What you highlight here is the difference between “implict atheism” and “explicit atheism.” In the former, the person is not capable of answering the question or simply has never considered the question of gods; in the latter, the person has actively concluded that there is no good reason to think that there are gods (what is sometimes called “weak atheism”) or that the weight of the evidence suggests that there is no god (what is sometimes called “strong atheism”).
I agree.
As soon as you’ve added a premise, you are no longer just talking about atheism. You are talking about atheism plus some belief. As such, any actions you derive will be consistent with atheism, but not derived from atheism.").
Antitheist, but the point is that both types of explicit atheism – weak atheism (WA) and strong atheism (SA) – are not merely defined as a lack of belief in god(s), but as a lack of belief because P. That is, implicit atheism is nothing more than an account of S’s psychological inventory: Check all of S’s beliefs, and you won’t find the belief, “God exists.” This is why implicit atheism is neither rational nor irrational, but non-rational. With explicit atheism, however, we’re not dealing with S’s psychological inventory, but with S’s justification for his atheism, which is why WA or SA can be described as rational or irrational. So, while it’s still the case that if we check the weak or strong atheist’s psychological inventory we won’t find the belief, “God exists,” we will find, “I don’t believe God exists” and "P justifies (1) my belief that God doesn’t exist (for SA) or (2) my lack of belief that God exists (for WA). " And it is here that atheism is
more than a mere lack of belief.
Now, since it’s the case that with the explicit atheism of WA and SA we’re dealing with – by definition – the additional element of justification, we’re in the realm of talk about rationality and irrationality. That is, SA and WA are bound up with talk about reasons. Think about it this way: You can’t have explicit SA or WA sans reasons, i.e. reasons are a necessary though not sufficient condition of explicit WA or SA. So it seems to me as if we can minimally derive the additional premise, “atheism is more rational than theism” from either SA or WA. And, we can logically derive from that premise the additional premise that “theism is less rational than atheism.” Note, these additional premises are logically implied by SA and WA, so we can further distinguish different kinds of “additional premises,” considering on the one hand those premises that are merely added to SA or WA, and those that are logical implications of SA and WA. I’m only referring, in my argument so far, to those premises that are logically implied by WA and SA.
Now here’s my main point: while it may be the case that there’s no logical route from implicit atheism to violence against believers, there
are obvious logical routes from WA and SA, and the premises they imply about the relative rationality of atheism vis-a-vis theism, to the conclusion that violence must be done against believers. These logical routes need not be taken, i.e. they’re not entailed, and they do require additional premises, such as the premise that irrationality is sufficiently dangerous that it must be dealt with forcibly, *but the point is that the logical distance between WA and SA and the conclusion that violence is to be done to believers is much shorter, and much more potentially direct, than any route from implicit atheism, i.e. the
mere lack of belief to which you consistently refer.
I think an analog might help here: There is no logical route whatsoever from the mere lack of a belief that all races are equal (let’s call it implicit racism, or IR) to the conclusion that violence against those of certain races is justified, but there are logical routes from “S lacks the belief that all races are equal because P” or “S believes that all races are not equal because P” (let’s call it WR or SR) to the conclusion that violence against those of certain races is justified. Note that this conclusion isn’t entailed, just as the conclusions above connecting SA and WA to violence aren’t entailed, and note that WR or SR require additional premises if we’re to move from either of them to the conclusion that violence against those of certain races is justified, just as the move from SA or WA requires additional premises to move to the conclusion that violence against believers is justified,
but note well that none of this changes the fact that it is perfectly legitimate to conclude that in such cases the WR or SR is a cause (if not the cause) of the violence. The same, I maintain, holds for SA or WA.
Further, I have had arguments with other atheists over whether or not belief in god is rational – it is quite possible to argue that belief in gods is rational but not true (and everyone here should be aware of the distinction).
I agree (though the truth of a belief is much more difficult to demonstrate than its rationality!).
Atheism – for the billionth time now – is simply the lack of belief in gods. You cannot logically derive a course of action from it. It’s beliefs that motivate action, not lack of beliefs. And while some beliefs may be consistent with atheism, they are not derived from atheism: that is a very important distinction that you’re overlooking.
As I explained above, I didn’t overlook that distinction at all, but contested your premise.
(Incidentally, I’ll add that all the standard reference works – the Oxford Guide to Philosophy, the Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy, the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, etc. – all define atheism in terms of strong (positive) atheism, and not as a mere lack of belief, as you’ve defined it.)
