The Categories

[freeload]

In Aristotle’s the Categories, present in a subject means cannot exist apart from the subject. Why does Aristotle say that man is never present in a subject in the statement “The individual man is man.” if man cannot be understood or exist without looking at the individual man?

 

[Betterave]

In Aristotle’s the Categories, present in a subject means cannot exist apart from the subject. Why does Aristotle say that man is never present in a subject in the statement “The individual man is man.” if man cannot be understood or exist without looking at the individual man?

‘Said-of’ refers to something as what the subject is. ‘Present in’ refers to something that belongs to, or ‘falls to’ (accidit), the subject as a matter of fact, but not as constituting the subject’s own nature, as making the subject to be the kind of thing that it is. ‘Man’ always refers to what a subject is, it is not a characteristic that can be ascribed to a subject that is not a man (e.g., “this horse is a man” makes an impossible claim, it is a ‘category mistake’), so it cannot be ‘present in’ a subject. Instead ‘man’ must be ‘said of’ a subject (an individual man) - this is just the terminology Aristotle uses for talking about the nature of a thing, as opposed to its properties or accidents (e.g., white) which are merely ‘present in’.

 

[freeload]

Thank you Betterave for answering my question. You are such a big help!

 

[freeload]

Other things, again, are both predicable of a subject and present in a subject. Thus while knowledge is present in the human mind, it is predicable of grammar.

There is, lastly, a class of things which are neither present in a subject nor predicable of a subject, such as the individual man or the individual horse. But, to speak more generally, that which is individual and has the character of a unit is never predicable of a subject. Yet in some cases there is nothing to prevent such being present in a subject. Thus a certain point of grammatical knowledge is present in a subject.

Above is a part of section 1 part 2 of Aristotle’s The Categories. In the line “Thus while knowledge is present in the human mind, it is predicable of grammar.”, did Aristotle mean it this way: the human mind is knowledge, the human mind is knowledgeable?

In the line “Yet in some cases there is nothing to prevent such being present in a subject. Thus a certain point of grammatical knowledge is present in a subject.”, can you give me an example of this?

Thank you in advance!

 

[Betterave]

First, you’re welcome for the first response, and second, you’re welcome in advance for what I’m about to say (assuming it’s helpful!).

Other things, again, are both predicable of a subject and present in a subject. Thus while knowledge is present in the human mind, it is predicable of grammar.

There is, lastly, a class of things which are neither present in a subject nor predicable of a subject, such as the individual man or the individual horse. But, to speak more generally, that which is individual and has the character of a unit is never predicable of a subject. Yet in some cases there is nothing to prevent such being present in a subject. Thus a certain point of grammatical knowledge is present in a subject.

Above is a part of section 1 part 2 of Aristotle’s The Categories. In the line “Thus while knowledge is present in the human mind, it is predicable of grammar.”, did Aristotle mean it this way: the human mind is knowledge, the human mind is knowledgeable?

What exactly the human mind is is difficult and controversial in Aristotle. But I think it’s fair to say that what he means here is (1) the human mind has knowledge/is knowledgeable, but is not itself knowledge, but some kind of substance in which knowledge inheres as an accident, and (2) grammar is knowledge (i.e., to the question “what kind of thing is grammar?” the answer would be “grammar is knowledge”).

In the line “Yet in some cases there is nothing to prevent such being present in a subject. Thus a certain point of grammatical knowledge is present in a subject.”, can you give me an example of this?

Actually, that’s just what Aristotle does: “Thus a certain point of grammatical knowledge is present in a subject.” Here “a certain point of grammatical knowledge” is “such a being,” i.e., an individual having the character of a unit, which is ‘present in’ a subject. But it is not a real individual in the same way as an individual man or horse, since the latter cannot be ‘present in’ another subject, whereas “a certain point of knowledge” is always ‘present in’ some other (knowing) subject, and does not subsist on its own.

 

[freeload]

I am sorry for the late response Betterave. My schedule of work and my absorption of your explanation did not permit me to reply quickly! “A certain point of knowledge” is what baffles me at first since Aristotle wrote that a certain point of knowledge is an individual that cannot be predicable of a subject and present in a subject. But he mentioned that a certain point of knowledge can be present in a subject. I am thinking that Aristotle might mean by saying a certain point of knowledge is like a thought in the man’s mind. This thought cannot be predicable of a subject but it is present in a subject since it is being thought about. I hope I understand Aristotle perfectly on that portion of The Categories. Once again, thank you Betterave for your time answering my question!

 

[Betterave]

I am sorry for the late response Betterave. My schedule of work and my absorption of your explanation did not permit me to reply quickly! “A certain point of knowledge” is what baffles me at first since Aristotle wrote that a certain point of knowledge is an individual that cannot be predicable of a subject and present in a subject. But he mentioned that a certain point of knowledge can be present in a subject. I am thinking that Aristotle might mean by saying a certain point of knowledge is like a thought in the man’s mind. This thought cannot be predicable of a subject but it is present in a subject since it is being thought about. I hope I understand Aristotle perfectly on that portion of The Categories. Once again, thank you Betterave for your time answering my question!

Yes, I think it’s safe to say that a certain point of knowledge (e.g., “adverbs modify verbs”) is like a thought, and that it must always be present in a subject, while there is no subject of which it can be predicated (i.e., it cannot be that “Socrates is a certain point of knowledge”). I don’t think the subject need be actually thinking about the thought for it to be present in the subject though. It is enough that the subject can think about it whenever it occurs to him (i.e., if he knows it, it is present in him; he need not currently be thinking it).