All I can infer from the SE Cosmo argument, is that if a First Cause does exist, the only property it need have is to kick off one or more processes that ultimately produce everything we know (and everything we don’t).
I think you can continue to draw some inferences from even this minimal starting point. You explain that this First Cause would need to have the property to kick off some processes. So, we have some ability identified (the ability to kick off things). We also have processes which are external to the First Cause (where did they come from?). We also have the power required to kick off processes – and the question of how much power was required for that. We also have processes acting on something external to the First Cause (where did that something come from?).
By definition, the First Cause must exist before all processes, powers, matter and developments of any kind exist. Since those things cannot come into existence from nothing, the First Cause must be the originator of all of those things. From that point, you could have your chain-reaction of one event leading to other events – but the potential for that development has to come from the First Cause.
I would also infer that because it has no cause, it has no intrinsic reason to exist; therefore any reason that might be ascribed to it is purely subjective.
I might be getting confused on the idea of “cause” here – since it can mean “reason” and also “a thing or action that leads to another thing or action”.
In this case, without a First Cause - the concept of “reason” (purpose, plan, meaning) cannot exist. Those things take their existence from the First Cause. So, the First Cause gives everything a reason to exist. It is, in itself, the thing that gives “reason” meaning and existence. Now that is using “cause” as the second definition. If we used “cause” as meaning “reason” – then you’d be right.
In other words, we say the First Cause is “uncaused” – it has no cause. So, in the second meaning of the word, we would say “The First Cause has no Reason”. (and that is your point, which is correct with that definition). But this is not using the word “cause” correctly.
Why should it have no beginning, just because it has no cause? The SE defines it as something that “if it exists, cannot not-exist.” There are two ways of interpreting this, I suppose: the first one is that if it is necessary, there is no point at which it can fail to exist. An equally valid one, I would suggest, is that it simply had to exist at *some *point.
Right, but in order for something to begin to exist – there must be something that preceeds its existence. A beginning point requires a power or a “thing” to cause it to come into existence. That is why the First Cause cannot have a beginning because if it did, it wouldn’t be the First Cause. Whatever came before it would be the First. But if each Cause had a beginning then we’d have the infinite string which itself is contingent – requiring an explanation.
It is essential to recognize what the existence of the First Cause already contains by logical necessity. Once you have the First Cause – there is something that exists. So, we have the First Existence – the First Being. This cannot have a beginning because it would require another Being to allow for this so-called First one to exist.
When we posit and accept the First Cause – it comes with some features “built-in” so to speak. It is not caused. It cannot have a beginning since nothing could exist before it existed. Then we have the problem of explaining where anything else that ever existed could have come from, if not from the First Cause.
If it has no beginning, how can it be called a ‘first’ cause? ‘First’ implies a backstop to the (otherwise infinite) regress, and so therefore also implies a point when that chain of contingency had to start.
Again, that’s a good point and it questions the terminology. I think it’s correct to point out that the term “First” implies a beginning since it suggests “one in a chain” – as if it is the same kind of thing as everything that follows. In other words, we see many Causes at work in the world – but now we say that there is a “First Cause” – which is basically the same as the rest except it came first in the line.
But the problem here is that the First Cause is radically different than all other causes simply because it required nothing to cause it. So, it’s really more like “The Unique Cause” – which also happens before any other cause or event or action could ever exist.
So, the question then might be – why is that true?
The key to the First Cause is that it explains itself. It is necessary being that creates all subsequent contingent beings. It cannot and does not rely on any other being for its existence. It could not rely on any other being since it is the First Being.
I wonder if perhaps the individual’s inference of the characteristics of the First Cause drives the conclusion.
It might seem that way, but it’s really a result of the logic. The First Cause of all things stands alone. If something existed before it – then it wouldn’t be the First Cause.
If some other being existed before the First Cause, for example, where would it come from?
I would be interested in understanding the theist’s inference of what constitutes the ‘first cause,’ if anybody is prepared to share.
Ok, but that sounds like a different question. If you are willing to accept (at least for the argument) the existence of the First Cause, we can then demonstrate how this leads to our understanding of God.
