The burden of proof: Theism as properly basic

[MindOverMatter2]

That’s wrong, because in the case of observing humans, one first observes that the entity (humans) exist

This is a circular argument and pure semantics on your part. You are just taking things for granted. We do not begin with the knowledge of an intelligence; intelligence being the relevant concept in this discussion. We begin with the knowledge of an object, and we conclude that there is rationality behind the behavior of that object because of its teleological expression and the meaning that it produces. The term “person” or “human” is merely given to symbolize what we have first “identified” as an intelligent mind according to the appearance of teleology. We only think that the object is intelligent because it behaves in a particular way and produces the kind of information that would suggest that such behavior or information is ultimately rooted in or caused by an intellect. The object we perceive and its behavior is the “medium” through which we indirectly identify intelligent behavior; we do not identify intelligence directly apart from the experience of a particular kind of behavior.

 

[TruthSeeker60]

This is a circular argument. You are just taking things for granted.

You’re confused.

We do not begin with the knowledge of an intelligence

Agreed. We begin by determining that an object, such as a human, exists regardless of whether or not it is intelligent (or rational). After determining that it exists, we determine whether or not it is intelligent (or rational) based on what we observe.

intelligence being the relevant concept in this discussion.

Perhaps rationality is the word you are looking for, but rationality is part of the intellect. You cannot conclude that something has rationality unless it has an intellect, nor can you conclude that something was rationally created unless it was designed by something that has an intellect. Thus, unless you are using the words “intellect” or “rationality” much differently than I am, intellect is very relevant to your “argument” on this thread.

We begin with the knowledge of an object, and we conclude that there is rationality behind the behavior of that object because of its teleological expression and the meaning that it produces.

I’m not sure if by “object” you are referring to a rational being doing the designing, or the design itself. In case you meant the design itself…

We do not infer that there is rationality behind an object that is acted upon on that basis. We determine whether or not an object was rationally acted upon based off of whether or not we have evidence that rational beings that do or can create such actions exist.

For example, if I saw a message a painting, I could conclude that a human probably made it because I know humans do make paintings and I don’t have examples otherwise. If, on the other hand, I saw a shooting star, I cannot reasonably conclude that it was made by a fairy, because I have no evidence that fairies create shooting stars, much less even exist.

You have to first identify a rational being that exists in order to conclude that there is rationality behind the object. Otherwise, you cannot determine whether the object is “teleological”.

EDIT: We do not determine whether something is the product of design (or rationality) because of the item itself (which you assert). Instead, knowledge of the rational being that effected the item (such as a human) is a prerequisite to determine whether the object is the product of design (or rationality).

 

[MindOverMatter2]

You’re confused.

Agreed. We begin by determining that an object, such as a human, exists regardless of whether or not it is intelligent (or rational).

You are putting the horse before the kart, and saying we see humans. This may seem reasonable at first, but then you make your claim irrelevant by saying that humanity is not first identified according to whether or not a thing has a mind.

You can call an object what ever you like. In the end you are making a fallacy, since it is irrelevant to the question of whether or not intelligent causes exist outside of our own intelligent acts. In so far as that is concerned, we do not know that minds exists simply by pointing to an object and calling it human. We identify the existence of other minds and intelligent causes according to the teleological behaviour of objects.

Agreed. We begin by determining that an object, such as a human, exists regardless of whether or not it is intelligent (or rational).

If we categorize a thing as human regardless of whether or not a thing has a mind; then it really is irrelevant to the question of how we know that other minds exist, since you your self have said that we cannot identify that fact according to a things humanness alone. We only know that a thing has a mind according to behavior, regardless of what form that object takes. We are talking about minds that have a self will and a self knowing, and the fact that we only understand that such minds exist on the basis that we perceive objects acting in a teleological manner. Otherwise we would not know that those minds existed regardless of what form any particular object happens to take. You only truly know that your mind exists.

 

[Sair]

Yet we are reasonable to believe in intelligent causes existing apart from us on the basis that we perceive objects acting for teleological ends. This is not necessary knowledge.

No, it isn’t knowledge - it’s assumption that requires support. If such support is not forthcoming, then the assumption is simply that.

For example, the fact that biological organisms produce traits which only makes sense in terms of objectifying survival; it appears we live in a universe created precisely for the possibility of self moving and self producing life.

Yet only on what appears to be a significant minority of planets within the universe. Astronomers have recently discovered a planet upon which liquid water might exist, and therefore life. There is actually no reason to believe that life is, in itself, a specific case of the physical laws coming together to produce something special - we only like to think so because we are living things.

Therefore the belief that the universe has an intelligent cause is properly basic knowledge, simply because it immediately appears as if it has been designed to some degree or extent by an intelligence .

Again, I would claim in counter to your assertion that there is no reason to simply assume intelligent design because it sits happily with our perception of ourselves in relation to the rest of the universe. Order and patterns do not require intention. Intention, as we can perceive it, is a product of certain arrangements of physical entities, not a prerequisite for them.

Therefore the burden of proof is on the atheist. Simply saying that its not necessarily the case is not a valid rebuttal, because the argument is not built on the premise of necessity, but rather it is built on the premise that it is reasonable to accept a thing as true if it is immediately and consistently present in our immediate knowledge, without the need for scientific or metaphysical evidence. This is properly basic knowledge.

It might be more accurate to call it a basic assumption. Whether it is proper or accurate or reasonable to make such an assumption depends upon the state of our collective knowledge and awareness. In times past, it was properly basic to suppose that disease was spread by bad air, or miasma - this has since been proved inaccurate. Anything we call a properly basic assumption must be subject to inquiry. The burden of proof, as such, lies with those who claim intelligent design - unless there is direct evidence of a designer (that is, evidence that points irrefutably to design rather than other phenomena, and/or to the existence of an actual designing intelligence) this is not a properly basic assumption.

So long as you accept properly basic knowledge as an epistemological premise. The only way you can defeat this argument is by either proving metaphysical naturalism to be true, or by denying that things do not appear to act for a purpose.

That knowledge must have some foundation, I do acknowledge. However, I think that properly basic knowledge is more limited than your claims of intelligent design, and requires only the existence of a knower and that which is known. I cannot prove metaphysical naturalism to be true in any absolute sense - that is presently beyond my scope as an amateur philosopher. All I can do is attempt to reconcile my experience and that of others with the explanatory power of the hypothesis of metaphysical naturalism. To prove purpose, however, takes more than just the appearance of purposive action, as I indicated in my previous reply to your OP. It does require the reasonable and independent inference of a designing intelligence, a purpose-giver, an overarching intention for that which exists. Apart from these, all we can assume is that things merely appear to act in a purposive fashion.

 

[TruthSeeker60]

we do not know that minds exists simply by pointing to an object and calling it human.

Responses like this demonstrate that you are confused about my posts, because I in no way said that calling something human – a word that just refers to a particular species of creatures – means it has a mind. I was saying that the logical step of determining whether or not something is conscious/intelligent/rational comes after determining that the thing exists.

We identify the existence of other minds and intelligent causes according to the teleological behaviour of objects.

In my previous post I asked you to clarify whether by “object” you are referring to the thing that has a mind (such as a god or human) or the thing that is effected by the thing that has a mind (such as the universe or a watch on a beach). Having failed to make that clarification, you leave me having to guess what you mean.

We judge whether or not a mind exists by observing the actions of the thing that may or may not have a mind. For example, we know that other creatures on this planet (I’m avoiding using the word “human” because that somehow seems to confuse you”) design and produce complex products such as watches, and I have no examples of watches that were made otherwise, which is why I would conclude that it was designed by one of those creatures if I found a watch one on a beach. However, I could not have concluded that the watch was a product of intelligent without first knowing that these creatures exist. Likewise, I cannot conclude that the specifications of the universe or what is contained within is the doing of a mind outside the universe unless I first know that that mind outside the universe exists, which renders the argument circular. I don’t know why this is so hard for you.

If you respond, please specify what you mean by “objects” and “teleological behavior”. No attempt to construct a logical argument should contain such vague language. In fact, I suspect that you want the language to remain vague so that it is difficult for me to thoroughly destroy the argument, since I’ll be shooting at an invisible and moving target.

 

[MindOverMatter2]

Responses like this demonstrate that you are confused about my posts, because I in no way said that calling something human – a word that just refers to a particular species of creatures – means it has a mind. I was saying that the logical step of determining whether or not something is conscious/intelligent/rational comes after determining that the thing exists.

We can see that things in general exist. We can see that objects have particular ways of behaving. Some objects behave in such away as to appear as being moved by a mind. Some objects produce the appearance of teleological information as such that we conclude that there is a mind producing that information. Some objects act for ends that only make rational sense in terms of purpose; thus we conclude there is ultimately a mind behind that act.

 

[TruthSeeker60]

We can see that things in general exist. We can see that objects have particular ways of behaving. Some objects behave in such away as to appear as being moved by a mind. Some objects produce the appearance of teleological information as such that we conclude that there is a mind producing that information. Some objects act for ends that only make rational sense in terms of purpose; thus we conclude there is ultimately a mind behind that act.

No we don’t. This is an argument from incredulity fallacy because you’re basically saying, “I cannot think of how this makes sense/could about about another way, so it must have been the product of a mind.”

I presented an alternative that does not have such a weakness. We know that watches have watchmakers not because of the “teleological information” (or organized complexity) of the watch itself, but because we know that other creatures (homosapiens) make watches, every watch we have seen was made by such creatures, and we have no watches that we know were not produced by such creatures.

You’ll find my explanation better in many ways. It does not appeal to incredulity. It does not use ambiguous language like you are using. It allows you to determine what the designer probably is (such as a human instead of an alien from Mars). In that case, it also works regardless of whether the intellect is real or artificial (such as an artificial intelligence in a computer, which can act toward a purposeful end).

Theoretically, something could be the product of a purposeful design of an artificial intelligence. Hypothetically, we could all be living in the “Matrix”, in which case you could be right that there is an intelligence behind the universe, but it would be an artificial intelligence of a computer, not a god.

 

[TruthSeeker60]

No we don’t. This is an argument from incredulity fallacy because you’re basically saying, “I cannot think of how this makes sense/could about about another way, so it must have been the product of a mind."

My dyslexia manifesting again. What I meant to say was:

could come about another way…

 

[Sair]

Further to the discussion of knowledge having foundations - it occurs to me that this is actually an idea that modern philosophy has inherited from Descartes; the idea of the Cogito ergo sum being the attempt to strip away all supposed ‘knowledge’ that was subject to doubt, in order to build the edifice of knowledge back up from an undoubtable foundation.

The trouble was - or at least this is my understanding - is that if one can only be certain of the existence of one’s own mind, where is there to go from there? Descartes was pretty much left with no choice but to posit a good god as a properly basic belief (or a leap of faith) in order to open a way out of his own head.

An alternative to foundationalism that I have seen posited (although unfortunately I can’t remember precisely where - I think it comes from constructivist philosophers) is the idea that knowledge is not a chain, where the whole thing is only as good as its weakest link, but rather a web, in which certain inferences lead to other inferences which then link to several other inferences besides, until what one has with regard to knowledge is a set of mutually supportive suppositions - such that one might prove inaccurate without destroying the whole web; some other supportive finding can take the place of the one that is no longer valid.

I’m not sure where properly basic assumptions/beliefs fit into the web analogy, but I do think it provides a more realistic picture of how we actually construct knowledge.

 

[MindOverMatter2]

No we don’t. This is an argument from incredulity fallacy because you’re basically saying, “I cannot think of how this makes sense/could about about another way, so it must have been the product of a mind.”

So you are now saying that we have no rational or epistemological grounds for thinking that other minds exist outside of our own.

 

[TruthSeeker60]

No we don’t

. This is an argument from incredulity fallacy because you’re basically saying, “I cannot think of how this makes sense/could about about another way, so it must have been the product of a mind.”

So you are now saying that we have no rational or epistemological grounds for thinking that other minds exist outside of our own.

Yet again you demonstrate that you are confused about my posts. I can’t believe that I have to repeat and clarify my simple point this many times for you to get it.

My point was to show that we can attribute something – such as a watch on a beach – to creatures because we know these creatures make such things and all watches that we know of were made by these creatures. Whether or not these creatures that make watches have “minds” is a completely additional issue, since my explanation allows for attributing the watch to the actions of those creatures without considering if the creatures have “minds”.

But now I can add another advantage to my explanation, because my explanation doesn’t use the stupid word “mind”. If you are willing to concede that my explanation is a perfectly good explanation for how we consider something (such as a watch on a beach) to be the result of the action of a being (such as a homosapien) regardless of whether that being has a “mind”, I’ll then be willing to discuss what a “mind” is and how we can determine whether or not a being has one.

My explanation provides a perfectly good explanation for how we consider something to the action of a being, while yours, as far as I can tell, comes down to an argument from ignorance fallacy. If I’m wrong about that, please tell me how you can determine whether or not something is “teleological information” without committing an argument from ignorance.

 

[tonyrey]

But now I can add another advantage to my explanation, because my explanation doesn’t use the stupid word “mind”.

Mindless explanations of minds are immensely superior because they demonstrate how meaningless they are…

 

[TruthSeeker60]

Mindless explanations of minds are immensely superior because they demonstrate how meaningless they are…

You too demonstrate you are confused that you are confused about my posts, because my explanation in my posts isn’t meant to be an explanation of minds, but an explanation for how we can attribute something – such as a watch – to be the result of behavior of a being – such as a homosapien – regardless of whether or not it has a “mind”.

Is it really this difficult for you people to get what I’m saying?

Again, this is my explanation:

My point was to show that we can attribute something – such as a watch on a beach – to creatures because we know these creatures make such things and all watches that we know of were made by these creatures.

This was made after pointing out the circularity or the explanation offered on this thread:

. . . ]You cannot attribute behavior to an entity that you do not already know exists.

For example, I know that humans exist. I also know that these humans make things such as paintings, watches, and airplanes, which is why I would attribute one of those things that I found on a beach to a human. Knowledge that the being exists is a prerequisite to attributing behavior, including intentional behavior, to it, thus rendering such an argument from design for the existence of god to be circular.

 

[MindOverMatter2]

Yet again you demonstrate that you are confused about my posts. I can’t believe that I have to repeat and clarify my simple point this many times for you to get it.

I see very clearly. Clearly enough to see that you fail to understand the epistemological difference between perceiving an object and concluding that it has a mind base upon an objects behavior. This is because you take things for granted and thus you do not really think about things properly. I am merely anticipating your failure.

My point was to show that we can attribute something – such as a watch on a beach – to creatures because we know these creatures make such things and all watches that we know of were made by these creatures.

No. We know that “minds” make watches. We see objects in the process of making these things and we conclude that the “object” is moved by a “mind” or “intelligence” because it makes the best sense of the fact that the “object” has produced what appears to be a complex teleological (goal driven) instrument. Otherwise it does not make sense.

A mind of some sort also makes the best sense of the object that is the universe since it produces traits that evidently appear goal driven.

1. I accept the existence of human minds because of what appears to be the goal driven or teleological behavior of objects. The is properly basic knowledge.
2. I accept the existence of an intelligent creator of the universe because of what appears to be the goal driven or teleological behavior of objects. This is properly basic knowledge.

 

[Sair]

No. We know that “minds” make watches. We see objects in the process of making these things and we conclude that the “object” is moved by a “mind” or “intelligence” because it makes the best sense of the fact that the “object” has produced what appears to be a complex teleological (goal driven) instrument. Otherwise it does not make sense.

Interesting. Do you assume a mind is behind the construction of a bird’s nest or a spider’s web? My experience has been that most Christians don’t believe so…

 

[MindOverMatter2]

Interesting. Do you assume a mind is behind the construction of a bird’s nest or a spider’s web? My experience has been that most Christians don’t believe so…

Teleological information is required for teleological constructs. Its reasonable to think that teleological information comes from a mind, because that is the best explanation, unless evidence is given to the contrary. Whether or not the objects we call a bird or a spider has a mind is irrelevant, since the existence of the meaningful information required for any teleological (goal driven) construction still only makes sense if a mind is the ultimate source of that information.

If a person creates a robot and releases that robot to the unsuspecting world, we may be mistaken for attributing a mind to the robot because of its intelligent behavior, but we are not mistaken for thinking that a mind is ultimately responsible for the teleological information which the robot is producing.

I would have thought that to be clear. Thats all i have left to say on the matter.

 

[Sair]

Teleological information is required for teleological constructs. Its reasonable to think that teleological information comes from a mind, because that is the best explanation, unless evidence is given to the contrary. Whether or not the objects we call a bird or a spider has a mind is irrelevant, since the existence of the meaningful information required for any teleological (goal driven) construction still only makes sense if a mind is the ultimate source of that information.

Aren’t you jumping the gun a little bit here?

After all, we can suppose that spiders were making webs, and birds constructing nests, well before humans evolved; yet it is only from our own perspective that we assume intention and purpose. We know that we ourselves conceive of purposes and act to bring about those purposes, but we don’t know, directly, that any other creatures do so, nor do we have any compelling reason to believe that orderly action must proceed from conscious intent.

My question would be this - you assume that prior intention, design, purpose are involved in any set of actions that lead to a particular outcome; yet you choose to ascribe these intentions ultimately to an (anthropomorphic) intelligent designer, rather than to the spider or to the bird - treating these animals as you would treat a robot designed and built by a human. On what basis do you make this distinction? Why would you suppose, rather than the spider or the bird having minds of their own, that the information they use to build their respective constructions must come from beyond their actual existence? Why does it need to be the result of conscious intent at all?

 

[Biblepoe]

Thought provoking thread.

I see very clearly. Clearly enough to see that you fail to understand the epistemological difference between perceiving an object and concluding that it has a mind base upon an objects behavior. This is because you take things for granted and thus you do not really think about things properly. I am merely anticipating your failure.

No. We know that “minds” make watches. We see objects in the process of making these things and we conclude that the “object” is moved by a “mind” or “intelligence” because it makes the best sense of the fact that the “object” has produced what appears to be a complex teleological (goal driven) instrument. Otherwise it does not make sense.

A mind of some sort also makes the best sense of the object that is the universe since it produces traits that evidently appear goal driven.

1. I accept the existence of human minds because of what appears to be the goal driven or teleological behavior of objects. The is properly basic knowledge.
2. I accept the existence of an intelligent creator of the universe because of what appears to be the goal driven or teleological behavior of objects. This is properly basic knowledge.

I think you need to be careful here to distinguish between inferring that the thing you notice, such as another man, having a mind itself, versus something being cause by a mind it does not have.

The difference is between meeting an alien from Mars and inferring based off of what you observe that it has a mind versus finding something organized and complex on Mars and infer that it must have been done by an alien (without having found an alien).

I hope you can appreciate that difference.

Remember, although the relation between the brain and the mind is not understood, we do know that the function of our minds on this earth is dependent on our brains. God makes use of the natural world.

 

[JohnAlexander]

1. There are things that we reasonably accept without evidence because it appears true; and this is what we would call properly basic knowledge.

That is a terrible argument for knowledge. Plenty of things appear true but they aren’t. It appears that the universe is made of stuff but the stuff is mostly empty space, everything appears solid but nothing is solid. You need to do a lot more work before you can say that we actually know anything.

1. Apparently the universe exists outside of our minds, and we would consider the burden of proof to be with those who would argue that it does not.

Assuming we agree with what we mean by mind, I this is not disputable.

1. Apparently other minds exist out side of our minds because we perceive physical bodies acting for purposeful ends and producing teleological information which only makes sense if that behaviour originates from an intelligence cause. Thus we would consider the burden of proof to be with those who would argue that other minds don’t exist.

I don’t think this is proven. There could be other reasons why we believe that other minds exist.

1. We see a universe which produces objects that act in a very specific and law-like manner. The universe behaves in a particular way and produces the kind of information that would suggest that it exists for a purpose. For example organisms produce traits that only makes sense if life exists for the purpose of survival. Emotions presuppose personal interaction. Things of that nature. Thus it appears immediately apparent that the universe has an intelligent cause.

With this argument I take issue. The universe for the most part seems to be random, as in lacking intentionality. There are laws of the universe that control the behavior of matter & energy. It doesn’t really look like the universe has a goal.

Animals seem to be somewhat random in their behavior. They don’t seem to intend anything they do, they just do it. Evolution does a very good job of explaining biological behavior. It explains why life exists for the purpose of survival. If it didn’t then it wouldn’t be alive.

 

[theowarner]

I’m not sure that it is enough to suggest that that which we reasonably accept without evidence because it appears to be true is what we mean by properly basic knowledge. That said, it doesn’t matter because “properly basic knowledge” is a just a label for certain sorts of assumptions… it is a list of assumptions including the existence of other minds and so on. These are just simple assumptions which we simply must make in order to get anywhere within philosophy.

I’m not convinced that there is some sort of a meta-philosophical standard by which the assumption that the universe exists outside our minds (typically thought to be a properly basic assumption) has no burden of proof. It does indeed have a burden of proof, but it is not possible for us to meet this burden. Thus, it is an assumption. The properness of assuming it, though, isn’t based, again, on some standard by which some assumptions are exempted from burdens of proof, but rather the reality that unless we make these assumptions, we must more or less abandon all philosophical thought.

Thus, my reaction to your argument is that you are attempting to exploit the word “proper.” Again, it is proper to make certain assumptions because we cannot proceed with philosophy without making these assumptions. But, we should imagine that these assumptions suddenly acquire propositional truth or can be analogized into an investigative tool. I mean: given that we must assume that other minds exist, we cannot possible use these assumption to verify anything about anything except that minds exist.