. The motivation is to break it. I could choose a different action: hit it with a hammer, but even though the action would be different the intent would be the same.

Ender

 

[Blue_Horizon]

Blue, I don’t find merit in the debate you introduce concerning word meanings, eg. Adultery. The church has no moral observation to make about a man sleepwalking into a sex act with his married (and for sake of argument, sleepwalking) sister in law. When the church speaks of adultery it envisages an act of a particular moral tenor, regardless of what one feels is the literal meaning of the word. I understand the distinction you want to make, but in a discussion of morality, why introduce acts with no moral content? I guess on this point i sister with Thomas White.

A man sleep walking has no rational will (not a functional one at that time). He is incapable of a human act. But the churches is moral teaching addresses only human acts.

The very simple point is that as soon as some Catholics here identify somebody’s objective behaviour as adultery they immediately conclude no grace, intrinsic moral evil, no Communion end of story.

Yet it is very clear that Catholic Moral Theology principles deny this easy jump from visible adulterous behaviour to actual mortal sin adultery. I introduce this because that is Thomas’s stated position.

Also, it is silly to think the presence of a full human act is a binary judgement. Sleep walking is but an extreme to clearly demonstrate the principle. When other real world complex factors are introduced that limit a person’s choices (ie level of consent) and understanding (I believe my 1st marriage was null from the get go and the tribunal process has stalled)…this can be equivalent to sleepwalking while awake to put it poetically.

Thirdly, some understandings by the agent can change the change the species of the object in question. Thus murder may become self defense as you observe. Hence adultery may become fornication. Sometimes a change in object details (which is not the same as circumstances as Aquinas observes) may mean the subjects intent is not adultery at all, even though physical sleeping with one not one’s wife may occur, but his intent is to protect this 2nd marriage for the sake of the children and my non Catholic partner is not willing or able to abstain.

You may not find merit in the observations but they are relevant to the AL debate. The principles are sound and analogous to other moral predicaments if we can get beyond the emotional baggage of the actual word “adultery” and investigate the object behaviour it signifies and how it relates to moral intent like any other less contentious grave ethical issue.
Unfortunately we do not have the same widely nuanced vocab re adultery that we have for killing.

It seems clear to me that there are a wide variety of objective species of the genus adultery that, while grave, have much less inherent moral approbation than that which Jesus lamented.
Thus not all killing is murder…some is homicide, some manslaughter, some self-defence.
I have no problem with some of those habitual killers receiving Communion, though I wish we lived in a world where no killing was necessary at all.

Likewise for 2nd marriages.

 

[Blue_Horizon]

Yes, the object is the concrete action taken. The intent is internal to the person taking the action. It is the motivation behind the action.
True, motivation is not outcome, but our intent causes us to act in a certain way. I want to break a glass so I drop it on a rock. The action - the object chosen - is dropping the glass. The motivation is to break it. I could choose a different action: hit it with a hammer, but even though the action would be different the intent would be the same.

Ender

Did you notice that motion-vation comes from the subject Ender.
The very words betray the Latin ethical philosophy behind them.
That is, the subject is the true source of the behaviour’s motion.
In Aristotelian or Thomistic terms the “act” or “form” comes from the subject.

Of course the action in question is the “moral” act, the “moral motion.”
Objective behaviour only has physical motion, we are talking moral motion.

In that sense the object (moral matter) is a noun, the subject (moral intent) is a verb.

 

[Thomas_White]

Yes, the object is the concrete action taken. The intent is internal to the person taking the action. It is the motivation behind the action.

Again, CCC 1751: “In contrast to the object, the intention resides in the acting subject.” This means the object does not reside in the subject and thus cannot be the action taken. The object is external to the subject, and this is the commonly understood meaning of the word.

True, motivation is not outcome, but our intent causes us to act in a certain way. I want to break a glass so I drop it on a rock. The action - the object chosen - is dropping the glass. The motivation is to break it. I could choose a different action: hit it with a hammer, but even though the action would be different the intent would be the same.

Ender

In this instance, the glass is the object. The decision to break the glass (the action chosen) is internal.

“There are acts which, in and of themselves, independently of circumstances and intentions, are always gravely illicit by reason of their object: such as blasphemy and perjury, murder and adultery” (CCC 1756) emphasis added.

These objects are nouns and are, in themselves, described as “gravely illicit”. I think the difficulty is perhaps that the word “object” is used to refer to both the “moral object” (internal) with the objective object.

 

[goout]

The very simple point is that as soon as some Catholics here identify somebody’s objective behaviour as adultery they immediately conclude no grace, intrinsic moral evil, no Communion end of story.

What some Catholics conclude is of little consequence. What the Church expresses as divine revelation is of consequence.
Revelation has an objective content.

Yet it is very clear that Catholic Moral Theology principles deny this easy jump from visible adulterous behaviour to actual mortal sin adultery. I introduce this because that is Thomas’s stated position.

Revelation has an objective content that is given by God, expressed by the Church, so that we who are God’s children might conform ourselves to Him, in unity with His revelation.

The Church exhorts us to seek the good always, and warns of the consequences of self seeking. That is a reasonable jump to make.
God loves us.
Sin separates us from his love and destroys us.

God judges our disposition for sure, and presumption might be one of the most dangerous sins to be judged, as it deceptively mollifies the erroneous conscience.

“I was gonna clean my window Lord, honest, I knew the spots were there, but I settled for the murky view instead of cleaning it”

 

[PRmerger]

What some Catholics conclude is of little consequence. What the Church expresses as divine revelation is of consequence.
Revelation has an objective content.

 

[goout]

http://38.media.tumblr.com/0c64eadca47ad62b665c1542de65cbe4/tumblr_inline_nnagejGvpl1r79k32_500.gif

That guy’s gonna have a sore neck tomorrow

 

[Ender]

Again, CCC 1751: “In contrast to the object, the intention resides in the acting subject.” This means the object does not reside in the subject and thus cannot be the action taken. The object is external to the subject, and this is the commonly understood meaning of the word.

When we are told “the end does not justify the means”, what exactly is the church referring to? What is meant by these terms? What are “the ends”, what are “the means” and how do they relate to the determination of whether an act is moral or not?

Ender

 

[Thomas_White]

When we are told “the end does not justify the means”, what exactly is the church referring to? What is meant by these terms? What are “the ends”, what are “the means” and how do they relate to the determination of whether an act is moral or not?

Ender

It means, for example, that euthanasia (the means) cannot be justified by the taking of the life of a human being (i.e., the end, even if the means to the end were to relieve suffering). The same would hold true for abortion, where the end does not justify the means (whatever they may be).

 

[goout]

It means, for example, that euthanasia (the means) cannot be justified by the taking of the life of a human being (i.e., the end, even if the means to the end were to relieve suffering). The same would hold true for abortion, where the end does not justify the means (whatever they may be).

The health and happiness of a person is a good end.
The killing of an unhealthy person by euthanasia is an immoral means to that end.

The health and welfare of a mother is a good end.
The taking of her child’s life by abortion is an immoral means to that end.