The Cosmological Argument

[wanstronian]

I’ve asked WarpSpeedPetey, in another thread, to present an argument for God’s existence, for the purpose of discussion. Here goes…

lets play with this one from the stanford encyclopedia.

1.A contingent being (a being that if it exists can not-exist) exists.
2.This contingent being has a cause of or explanation[1] for its existence.
3.The cause of or explanation for its existence is something other than the contingent being itself.
4.What causes or explains the existence of this contingent being must either be solely other contingent beings or include a non-contingent (necessary) being.
5.Contingent beings alone cannot provide an adequate causal account or explanation for the existence of a contingent being.
6.Therefore, what causes or explains the existence of this contingent being must include a non-contingent (necessary) being.
7.Therefore, a necessary being (a being that if it exists cannot not-exist) exists.

Do you perceive Point 1 to assert an instantiation of a being, or merely an abstract? It seems to imply the former - “A contingent being…exists.” If it’s an instantiation, who or what is the instance, for this discussion? Is it a person, or any intelligent entity, or merely a physical object? Does it matter? Well, yes, because it must be something that we can show and agree to be contingent. Otherwise the rest of the argument is void.

I’m okay with Steps 2 and 3.

For me, 4 is something of a ‘set-up’ step. In and of itself, it’s quite innocuous (either P or ¬P is true); however, the surreptitious way in which a non-contingent being is introduced into the equation means that when one gets to step 5, one is predisposed to choose this alternative without due consideration, because to do otherwise is to accept the notion of an infinite regress. As we well know, infinity is something with which the human brain is ill-equipped to cope, so this leads to an instinctive rejection of it, and eases the transition to an implicit acceptance of a non-contingent being. But I would contend that there’s no good reason to suppose a non-contingent being is any more probable than an infinite regress - we just don’t have the ability or knowledge to reliably assess either option for feasibility.

Step 5: as the Stanford Encyclopedia states, “Whether 5 is true depends upon the requirements for an adequate explanation,” and I suspect that this is the first of the areas in which we’ll disagree, as I’ve alluded to above.

Conceding, in lieu of an agreed “adequate explanation”, that Step 5 is true, then steps 6 and 7 are fine. The second of the areas in which we’ll disagree is that I assume you take the ‘necessary being’ to be God.

So I guess now, I’d like you to
(a) define the contingent being (it clearly doesn’t have to be a named individual)
(b) state your “adequate explanation” for Point 5
…(b-sub) If you intend to invoke the PSR, please clarify your interpretation of it
(c) show that, if we get to step 7, the “necessary being” is God (if that is your contention)
…(c-sub) I guess you need to provide your definition of “God.”

I haven’t read through the whole section of the SE yet, so if your answer to any of the above is “go read x in the SE” that’s fine. Although I do worry that we’re just going to bat the contents of the SE back and forth between each other - a quick glance shows that the arguments on each side are nothing new, and are unlikely to change either my opinion or yours.

 

[headsmith]

The fact of any being itself requires a non-contingent Being. Whether we attach the word “God” to it or not, there is no difference, other than personal connotations. Philosopically, “Non-contingent Being” (a Being who cannot not be) and infinite regress are the same thing. In short, it is possible and probable that a semantic equivocation is all that is at stake in arguments like this.

What we have here are two words for the same referrent, namely “Non-contingent Being” and “God.” To distinguish the two as different but continuous or mutually exclusive or even contiguous just begs the question again. In short, the anti-God types struggle with an ethnic loyalty with which they are unaware.

They are apparently and emotionally committed for other than self-evident reasons to someone or something or some primitive imprint in their earlier and more naive development that has set them against the imperatives of logic. And by resisting the logic inherent in all this, they simply have opted out of the inevitable conclusion: If we be, then God be’s. And if we do not be, what is all this that is going on? If it’s not being, then we need another word than “being” for it but end up with the same referent. And we’re back to another equivocation: Two words for the same object.

In short, the arguments against the existence of a non-contingent Being fail in the court of rationality. If they win in the court of ethnic loyalty, then they do so only by ignoring a critical factor, in this case, the fact of universal being itself. As GK Chesterton noted somewhere – Orthodoxy? – Closed systems win by ignoring their original premise, or words to that effect.

 

[wanstronian]

The fact of any being itself requires a non-contingent Being.

Why?

Whether we attach the word “God” to it or not, there is no difference, other than personal connotations. Philosopically, “Non-contingent Being” (a Being who cannot not be) and infinite regress are the same thing. In short, it is possible and probable that a semantic equivocation is all that is at stake in arguments like this.

So the discussion ultimately leads to a non-conclusion?

What we have here are two words for the same referrent, namely “Non-contingent Being” and “God.” To distinguish the two as different but continuous or mutually exclusive or even contiguous just begs the question again. In short, the anti-God types struggle with an ethnic loyalty with which they are unaware.

Why are they the same referrent? The only property necessary for a generic non-contingent being is non-contingency. This is some way from the standard attribute list ascribed, by theists, to God.

They are apparently and emotionally committed for other than self-evident reasons to someone or something or some primitive imprint in their earlier and more naive development that has set them against the imperatives of logic. And by resisting the logic inherent in all this, they simply have opted out of the inevitable conclusion: If we be, then God be’s. And if we do not be, what is all this that is going on? If it’s not being, then we need another word than “being” for it but end up with the same referent. And we’re back to another equivocation: Two words for the same object.

This might be true, if only theists could offer a convincing argument that (a) there is/was a non-contingent being, and (b) that being is God, as commonly conceived. Unfortunately they offer nothing but circular beliefs or assertion based on preferred conclusion. Or at least, they offer no reason to suspect any other mental process.

In short, the arguments against the existence of a non-contingent Being fail in the court of rationality. If they win in the court of ethnic loyalty, then they do so only by ignoring a critical factor, in this case, the fact of universal being itself. As GK Chesterton noted somewhere – Orthodoxy? – Closed systems win by ignoring their original premise, or words to that effect.

That’s not an unusual perspective for a theist. However, ultimately, all we can really say with any confidence is: we have no idea. This is clearly not a sound position upon which to assert the existence of a creator deity. Such an assertion merely reeks of a intense desire for an answer; a lack of courage to admit that the answer is unknown, and probably unknowable.

 

[Syntax]

Why?

…because you accepted premise 3. A contingent being (the universe) must have a cause or a reason other than its own existence.

 

[punkforchrist]

Hi wanstronian,

You’re basically asking two general questions: 1) does a necessary being exist?, and 2) is this necessary being God?

Let’s stick to the first question for now. First of all, there are dependent beings (entities, or things, if you prefer). You and I are dependent on the air we breathe, for example. Now, the causal regress of dependent beings either proceeds to infinity, or else has its ground in some type of First Cause. If there is a First Cause, it would have to be independent (or, as you say, non-contingent), since if it were dependent on something else, it would be caused and not the First Cause, which is a contradiction. Let’s summarize the argument:

1. Dependent things exist.
2. Every dependent thing has a cause.
3. If there is no First Cause, then nothing will be caused.
4. Therefore, a First Cause exists.

We have seen that (1) is true. (2) is true by definition, once we understand the utility of the word “cause.” If X is caused by Y, then Y is a cause of X. This is a very general definition, but it allows for the existence of spontaneity (e.g. on the quantum level).

(3) rejects the notion of an infinite regress. We might put the argument against an infinite regress inductively:

A. Every attribute of nature we have observed is finite.
B. The regress of causes in nature is an attribute of nature.
C. Therefore, the regress of causes in nature is most likely finite.

(B), I take it, is uncontroversial, so that leaves us with (A). The best way to support this premise is by simply offering examples: mountains, trees, galaxies, human beings, etc., all have limitations. Since only finite things have limitations, we may infer that (A) is much more likely true than its negation.

Given the truth of premises (1)-(3), it follows that an independent First Cause exists.

 

[hatsoff]

I have serious issues with using “contingency” in this way. What does the term mean, anyway? Everyone seems to have a different idea about that. Perhaps there is some fixed meaning in philosophy literature, but if so I can find no evidence of it. SEP defines a contingent being as one which could “not-exist.” But what does that mean? Is it suggesting that if we can imagine the world without some being, then that being is contingent? Or is it tied to time, such that only eternal beings are not contingent?

Until this is clarified, I see no reason at all to even consider the argument.

 

[punkforchrist]

Hatsoff, you’re correct that “contingent” is used in more than one way. One way is in a strictly modal sense: “S is contingent if and only if S exists in at least one, but not all possible worlds.”

Another way of defining the term is with respect to the actual world only. In this case, “contingent” is interchangeable with “dependent.” This is one of the reasons why I changed the word in my post above to “dependent.” We often talk about contingency plans, or comment in passing that, say, “my plans for tomorrow are contingent upon whether it snows.” This wouldn’t necessarily entail any talk of possible worlds semantics; in fact, this is the more colloquial definition.

 

[warpspeedpetey]

I’ve asked WarpSpeedPetey, in another thread, to present an argument for God’s existence, for the purpose of discussion. Here goes…

Do you perceive Point 1 to assert an instantiation of a being, or merely an abstract?

this sentence doesnt make sense. we arent talking about abstracts or their instantiation. we are talking about real beings. real beings are actualized. abstract concepts are instantiated.

It seems to imply the former - “A contingent being…exists.” If it’s an instantiation, who or what is the instance, for this discussion? Is it a person, or any intelligent entity, or merely a physical object? Does it matter? Well, yes, because it must be something that we can show and agree to be contingent. Otherwise the rest of the argument is void.

all actualized beings are contingent, other wise they wouldnt need to be actualized. they would be necessary and incapable of not existing.

I’m okay with Steps 2 and 3.

ok

For me, 4 is something of a ‘set-up’ step. In and of itself, it’s quite innocuous (either P or ¬P is true); however, the surreptitious way in which a non-contingent being is introduced into the equation means that when one gets to step 5, one is predisposed to choose this alternative without due consideration, because to do otherwise is to accept the notion of an infinite regress. As we well know, infinity is something with which the human brain is ill-equipped to cope, so this leads to an instinctive rejection of it, and eases the transition to an implicit acceptance of a non-contingent being. But I would contend that there’s no good reason to suppose a non-contingent being is any more probable than an infinite regress - we just don’t have the ability or knowledge to reliably assess either option for feasibility.

Step 5: as the Stanford Encyclopedia states, “Whether 5 is true depends upon the requirements for an adequate explanation,” and I suspect that this is the first of the areas in which we’ll disagree, as I’ve alluded to above.

an infinite regression of contingent beings, where each contingent being is necessary for the next contingent being in the chain to exist, is actually a chain of necessary beings, because each being in the chain is necessary for the existence of the next.

an infinite regression of contingent beings is simply another way to say the universe is necessary, yet i have no reason to believe that the universe is incapable of not existing. and therefore is not necessary.

further, should we ignore the problem of an infinite chain of contingent beings, and simply accept its existence, then it still requires a necessary beig, or its a Poof theory. leading to a violation of the PSR. which i define as ‘everything that happens requires a reason’

Conceding, in lieu of an agreed “adequate explanation”, that Step 5 is true, then steps 6 and 7 are fine. The second of the areas in which we’ll disagree is that I assume you take the ‘necessary being’ to be God.

we define G-d as the necessary being. we could just as easily do it as a function of Scripture.

So I guess now, I’d like you to
(a) define the contingent being (it clearly doesn’t have to be a named individual)
(b) state your “adequate explanation” for Point 5
…(b-sub) If you intend to invoke the PSR, please clarify your interpretation of it
(c) show that, if we get to step 7, the “necessary being” is God (if that is your contention)
…(c-sub) I guess you need to provide your definition of “God.”

i think ive met these, in the text above.

I haven’t read through the whole section of the SE yet, so if your answer to any of the above is “go read x in the SE” that’s fine. Although I do worry that we’re just going to bat the contents of the SE back and forth between each other - a quick glance shows that the arguments on each side are nothing new, and are unlikely to change either my opinion or yours.

im not interested in regurgitating the SE. had i known you wanted to make a seperate thread, i would have picked a better known, simpler, variation of contingency to defend.

 

[wanstronian]

Will try and find time to respond to you all later today, but if not, it won’t be until Friday, as I’m away on business from tomorrow.

 

[wanstronian]

Hi wanstronian,

You’re basically asking two general questions: 1) does a necessary being exist?, and 2) is this necessary being God?

Let’s stick to the first question for now. First of all, there are dependent beings (entities, or things, if you prefer). You and I are dependent on the air we breathe, for example. Now, the causal regress of dependent beings either proceeds to infinity, or else has its ground in some type of First Cause. If there is a First Cause, it would have to be independent (or, as you say, non-contingent), since if it were dependent on something else, it would be caused and not the First Cause, which is a contradiction. Let’s summarize the argument:

1. Dependent things exist.
2. Every dependent thing has a cause.
3. If there is no First Cause, then nothing will be caused.
4. Therefore, a First Cause exists.

We have seen that (1) is true. (2) is true by definition, once we understand the utility of the word “cause.” If X is caused by Y, then Y is a cause of X. This is a very general definition, but it allows for the existence of spontaneity (e.g. on the quantum level).

(3) rejects the notion of an infinite regress. We might put the argument against an infinite regress inductively:

A. Every attribute of nature we have observed is finite.
B. The regress of causes in nature is an attribute of nature.
C. Therefore, the regress of causes in nature is most likely finite.

(B), I take it, is uncontroversial, so that leaves us with (A). The best way to support this premise is by simply offering examples: mountains, trees, galaxies, human beings, etc., all have limitations. Since only finite things have limitations, we may infer that (A) is much more likely true than its negation.

I don’t think that (B) is uncontroversial. Certainly for most things in nature that we observe, we can derive a cause. However, I don’t think that gives us license to state that everything that has ever been, conforms to this premise.

I also think it’s somewhat simplistic to say that “mountains [et al] are finite, therefore everything else in nature is also finite.” Our visible, testable universe is an infinitesimal fraction of the entirety of the universe. We also don’t know what, if anything, is beyond the universe. The only honest point of view to take here is: We just don’t know.

Given the truth of premises (1)-(3), it follows that an independent First Cause exists.

It would do, yes, but I don’t think we can take those as given, for the reasons I’ve state above. And although the overwhelming temptation is to reject an infinite regress (as I stated upthread, infinity is not something the human mind can really comprehend, so it just doesn’t sound logical that infinity can ever actually exist), that doesn’t mean we should just accept the alternative without giving it proper consideration. An uncaused first cause? How come? As you point out, we’ve never seen anything like it, so why should we just accept it because our instinct is to reject the alternative? Why is an uncaused cause any more acceptable than an infinite regress?

And let’s be clear, even if we go round and round and ultimately decide that, on balance, and by our undeniably arbitrary reasoning, an uncaused cause is the more likely scenario… this is still a mighty long way from constituting convincing evidence!

I cannot, and nor would I try to, prove that the conclusion of the Cosmological argument is incorrect. I cannot prove that there is no God. What I can do (and have done), is show that there is sufficient recourse to subjective probabilities, special pleading and unverifiable assumption in its construction and defence, that its conclusion cannot (or should not) be taken as, well, conclusive (or even likely). It fails to demonstrate the existence of a First Cause, let alone a deity, let alone the Christian deity.

 

[wanstronian]

this sentence doesnt make sense. we arent talking about abstracts or their instantiation. we are talking about real beings. real beings are actualized. abstract concepts are instantiated.

all actualized beings are contingent, other wise they wouldnt need to be actualized. they would be necessary and incapable of not existing.

ok

an infinite regression of contingent beings, where each contingent being is necessary for the next contingent being in the chain to exist, is actually a chain of necessary beings, because each being in the chain is necessary for the existence of the next.

an infinite regression of contingent beings is simply another way to say the universe is necessary, yet i have no reason to believe that the universe is incapable of not existing. and therefore is not necessary.

further, should we ignore the problem of an infinite chain of contingent beings, and simply accept its existence, then it still requires a necessary beig, or its a Poof theory. leading to a violation of the PSR. which i define as ‘everything that happens requires a reason’

we define G-d as the necessary being. we could just as easily do it as a function of Scripture.

i think ive met these, in the text above.

im not interested in regurgitating the SE. had i known you wanted to make a seperate thread, i would have picked a better known, simpler, variation of contingency to defend.

Nor am I thrilled by the prospect of repeating previous arguments, but I suspect any arguments you and I make will have been made before, that’s all. The debate has been going on for nearly 750 years, it’s unlikely that you and I are going to state anything new! Anyway, I’m out of time to respond properly to your post, but will get back to you as soon as I can. I may find time before I leave for my business trip tomorrow.

Btw, sorry if you’re upset by my starting another thread - just wanted to keep it clean and separate. If you want to declare null and void and restart with a different variation, I’m happy to do so.

 

[warpspeedpetey]

Btw, sorry if you’re upset by my starting another thread - just wanted to keep it clean and separate. If you want to declare null and void and restart with a different variation, I’m happy to do so.

i thought so at first, but the general objections will be the same.

 

[wanstronian]

this sentence doesnt make sense. we arent talking about abstracts or their instantiation. we are talking about real beings. real beings are actualized. abstract concepts are instantiated.

all actualized beings are contingent, other wise they wouldnt need to be actualized. they would be necessary and incapable of not existing.

What I’m trying to get to is an agreed definition of a contingent being. It doesn’t have to be a particular individual, but we need to agree. For the sake of the argument, can you give an example of a contingent being?

ok

an infinite regression of contingent beings, where each contingent being is necessary for the next contingent being in the chain to exist, is actually a chain of necessary beings, because each being in the chain is necessary for the existence of the next.

Indeed - but these beings are necessary only by virtue of their parentage of the contingent being. It doesn’t make them necessary beings according to the original definition-by-exclusion in the SE (other than by circumstance).

an infinite regression of contingent beings is simply another way to say the universe is necessary, yet i have no reason to believe that the universe is incapable of not existing. and therefore is not necessary.

So your definition of a necessary being is a being that becomes necessary by virtue of having contingent ‘child’ beings? So every contingent being that is manifested is, practically speaking, a necessary being?

You may have no reason to believe that the Universe is necessary (if I understand your triple negative), but do you have any reason to believe that it’s otherwise? And if so, do you have any reason to believe that the cause of the Universe is necessary? Or anywhere down the chain? What’s your rationale for where the regress stops?

further, should we ignore the problem of an infinite chain of contingent beings, and simply accept its existence, then it still requires a necessary beig, or its a Poof theory. leading to a violation of the PSR. which i define as ‘everything that happens requires a reason’

By ‘reason’ do you mean ‘cause,’ or do you infer intent?

Let’s proceed on the basis that there is a backstop, even though the rationale is clearly dubious. For some arbitrary reason, a backstop is required to prevent an infinite regress. How can we know where, or what, that backstop is?

we define G-d as the necessary being. we could just as easily do it as a function of Scripture.

Isn’t this just an arbitrary assertion? If the backstop hypothesis is true, surely the only attribute required of it is the ability to effect the birth of the universe, or the chain of events resulting in the universe. There is no requirement that this backstop be sentient, or intelligent, or purposeful. Why must it have any of the omnimaxial entities traditionally ascribed to God?

 

[Magnanimity]

“What I’m trying to get to is an agreed definition of a contingent being. It doesn’t have to be a particular individual, but we need to agree. For the sake of the argument, can you give an example of a contingent being?”

wanstronian,

Have you tried approaching this argument from a contemporary Thomistic perspective? If not, then the following may not be very helpful, but here goes anyway…

St Thomas incorporates an Aristotelian way of considering act/potency distinctions. A being “in act” is one which which exists. To have potency (or potentiality) is to be mutable, capable of change and/or actually changing, and even to include going from non-existence to existence (or vice-versa).

So, according to St Thomas, all beings in the real world are composite beings, in the sense that they have this dual aspect of act/potency as regards their natures. To come into existence, for example, or to change in any way, is to have actualized some potentiality.

All beings which have a potentiality actualized are what is meant by contingent being.

How you get to the Necessary Being from there is to argue that no contingent being could be the ground of its own existence. It cannot account for itself, in the here and now and this has to do with causation, which is defined as the actualization of a potentiality.

This actualization of a potentiality is either (1) uncaused, (2) self-caused, or (3) caused by another. Option (1) doesn’t seem to make sense. Option (2) seems difficult to establish, at least with regard to coming into being because you’d be pulling yourself up by your own ontological bootstraps. So, that leaves option three. But, if contingent being A is caused by contingent being B, this would go on ad infinitum, which is impossible. There has to be a non-contingent being outside of either a single contingent being or a chain of contingent beings or else there is no real ground for the existence of all these contingent beings.

You may have already covered this extensively elsewhere, so I’ll shut up for now and see where we go from here.

 

[warpspeedpetey]

What I’m trying to get to is an agreed definition of a contingent being. It doesn’t have to be a particular individual, but we need to agree. For the sake of the argument, can you give an example of a contingent being?

it simply means a thing that requires a cause to exist. anything from a rock, to an angel

Indeed - but these beings are necessary only by virtue of their parentage of the contingent being. It doesn’t make them necessary beings according to the original definition-by-exclusion in the SE (other than by circumstance).So your definition of a necessary being is a being that becomes necessary by virtue of having contingent ‘child’ beings? So every contingent being that is manifested is, practically speaking, a necessary being?

my definition of a necessary being is one whose non-existence implies a logical contradiction. essentially something that cannot not exist.

and if we are claiming an infinite chain of contingent beings then each being in that chain is actually a necessary being because it cannot, not exist. else the whole chain falls apart.

but thats actually an aside. given my choice of objections, prefer the one below.

im quite happy to accept an infinite chain of contingent beings, they are no more capable of existing without a cause than a single contingent being is.

You may have no reason to believe that the Universe is necessary (if I understand your triple negative), but do you have any reason to believe that it’s otherwise? And if so, do you have any reason to believe that the cause of the Universe is necessary? Or anywhere down the chain?

there is no universe apart from the contingent beings of which it is composed. should all contingent beings fail to exist, then the universe fails to exist. therefore it cannot be necessary.

What’s your rationale for where the regress stops?

it stops at G-ds essence. bare existence. beyond that is nothing. an existent ‘nothing’ is a logical impossibility.

By ‘reason’ do you mean ‘cause,’ or do you infer intent?

cause

Let’s proceed on the basis that there is a backstop, even though the rationale is clearly dubious. For some arbitrary reason, a backstop is required to prevent an infinite regress. How can we know where, or what, that backstop is?

as above

Isn’t this just an arbitrary assertion?

no more so than any other definition is.

If the backstop hypothesis is true, surely the only attribute required of it is the ability to effect the birth of the universe, or the chain of events resulting in the universe. There is no requirement that this backstop be sentient, or intelligent, or purposeful. Why must it have any of the omnimaxial entities traditionally ascribed to God?

this isnt part of the contingency arguments, we only reason so far as a necessary being. deciding which G-d that is, or why G-d has omnimax attributes is a different discussion.

let us settle the matter of a necessary being, all other concerns are moot until that is done.

 

[wanstronian]

it simply means a thing that requires a cause to exist. anything from a rock, to an angel

That doesn’t help! I wanted to nail down what a contingent being was, so we can start from an agreed baseline. You’re suggesting an angel counts. We can’t agree that, because to me, an angel is no more than an abstract concept.

my definition of a necessary being is one whose non-existence implies a logical contradiction. essentially something that cannot not exist.

Yes, you’ve made that clear. Unfortunately, that still doesn’t help, because your idea of something that can’t not exist may be different to mine. Can we settle upon a thing? Let’s say, “A human being is a contingent being” - okay?

and if we are claiming an infinite chain of contingent beings then each being in that chain is actually a necessary being because it cannot, not exist. else the whole chain falls apart.

Yes, but each of those beings becomes a necessary being, by virtue of spawning a child or effect. They’re not, in and of themselves, necessary beings. They’re necessary by dint of their actions. This is the distinction that I’d like to clarify.

but thats actually an aside. given my choice of objections, prefer the one below.

im quite happy to accept an infinite chain of contingent beings, they are no more capable of existing without a cause than a single contingent being is.

But their cause is their parent, ad infinitum. If you accept this, then no first cause is necessary, by definition.

there is no universe apart from the contingent beings of which it is composed. should all contingent beings fail to exist, then the universe fails to exist. therefore it cannot be necessary.

I think what you’re confirming here is that your definition of a necessary being is one that is necessary only when it causes an effect. This is fine, although it seems to be an arbitrary definition. What about a being that has no effect? Is such a thing possible? Maybe, maybe not. But we lack the experience or tools to say for definite. So is there another type of necessary being - one that is inherently necessary?

But if we take your apparent definition of a necessary being, there is nothing about it that prevents an infinite regress. So the rest of the argument becomes void.

Alternatively, one could take a definition of a necessary being as one that, for some reason, must exist, regardless of whether it spawns an effect. If this definition is used, then a robust justification for such a being must be presented.

it stops at G-ds essence. bare existence. beyond that is nothing. an existent ‘nothing’ is a logical impossibility.

Your rationale belies your conclusion. This is nothing but assertion. If the regress does stop, the only thing we can say about the first cause is that it had the effect of starting a chain of events. There is no reason to suppose that this cause was anything other than a blind, unintelligent process. Labelling this as ‘God’ implicitly assigns it all the properties with which the God concept is traditionally associated. If you want to call this first process ‘God’, then that’s fine. But you can’t show that it was a God that knew what it was doing, listens to our thoughts, influences our environment, or even still exists.

cause

as above

And as above, I have shown that, at best, ‘God’ can be no more than a label for an unknown, one-off process. And I have shown that we can’t possibly know whether this ‘God’ process was indeed a first cause, or just a particular event in an infinite chain of causes.

no more so than any other definition is.

Er, this isn’t really true, when you consider that God is traditionally represented as a sentient indidual with omnimax attributes. This becomes the loaded language fallacy unless you are prepared to caveat it with your definition of God as nothing more than an arbitrary ‘cause.’

this isnt part of the contingency arguments, we only reason so far as a necessary being. deciding which G-d that is, or why G-d has omnimax attributes is a different discussion.

Okay. Well I’ll guess we’ll get to that in time. Or maybe not - at the moment, I can’t see us getting past the regress vs backstop dilemma…

let us settle the matter of a necessary being, all other concerns are moot until that is done.

How do you propose that we settle it? You have (I think) conceded that an infinite regress is no less likely than an arbitrary backstop. Or at least, if you disagree, I can’t see where you provided your rationale. So how do we proceed?

 

[warpspeedpetey]

That doesn’t help! I wanted to nail down what a contingent being was, so we can start from an agreed baseline. You’re suggesting an angel counts. We can’t agree that, because to me, an angel is no more than an abstract concept.Yes, you’ve made that clear. Unfortunately, that still doesn’t help, because your idea of something that can’t not exist may be different to mine. Can we settle upon a thing? Let’s say, “A human being is a contingent being” - okay?Yes, but each of those beings becomes a necessary being, by virtue of spawning a child or effect. They’re not, in and of themselves, necessary beings. They’re necessary by dint of their actions. This is the distinction that I’d like to clarify.But their cause is their parent, ad infinitum. If you accept this, then no first cause is necessary, by definition.I think what you’re confirming here is that your definition of a necessary being is one that is necessary only when it causes an effect. This is fine, although it seems to be an arbitrary definition. What about a being that has no effect? Is such a thing possible? Maybe, maybe not. But we lack the experience or tools to say for definite. So is there another type of necessary being - one that is inherently necessary?

But if we take your apparent definition of a necessary being, there is nothing about it that prevents an infinite regress. So the rest of the argument becomes void.

Alternatively, one could take a definition of a necessary being as one that, for some reason, must exist, regardless of whether it spawns an effect. If this definition is used, then a robust justification for such a being must be presented.Your rationale belies your conclusion. This is nothing but assertion. If the regress does stop, the only thing we can say about the first cause is that it had the effect of starting a chain of events. There is no reason to suppose that this cause was anything other than a blind, unintelligent process. Labelling this as ‘God’ implicitly assigns it all the properties with which the God concept is traditionally associated. If you want to call this first process ‘God’, then that’s fine. But you can’t show that it was a God that knew what it was doing, listens to our thoughts, influences our environment, or even still exists.And as above, I have shown that, at best, ‘God’ can be no more than a label for an unknown, one-off process. And I have shown that we can’t possibly know whether this ‘God’ process was indeed a first cause, or just a particular event in an infinite chain of causes.Er, this isn’t really true, when you consider that God is traditionally represented as a sentient indidual with omnimax attributes. This becomes the loaded language fallacy unless you are prepared to caveat it with your definition of God as nothing more than an arbitrary 'cause.'Okay. Well I’ll guess we’ll get to that in time. Or maybe not - at the moment, I can’t see us getting past the regress vs backstop dilemma…How do you propose that we settle it? You have (I think) conceded that an infinite regress is no less likely than an arbitrary backstop. Or at least, if you disagree, I can’t see where you provided your rationale. So how do we proceed?

im not going to parse all this out. fix it or limit the post length.

 

[warpspeedpetey]

That doesn’t help! I wanted to nail down what a contingent being was, so we can start from an agreed baseline. You’re suggesting an angel counts. We can’t agree that, because to me, an angel is no more than an abstract concept.

you dont have to believe in a being in order for it to be classified as contingent.

as ive stated, a contingent being is simply a being that needs a cause to exist.

Yes, you’ve made that clear. Unfortunately, that still doesn’t help, because your idea of something that can’t not exist may be different to mine.

we arent using personal definitions, that is the technical definition.

Can we settle upon a thing? Let’s say, “A human being is a contingent being” - okay?

no, im not intereseted in limiting our domain to humans, its all contingent beings, as is defined above. everything that needs a cause to exist.

Yes, but each of those beings becomes a necessary being, by virtue of spawning a child or effect. They’re not, in and of themselves, necessary beings. They’re necessary by dint of their actions. This is the distinction that I’d like to clarify.

contingent beings cannot become, necessary. if they at some point could not exist, then, they are not and can never be necessary. because it was possible for them not to exist.

a necessary being is one that cannot fail to exist.

hence, the problem with claiming an infinite chain of contingent beings, they would all have to be necessary. which is nothing more than claiming the universe is a necessary being.

but this is all an aside. because im happy to accept it anyway.

But their cause is their parent, ad infinitum. If you accept this, then no first cause is necessary, by definition.

an infinite chain of contingent beings is no more capable of causing themselves than a single contingent being.

you still need a necessary being.

otherwise you posit a magical POOF! theory. violating the PSR.

I think what you’re confirming here is that your definition of a necessary being is one that is necessary only when it causes an effect.

no, i was just pointing out that an infinite chain of contingent beings is a silly idea from the start, because it makes all contingent beings necessary, but a being is either contingent, or necessary. not both.

but thats an aside, im happy to accept an infinite chain of contingent beings. they all still need a necessary being.

This is fine, although it seems to be an arbitrary definition. What about a being that has no effect? Is such a thing possible? Maybe, maybe not. But we lack the experience or tools to say for definite. So is there another type of necessary being - one that is inherently necessary?

there is only 1 type of necessary being, one that cannot fail to exist.

But if we take your apparent definition of a necessary being, there is nothing about it that prevents an infinite regress. So the rest of the argument becomes void.

its not my definition its the standard definition of a necessary being. the infinite regress isnt the panacea many atheists think it is, because you still need a necessary being even for an infinite chain of contingent beings.

otherwise its POOF!, a magic trick.

Alternatively, one could take a definition of a necessary being as one that, for some reason, must exist, regardless of whether it spawns an effect. If this definition is used, then a robust justification for such a being must be presented.

thats the same definition of a necessary being.

whether or not it produces an effect doesnt make it a different kind of necessary being.

Your rationale belies your conclusion. This is nothing but assertion.

absolutely not, it is an exposition of a logical contradiction. that is not assertion. it demonstates a violation of the law of non-contradiction.

If the regress does stop,…

not at all, but this isnt in the purview of the contingnecy argument.

And I have shown that we can’t possibly know whether this ‘God’ process was indeed a first cause, or just a particular event in an infinite chain of causes.

what “process”? what chain of causes?

we are talking about necessary and contingent beings.

Er, this isn’t really true, when you consider that God is traditionally represented as a sentient indidual with omnimax attributes. This becomes the loaded language fallacy unless you are prepared to caveat it with your definition of God as nothing more than an arbitrary ‘cause.’

all definitions are arbitrary. we could cal a tree “shoe” or a clown “bush”.

if you want to talk omnimax, thats a different argument than the contingency argument.

Okay. Well I’ll guess we’ll get to that in time. Or maybe not - at the moment, I can’t see us getting past the regress vs backstop dilemma…

its not an “either/or” situation, with an infinite regress of contingent beings or not, you must still have a necessary being. if not, then you violate the PSR wwith a POOF! theory.

and i dont believe in magic.

How do you propose that we settle it? You have (I think) conceded that an infinite regress is no less likely than an arbitrary backstop. Or at least, if you disagree, I can’t see where you provided your rationale. So how do we proceed?

an infinite regress still requires a necessary being.

the rationale for this, is that an infinite chain of contingent beings is no more capable of existing without a cause than a single contingent being.

 

[wanstronian]

you dont have to believe in a being in order for it to be classified as contingent.

as ive stated, a contingent being is simply a being that needs a cause to exist.

But as an angel is not a real being, how can it be judged contingent or otherwise? How can you show an angel is contingent?

we arent using personal definitions, that is the technical definition.

We do need personal definitions, because the technical definition is insufficient to result in agreement. We’ve proved this, because we have yet to agree on an example.

no, im not intereseted in limiting our domain to humans, its all contingent beings, as is defined above. everything that needs a cause to exist.

Well, we’re not going to get past stage one then. How can we start a chain of contingency when you are proposing an abstract concept as our starting point (or I should say, end point)?

contingent beings cannot become, necessary. if they at some point could not exist, then, they are not and can never be necessary. because it was possible for them not to exist.

I completely agree, that’s how I interpreted the definition. However, your comment:

an infinite regression of contingent beings, where each contingent being is necessary for the next contingent being in the chain to exist, is actually a chain of necessary beings, because each being in the chain is necessary for the existence of the next.

seems to be trying to redefine what ‘necessary’ is.

a necessary being is one that cannot fail to exist.

Okay. So it is necessary before and despite any effect it may spawn. That was my understanding.

hence, the problem with claiming an infinite chain of contingent beings, they would all have to be necessary. which is nothing more than claiming the universe is a necessary being.

I think this is where the concept of ‘infinity’ starts to cause problems. How can we prove that an infinite chain of contingent beings has to be an infinte chain of necessary beings? That’s surely a paradox, given that our definitions of ‘contingent’ and ‘necessary’ are mutually exclusive?

but this is all an aside. because im happy to accept it anyway.

Accept what? That contingent beings can become necessary? You’ve just rejected that notion!

an infinite chain of contingent beings is no more capable of causing themselves than a single contingent being.

The point is that we don’t know this. We can’t grasp infinity. I agree that a very very very very long line of things has a beginning. But an infinite line? We just can’t say for sure. It seems logical, so as I said before, I’m happy to proceed. But we can’t know, just because it seems instinctive.

you still need a necessary being.

otherwise you posit a magical POOF! theory. violating the PSR.

It doesn’t violate the PSR. The cause is the preceding being. Invoking the PSR doesn’t prove a necessary being. Remember, the PSR is not inviolate. It’s a Principle, not a mathematical proof. We can’t possibly know its truth in all practical applications.

no, i was just pointing out that an infinite chain of contingent beings is a silly idea from the start, because it makes all contingent beings necessary, but a being is either contingent, or necessary. not both.

Okay, at least we agree on the definitions of contingent and necessary, even if we can’t prove that an infinite regress is impossible.

but thats an aside, im happy to accept an infinite chain of contingent beings. they all still need a necessary being.

That’s an assertion on your part, on something that seems instinctive but which you can’t possible know for sure. I don’t believe you’ve ever counted to infinity, so you can’t claim knowledge about what it’s like.

there is only 1 type of necessary being, one that cannot fail to exist.

Yep. We’ve nailed that definition now.

its not my definition its the standard definition of a necessary being. the infinite regress isnt the panacea many atheists think it is, because you still need a necessary being even for an infinite chain of contingent beings.

Interesting that the ‘necessary’ being is defined by exclusion. The SE definition doesn’t explore or define the concept explicitly. If it did, maybe more people would balk at the idea. It’s really no more logical than an infinite regress. Or at least, not sufficiently so to support the argument.

otherwise its POOF!, a magic trick.

Why is a necessary being not a ‘magic trick?’ Sounds like special pleading to me.

thats the same definition of a necessary being.

I know! I was trying to clarify your stated redefinition, that I’ve quoted above.

whether or not it produces an effect doesnt make it a different kind of necessary being.

Exactly. I hope you can see how your previous comment caused confusion though.

 

[wanstronian]

absolutely not, it is an exposition of a logical contradiction. that is not assertion. it demonstates a violation of the law of non-contradiction.

You called upon ‘God.’ It that isn’t a presupposition, I don’t know what is. If you truly believe that the** next logical step** in this argument is to baldly state that all regresses stop ‘at God’s essence’ then there is no point continuing this discussion.

not at all, but this isnt in the purview of the contingnecy argument.

Okay - you were the one calling out God. I was just pointing out that this was premature.

what “process”? what chain of causes?

we are talking about necessary and contingent beings.

If there were a first being, then it would logically have to initiate the chain of beings that brought us all to this point. Do you deny that the first being must also be the first cause? And that a process must have occurred to get from there to here? Swap ‘cause’ for ‘being’ if it helps. I think you’re arguing semantics here, purely for the sake of arguing.

all definitions are arbitrary. we could cal a tree “shoe” or a clown “bush”.

You could, but you wouldn’t get far if you called everything by a different name. This again, is argument for its own sake. When was the last time you went to the circus to watch a bush walking around in big shoes (or should I say ‘trees’) honking a horn?

if you want to talk omnimax, thats a different argument than the contingency argument.

As you are well aware, I am picking up on your use of the word ‘God,’ with all the baggage that this word entails. This is supremely evident from your previous post, and my response to it. I agree, God has no place in the Cosmological argument. But it was you who introduced him, not I. This feels like evasiveness to me. You have introduced a new concept then berated me for picking you up on it! What’s your motivation here? To get to the conclusion, or to draw attention away from the argument’s weaknesses by sniping at me for imagined infringements?

its not an “either/or” situation, with an infinite regress of contingent beings or not, you must still have a necessary being.

Yes, so you said, but are unable to demonstrate. This is the problem with all such arguments. They depend, at some point, upon assertion without substantiation.

if not, then you violate the PSR wwith a POOF! theory.

and i dont believe in magic.

No? I do. Magic is just misdirection and manipulation. It most definitely exists. I don’t believe in miracles, though.

an infinite regress still requires a necessary being.

Again, you state this without being able to demonstrate its truth.

the rationale for this, is that an infinite chain of contingent beings is no more capable of existing without a cause than a single contingent being.

This is conjecture. It cannot be shown to be true, which is one reason why the Cosmo argument fails.