The 5th dubium: the conscience

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Ender said:
The word “object” has a non-standard meaning in 1750. Yes, an object is a noun, a person or thing, but that is not its meaning in this case. In this case it is the action taken that is referred to as the object chosen.

Yes, the object chosen is the action or kind of action we are doing. It answers to the question *What *are you doing? For example, walking, talking, praying, thinking, fornicating, typing on the computer answering catholic answers, etc. The object chosen places the action into its species or kind such as the examples just given. The intention, end, or motive is not the action but the why, purpose, motive of the action. Neither are the circumstances the action but are as it were accidents of the action such as how, when, where, who. If the intention/motive or circumstances are not the action, that leaves us with only one other option, i.e., the object chosen, otherwise we don’t have an action to consider whether it is good or evil.

The object chosen is that which the will wills to do which is an act of the will. The will must will something and this something is called its object which object is presented to the will by the intellect under the aspect of good or apparent good. The intellect and will are involved in every human action if it is to be a ‘human action’ at all and as such it involves morality. The external ‘human’ actions involving the body and its members are the commands of the will upon it to perform some action. For example, if a person wills to walk, the object chosen, the will commands the members of the body to the act of walking.
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Thomas_White said:
It means, for example, that euthanasia (the means) cannot be justified by the taking of the life of a human being (i.e., the end, even if the means to the end were to relieve suffering). The same would hold true for abortion, where the end does not justify the means (whatever they may be).
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I had hope this approach would show the relation of means and ends to the moral fonts of object chosen and intention. That is, the means correspond to the object chosen while the ends correspond with the intention. I think this helps clarify the nature of the “object chosen”: it is the means one uses to achieve the intended goal. And the means include an action.

I do think there is a bit more involved. Is the action involved in intentionally shooting someone moving the finger a half inch? Well that may be the action but it isn’t really the “object chosen”, which would be murder. I think it is largely true that the object chosen refers to the action taken, but I also think there is more than that alone. There are times when I may properly choose to shoot someone, but there are no times when I may properly murder someone. It seems the object includes the nature of the act, and not just its visible, physical properties.the primary evil in moral actions is that which is from the object, for instance, “to take what belongs to another.” (ST I-II 18,2)

*Now since the object is in some way the effect of the active power, it follows that it is the term of its action, and consequently that it gives it its form and species, since movement derives its **species from its term. (ST I-II 18,2ad3)
*I think this is also the sense in which intrinsic evil is discussed. Some objects cannot ever be justified because their nature prevents them from ever according with man’s good.

Ender
 
Richca said:
Yes, the object chosen is the action or kind of action we are doing. It answers to the question *What *are you doing? For example, walking, talking, praying, thinking, fornicating, typing on the computer answering catholic answers, etc. The object chosen places the action into its species or kind such as the examples just given. The intention, end, or motive is not the action but the why, purpose, motive of the action. Neither are the circumstances the action but are as it were accidents of the action such as how, when, where, who. If the intention/motive or circumstances are not the action, that leaves us with only one other option, i.e., the object chosen, otherwise we don’t have an action to consider whether it is good or evil.

The object chosen is that which the will wills to do which is an act of the will. The will must will something and this something is called its object which object is presented to the will by the intellect under the aspect of good or apparent good. The intellect and will are involved in every human action if it is to be a ‘human action’ at all and as such it involves morality. The external ‘human’ actions involving the body and its members are the commands of the will upon it to perform some action. For example, if a person wills to walk, the object chosen, the will commands the members of the body to the act of walking.
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Yes. I understand the intention to be they why (the ends), and the action to be the what (the means). In order to achieve a goal we must (normally) do something. Every deliberate act we perform is for a reason; we don’t act simply to act but to accomplish a goal. The reasons can be either good or bad, and so can the actions.

Ender
 
Richca said:
Yes, the object chosen is the action or kind of action we are doing. It answers to the question *What *are you doing? For example, walking, talking, praying, thinking, fornicating, typing on the computer answering catholic answers, etc. The object chosen places the action into its species or kind such as the examples just given. The intention, end, or motive is not the action but the why, purpose, motive of the action. Neither are the circumstances the action but are as it were accidents of the action such as how, when, where, who. If the intention/motive or circumstances are not the action, that leaves us with only one other option, i.e., the object chosen, otherwise we don’t have an action to consider whether it is good or evil.

The object chosen is that which the will wills to do which is an act of the will. The will must will something and this something is called its object which object is presented to the will by the intellect under the aspect of good or apparent good. The intellect and will are involved in every human action if it is to be a ‘human action’ at all and as such it involves morality. The external ‘human’ actions involving the body and its members are the commands of the will upon it to perform some action. For example, if a person wills to walk, the object chosen, the will commands the members of the body to the act of walking.
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I quote: “The object chosen is that which the will wills to do which is an act of the will.”

This still seems confusing, and I will attempt to explain why. If walking is an act of the will, then walking, the action, is an external human act. By this I mean that walking, the act, does not take place in the intellect.

Simply stated: For Aquinas, a substance is both essence and existence (form and matter). An “accident” is a potential of a substance and is intrinsic to it (a possibility). A house may be yellow, but yellow requires a substance to exist. It is accidental to the substance (the house)–the color yellow (which could be blue or green) cannot exist in itself and must be a property of a substance. It is an “accident” and not essential to the existence of the substance. Walking is likewise an accident (a potential) of the substance that is a human being. If this act is said to exists only in the intellect, then it remains only a potentiality.

What I don’t understand is how an action could occur solely in the intellect, not when it obviously requires both mind and body. It is a thing we can objectively observe (i.e., an object, a person walking). What then is a mental act?
 
Thomas_White said:
This still seems confusing, and I will attempt to explain why. If walking is an act of the will, then walking, the action, is an external human act. By this I mean that walking, the act, does not take place in the intellect.
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  • The act of the will is twofold: one is its immediate act, as it were, elicited by it, namely, “to wish”; the other is an act of the will commanded by it, and put into execution by means of some other power, such as “to walk” and “to speak,” which are commanded by the will to be executed by means of the motive power.(Aquinas ST I-II 6,4)
    *Ender
 
Ender said:
I had hope this approach would show the relation of means and ends to the moral fonts of object chosen and intention. That is, the means correspond to the object chosen while the ends correspond with the intention. I think this helps clarify the nature of the “object chosen”: it is the means one uses to achieve the intended goal. And the means include an action.
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Okay, got it.
Ender said:
I do think there is a bit more involved. Is the action involved in intentionally shooting someone moving the finger a half inch? Well that may be the action but it isn’t really the “object chosen”, which would be murder. I think it is largely true that the object chosen refers to the action taken, but I also think there is more than that alone. There are times when I may properly choose to shoot someone, but there are no times when I may properly murder someone. It seems the object includes the nature of the act, and not just its visible, physical properties.the primary evil in moral actions is that which is from the object, for instance, “to take what belongs to another.” (ST I-II 18,2)

Now since the object is in some way the effect of the active power, it follows that it is the term of its action, and consequently that it gives it its form and species, since movement derives its
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species from its term. (ST I-II 18,2ad3)

I think this is also the sense in which intrinsic evil is discussed. Some objects cannot ever be justified because their nature prevents them from ever according with man’s good.

Ender

This is understandable when the “object chosen” is defined this way. It would seem to mean intrinsic evil is in the means (murder, for instance) and cannot ever be justified. That makes sense. Thanks.
 
Ender said:
  • The act of the will is twofold: one is its immediate act, as it were, elicited by it, namely, “to wish”; the other is an act of the will commanded by it, and put into execution by means of some other power, such as “to walk” and “to speak,” which are commanded by the will to be executed by means of the motive power.(Aquinas ST I-II 6,4)
    *Ender
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Okay. I guess it is helpful to remember this was an attempt at psychology written eight centuries ago. Even today, modern neuroscience cannot explain the concept of the “will” (or consciousness either, for that matter).
 
Thomas_White said:
This is understandable when the “object chosen” is defined this way. It would seem to mean intrinsic evil is in the means (murder, for instance) and cannot ever be justified.
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Yes, that is my understanding as well. Viewed this way it is reasonable that there should be some actions that are never justifiable under any circumstances, and adultery is one such action.

Ender
 
Rau said:
Some thoughts on the nature of conscience:
thecatholicthing.org/2017/02/22/a-brief-primer-on-catholic-faith-and-conscience/
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Very good article; thank you for posting it. I was particularly struck by this passage:*Where private, subjective conscience becomes the ultimate moral authority, religion based on faith is simply no longer tenable. *
It seems to me that this is the concern raised by the fifth dubium, and why resolution of that question is so important. One may argue that the author is mistaken in his analysis, but if he’s right the significance of his position would be hard to overstate.
The result has been…the collapse of religious practice among the laity
Ender
 
Rau said:
Some thoughts on the nature of conscience:
thecatholicthing.org/2017/02/22/a-brief-primer-on-catholic-faith-and-conscience/
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From the article: “Let’s begin with an anthropological fact: conscience is a function or act of practical judgment, that is, a function of the human intellect and not some imaginary mystical power of the soul” (emphasis added).

From the CCC: “Deep within his conscience man discovers a law which he has not laid upon himself but which he must obey…For man has in his heart a law inscribed by God…” (CCC 1776).

The article continues: “Thus, the conscience, like other intellectual functions, has to be educated and informed from outside. It is not self-informed or innately informed.”

If the conscience is a tabula rosa at birth (a blank slate) with no innate moral authority (which, to the contrary, CCC 1776 says it has), then conscience would be only objective knowledge and merely a convenient concept to explain learned behavior. In essence, the conscience would not exist, or would exist only as an idea.

But the author goes on: “It [the conscience] is not self-informed or innately informed. It has some innate first principles, just as the theoretical or speculative intellect does, but even these principles, except for a very few absolutely primary ones, are often clouded in the intellect.”

One wonders…from whence did these principles arise?
 
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Richca:
 
Thomas_White said:
From the article: “Let’s begin with an anthropological fact: conscience is a function or act of practical judgment, that is, a function of the human intellect and not some imaginary mystical power of the soul” (emphasis added).

From the CCC: “Deep within his conscience man discovers a law which he has not laid upon himself but which he must obey…For man has in his heart a law inscribed by God…” (CCC 1776).

The article continues: “Thus, the conscience, like other intellectual functions, has to be educated and informed from outside. It is not self-informed or innately informed.”

If the conscience is a tabula rosa at birth (a blank slate) with no innate moral authority (which, to the contrary, CCC 1776 says it has), then conscience would be only objective knowledge and merely a convenient concept to explain learned behavior. In essence, the conscience would not exist, or would exist only as an idea.

But the author goes on: “It [the conscience] is not self-informed or innately informed. It has some innate first principles, just as the theoretical or speculative intellect does, but even these principles, except for a very few absolutely primary ones, are often clouded in the intellect.”

One wonders…from whence did these principles arise?
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This is what I understood the author to say:
  1. conscience is an act of judgment
  2. the conscience is indued with some basic principles
  3. the conscience must be informed in order to make proper moral judgments
As you acknowledged, he didn’t say it was a tabula rasa and contains only learned knowledge.

So: is it an act of judgment? Is the first assertion true?*…in the practical judgment of conscience, which imposes on the person the obligation to perform a given act, the link between freedom and truth is made manifest. Precisely for this reason conscience expresses itself in acts of “judgment” which reflect the truth about the good, and not in arbitrary “decisions.” *(Veritatis splendor #61)
We all accept that the second assertion is true, what we disagree over is the extent of the moral law with which man’s conscience is initialized.

It would seem that if (3) is true, it would clearly demonstrate that whatever the conscience knows innately, it is incomplete, and we know from the catechism that in fact man’s conscience must indeed be formed.Conscience must be informed and moral judgment enlightened…The education of conscience is indispensable… (CCC 1783)
I think what we’re debating here is more than simply the extent to which the conscience innately knows right from wrong; I think we fundamentally disagree over the nature of the conscience.* Once the idea of a universal truth about the good, knowable by human reason, is lost, inevitably the notion of conscience also changes. Conscience is no longer considered in its primordial reality as an act of a person’s intelligence, the function of which is to apply the universal knowledge of the good in a specific situation and thus to express a judgment about the right conduct to be chosen here and now. Instead, there is a tendency to grant to the individual conscience the prerogative of independently determining the criteria of good and evil and then acting accordingly. *(VS 32)
If there is no universal knowledge of the good, or if it is not acknowledged, then in fact good and evil become whatever the individual believes them to be. The conscience can act on knowledge of the good, but it can only accept it, it cannot define it.

This question goes to the heart of the dubium raised by the four cardinals: how are we to understand the conscience?

Ender
 
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