The central contradiction running through the arguments of many of those new atheists authors

[Charlemagne_II]

ThomasToo

And theism creates an environment that allows for Al-Qaeda, the Taliban and FGM.

And atheism creates an environment that leads to Hitler, Stalin, and Mao.

You are not going to get the upper hand reasoning along that line!

 

[ThomasToo]

ThomasToo

And theism creates an environment that allows for Al-Qaeda, the Taliban and FGM.

And atheism creates an environment that leads to Hitler, Stalin, and Mao.

You are not going to get the upper hand reasoning along that line!

I’m not looking for the upper hand; I’m looking to have an interesting and thought provoking discussion. Blaming me and mine for the Holocaust doesn’t really seem conducive to that.

 

[AntiTheist]

Your definition of an atheist is “one who holds no belief in gods”; mine is “one who believes there are no gods” – these two positions are VERY different.

The way you’ve phrased the above leads me to think that I have failed to make myself clear. I think I can clear it up.

When faced with any given claim, you have only two options: to accept the claim or to not accept it.

Here is claim A: “A god exists.”

Here is claim B: “No gods exist.”

I am saying that an atheist – under my definition – is someone who does not accept claim A. Now, that person may additionally accept claim B, but that’s a separate issue from that person not accepting claim A.

It is the not accepting of claim A that I consider to be the defining characteristic of an atheist. Whether or not that person accepts claim B is a different issue.

In other words, I consider people who accept claim B to be a subset of people who do not accept claim A. When I talk about atheists, I’m talking about all of the people who do not accept claim A – and some of them will, in fact, accept claim B.

Now, if you want to call me something different (agnostic, maybe?), then whatever. We’re just quibbling about definitions at that point. I’m just trying to make clear what I mean when I use the term.

 

[AntiTheist]

In terms of practical consequences, when judging a philosophy the two most meaningful questions are: “is a given philosophy more or less likely to be consistent with the commission of a grave evil?” and “is a philosophy more or less likely to promote the common good?” The answer to the first question is critically important, because if a philosophy is consistent with the commission of a grave evil, then that philosophy is self-evidently bad (practically). If honest, even AntiTheist would have to agree, as he or she believes that theism is wrong and results in “bad things”. The answer to the second question is an indicator of how closely a given philosopy conforms to the Truth.

I don’t agree that things that are consistent with bad things are themselves bad. [my wearing a blue shirt is consistent with me doing bad things like punching a random stranger in the face…it doesn’t prevent me from doing it…but that doesn’t make wearing a blue shirt bad]. However, I do think that things that directly lead to bad things are bad. [If, for example, I held the belief that “punching random people is good,” then that belief – which presumably would lead to action – I would consider bad]

And furthermore, I don’t think that the practical consequences of any particular belief or non-belief have anything to do with truth value

Any evil deed commited by a Catholic is inconsistent with Catholicism itself.

I disagree, on the grounds that you and I likely define “evil” very differently. But let’s put that aside for a moment – because it will sidetrack us – to get to something more interesting:

In contrast, atheism, does not preach anything other than either 1) lack of belief or 2) disbelief. Atheism, in either form, by itself, stands for nothing. An atheist may believe whatever he or she wants, and different atheists can have radically different moral conclusions regarding actions.

I’m stunned. You’ve actually said something correct. Congratulations.

However, nothing stops an atheist from taking a more sinister road. For example, nothing about atheism prevents Stalin (an atheist) from stating that his murderous pogroms were good.

Nor would we expect atheism to do so. As you yourself have said, atheism is either a lack of belief or a disbelief. It’s clearly not a system of morality.

Logically, to criticize something that’s not a system of morality on the grounds that it’s not a system of morality is absurd. It would be like criticizing my philosophy of wearing blue shirts on the grounds that nothing about it prevents me from calling murder “good.” Or it would be like criticizing my non-belief in Thor on the grounds that nothing about it prevents me from calling murder “good.”

While Leela and other atheists may naturally recoil from such a statement and provide various reasons why Stalin’s pogroms were NOT good (maybe even Evil), nothing about atheism as a philosophy itself contradicts Stalin’s position. Atheism is consistent with Stalin’s actions and his beliefs regarding the rightness of his actions.

I don’t “recoil” from such a statement. It’s a fact: absolutely nothing about atheism prevents a person from choosing to do something bad, just like absolutely nothing about blue-shirt-ism prevents a person from choosing to do something bad. So what does that prove?

However, atheism is consistent with Stalin or any other evil.

Or any good. Similarly, my blue shirt philosophy is consistent with any action, good or evil.

While an atheist may properly deny that atheism leads to or compels evil, it is undeniable that evil is consistent with atheism.

It’s equally undeniable that evil is consistent with my blue shirt philosophy.

If so, then atheism is a philosophy to be rejected as bad for both the individual and society.

Unless you’re willing to claim that we should reject my blue shirt philosophy – and any other position that is not a system of morality – you should see what’s wrong with this statement.

Now, interestingly enough, my screen name is AntiTheist because I do believe that god-beliefs (and more generally, supernatural beliefs) lead towards things that I would label “bad.” And when I say “lead,” I don’t mean, “there’s nothing in the philosophy that prevents it from happening!” I mean that bad things are a direct consequence of belief.

Of course, that argument is going to lead us very far astray, and, as I’ve said, whether a belief leads to good actions or bad actions is irrelevant to the more important point: whether or not it’s true.

EDIT: It strikes me, upon re-reading your post, that you seem to think that atheism is a “philosophy.” It’s not. You yourself point out that atheism is only a lack of belief or a disbelief in something. Your whole argument is predicated around the fact that atheism is nothing more than this, but you simultaneously want to claim that it is a “philosophy” so that you can criticize it for not being a system of morals. It’s all very bizarre.

I mean, I also don’t believe in fire-breathing zebras. I’m an a-fire-breathing-zebra-ist. And my a-fire-breathing-zebraism is completely and totally consistent with all sorts of actions, good and evil. It’s consistent with the most atrocious and horrendous crimes. It does absolutely nothing to stop me from doing bad things.

Does this mean I should abandon my “philosophy” of a-fire-breathing-zebraism and finally accept that some zebras can breathe fire?

Obviously, it’s not a philosophy, and obviously it’s not a system of morals – so criticizing it on the basis that it’s neither of those things is more than ridiculous.

 

[Charlemagne_II]

This dialogue is getting too far out for me.

Adios!

 

[Eric0802]

Obviously, it’s not a philosophy, and obviously it’s not a system of morals – so criticizing it on the basis that it’s neither of those things is more than ridiculous.

While one cannot criticize atheism on the grounds that it’s not a system of morals, one can criticize it on moral grounds. It’s here that I think the comparison between atheism and blue-shirtism or a-fire-breathing-zebraism is disingenuous. No one claims, or could reasonably claim, that blue shirts or fire-breathing zebras objectively ground moral propositions, but we can make such a claim of God. So, suppose I accept the proposition,

(1) Iff God exists, moral propositions can be objectively grounded.

In this case, even given your minimalist definition of atheism as a mere lack of belief in God (a definition I partly criticized earlier in this thread), we can see quite clearly that atheism does have moral implications, since if you deny God’s existence, you’re denying that moral propositions can be objectively grounded.

Now you cannot reject this conclusion merely by claiming to reject (1). Rather, by introducing (1), the theist has now changed the issue to whether (1) is true, since, if (1) obtains, then the claim that atheism has nothing to do with morality is false. We can construct the following argument:

(P1) If (1), then the claim that atheism has nothing to do with morality is false.
(P2) (1)
(C) The claim that atheism has nothing to do with morality is false.

The argument is logically valid (modus ponens), and (P1) is true, so the only issue is whether (1) is true (so, as I said above, the truth of (1) becomes the issue).

I also think that this argument, even if it’s not sound (i.e. even if (1) is false) demonstrates that it’s decidedly false that a lack of belief cannot possibly have any moral or practical implications.

 

[ThomasToo]

So, suppose I accept the proposition,

(1) Iff God exists, moral propositions can be objectively grounded.

Assuming you’re using ‘iff’ in the technical sense of ‘if and only if’ then I would argue the point with you. Why do you think a world without gods means moral principles cannot be objectively grounded?

If, however, you simply had a typo–these things happen to the best of us–and meant ‘if’ then we can accept your principle and still have an atheist worldview with objectively grounded moral propositions. This is because ~(A–>B) is A&~B and not ~(B–>A). Reading through your post this seems unlikely but I thought I’d go through this just in case.

 

[AntiTheist]

While one cannot criticize atheism on the grounds that it’s not a system of morals, one can criticize it on moral grounds. It’s here that I think the comparison between atheism and blue-shirtism or a-fire-breathing-zebraism is disingenuous. No one claims, or could reasonably claim, that blue shirts or fire-breathing zebras objectively ground moral propositions, but we can make such a claim of God. So, suppose I accept the proposition,

(1) Iff God exists, moral propositions can be objectively grounded.

In this case, even given your minimalist definition of atheism as a mere lack of belief in God (a definition I partly criticized earlier in this thread), we can see quite clearly that atheism does have moral implications, since if you deny God’s existence, you’re denying that moral propositions can be objectively grounded.

This would be true if and only if objective moral principles always required the existence of some god.

In fact, it is possible to believe that objective moral principles exist all by themselves, without having to believe in a god. For example, an atheist can be a Kantian and believe that there really is an objective categorical imperative that all people must follow.

 

[TechieJustin]

Atheists won’t believe anything unless they can see it.
Do they believe in gravity? Sure, because they can “feel the effects.”

Anyone who can’t feel the effects of God has a closed mind.
Its pointless to ‘debate’ with atheists - I suggest simply nodding and smiling.

 

[Eric0802]

This would be true if and only if objective moral principles always required the existence of some god.

Hence my use of ‘iff.’

In fact, it is possible to believe that objective moral principles exist all by themselves, without having to believe in a god. For example, an atheist can be a Kantian and believe that there really is an objective categorical imperative that all people must follow.

It’s possible, sure, but my point is twofold:

(a) If (1) is true, your position is false, so the issue becomes the truth of (1)

and

(b) even if (1) is false, a strong reading of your position – it’s not possible for atheism, as a mere lack of belief, to have moral and practical implications – is rendered false by my modus ponens (which demonstrates that there is at least one possible world – a world where (1) is true, even if it’s false in the actual world – where a mere lack of belief does have moral and practical implications). Hence, your position would have to be modified to something along these lines: While it’s possible for a lack of belief to have moral and practical implications, in fact ‘atheism’ understood as a lack of belief has no moral and practical implications. And note that this then changes the nature of the discussion, since this weaker position at least admits possibilities that the stronger one denies.

In short, my argument changes the dynamics of the discussion by forcing you to defend a weaker claim.

 

[AntiTheist]

Hence my use of ‘iff.’

Sorry, I missed that.

Part of the problem here is defining “morality.” If you mean “morality” to be “the system of Catholic teachings, including injunctions about not thinking about certain things (e.g. lusting in your heart) and injunctions to perform certain acts of worship (e.g. to “keep holy” a certain day of the week),” then sure, atheism has moral implications in terms of that particular system.

If you define morality in terms of certain supernatural beliefs, then yes, not accepting those supernatural beliefs is going to have “moral” implications in terms of that system.

But this thread was talking specifically about actions of atrocity, and the claim was that atheism “allows” atrocity because it “doesn’t prevent you from doing it.”

In terms of morality – understood to be the study of how people should ideally treat each other…the implication being that we all agree that horrific atrocity like mass murder and such is bad – atheism has as little to say as a-fire-breathing-zebraism.

 

[Eric0802]

Sorry, I missed that.

No problem.

If you define morality in terms of certain supernatural beliefs, then yes, not accepting those supernatural beliefs is going to have “moral” implications in terms of that system.

I wasn’t addressing questions of definition as much as questions of justification. (We all know of atheists like Sartre who agreed with (1).)

But this thread was talking specifically about actions of atrocity, and the claim was that atheism “allows” atrocity because it “doesn’t prevent you from doing it.”

Right, and I agree with almost everything you said with respect to that claim. However, you went beyond that when you suggested that atheism, as a lack of belief, could have no moral or practical implications.

In terms of morality – understood to be the study of how people should ideally treat each other…the implication being that we all agree that horrific atrocity like mass murder and such is bad – atheism has as little to say as a-fire-breathing-zebraism.

Only if (1) is false, since this will seriously affect what we mean by “bad.”

 

[Slowlearner]

I’m a bit pressed for time at the moment, but I wanted to answer this question. I’ll get to the rest later.

Usually, I have a goal of some kind and I’m trying to figure out the best way to achieve the goal. For example, if I want something to eat, is it better to pay for it, or better to beat up the hotdog guy and take his food?

Atheism is not connected to moral systems – atheists can subscribe to pretty much any system of ethics, from Kantian maxims to utilitarian judgments of value to moral skepticism to a brutish “might makes right” philosophy to extreme pacifism to anything else. The choice of moral system is not connected to atheism.

For me personally, I’m a moral skeptic. I don’t think that there’s such a thing as morality “out there,” rules that exist outside of human minds. What we call “morality” is our word for the kinds of behaviors that the human animal exhibits in his society. There are examples of similar kinds of behaviors in other animals – wolf packs, for example, have a number of rules that they punish members for violating (harming young wolves is, I believe, an offense that you can be banished from the pack for).

It’s not all that surprising that animals that exist in cooperative societies have rules for interacting with other cooperative animals. For me, the rules that our societies have set up are part of the environment I have to take into account when I make decisions. For example, it might be easy to beat up the hotdog guy and take his stuff, but 1) I’m not particularly inclined to beat him up and 2) my knowledge of the rules that exist in our particular society leads me to conclude that even if I were inclined to beat him up, there are easier and more satisfying ways to attain my goal.

Every atheist is going to give you a very different answer to this because atheism is just not believing in gods. It’s not a system with rules.

But in general, the reason that people address “morality” at all is that we all have to get along, and we’re all trying to figure out the best ways to do this.

Does that answer your question?

You sure did – quite directly got at what I was seeking. As you are a moral skeptic, I can’t argue with you, but that doesn’t mean I won’t appeal to you (I suppose you’ll be visiting as long as you have fun here).

DoubtingThomasToo on the other hand, took a bit to pin him down to admission that he thinks there is objective morality, or something bigger than what is in any individual’s mind. He says there is no God, but he’s got something he can’t prove in which he has faith.

 

[ThomasToo]

You sure did – quite directly got at what I was seeking. As you are a moral skeptic, I can’t argue with you, but that doesn’t mean I won’t appeal to you (I suppose you’ll be visiting as long as you have fun here).

DoubtingThomasToo on the other hand, took a bit to pin him down to admission that he thinks there is objective morality, or something bigger than what is in any individual’s mind. He says there is no God, but he’s got something he can’t prove in which he has faith.

Beg pardon… Did I ever say there was something I can’t prove in which I have faith? I don’t think objective morality necessitates something over and above the universe…

 

[Eric0802]

Why do you think a world without gods means moral principles cannot be objectively grounded?

ThomasToo, I didn’t initially bring (1) up to defend it, but to show that a theist could use (1) to formulate an argument against the claim that atheism, understood as a lack of belief, cannot have moral and practical implications.

However, I would in fact defend the truth of (1) too. I take a moral proposition P to be objectively grounded if and only if some fact of the matter determines P’s truth value. But in order for this to be the case, we have to bridge the fact/value gap. All attempts to bridge this gap – e.g. appeals to rationality (Kant), sentiment (Hume), maximizing utility (Mill), evolution (pop atheists), etc. – fail for the same reason, viz. they leave us with contingent starting points so we can always ask, “Why should I be rational, act in accord with sentiment, maximize utility, act in accord with evolved practices and instincts, etc.?” Such questions are obviously meaningful, but are unanswerable given the premises of their respective moral systems. However, if we posit God as the objective ground of moral values, and thus God’s commands as the objective ground of our moral duties, we find a necessary (as opposed to a contingent) ground for moral propositions. The answer to the question, “Why should I act in accord with God’s commands” has an answer, i.e. because God, a necessary being, has a nature, and God’s nature objectively determines the nature of the Good. (That’s a quick, and admittedly simplified response to a very complicated question. But remember that I didn’t raise (1) with the intention of defending it; rather, I was positing it as an effective response, whether it’s true or false, to the the claims Antitheist made about the relationship between morality/action and a lack of belief in God.)

 

[ThomasToo]

ThomasToo, I didn’t initially bring (1) up to defend it, but to show that a theist could use (1) to formulate an argument against the claim that atheism, understood as a lack of belief, cannot have moral and practical implications.

However, I would in fact defend the truth of (1) too. I take a moral proposition P to be objectively grounded if and only if some fact of the matter determines P’s truth value. But in order for this to be the case, we have to bridge the fact/value gap. All attempts to bridge this gap – e.g. appeals to rationality (Kant), sentiment (Hume), maximizing utility (Mill), evolution (pop atheists), etc. – fail for the same reason, viz. they leave us with contingent starting points so we can always ask, “Why should I be rational, act in accord with sentiment, maximize utility, act in accord with evolved practices and instincts, etc.?” Such questions are obviously meaningful, but are unanswerable given the premises of their respective moral systems. However, if we posit God as the objective ground of moral values, and thus God’s commands as the objective ground of our moral duties, we find a necessary (as opposed to a contingent) ground for moral propositions. The answer to the question, “Why should I act in accord with God’s commands” has an answer, i.e. because God, a necessary being, has a nature, and God’s nature objectively determines the nature of the Good. (That’s a quick, and admittedly simplified response to a very complicated question. But remember that I didn’t raise (1) with the intention of defending it; rather, I was positing it as an effective response, whether it’s true or false, to the the claims Antitheist made about the relationship between morality/action and a lack of belief in God.)

Didn’t mean to throw you off… Interesting. I think my simple answer to your question would be another question. Is the good good because God commands it or does God command the good because it is good? In other words, is the concept of goodness the result of divine command or independent of–and ontologically prior to–God? This is the question I referenced above and was raised by Plato (in Euthyphro) and Kierkegaard (in Fear and Trembling).

 

[DanteAlighieri]

I think you are mixing things up a bit.

a-theist means ‘one without god’.
anti-theist means ‘one against [the notion of] god’

What you describe as “one who believes there are no gods” is actually an anti-theist. By definition all anti-theist are a-theist as well. However, not all a-theist are anti-theist.

Thanks, but I’m responding to a definition proposed by the person whose post I quoted.

Peace,
Dante

 

[Eric0802]

Is the good good because God commands it or does God command the good because it is good? In other words, is the concept of goodness the result of divine command or independent of–and ontologically prior to–God? This is the question I referenced above and was raised by Plato (in Euthyphro) and Kierkegaard (in Fear and Trembling).

ThomasToo, my position (which is from Aquinas) shows Euthyphro’s dilemma to be a false dilemma. That is, it fails to consider the third possibility that (1) the concept of goodness is grounded in God’s nature, while (2) our duties follow from God’s commands, which follow from God’s nature. So God commands the good because goodness is God’s nature. This means that God’s commands aren’t arbitrary, as they would be if God’s commands determined the good (the first horn of the ‘dilemma’), and that the good isn’t independent of God’s commands, as it would be if God commanded something because it’s good (the second horn of the ‘dilemma’).

I should clarify something I said earlier by dilating upon it a bit. If moral propositions are grounded in the nature and commands of a necessary being, then they’re true in all possible worlds. So, to ask, “Why should I act in accord with God’s commands?” where “why should” is understood as “why is it good to,” and where’s “God’s commands” are identified with good actions (because they follow from God’s necessarily good nature) is to ask, “Why is it good to do what’s good in all possible worlds?” And that question is rather obviously wrongheaded in a way that questions such as “Why should I act rationally, in accord with sentiment, etc.?” are not.

 

[DanteAlighieri]

The way you’ve phrased the above leads me to think that I have failed to make myself clear. I think I can clear it up.

When faced with any given claim, you have only two options: to accept the claim or to not accept it.

Here is claim A: “A god exists.”

Here is claim B: “No gods exist.”

I am saying that an atheist – under my definition – is someone who does not accept claim A. Now, that person may additionally accept claim B, but that’s a separate issue from that person not accepting claim A.

It is the not accepting of claim A that I consider to be the defining characteristic of an atheist. Whether or not that person accepts claim B is a different issue.

In other words, I consider people who accept claim B to be a subset of people who do not accept claim A. When I talk about atheists, I’m talking about all of the people who do not accept claim A – and some of them will, in fact, accept claim B.

Now, if you want to call me something different (agnostic, maybe?), then whatever. We’re just quibbling about definitions at that point. I’m just trying to make clear what I mean when I use the term.

But we’re NOT just quibbling about definitions. We’re debating the question of whether atheism is a belief system.

The problem with your above assessment is that Claim A and Claim B are mutually exclusive; in other words, they are two alternatives, not two unrelated claims. My overall point is that atheists, in embracing Claim B, are by definition rejecting Claim A. Thus, it is false to claim that atheists have “no beliefs” about God, and it is true to claim that they have (as I said initially) an affirmative belief that there is no God.

Which, of course, begs the question: why? There is absolutely no evidence to suggest that there is no God, and there is a long history of human belief and experience to suggest that there just might be.

Peace,
Dante

 

[DanteAlighieri]

Beg pardon… Did I ever say there was something I can’t prove in which I have faith? I don’t think objective morality necessitates something over and above the universe…

By what standard can morality be objectively judged if not by one that is absolute, eternal, and perfect – in other words, indisputably correct?

Even assuming that such a principle existed independently of a Supreme Being, how on earth could we ever comprehend it?

Peace,
Dante