The Death Penalty from a different angle

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I see my flaw. My argument about prudential judgment has been flawed. BUT, I have another one.

Perhaps Bl. Pope John Paul II was saying authoritatively that in the present age capital punishment must be used only in cases to protect society, and that this is a principle that should be followed today.

Evangelium Vitae 56 says:

In any event, the principle set forth in the new Catechism of the Catholic Church remains valid: “If bloodless means are sufficient to defend human lives against an aggressor and to protect public order and the safety of persons, public authority must limit itself to such means, because they better correspond to the concrete conditions of the common good and are more in conformity to the dignity of the human person”.48
It seems to me that the death penalty is similar to religious freedom in the sense that traditionally religious freedom is allowed within just limits, and that still stands, but at the same time "If, in view of peculiar circumstances obtaining among peoples, special civil recognition is given to one religious community in the constitutional order of society, it is at the same time imperative that the right of all citizens and religious communities to religious freedom should be recognized and made effective in practice.. No teaching is changed, but the extent that the Church has allowed the religious toleration within just limits or the limits the Church has set for the use of the death penalty have changed (must be necessary to protect society). What constitutes being necessary to protect society is prudential judgment however, and Bl. Pope JPII’s prudential judgment was that in the present day the need for the death penalty is practically nonexistent. I agree with his judgment.
 
No teaching is changed, but the extent that the Church has allowed the religious toleration within just limits or the limits the Church has set for the use of the death penalty have changed (must be necessary to protect society). What constitutes being necessary to protect society is prudential judgment however, and Bl. Pope JPII’s prudential judgment was that in the present day the need for the death penalty is practically nonexistent. I agree with his judgment.
It is certainly true that judging what is necessary to protect society is a prudential judgment. What is not true is that “no teaching has changed.” I could agree with that claim only by accepting that the entire teaching in 2267 is prudential (which is what I believe). You cannot say that nothing has changed while also claiming that the use of capital punishment is determined by whether it is necessary to protect society since the Church has never in her history had that as the determining criterion. The need for capital punishment was always predicated on whether it was necessary to secure justice, not protection. Protection is a secondary objective of punishment. Retributive justice is first.

Ender
 
Not all murders are the same and not all murders should get the same punishment. Adultery is punishable by death in the Bible but I’m against executing a man or woman for having an affair. If a man comes home and finds his wife having sex with another man after which the man in a passion crime were to take out a gun and kill both his wife and her lover, he should go to prison for many years for this. But it must not be a death penalty offense as it was in reaction to adultery.
It doesn’t matter to the victim if his murderer killed him for revenge or any other motive, he is still dead.
Murder has different degrees-1st, 2nd and Manslaughter. Murdering some1 is serious but executing some1 is also serious because you have to live with that. A man who kills his wife after he finds her having sex with another man will have to live with that for the rest of his life and he will be traumatized by what he did which is why prison but not the death penalty must be the punishment.
Non-sequitur.
Good character of the convicted murderer should also be considered such as Dan (DJ) White’s good character as a Vietnam War Sergeant, SF policeman and his deed of saving a woman and her baby from a burning building when he was a fireman while his victim Harvey B. Milk’s bad character must be regarded as Harvey B. Milk won’t be committing homosexual statutory rape on any more boys.
The fact that White was police officer makes his crime more serious. His job was to uphold the law, not take it into his own hands.
Also if the victim was abusing the killer, then that must be considered. In February 2011 there was a case where a 19 year old mentally handicapped boy Michael Andersen shot and killed 36 year old Stephen Starr in North Carolina and then axed his body and wrote joker. What happened here was that Stephen Starr was a 36 year old gay who had taken in a 19 year old boy he knew was mentally handicapped. Stephen Starr sexually abused this 19 year old retarded boy, including giving the kid drugs such as Ecstasy and drugging the kid’s medicine Mucinex and in Feb. 2011, the kid killed him. Gay groups including Judy Shepard of the Laramie Project expressed sympathy for Stephen Starr-Judy Shepard saw nothing wrong with Stephen Starr sexually abusing a 19 year old retarded kid. The case has since been pleabargained to Murder 2 and the Michael Anderson got 16 to 20 years-had the kid rejected the pleabargain and it went to trial the defense lawyer would’ve raised Stephen Starr’s abuse of a mentally retarded kid. IMO, that was manslaughter. The fact that homosexual Stephen Starr was sexually abusing a 19 year old kid he knew was mentally handicapped, telling others that the kid was his adopted son when his intent was to sexually abuse him was bad. That 19 year old retarded kid reacted to abuse that Stephen Starr did by shooting Stephen Starr as he slept and then axing his body. Yes, his victim should’ve called the police, but there are mitigating circumstances and while no guarantee, the fact that homosexual Stephen Starr sexually abused a 19 year old retarded kid should be regarded in deciding the kid’s punishment as again, the kid did his killing because of crime Stephen Starr did…
If he really was retarded, could his lawyer not use insanity as defense, or something along those lines??? :confused:
 
It is certainly true that judging what is necessary to protect society is a prudential judgment. What is not true is that “no teaching has changed.” I could agree with that claim only by accepting that the entire teaching in 2267 is prudential (which is what I believe). You cannot say that nothing has changed while also claiming that the use of capital punishment is determined by whether it is necessary to protect society since the Church has never in her history had that as the determining criterion. The need for capital punishment was always predicated on whether it was necessary to secure justice, not protection. Protection is a secondary objective of punishment. Retributive justice is first.

Ender
First, I would like to say that the statement Today however, as a result of steady improvements in the organization of the penal system, such cases are very rare, if not practically non-existent seems almost to be a fact, but I guess that’s just my prudential judgment (kind of like it’s my prudential judgment how Liechtenstein isn’t going to rule the world any time soon, imho.) 🙂

Now, I would say that it’s a combination of a development (not change) and changes in society. For instance, the Church used to condemn the taking of interest on a loan, but it doesn’t today; this is because of a development in teaching (a more complete understanding of what usury is), and the fact that charging interest used to constitute usury. The Church wasn’t condemning interest in and of itself when it didn’t allow it, but the conditions in the time period made it possible for the Church to declare that it was a sin to charge interest on a loan. Similarly, the Church today can say that the death penalty must only be used to protect society because it is better for the common good in the present day, while still holding in principle that the death penalty isn’t necessarily limited by only protecting society.
 
First, I would like to say that the statement Today however, as a result of steady improvements in the organization of the penal system, such cases are very rare, if not practically non-existent seems almost to be a fact
What are the criteria you use to determine whether society is adequately protected? We know that some small percentage of killers are recidivists so where do you draw the line between acceptable and not acceptable repeat killings? If you cannot define what constitutes “defense against the aggressor” then how can you say we have achieved it?
Now, I would say that it’s a combination of a development (not change) and changes in society.
Whether or not society has changed has nothing to do with the change in doctrine. The primary objective of punishment was (and still is) retributive justice. The protection of society was (and still is) a secondary objective. The traditional teaching of the Church has always been that capital punishment was acceptable as a act of justice; it was never - despite a claim to the contrary in 2267 - restricted to the need to provide protection. This is the change: 2267 ignores the primary objective of punishment and conditions the acceptability of capital punishment on a secondary objective.
Similarly, the Church today can say that the death penalty must only be used to protect society because it is better for the common good in the present day, while still holding in principle that the death penalty isn’t necessarily limited by only protecting society.
I can accept that 2267 represents JPII’s opinion that not using capital punishment is “better for the common good in the present day” but the Church cannot say it “must” be used only for that purpose without repudiating what she has taught for nearly two millennia.*If the Pope were to deny that the death penalty could be an exercise of retributive justice, he would be overthrowing the tradition of two millennia of Catholic thought, denying the teaching of several previous popes, and contradicting the teaching of Scripture (notably in Genesis 9:5-6 and Romans 13:1-4). *(Cardinal Dulles)
Ender
 
What are the criteria you use to determine whether society is adequately protected? We know that some small percentage of killers are recidivists so where do you draw the line between acceptable and not acceptable repeat killings? If you cannot define what constitutes “defense against the aggressor” then how can you say we have achieved it?
It’s just my opinion. 🤷
Whether or not society has changed has nothing to do with the change in doctrine. The primary objective of punishment was (and still is) retributive justice. The protection of society was (and still is) a secondary objective.
Yep, no change.
The traditional teaching of the Church has always been that capital punishment was acceptable as a act of justice; it was never - despite a claim to the contrary in 2267 - restricted to the need to provide protection. This is the change: 2267 ignores the primary objective of punishment and conditions the acceptability of capital punishment on a secondary objective.
I’m just not seeing the change. Not talking about something doesn’t equal a change.
I can accept that 2267 represents JPII’s opinion that not using capital punishment is “better for the common good in the present day” but the Church cannot say it “must” be used only for that purpose without repudiating what she has taught for nearly two millennia.*If the Pope were to deny that the death penalty could be an exercise of retributive justice, he would be overthrowing the tradition of two millennia of Catholic thought, denying the teaching of several previous popes, and contradicting the teaching of Scripture (notably in Genesis 9:5-6 and Romans 13:1-4). *
(Cardinal Dulles)
Ender

No one is denying that the death penalty could be an exercise of retributive justice, but must it? There are other ways to exercise retributive justice other than the death penalty.

The Church has said that the death penalty in the present age must be used only if necessary to protect society. I disagree with you when you say the Church cannot say it must be used only for the purpose of protecting society without repudiating what she has taught. The Catholic Church can put limits on when the death penalty must be used in the present day (i.e only to protect society), without rejecting that in theory it can be ok to use the death penalty for the purpose of retributive justice.
 
As I am from a society (UK) where capital punishment has been abolished since 1965( see Wikipedia entry "Murder(Abolition Of Death Penalty) Act of 1965), www.wikipedia.org) as it has since been throughout Europe( save Belarus, ruled by dictator Aleksandr Lukashenko), esp EU states, I will make some observations. In questions of terrorist related murder( such as during the NI “Troubles” and so-called “suicide bombing”- 9/11 in the US and 7/7/2005), it is of questionable efficacy and there is a strong risk that innocent people may be wrongfully convicted( see Wikipedia entries “Birmingham Six” “Guildford Four” “Maguire Seven”), secondly trials for murder where the death penalty is on the table are notoriously more expensive than a simple sentence of life without parole( California is due to vote on repealing its death penalty on such grounds later this year).
Thirdly, executions now occur in highly abusive or autocratic states like Saudi Arabia, China, Cuba, North Korea, the very states I doubt that America (or individual states like California) would wish to find themselves in the moral company of!

'Nuff said!!

Terry
 
It’s just my opinion.
It was also JPII’s opinion but as it is an opinion it is not binding Church doctrine and we are allowed to form our own position.
I’m just not seeing the change. Not talking about something doesn’t equal a change.
Traditional teaching: Retribution determines the use of capital punishment. New teaching: Protection determines the use of capital punishment. Surely you recognize the change even though the traditional teaching is not mentioned by the new formulation.
No one is denying that the death penalty could be an exercise of retributive justice…
Really? Isn’t that what 2267 is saying when it states that the cases where it could be used are virtually non-existent? And isn’t it saying that in regard to cases where it is necessary for defense? It even claims that the traditional teaching is that capital punishment is acceptable when necessary for defense; it says nothing about it being used as just retribution.
but must it? There are other ways to exercise retributive justice other than the death penalty.
Now this is a different argument and an approach that is a valid one to take.
The Church has said that the death penalty in the present age must be used only if necessary to protect society. I disagree with you when you say the Church cannot say it must be used only for the purpose of protecting society without repudiating what she has taught.
But this is a repudiation of what she has taught since what she taught in the past was different. That’s the exact point that Cardinal Dulles made.
The Catholic Church can put limits on when the death penalty must be used in the present day (i.e only to protect society), without rejecting that in theory it can be ok to use the death penalty for the purpose of retributive justice.
How is this possible? Either retributive justice is the primary objective or protecting society is; they cannot both be primary. So - which is it?

Ender
 
It was also JPII’s opinion but as it is an opinion it is not binding Church doctrine and we are allowed to form our own position.

Traditional teaching: Retribution determines the use of capital punishment. New teaching: Protection determines the use of capital punishment. Surely you recognize the change even though the traditional teaching is not mentioned by the new formulation.

Really? Isn’t that what 2267 is saying when it states that the cases where it could be used are virtually non-existent? And isn’t it saying that in regard to cases where it is necessary for defense? It even claims that the traditional teaching is that capital punishment is acceptable when necessary for defense; it says nothing about it being used as just retribution.

But this is a repudiation of what she has taught since what she taught in the past was different. That’s the exact point that Cardinal Dulles made.

How is this possible? Either retributive justice is the primary objective or protecting society is; they cannot both be primary. So - which is it?

Ender
Agreed

I still don’t see the change. In theory, the state has a right to impose the death penalty on people who are convicted of grave crimes. Today, the Church has limited that right so that it can be used only if necessary to protect society, because the Church “has called us to a higher road” (Archbishop Chaput).

No. JPII said in Evangelium Vitae that The primary purpose of the punishment which society inflicts is “to redress the disorder caused by the offence”. The primary purpose isn’t the only purpose. And today the Church has said the primary purpose (retribution) must be coupled with the purpose of defending society to justify the use of the death penalty. It’s not a change in teaching per se but a change in when it can be applied.

That’s not what I understand:

*However, since the “new teaching” is contrary to traditional Catholic moral reasoning, Scalia believes that he is not in such a predicament and can therefore remain both a Supreme Court justice and a Catholic in good standing.

Unlike Justice Scalia, Avery Dulles finds no rupture in the development of Catholic teaching on the death penalty. The Jesuit cardinal distinguishes between theological affirmations, which allow for the death penalty in certain instances, and their practical application to contemporary contexts. By virtue of their office, the church’s pastors receive the guidance of the Holy Spirit to apply the principles of justice to public policy on matters like the death penalty.*

Archbishop Gregory

Retributive justice is. It seems like you are creating a false dichotomy, but I could be wrong since I’m wrong quite a bit :o.
 
Agreed

I still don’t see the change. In theory, the state has a right to impose the death penalty on people who are convicted of grave crimes. Today, the Church has limited that right so that it can be used only if necessary to protect society, because the Church “has called us to a higher road” (Archbishop Chaput).

No. JPII said in Evangelium Vitae that The primary purpose of the punishment which society inflicts is “to redress the disorder caused by the offence”. The primary purpose isn’t the only purpose. And today the Church has said the primary purpose (retribution) must be coupled with the purpose of defending society to justify the use of the death penalty. It’s not a change in teaching per se but a change in when it can be applied.

That’s not what I understand:

*However, since the “new teaching” is contrary to traditional Catholic moral reasoning, Scalia believes that he is not in such a predicament and can therefore remain both a Supreme Court justice and a Catholic in good standing.

Unlike Justice Scalia, Avery Dulles finds no rupture in the development of Catholic teaching on the death penalty*. The Jesuit cardinal distinguishes between theological affirmations, which allow for the death penalty in certain instances, and their practical application to contemporary contexts. By virtue of their office, the church’s pastors receive the guidance of the Holy Spirit to apply the principles of justice to public policy on matters like the death penalty.

Archbishop Gregory

Retributive justice is. It seems like you are creating a false dichotomy, but I could be wrong since I’m wrong quite a bit :o.
To the first part agreed, but like I mentioned earlier sort of a common sense thing imho.

I still see this as something very similar to usury/interest and Church teaching → a development, but not a change.

I’m unsubscribing to this thread because I’ve spent way more time on this thread than I should and as a result probably too much time on CAF. Thank you for the discussion. 🙂
 
Today, the Church has limited that right so that it can be used only if necessary to protect society, because the Church “has called us to a higher road” (Archbishop Chaput).
Accepting this explanation requires us to accept that the Church was for two millennia on the lower road.
And today the Church has said the primary purpose (retribution) must be coupled with the purpose of defending society to justify the use of the death penalty.
Not exactly. Nothing in either 2266 or 2267 couples those two objectives and as I said before they cannot both be primary. If retributive justice is primary then you can use capital punishment when it is not necessary for protection but if protection is primary you can use it when it is not just. Or I suppose you could accept that capital punishment is just and hold that for practical reasons one should use it only for protection. This is pretty much my understanding of 2267.
  • Avery Dulles finds no rupture in the development of Catholic teaching on the death penalty*.
It is worth pointing out that Dulles also believed that 2267 was a prudential teaching and since it wasn’t doctrine could naturally not be in conflict with what was doctrine.
Retributive justice is.
Yes, retribution is the primary objective of punishment which means that it is a just punishment for (at least) murder and its use cannot doctrinally be conditioned by its usefulness. The restriction is prudential .

Ender
 
Starshiptropper, most criminal cases including murder cases are pleabargained. When a suspect decides they want to take case to jury trial, they take a risk. If the jury sees things the defense’s way, then good but if they don’t and you get convicted of more serious charge, you get more prison time. The 19 year old mentally handicapped kid who shot and killed homosexual Stephen Starr decided to take pleabargain to Murder 2 and get 16 to 20 years in prison than risk a jury trial. IMO, that was manslaughter. Had it gone to jury trial, the prosecution would’ve argued that the level of mental retardation was not that serious while defense would argue it was. This can be stressful because if jury didn’t agree with the defense and convicted him of Murder 1, he would get life. That kid decided to accept the pleabargain, then to gamble.

Sometimes innocent people will plead guilty to crimes and get less time than go to trial. If the defense lawyer advises the client that they think a jury will convict as circumstantial proof is strong, some innocents will plead guilty than risk more prison time if convicted on more serious charge. Don’t know if the teacher was innocent here mlive.com/news/flint/index.ssf/2009/12/teacher-sex_punishments_vastly.html. Woman said she was innocent, rejected a pleabargain where she would’ve gotten out of jail in 1 year but she was convicted on more serious charge and now spending 25 years to life for sex with a 12 to 14 year old boy. Now if she was guilty, then no sympathy for her as she had been offered a pleabargain where she would’ve been out of jail in 1 year. But if she was innocent as she says she was, then can’t blame her for rejecting the pleabargain. It’s not easy and simple because innocent people sometimes accept pleabargains to avoid more prison time if they think they’ll be convicted by jury on more serious charge.
 
No, that doesn’t follow. Most people have an incentive not to attack an officer, because there would be worse consequences for them. Also, to execute someone for a crime less than murder would be intrinsically evil, so not an option even if there were pragmatic reasons for it.

The argument I find somewhat persuasive is that if a person has already been sentenced to life in prison for murder, and essentially has nothing more to lose except his life, then the death penalty would be an appropriate consequence if he committed a further murder while in prison (or if he escaped and committed murder while on the loose). I think that makes sense, and if these were the only crimes for which the death penalty was imposed, I wouldn’t have a problem with it.

Edwin
Why would executing someone for a crime less than murder be intrinsically evil?

In Christ
 
Why would executing someone for a crime less than murder be intrinsically evil?

In Christ
If they had the death penalty for child molestation, then it would be fine with me but this must be decided by 12 jurors and many appeals. Problem with this is that innocents are sometimes accused and even convicted of child molestation. Even if a person is acquitted, human nature is to wonder if the person was guilty but just beat the charge.
 
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