… My position on the matter is not limited to believing that he does or believing that he doesn’t. I can choose to not accept either of those options as my current personal belief about it.
I agree that this a true statement, in the context of a positivistic question. Indeed, this concept is at the essence of quantum mechanics, such as in the example of Schrodinger’s cat.
I consider not accepting the claim “There are gods” to be the defining characteristic of atheism, and I consider accepting the claim “There are no gods” to be something extra that some atheists believe. [And I’ll explain why some atheists might believe that if you’d just grasp this simple point]
Despite my agreement that it is possible to have no position regarding a positivistic matter, *practically speaking *you can’t take the same position on matters of faith. We are not robots; we form opinions regarding unproven things based on our evaluation of the evidence or lack thereof. A
robot would be truly agnostic; taking no position with regards to faith.
However, any atheist actually believes there is no God. This position is justified by the underlying, unprovable principle of “lack of belief without evidence” in conjunction with “no evidence for God,” possibly on other arguments.
On a deeper level, I believe that the vast majority of atheists accept atheism for one of four main reasons (though there could be others) 1) in order to justify attachment to objectively immoral things (whatever they are), 2) because of the darkness in their own hearts, 3) because they are angry at the idea that a good God would allow the horrible suffering we see in the world today and throughout history, or 4) (and this is very rare IMO) he or she actually believes that atheism is Truth.
In any case, for all practical purposes, any atheist really
is professing the unproven belief that there is no God. To say otherwise is either sophistry or disingenuousness. The question of “lack of belief” is merely an underlying and unprovable rationale to support the belief of “no God.”
As I showed several days ago, belief in no God is an extremely bad philosophy for humans, even if it were the Truth (which it is not). Atheism predisposes people, as individuals and as a society, towards amorality and, worse, atheism is open to objectively grave evils. Atheism predisposes people, as individuals and as a society, towards hoplessness, nihilism, depression, and a negative outlook on life that leads to misery and suffering, and possibly reduced long-term production. All we have to do is look at societies such as China, Russia, and North Korea where atheism held for a long time. Maybe you very few atheists debating us here would assert otherwise, but for the
vast majority of people, atheism is just bad. Atheism is also bad if only atheistic leaders are in power, because of the resulting policies that come about, citing Russia and China and North Korea again as examples.
Because atheism is a bad philosophy for humans, and because atheism cannot be
shown to be the truth, atheism should be rejected as a philosophy altogether.
The question then becomes, which philosophy to accept? As argued earlier, the Catholic faith is by far the most rational and most likely to be true. Due to lack of space, I’ll have to defend this assertion in another post, if needed.
I’ve given more thought to this issue, and particularly to the objection that Pascal’s Wager relies on the unproven assumption that there is a Christian God, complete with Heaven and Hell - but that a-priori you cannot know whether there are any gods at all. For example, Hinduism does not believe in Heaven or Hell, but rather continuous reincarnation, if Hinduism is true, then Pasclal’s Wager would not apply - and because we cannot know a-priori whether Hinduism or Christianity is true, Pascal’s Wager must be rejected as a false choice.
Upon further thought, I think Pascal’s Wager still is a valid wager due to the ontology of its assumption (the existence of a Christian God). Because one cannot prove the non-existence of the Christian God, one may rationally make the unproven assumption that He does exist. Naturally, if you assumed evidence is required for belief, then you would reject the rationality of this assumption. However, because you cannot
prove God’s non-existence, you cannot prove that the assumption is irrational (especially in the light of reasonable arguments for God’s existence, such as first cause).
In any case, I think the more proper assumption of Pascal’s Wager is that there exists the
possibility of a Christian God. If there is that
possibility, then it is irrational not to believe in God because of the risk analysis imposed by Pascal’s Wager.
In other words, Pascal’s Wager works because it does not rely on the assumption that God
truly exists, but rather on the
possibility that He exists.
Given that no one can
disprove either the Truth or the
possibility of the
Christian God’s existence, and given that belief in the Christian God cannot be proven to be
irrational in the face of ontological and telelogical arguments of His existence, the risk analysis of Pascal’s Wager is both rational and fully effective.
Indeed, when looked at from this way, Pascal’s Wager becomes yet another ontological “proof” (non-positivistic) of God’s existence. The Truth will always support itself and lead back to itself, and Pascal’s Wager ontologically helps us to exclude all religions, except a Monotheism that accepts Hevean and Hell as possibilities, as not holding the
fullness of Truth. Which such monotheistic religion to choose is then derived from other principles, such as analyzing the claims of the religions themselves.