The basis of secular values and ethics?

[fnr]

Let’s assume that one is seeking to develop some kind of purely secular ethical basis for living. Now, in the absence of an afterlife, what possible basis can there be for ethics? If this world is all we have, with no punishment or reward, the most advisable thing to do would seem to live purely for personal pleasure, or, if that wasn’t available, simply to throw oneself of a cliff. What possible value or meaning could anything offer- life, society, oneself, the entire universe- that would provide a basis making the effort? Why should I care about anything, since it will all be reduced to dust soon enough…

Am I wrong?

Well, if reward or punishment are our only reason for acting ethically, then it’s easy to question whether we’re acting ethically!

There are plenty of ways to construct ethics without a theistic reference. In fact, that’s been the whole project of western ethical philosophy since probably the Renaissance.

To give an example (not in detail), Kant’s ideas can be used to construct an ethical system by which the integrity of a conscious person is paramount. The ends never justify the means. Under his system, the “categorical imperative” says that you should only act only in ways that you think should occur under universal laws that would apply to everyone. Here’s a quote from Kant that encapsulates much of his thinking:
“Act in such a way that you always treat humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any other, never simply as a means, but always at the same time as an end.”

 

[polytropos]

No, it is not axiomatic. It is a very good basic principle, and most societies understood it.

This does not prevent it from being axiomatic. Also, are you making the empirical, sociological claim that most societies have followed your blend of utilitarianism and intuitionism? That is historically implausible.

There are all sorts of “special” rules and requirements for not “fully” adults. We do not allow underage people to drive a car, or drink beer, or obtain weapons. So the different treatment of people depending on their age is perfectly accepted in our societies. The extent of this different treatment can be disputed, but the principle cannot.

Yes, but special rules for protecting younger people are separate from special rules that justify killing them.

Why would it be arbitrary? Of course the basic contention here is the definition of a “human being”. To equate a human being with its DNA is truly arbitrary, since this definition would make a tumor also a human “being” and besides, there IS no such thing as human DNA. The best definition I have seen so far stipulated that the brain’s electro-chemical activity should be the dividing point. To equate a freshly fertilized egg (which has a huge chance to be expelled from the woman’s body) with a full human being is ridiculous. Besides, not even the church wishes to stipulate the moment of “ensoulment”.

The definition of human being is what is in contention. But “human being” in secular ethics is as much a construct as human rights (which is part of the reason why it secular ethics must be arbitrary - any metaphysical assumptions which deny humanity as a genuine universal can only lead to a contingent and arbitrary definition of human being).

I also have not equated a human being with human DNA. A human being would have a genetically human individual capable of rationality - a tumor is not individually capable of rationality, while a fetus is. A sperm or egg on its own is not individually capable of rationality either.

But even so, whether the fetus is a human being is not necessary to establish. It is clearly a human life whose existence is contiguous with one or more humans (in a way that a sperm or egg’s is not). At the very least, any ethic of reciprocity must preclude abortion. I was a fetus. If I were aborted, I would not be alive now; it does not matter whether or not, when I was a fetus, I fit any legal definition of human being. Any ethic of reciprocity would therefore morally obligate me to oppose abortion. People only have the “option” to abort because they were not themselves aborted. As such, the exercise and permission of abortion is just based on a principle of “might makes right.” Even though I owe my existence to not being aborted, I will support abortion to make my existence more convenient.

In any case, the moment of ensoulment is not really at issue, since we’re talking about secular ethics, and secularists would have to find some other criteria for extending human dignity. It should actually be noted that whether or not a fetus is a human being is not particularly relevant, since it would be taken to be morally reprehensible to, say, mutilate the body of a recently deceased person, even though that body is no longer a human being and no longer has any brain activity. It would even be reprehensible to use their organs - an action with obvious utility - without their consent, which has, I think, obvious parallels with abortion.

Sure. Mathematically sub-optimal solutions in conflict resolution.

A mathematical evaluation can only be judged “sub-optimal” by external standards.

Yes, it would be a much better solution to prevent that pregnancy as long as that pregnancy is not desired. As soon as the catholic church would become the champion of prevention, it would gain credibility in the matter. But to preach abstinence even in marriage, when the partners are not ready for a child is pretty “far-out”.

The Church has reasons for not allowing contraception. One can worry elsewhere whether those reasons succeed. What is at issue here is whether the tendency of secular ethics to lead to genocide (I believe 40 million children have been killed since Roe v. Wade) undermines it.

Which leads us to the fact that abortion happens whether or not contraception is provided - so the problem is not with any sort of lack of contraception, but with the attitude toward sex and the callous selfishness that would lead one to kill another.

There was a good saying: “of all the sexual perversions, the most unnatural one is chastity”. And another one: “For christians, sex is an obsession. For everyone else it is a simple fact of life”.

Even a not-so-satisfying encounter is much better than a highly satisfying fight.

These statements are absurd. I live on a college campus; I can tell you that Christians are not the ones obsessed with sex.

I also don’t know how much in particular anyone engaging in practical sex is enjoying it. But the incidence of rape seems symptomatic of a lax attitude toward sex - people want it, people go out expecting to get it because, hey, it’s no big deal, they get drunk, and so they rape a woman.

 

[Peter_Plato]

Why would it be arbitrary? Of course the basic contention here is the definition of a “human being”. To equate a human being with its DNA is truly arbitrary, since this definition would make a tumor also a human “being” and besides, there IS no such thing as human DNA. The best definition I have seen so far stipulated that the brain’s electro-chemical activity should be the dividing point. To equate a freshly fertilized egg (which has a huge chance to be expelled from the woman’s body) with a full human being is ridiculous. Besides, not even the church wishes to stipulate the moment of “ensoulment”.

The reason choosing any point in the development of a human person as the point at which it becomes human is arbitrary is because such an endeavor essentially ignores that a human being is not the kind of thing that can be sliced up in that manner. A human being is a being that exists in time as a developing entity. As such it should be identified as human only in the context of its entire lifespan. That is the only non-arbitrary criteria by which a human life can be understood to be human.

Every human begins as a zygote, undergoes fetal development, is “born,” becomes a child, teenager and adult. All of these are aspects of what it means to be a human and a human at any particular stage is no less a human except by the arbitrary fiat of some particularly arrogant individuals who believe themselves to have some special right to determine which other humans - on some other qualification - should be considered by this audaciously lunatic community of delusional “humans” to be regarded as “human” only when and if “they” deem it so. Welcome to a world where “some” humans are more equal than others because “we” say they are for no other reason than because they get in the way of our right to pleasure ourselves at will. In any other context this would be, minimally, called homicide.

 

[polytropos]

At the very least, any ethic of reciprocity must preclude abortion. I was a fetus. If I were aborted, I would not be alive now; it does not matter whether or not, when I was a fetus, I fit any legal definition of human being. Any ethic of reciprocity would therefore morally obligate me to oppose abortion. People only have the “option” to abort because they were not themselves aborted. As such, the exercise and permission of abortion is just based on a principle of “might makes right.” Even though I owe my existence to not being aborted, I will support abortion to make my existence more convenient.

I should also note that I wrote a topic some time ago about whether abortion was compatible with the golden rule, the basic thrust of which was that, if believers and nonbelievers were to agree upon an ethic of reciprocity, abortion would have to be regarded as immoral.

 

[Bagheera]

polytropos:

Yes, but special rules for protecting younger people are separate from special rules that justify killing them.

I did not make an argument yet. I simply wished to establish that it is rational to have a separate rule-set based upon the age as criterion.

polytropos:

The definition of human being is what is in contention. But “human being” in secular ethics is as much a construct as human rights (which is part of the reason why it secular ethics must be arbitrary - any metaphysical assumptions which deny humanity as a genuine universal can only lead to a contingent and arbitrary definition of human being).

The only definition would be a descriptive one, loosely borrowed from Forrest Gump: “human is as human does”. It should not matter what kind of DNA it has, or if it is a biological being, or if it is a space alien, or a mutant dolphin… if that being is capable of discursive thinking, if it can differentiate between “right” and “wrong”, it should be treated as a “fellow” human being and treated as such.

Now the zygote is a potential human being, just like an acorn is a potential oak tree, or a fertilized egg is a potential chicken. However all of these need a certain environment to fulfill that potential, and even in the best case this fulfillment is not assured.

polytropos:

A sperm or egg on its own is not individually capable of rationality either.

It is not that simple. Left to its own “devices” an egg will probably not grow into anything. But “virgin-birth” is possible, if the egg is “excited” via some mechanical or chemical means. (Of course the result would be a replica of the mother.) Experiments of such kind have been performed on animals. A zygote needs to be implanted into the uterus, to grow on its own. Or it can be placed into an artificial womb, and allow it to grow. With the advancement of technology the boundaries become “blurred”.

polytropos:

It should actually be noted that whether or not a fetus is a human being is not particularly relevant, since it would be taken to be morally reprehensible to, say, mutilate the body of a recently deceased person, even though that body is no longer a human being and no longer has any brain activity. It would even be reprehensible to use their organs - an action with obvious utility - without their consent, which has, I think, obvious parallels with abortion.

You talk about the current ethical system. Yes, today, in this society the carcass of a deceased person “enjoys” special consideration, which is definitely arbitrary and also irrational.

polytropos:

What is at issue here is whether the tendency of secular ethics to lead to genocide (I believe 40 million children have been killed since Roe v. Wade) undermines it.

This is sheer emotionalism. Many more “zygotes” have been flushed out from the women’s body and no one seems to care – even though according to the catholic view, those zygotes were also “children”.

There is a very good, rational reason why to draw the line between a child and a fetus at the time of birth. That is the time when the umbilical cord is severed, and the fetus/child starts its own, biologically independent existence. It is still dependent on external care, but that is not a biological dependence. It is interesting (though not really relevant) that is some languages the word of “soul” is derived from the word “breath”.

But I think that it is possible to compromise at a different point. When the fetus’s brain activity starts, it can be declared (and, yes, this is arbitrary, too!) a human being.

Of course this still does not solve all the problems. It can happen that we must choose between the lives of two fully grown adults. Such tough choices can occur due to very mundane reasons, for example, there are two ill people and we only have one dose of medication to save one of them. These “lifeboat” problems are dime a dozen, and there is no general method to solve them.

 

[polytropos]

I did not make an argument yet. I simply wished to establish that it is rational to have a separate rule-set based upon the age as criterion.

Which I am not totally unreceptive to. The problem is that your examples were all special rules that are instituted for the purpose of protecting younger humans, not of killing them. By contrast, we do not correspondingly institute special rules, in general, for the purpose of killing younger humans, besides abortion. We do not regard it as less morally reprehensible to kill a 3 year old than to kill an 8 year old or to kill a 22 year old or to kill a 45 year old. So you might have shown that protective regulations can be rational, not that a human entity can be sufficiently young to have lost its designation as a human being.

The only definition would be a descriptive one, loosely borrowed from Forrest Gump: “human is as human does”. It should not matter what kind of DNA it has, or if it is a biological being, or if it is a space alien, or a mutant dolphin… if that being is capable of discursive thinking, if it can differentiate between “right” and “wrong”, it should be treated as a “fellow” human being and treated as such.

I am sympathetic to Forrest’s definition, since the idea that things are defined by what they do is at least in principle compatible with a robust hylemorphic essentialism, although I’m certain that is not your intent. Of course, the problem with unreflectively using it as is, is circularity. Human is as human does; for this to be substantive, we would have to know what a human does, which requires knowing what we mean by human.

We can, presumably, agree that by “human” entails what would commonly be referred to as adult human. But an adult human is a biological entity whose life is a continuous process of growth, and whose individuation occurred at conception. In that respect, it seems that what “human does” involves the full gestation process.

Any other account would construe require a separate individuation event after the individuation which indisputably occurred at conception. This is where the circularity becomes an issue, and where one cannot but be arbitrary in saying that one starts to “do what humans do” at some subsequent point.

Now the zygote is a potential human being, just like an acorn is a potential oak tree, or a fertilized egg is a potential chicken. However all of these need a certain environment to fulfill that potential, and even in the best case this fulfillment is not assured.

Quite. But an infant human is also dependent on a certain kind of environment, and this is what makes the dependence of a zygote/fetus on its mother an arbtirary standard of personhood.

There is a legal consensus (not implying that you endorse this), or notion at least, that personhood begins with viability. But the obvious issue is that viability is nonstatic, and probing such a conception produces inconsistencies. For instance, a child born early can still survive with our present technology. But suppose that a child is born into an environment where, say, baby formula is not available. As such, the child is not viable and independent of its mothers body; the child still relies on its mothers body for food. It needs that environment to fulfill its potential, and its reliance on a particular environment does not make it less human.

You talk about the current ethical system. Yes, today, in this society the carcass of a deceased person “enjoys” special consideration, which is definitely arbitrary and also irrational.

All right. Just verifying that in your enlightened ethical system, those who opt out of organ donation need not have their wishes observed. (This is, of course, referring to enlightened ethical systems. I would even agree that organ donation should be “opt out” rather than “opt in,” as certain European nations do it, since that leads to more organ availability, but organ donation is then still voluntary. I do not think any nation holds that one cannot opt out of organ donation, which is not to say that your view is wrong because few others hold it, just that it is a fringe position which probably does not cohere with a consistent ethic of reciprocity.)

This is sheer emotionalism. Many more “zygotes” have been flushed out from the women’s body and no one seems to care – even though according to the catholic view, those zygotes were also “children”.

Indeed, they were. But this is an inconsistent view. All people will die eventually of natural causes; it does not follow that objections to killing them unnaturally are “sheer emotionalism.” If I went to a retirement home and killed the people there, saying, “They were unwanted and a drain on resources. Large numbers of them were going to die anyway.,” I would have a terrible argument. More people have died naturally than were killed by Hitler, Stalin, Pol Pot, etc., but any serious system of ethics would have to regard the avoidable genocides as less acceptable than the natural deaths.

Also, to say that no one cares about miscarriages seems to be patently false.

 

[polytropos]

There is a very good, rational reason why to draw the line between a child and a fetus at the time of birth. That is the time when the umbilical cord is severed, and the fetus/child starts its own, biologically independent existence. It is still dependent on external care, but that is not a biological dependence. It is interesting (though not really relevant) that is some languages the word of “soul” is derived from the word “breath”.

But I think that it is possible to compromise at a different point. When the fetus’s brain activity starts, it can be declared (and, yes, this is arbitrary, too!) a human being.

Both are arbitrary, indeed. What makes biological dependance the standard of personhood other than arbitrary stipulation? What makes biological dependance substantially different from dependence on external care? There is obviously a material difference - but simply stating that there is a difference does not show that it is a relevant difference without recourse to some other hidden premise.

 

[Captain_America]

In a purely secular ethical world, at the end of the day, it’s the man with the machine gun who compels others to act as he wishes.

Why should I be Kantian if I can grab whatever I want, and force you to suck it up?

Power.

It’s about the power. Who can put whom into jail?

 

[Charlemagne_II]

** Originally Posted by Bagheera
You talk about the current ethical system. Yes, today, in this society the carcass of a deceased person “enjoys” special consideration, which is definitely arbitrary and also irrational.**

Why irrational? I can see why it would be irrational to Hitler that a deceased person’s carcass should enjoy special consideration, considering the way he treated Jewish carcasses (making lampshades from their skin, for example).

But why do you think it’s irrational to treat human carcasses with “special consideration”?

 

[tonyrey]

Life is valuable regardless of what we believe because it is an opportunity for physical, intellectual, moral, aesthetic, social and spiritual development and fulfilment but its value would be very limited if it were terminated by death for the simple reason that it would be incomplete, inequitable and inconsequential:

“To-morrow, and to-morrow, and to-morrow,
Creeps in this petty pace from day to day,
To the last syllable of recorded time;
And all our yesterdays have lighted fools
The way to dusty death. Out, out, brief candle!
Life’s but a walking shadow, a poor player,
That struts and frets his hour upon the stage,
And then is heard no more. It is a tale
Told by an idiot, full of sound and fury,
Signifying nothing.”

It is not surprising Macbeth preferred not to believe we get what we deserve in an afterlife in view of his crimes motivated by his lust for power. I wonder who the real idiot is…

 

[ThinkingSapien]

In a purely secular ethical world, at the end of the day, it’s the man with the machine gun who compels others to act as he wishes.

Isn’t that in part descriptive of the world in which we live?

 

[Charlemagne_II]

**Thinking

Isn’t that in part descriptive of the world in which we live? **

To a degree, yes. But the is is not the same as the** ough**t.

 

[tonyrey]

Isn’t that in part descriptive of the world in which we live?

It is certainly the logical outcome of secular values. In a purposeless universe morality is meaningless.

 

[tonyrey]

**Thinking

Isn’t that in part descriptive of the world in which we live? **

To a degree, yes. But the is is not the same as the** ough**t.

There is one significant exception. To be reasonable is a moral obligation.

 

[Bagheera]

polytropos:

We do not regard it as less morally reprehensible to kill a 3 year old than to kill an 8 year old or to kill a 22 year old or to kill a 45 year old.

Sure, all of them have been born, and thus they are biologically independent beings.

polytropos:

So you might have shown that protective regulations can be rational, not that a human entity can be sufficiently young to have lost its designation as a human being.

They never “lost” it. You cannot lose something that was never gained.

polytropos:

Quite. But an infant human is also dependent on a certain kind of environment, and this is what makes the dependence of a zygote/fetus on its mother an arbtirary standard of personhood.

There is a fundamentally different requirement of “biologically” dependent vs. the “nutritionally” dependent. However, I offered a different cut-off point, the electro-chemical activity of the brain. That is when one can argue for personhood.

If you consider a zygote a human being, then you subscribe to the DNA based definition.

The arbitrary definitions cannot be avoided.

We have zillions of “arbitrarily” defined categories. If someone’s DNA would be so “deformed” that they cannot procreate with “normal” humans, then biologically speaking they are not part of the human race. The definition of death is arbitrarily defined at the cessation of brain activity. A medical student is arbitrarily defined to become a doctor, when she receives her diploma, even though this symbolic act has nothing to do with her ability to perform a doctor’s duties.

polytropos:

Both are arbitrary, indeed. What makes biological dependance the standard of personhood other than arbitrary stipulation? What makes biological dependance substantially different from dependence on external care? There is obviously a material difference - but simply stating that there is a difference does not show that it is a relevant difference without recourse to some other hidden premise.

Look at a certain wasp, which injects its larva into an unwilling “mother” and the larva eats its way out against the “implicit” wishes of the “surrogate” mother. Using the bodily resources of someone is fundamentally different from proving nutrition. Today, someone whose life is contingent upon getting a kidney transplant cannot look around and obtain someone’s kidney against their wishes, even though one can have a healthy life with one kidney. Not even to get a blood or bone-marrow transfusion, and those are renewable bodily resources.

The true problem is the conflict between the woman’s express desire not to conceive, and fetus’s implicit “desire” to change from a potential human into an actual human. Of course the fetus’s “so called desire” is just a poetic phrase. A zygote has no desire, it simply acts out its biological nature. It has no brain, no thoughts, no feelings. To say that this biological activity should “trump” the woman’s express desire is irrational.

polytropos:

Just verifying that in your enlightened ethical system, those who opt out of organ donation need not have their wishes observed.

Yes.

 

[tonyrey]

The reason choosing any point in the development of a human person as the point at which it becomes human is arbitrary is because such an endeavor essentially ignores that a human being is not the kind of thing that can be sliced up in that manner. A human being is a being that exists in time as a developing entity. As such it should be identified as human only in the context of its entire lifespan. That is the only non-arbitrary criteria by which a human life can be understood to be human.

Every human begins as a zygote, undergoes fetal development, is “born,” becomes a child, teenager and adult. All of these are aspects of what it means to be a human and a human at any particular stage is no less a human except by the arbitrary fiat of some particularly arrogant individuals who believe themselves to have some special right to determine which other humans - on some other qualification - should be considered by this audaciously lunatic community of delusional “humans” to be regarded as “human” only when and if “they” deem it so. Welcome to a world where “some” humans are more equal than others because “we” say they are for no other reason than because they get in the way of our right to pleasure ourselves at will. In any other context this would be, minimally, called homicide.

There is no rational basis for secular values and ethics. When individuals select an arbitrary criterion of personhood no one is safe…

 

[Charlemagne_II]

**tonyrey

There is no rational basis for secular values and ethics. When individuals select an arbitrary criterion of personhood no one is safe… **

The secularist will claim to have a rational basis for moral values. However, he cannot impose his rationality on others except by putting a pistol to their head. This is hardly rational

 

[ThinkingSapien]

To a degree, yes. But the is is not the same as the** ough**t.

That’s fine, as that’s not what I’m getting at. Looking back at the previous statement:

In a purely secular ethical world, at the end of the day, it’s the man with the machine gun who compels others to act as he wishes.

This seems to be the state of things in our present world (which is not of purely secular ethics). I think the phrase “In a purely secular ethical world” could be removed from the sentence all together to be descriptive of the state of things.

It is certainly the logical outcome of secular values. In a purposeless universe morality is meaningless.

I don’t think it has anything to do with whether or not some one is motivated by secular or religiously motivated values. People can and do at times use weapons and destruction (previous discussion) to enforce their point for a wide range of motivations. Finding an example of a secular or holy fight isn’t difficult; remember our brief discussion involving imperialism?

 

[polytropos]

They never “lost” it. You cannot lose something that was never gained.

The word “lost” is used because we are speaking about justifications for treating other humans differently and to their disadvantage. There is no analogy with protective regulations against alcohol, driving, etc.

Sure, all of them have been born, and thus they are biologically independent beings.

There is a fundamentally different requirement of “biologically” dependent vs. the “nutritionally” dependent.

This is not a very convincing distinction. A breastfeeding child is biologically dependent by any sensible definition of the words. And a fetus is “biologically dependent” just because it obtains its nutrition from its mother. There is not actually the distinction that you are speaking of.

If you consider a zygote a human being, then you subscribe to the DNA based definition.

This is not true. I have not appealed to a DNA-based definition, nor am I committed to it, since a cell can have human DNA and not be a human person. It is a zygote which has been individuated and is on the normal course for human development that is a human person (since it grows into what is undeniably a human person, and there is no individuation event after conception, with the exception perhaps of twinning, a zygote must be a human person).

Look at a certain wasp, which injects its larva into an unwilling “mother” and the larva eats its way out against the “implicit” wishes of the “surrogate” mother. Using the bodily resources of someone is fundamentally different from proving nutrition.

You and I aren’t wasps.

Today, someone whose life is contingent upon getting a kidney transplant cannot look around and obtain someone’s kidney against their wishes, even though one can have a healthy life with one kidney. Not even to get a blood or bone-marrow transfusion, and those are renewable bodily resources.

So someone who needs someone else’s kidney can take it against their wishes, but a fetus cannot be sustained by the normal biological processes which led to its involuntary creation?

Incidentally, it makes sense that one is not obligated to give up an organ to the first person who needs one. But what one cannot do is simply kill the person who needs the organ.

The true problem is the conflict between the woman’s express desire not to conceive, and fetus’s implicit “desire” to change from a potential human into an actual human. Of course the fetus’s “so called desire” is just a poetic phrase. A zygote has no desire, it simply acts out its biological nature. It has no brain, no thoughts, no feelings. To say that this biological activity should “trump” the woman’s express desire is irrational.

No implicit desire necessary. Regardless of a person’s “desire” to be alive, one is not permitted to kill him or her.

 

[Peter_Plato]

The true problem is the conflict between the woman’s express desire not to conceive, and fetus’s implicit “desire” to change from a potential human into an actual human. Of course the fetus’s “so called desire” is just a poetic phrase. A zygote has no desire, it simply acts out its biological nature. It has no brain, no thoughts, no feelings. **To say that this biological activity should “trump” the woman’s express desire is irrational. **

It is not clear, at least not to me, why an “express desire” of one human being should trump the essential interests of another, whether or not those interests are the objects of express desires or not.

A person in a coma, say for nine months, may have no “express desires,” perhaps not even thoughts or feelings about the property they own. Does that entail it is moral and rational to think the “express desire” of the next of kin to have that property should trump the interests of the mere “biological activity” (aka comatose human being) in the hospital bed?"

Morally reprehensible is the term that comes to mind, as it does when speaking of the “express desires” of an adult over the interests of a child in the womb.