The demand for evidence for the existence of God

[grannymh]

Well, perhaps. So could you give me an example of a non-supernatural revelatory, non-paranormal non-sensory external experience?

.

What was going through my mind was a non-material external experience such beauty. Beauty is more an evaluation of the mind rather than a concrete, space and time object. Of course one could rightly say that we see beauty because we consider the object we are looking at is beautiful.

granny: "Nor can sensory experience be extrapolated without limits. Previous sensory experience of a 11 o’clock arrival of an ice-cream truck is not as simple as it sounds especially when it comes to humans.

I’m not sure what you mean here.

You are absolutely right.

I’m on the wrong path. I finally realized that I wasn’t seeing the analogy in reference to God. I was seeing it in reference to logical thinking in a material world. The bad thing is that I can’t continue because I don’t want to go off topic. The good thing is that I can subjectively experience some of what may have been going through Billy’s mind. It is a good day for me when I can come to a better understanding of other people–even those in an analogy which I mistook.

Blessings,
granny

“My soul’s a shepherd too; a flock it feeds
Of thoughts, and words, and deeds.”
George Herbert

 

[grannymh]

Well, this might well be true - that there is one transcendent Being who permeates what we call the material world but also exists in a domain beyond that and not subject to it; and that that Being can be known only by assuming His existence and seeking communication with Him. But this doesn’t, as far as I can see, help with the problem of discerning truth from illusion because ultimately one has to rely on some sort of personal revelation or personal experience. And, moreover, one is hoping that one will receive that personal experience and so is specially open to self-delusion. I think you agree with me judging by the way you approached this in your post.

You are right in that I understand that ultimately people do rely on some sort of personal revelation or personal experience of the existence of God. Where we differ is the method of personal revelation or personal experience. Our findings as to the location of the “illusion” are also different. Even our concepts of human nature differ.

Yet, from my perspective, we are both similar in that we see the quest for truth as worthy of both the exciting adventures as well as the discouraging difficulties of the journey. And we recognize the basic goodness in our human nature. The human person is worthy of profound respect.

As for the demand for the evidence for the existence of God, what people forget is that there is more than one kind of evidence and that the demand comes from within a person according to her or his own individuality. Those of us who have the broad view of a transcendent Pure Spirit need to present this belief, and it is a belief, as best we can considering the limitations of human nature which, in itself, unites the material and spiritual worlds.

It is my observation that human nature, an unique unification of rational/corporeal, is an objective truth in that it does not depend on human affirmation in order to exist. From my perspective, there exists within human nature, the innate curiosity and desire to learn about both the material and spiritual worlds. Having the freedom of choice, humans can accept or deny the totality of human nature. In other words, humans can choose to deny that our spirituality has to come from something other than the material world around us.

Catholicism gives us the mission to preach the Gospel to all. Being individuals, we do this in a variety of ways. Sometimes we use words.

Blessings,
granny

The quest for truth needs Catholicism.

 

[hecd2]

I’ve bolded the above to bring out my point. What you consider “good epistemic warrant” is only good – indeed can only be good – to you and you alone. Your criteria can never be validated in the mind of another individual without that individual making his or her own decision and judgment. Evaluating the evidence is a necessarily personal affair, because it is always up to your mind, whenever the evidence comes in, to decide. Now, sometimes the evidence may be compelling, other times not so much. We seem to have less say so in the former case than in the latter.

Your stance on the ability of science to answer certain questions correctly is really a reflection of what your will has given authority to as “good epistemic warrant” in your mind. Many people, as you note, do not share the same conviction because they have interpreted various evidences differently (perhaps they’ve had – or thought they had – revelations.) To a large extent we authenticate the evidence, particularly in “Big Questions.”

I don’t have a problem with this as far as it goes. I think you are quite right that we each to have make a decision as to what constitutes good evidence and people choose different ways to address this.

What I don’t think is that this entails a descent into pure relativism; the absurd epistemology of postmodern cultural constructivism and decontructionism shows what happens if one abandons the idea that there is a reality and that our beliefs and statements about that reality are and can be shown to be more or less conforming to it, and if one claims that all statements of belief constitute “narratives” of equal merit, or statements purely founded in cultural and social convention. All beliefs are not equal in the Truth Stakes. In other words, some epistemic systems are objectively and demonstrably better than others, and we can see this by considering, amongst other things, their predictive and performative merits. (See for example Koertge’s ‘A House Built on Sand’, Socal and Bricmont’s ‘Fashionable Nonsense’, and Gross and Levitt’s ‘Higher Superstition’).

Alec
evolutionpages.com

 

[Betterave]

Thanks for this. This is interesting because there are some subtle points here and because behind the analogy there is a very important question - are atheists unwise to refuse to act on the testimony of the very many believers?

Yes, agree completely.

My position in all cases, ice cream, million bucks and theistic belief are, within the terms of the analogies, grounded in the testimony of others and not in any evidence that I have myself. When it comes to the warrants that the others have for their propositions the case is not so uniform.

Agreed.

I was using the example to establish the fact, which I now believe you accept, that the reasonableness of rejection of such a proposition depends on the strength of the epistemic warrant that the persuaders have for the proposition, regardless of whether the warrant is sensory evidence or not.

Yes. And perhaps more to the point, our ability to assess the reasonableness of rejection of such a proposition depends on our ability to assess the strength of the epistemic warrant that the persuaders have for the proposition, regardless of whether the warrant is sensory evidence or not.

In the case of the ice cream kids we all agree that their warrant, based on sensory experience, is sound. In the case of Professor Abayomi, we all agree that his warrant for his proposition is, to put it kindly, a tad flaky in that he is deliberately ignoring the external sensory evidence provided by his bank statement which is composed chiefly of red numbers. His warrant is fundamentally opposed to that of the kids in that they are acting on their sense of external reality and he is deliberately distorting and falsifying his.

Not a major point, but I would rather say that his ‘warrant’ is not a warrant at all. He has a reason for making his claim, but no epistemic warrant.

In the case of the theistic proposition, the warrant, such as it is, is also of an entirely different kind from that of the kids (and also from that of the professor’s in that there is no question of deliberate deceit in their case), and it is this fact that renders John’s analogy impertinent, because for it to be valid, we would have to accept that the warrants for belief in the ice cream case and the theistic case are equivalent, but John has already conceded in the OP that they are not.

We would have to accept that the warrants are analogous. They *are *equivalent in terms of the analogy. The question is whether the analogy is a good one.

My point is that the reasonableness of the ice cream case (which is based on a prima facie good warrant) does not in itself establish the theistic case absent independent assessment of the evidence for the theistic case and the strength of the warrant there.

Agreed.

I’m sorry - do you mean you read John’s statement and you now accept that my paraphrase of that particular paragraph was fair; and if that’s not what you mean, I’d appreciate knowing just how my paraphrase and John specific statement diverge.

Sorry, I was confused on that point. John’s statement, which you quoted, dropped out when I hit the reply button, so I was thinking that the referent of “this statement” was *your *statement: “Second, I don’t accept…” My bad.

So, if your adherence to the testimony of others is not based on a belief that “their behaviour is itself based on sound evidence” what is it based on?

Adherence to the testimony of others might be based on a belief that their behaviour constitutes sound evidence.

It clearly cannot, as you point out, be based on a knowledge of the evidence itself, because then there would be no need for testimony. But neither is it reasonable to say that a default stance of scepticism is generally unjustified.

But it is reasonable to say that a default stance of scepticism is not generally justified.

If reason compelled one to take every proposition seriously without any consideration of the likely strength of the evidence underlying the proposition, life would be impossible and the Professor would be a rich man.

True, but there is no question here of “taking every proposition seriously without any consideration of the likely strength of the evidence underlying the proposition.”

If one is to act on testimony alone, without the evidence oneself, then one needs to understand at least that the warrant for belief for those providing the testimony is likely to be strong - that is the prima facie case for the kids and is not, by the statement of the problem in the first place, the case for theism.

But I think the analogy should not be read this way. The point of the analogy has to be to stimulate reflection on how testimony itself, in certain circumstances, consititutes evidence, at least prima facie.

 

[Touchstone]

I don’t have a problem with this as far as it goes. I think you are quite right that we each to have make a decision as to what constitutes good evidence and people choose different ways to address this.

What I don’t think is that this entails a descent into pure relativism; the absurd epistemology of postmodern cultural constructivism and decontructionism shows what happens if one abandons the idea that there is a reality and that our beliefs and statements about that reality are and can be shown to be more or less conforming to it, and if one claims that all statements of belief constitute “narratives” of equal merit, or statements purely founded in cultural and social convention. All beliefs are not equal in the Truth Stakes. In other words, some epistemic systems are objectively and demonstrably better than others, and we can see this by considering, amongst other things, their predictive and performative merits. (See for example Koertge’s ‘A House Built on Sand’, Socal and Bricmont’s ‘Fashionable Nonsense’, and Gross and Levitt’s ‘Higher Superstition’).

Alec
evolutionpages.com

I agree with this sentiment, but I think it’s easily refuted as binding or obligatory in some objective sense. Predictive and performative merits are the VERY THING looked at with suspicion, here. That’s what is seen as oppressive to their view of the truth.

On some level, unless the parties agree to basic commitments to the reality of reality, the epistemic value of evidence and experience for probing the extra-mental world, and the value of predictive and performative models, we got nothin’ to go on.

Your basis for “objectively and demonstrably better” are easily denied, in other words. Why should person A accept person B’s claim that the predictions and performance of the models are “better”?

That one stumps me, anyway. I got nothin’ if you can’t see your way to valuing predictive and modeling success.

But that’s not just something to contend with from followers of von Foerster or Luhmann. Everyone like to pay lip service to those commitments – judging from the evidence, valuing objective results and measurable performance. But this gets problematic across the board with many major brands of theism, it’s problematic right here on this forum. You do not have and cannot count on “objectively and demonstrably better” across the board. Many, when this seems to point to conclusions they don’t like, will readily through that under the bus, way before they’d suborn their intuitions to the results of that process.

-TS

 

[hecd2]

hecd2:

In the case of the theistic proposition, the warrant, such as it is, is also of an entirely different kind from that of the kids (and also from that of the professor’s in that there is no question of deliberate deceit in their case), and it is this fact that renders John’s analogy impertinent, because for it to be valid, we would have to accept that the warrants for belief in the ice cream case and the theistic case are equivalent, but John has already conceded in the OP that they are not.

                  We would have to accept that the warrants are *analogous*. They *are *equivalent in terms of the analogy. The question is whether the analogy is a good one.

The warrants are analogous in the particular that they are both reasons to make a proposition, but not in other particulars and particularly not in their source; I certainly don’t see them as equivalent (ie of equal merit), and this is the crux of my objection. In the one case the warrant is prima facie strong as it is based on a non-contentious interpretation of straightforward sensory data; in the other case none of these particulars apply. The analogy attempts to smuggle in the idea that we are unwise to seek evidence for acceding to the theistic proposition on the back of the seemingly obvious idea that Billy is unwise to seek evidence before acting. It is the lack of equivalence in the merits of the warrants for belief of the persuaders (which has its origin in the nature of the evidence that they employ as their warrants for belief) that *causes *the paucity of the analogy as I see it.

Adherence to the testimony of others might be based on a belief that their behaviour constitutes sound evidence.

I suppose that might be correct in some cases but I can’t actually think of a clear-cut case where the behaviour of those testifying constitutes evidence for us that the proposition is true. In most cases where that seems to apply at first sight, is it rather that their behaviour is evidence, not for the proposition, but for the merits of the warrant they have for believing the proposition? Which is not the same thing, is it? Can you help me here? In any case, and as something of an aside, I don’t see that the behaviour of theists constitutes evidence for the truth of the theistic proposition.

But it is reasonable to say that a default stance of scepticism is not generally justified.

Why do you say that? I don’t agree, at least under some conditions. In my view a default stance of scepticism (“show me the evidence and the reasoning”) is generally (if not always) justified in cases of metaphysical, philosophical and scientific propositions and in other cases of import. We can *choose *to rely on others, but that doesn’t remove the justification for scepticism should we choose to exercise it. Scepticism might not be justified in trivial cases (say if I like ice cream and someone whom I have no reason to doubt tells me a truck is round the corner) and cases of urgency (say I meet a bunch of people yelling “BULL” and stampeding out of the china shop that I am just about to step into), but I don’t see why it would not be generally justified in the other circumstances I described.

True, but there is no question here of “taking every proposition seriously without any consideration of the likely strength of the evidence underlying the proposition.”

Isn’t there? Isn’t that just what the ice cream analogy is inviting us to do? That’s what I see if I look at the title of the thread again and read the OP.

But I think the analogy should not be read this way. The point of the analogy has to be to stimulate reflection on how testimony itself, in certain circumstances, constitutes evidence, at least prima facie.

Well, if that is the point of the analogy, and I am quite prepared to accept that that is what it is, it has succeeded well, in that we have been reflecting on it for about 20 pages in the thread . But see earlier in the post for a question on circumstances in which the behaviour of the persuaders really *constitutes *evidence for us rather than leading us to accept that the persuaders have a good warrant for the proposition.

In any case, we have agreed on a number of points in the last two or three posts that brings our views on this closer if not fully aligned. I don’t think either can justifiably accuse the other of missing our points now and mostly what is left is a difference in perspective ( a perspective which in my case at least is refined as a result of the exchange).

Alec
evolutionpages.com

 

[hecd2]

I agree with this sentiment, but I think it’s easily refuted as binding or obligatory in some objective sense. Predictive and performative merits are the VERY THING looked at with suspicion, here. That’s what is seen as oppressive to their view of the truth.

Rejected rather than refuted I would say. But if people are unwilling to accept that there is an objective reality and that there are objective criteria by which we can judge how well various propositions align with that reality, all you can do is to shrug and move on. They are playing a different game and we’ve got no purchase on that surface whether they are fundamentalist hicks or French post-modernist academics.

On some level, unless the parties agree to basic commitments to the reality of reality, the epistemic value of evidence and experience for probing the extra-mental world, and the value of predictive and performative models, we got nothin’ to go on.

Just so. My post was meant to be a statement of my position, that I see objective criteria by which to judge beliefs, and was not to persuade anyone who thinks differently - I was agreeing with the Exodus that we have to choose our epistemology but pointing out that, at least for me, that doesn’t entail pure subjective relativism.

Your basis for “objectively and demonstrably better” are easily denied, in other words. Why should person A accept person B’s claim that the predictions and performance of the models are “better”?

If A accepts the definition of better as the map more closely conforming to the territory yada yada then you can persuade A that model X is better than model Y. If A does not accept this, if for example A claims that “better” is what makes him feel warm and cuddled, we’ve got nowt.

That one stumps me, anyway. I got nothin’ if you can’t see your way to valuing predictive and modeling success.

Agreed

But that’s not just something to contend with from followers of von Foerster or Luhmann. Everyone like to pay lip service to those commitments – judging from the evidence, valuing objective results and measurable performance. But this gets problematic across the board with many major brands of theism, it’s problematic right here on this forum. You do not have and cannot count on “objectively and demonstrably better” across the board. Many, when this seems to point to conclusions they don’t like, will readily through that under the bus, way before they’d suborn their intuitions to the results of that process.

Well, having shrugged and moved on from the truth-is-what-makes-me-feel-good folk and the truth-is-scripture-as-I-interpret it folk, I think I have to give all those who claim to be committed to objective reality and performative criteria a fair hearing. Maybe they see or understand something that I don’t within the rules of the game. Of course in many cases it becomes clear that they’ll only play by the rules so far and then we just have to agree where that boundary is and to diverge beyond it, but merely getting to that understanding is often good for focusing and refining my own position. I’m only a fallible player myself of course and subject to the same temptations of suborning truth to what I want to believe as everyone else. Submitting my position to scrutiny, particularly to those who start out from a contrary perspective is one essence of the game, isn’t it? I’m conscious of the fact that I have a formally weak axiomatic foundation for my system (it’s as strong as I can conscientiously make it), so I can’t be dismissive of alternative propositions provided they are potentially within the game.

As for making the case for objective reality and against contructivism I don’t know better popular sources than the books I referenced. Personally, I start with everyday life and build a case from that. But, anyway, the statement that you commented on was intended to be declaratory rather than polemic.

Alec
evolutionpages.com

 

[The_Exodus]

What I don’t think is that this entails a descent into pure relativism;

I’m pretty sure I agree with you here, though “pure relativism” is a problematic term. I think, however, you mean that in some way what is outside our minds ought very much to determine what is in them, instead of vice versa.

At the same time we must realize that to a large extent we have to make conscious decisions all the time about what we think, and these decisions very much take what is inside the mind and project it onto what is outside it.

And I think that’s about as far as we can go. I know you value “performative models” but, quite frankly, that just seems to me to cater to your particular tastes. I value “idealistic models” for instance, though one may argue that they “mentally perform” as well as practical models.

In other words, I think we ought to take things one question at a time instead of throwing around the phrase “performative model.” Obviously, everyone thinks their ideas perform in some respect, so it seems to me more a red herring than an actual answer to anything.

 

[Betterave]

In other words, I think we ought to take things one question at a time instead of throwing around the phrase “performative model.” Obviously, everyone thinks their ideas perform in some respect, so it seems to me more a red herring than an actual answer to anything.

Indeed. With the exception of TS, I think we can all agree on that.

 

[Betterave]

The warrants are analogous in the particular that they are both reasons to make a proposition, but not in other particulars and particularly not in their source; I certainly don’t see them as equivalent (ie of equal merit), and this is the crux of my objection.

I think our difference here is purely terminological. If you prefer to express it that way, that’s fine.

In the one case the warrant is prima facie strong as it is based on a non-contentious interpretation of straightforward sensory data; in the other case none of these particulars apply. The analogy attempts to smuggle in the idea that we are unwise to seek evidence for acceding to the theistic proposition on the back of the seemingly obvious idea that Billy is unwise to seek evidence before acting.

It seems that you are doing violence to the analogy here. Billy is invited to act based on the assumption of an epistemic warrant constituted by the other kids’ behaviour. The unbeliever is also invited to act based on a similar assumption of epistemic warrant constituted by the belief of believers. I don’t see why you introduce the notion of “unwise to seek evidence,” as if this is or needs to be an essential component in both cases in the analogy (it’s not - there is no question of Billy needing to “seek evidence”; the question is simply whether he understands the situation or not). Whether or not it is wise to seek evidence is a contingent matter, based on one’s judgment in a particular case about the probable legitimacy of the testimony in question; but the invitation to ‘action’ in question seems logically independent from possible subsequent evidence-seeking as such. I think that the force of the analogy should be to neutralize the unbeliever’s tendency to stack the deck against belief by assuming that testimony of the kind in question is inherently suspicious such that it constitutes no prima facie epistemic warrant. Regardless of whether in the case in question one feels the need to include evidence-seeking as part of the action that is called for, that question is logically posterior to the point about testimony as such.

This all sounds rather complicated, but I think it just boils down to the simple fact that reasonable people don’t simply dismiss what others have to say, unless they have a good reason for doing so. And the contention made in the analogy is that unbelievers don’t have a good reason for doing so.

I suppose that might be correct in some cases but I can’t actually think of a clear-cut case where the behaviour of those testifying constitutes evidence for us that the proposition is true. In most cases where that seems to apply at first sight, is it rather that their behaviour is evidence, not for the proposition, but for the merits of the warrant they have for believing the proposition? Which is not the same thing, is it? Can you help me here? In any case, and as something of an aside, I don’t see that the behaviour of theists constitutes evidence for the truth of the theistic proposition.

Arguments from authority are rarely perfectly clear cut, but we most certainly do just accept that they are legitimate in many cases. I would say that these are cases “where the behaviour of those testifying constitutes evidence for us that the proposition is true.” But you want to say that their behaviour [their assertion of a proposition] is not evidence for the truth of the proposition? …it is only evidence for the merits of their warrant for believing the proposition? Okay, but it seems clear enough to me that evidence for the merits of the warrant for believing a proposition is evidence that the proposition is true.

Why do you say that? I don’t agree, at least under some conditions. In my view a default stance of scepticism (“show me the evidence and the reasoning”) is generally (if not always) justified in cases of metaphysical, philosophical and scientific propositions and in other cases of import. We can *choose *to rely on others, but that doesn’t remove the justification for scepticism should we choose to exercise it. Scepticism might not be justified in trivial cases (say if I like ice cream and someone whom I have no reason to doubt tells me a truck is round the corner) and cases of urgency (say I meet a bunch of people yelling “BULL” and stampeding out of the china shop that I am just about to step into), but I don’t see why it would not be generally justified in the other circumstances I described.

If you want to claim that it *is *reasonable to say that a default stance of scepticism is generally justified, then you will naturally accept it as reasonable on my part when I tell you that I am sceptical of your claim, and ask you to justify it. (And so far as I can see you haven’t yet even attempted to do so.)

Isn’t there? Isn’t that just what the ice cream analogy is inviting us to do? That’s what I see if I look at the title of the thread again and read the OP.

No, I think not. As I recall, the ice cream case was certainly not offered as analogous to every proposition and the analogy said nothing about *discounting *“any consideration of the likely strength of the evidence underlying the proposition.”

 

[hecd2]

I’m pretty sure I agree with you here, though “pure relativism” is a problematic term. I think, however, you mean that in some way what is outside our minds ought very much to determine what is in them, instead of vice versa.

Yes. And there’s no doubt that pure relativism is a problematic term that we can unpack if you like but since you understand me here, there doesn’t seem to be much point going down that rabbit hole.

At the same time we must realize that to a large extent we have to make conscious decisions all the time about what we think, and these decisions very much take what is inside the mind and project it onto what is outside it.

Yes, and that is one source of our fallibility in aligning our propositions with the external reality, which I think is why the social aspect of science as a group activity is one important element in its efficacy.

And I think that’s about as far as we can go. I know you value “performative models” but, quite frankly, that just seems to me to cater to your particular tastes. I value “idealistic models” for instance, though one may argue that they “mentally perform” as well as practical models.

Sure, epistemic systems that judge the truth value of propositions based on their external performance cater to my taste, but it is not merely an irrational preference but one that I can justify with some degree of reason. They are the basis for discerning between a true and false mathematical theorem or between a good and a better scientific theory. But I’m intrigued by what you mean by idealistic models and their mental performance and would appreciate you elaborating that a little.

In other words, I think we ought to take things one question at a time instead of throwing around the phrase “performative model.” Obviously, everyone thinks their ideas perform in some respect, so it seems to me more a red herring than an actual answer to anything.

Hmm - I don’t think I used the phrase ‘performative model’ - did I? And to the extent that it appears crude and ill-defined it seems to be a strawman for what I did say. Which is not to claim that any of my philosophical thoughts are other than crude and ill-defined, but I’m sure you’ll forgive me that as I blunder my way to a clearer definition and justification of my world-view. What I did say was: “some epistemic systems are objectively and demonstrably better than others, and we can see this by considering, amongst other things, their predictive and performative merits.” which seems to carry rather more meaning than that phrase.

Alec
evolutionpages.com

 

[Touchstone]

Rejected rather than refuted I would say.

Ok, better, I’ll grant

But if people are unwilling to accept that there is an objective reality and that there are objective criteria by which we can judge how well various propositions align with that reality, all you can do is to shrug and move on. They are playing a different game and we’ve got no purchase on that surface whether they are fundamentalist hicks or French post-modernist academics.

Right. Tracking.

Just so. My post was meant to be a statement of my position, that I see objective criteria by which to judge beliefs, and was not to persuade anyone who thinks differently - I was agreeing with the Exodus that we have to choose our epistemology but pointing out that, at least for me, that doesn’t entail pure subjective relativism.

Understood. I’d say the same. But those same criteria, just as objective as they are to you and me, just aren’t valued for that, and in fact are held at arms length for that. If you’re committed to some form of mystical idealism, or just very much inclined to trust your intuitions over anything else, I think that does cast you (and I) as “at parity”, or “purely subjectively relativist” to try and apply your term, to the intuitionist.

It’s just a matter of starting points. Why should one not just embrace pure subjectivism as their epistemology? If you start at the very beginning, I think it does have to drop off in terms of anything… deontological in terms of adopting an epistemology. All of which to say, I’m an ardent defender of performative models and objective analysis and skeptical thinking, but I don’t suppose if the value of those are denied outright – and here on this forum that’s something to contend with – that I have anything other than a (relativistic) preference and subjective disposition. As you said above, when the break happens at that level, there’s just no common ground to proceed from. And there’s nothing to force them there, nor should be they be coerced if they could be. The mind either chooses to go there, or it doesn’t.

If A accepts the definition of better as the map more closely conforming to the territory yada yada then you can persuade A that model X is better than model Y. If A does not accept this, if for example A claims that “better” is what makes him feel warm and cuddled, we’ve got nowt.

Yep, and this is the basic point of departure for supernaturalist thinking. We can discuss and progress insofar as a “group epistemology”, some kind of shared standard is available, but when the intuition is invoked as plenopotentiary, it’s every man for himself, and we are each an island in our mind. An objective model becomes a problem not a benefit for many at that point.

Well, having shrugged and moved on from the truth-is-what-makes-me-feel-good folk and the truth-is-scripture-as-I-interpret it folk, I think I have to give all those who claim to be committed to objective reality and performative criteria a fair hearing. Maybe they see or understand something that I don’t within the rules of the game. Of course in many cases it becomes clear that they’ll only play by the rules so far and then we just have to agree where that boundary is and to diverge beyond it, but merely getting to that understanding is often good for focusing and refining my own position. I’m only a fallible player myself of course and subject to the same temptations of suborning truth to what I want to believe as everyone else. Submitting my position to scrutiny, particularly to those who start out from a contrary perspective is one essence of the game, isn’t it? I’m conscious of the fact that I have a formally weak axiomatic foundation for my system (it’s as strong as I can conscientiously make it), so I can’t be dismissive of alternative propositions provided they are potentially within the game.

Yes, well put. That’s the fault line: here, here’s my math, I’ll show my work, now who can knock it down? I’d like to know, and am the better for it, thank you, if so. The axiomata are minimal because that’s the nature of an axiom, it’s just the minimum necessary to bootstrap the process, NOT a way to build a protective fence around things you just would rather not have scrutinized. So how did my idea fare? Not by measure how it tickles my fancy? How does it fare in a hostile, adversarial environment where it doesn’t have the benefit of my confirmation bias, and my own prejudices protecting it and coddling it?

So long as someone can show how they’d subject their ideas to scrutiny, and make evaluations – interpreting those broadly – it’s something to consider, and evaluate.

As for making the case for objective reality and against contructivism I don’t know better popular sources than the books I referenced. Personally, I start with everyday life and build a case from that. But, anyway, the statement that you commented on was intended to be declaratory rather than polemic.

Alec
evolutionpages.com

Understood.

-TS

 

[Betterave]

Well, having shrugged and moved on from the truth-is-what-makes-me-feel-good folk and the truth-is-scripture-as-I-interpret it folk, I think I have to give all those who claim to be committed to objective reality and performative criteria a fair hearing.

What remains unclear here is: to whom are you referring, when you refer to “those who claim to be committed to objective reality and performative criteria,” and with what justification are they referred to as “those who claim to be committed to objective reality and performative criteria”? (Are you referring to a guy like Touchstone, whose verbal behaviour seems to belie his verbal claim?)

Maybe they see or understand something that I don’t within the rules of the game. Of course in many cases it becomes clear that they’ll only play by the rules so far and then we just have to agree where that boundary is and to diverge beyond it, but merely getting to that understanding is often good for focusing and refining my own position.

On the one hand, I appreciate and admire the way you play the game and respect the rules. On the other, your statement here is again unfortunately vague: what is the game and what are the rules? how do we avoid turning the kind of language you use here into empty rhetorical posturing, which serves only to make the one using such language feel “warm and cuddly”? (perhaps there are those who smugly cultivate their own “warm and cuddly” feelings precisely by lampooning those who admit to valuing the “warm and cuddly” - and this might be an embarrassment for them, but perhaps they just never notice)…

Submitting my position to scrutiny, particularly to those who start out from a contrary perspective is one essence of the game, isn’t it? I’m conscious of the fact that I have a formally weak axiomatic foundation for my system (it’s as strong as I can conscientiously make it), so I can’t be dismissive of alternative propositions provided they are potentially within the game.

…and how do you suppose we know when an alternative proposition is “potentially within the game”?

 

[Touchstone]

The Exodus:

			*In other words, I think we ought to  take things one question at a time instead of throwing around the  phrase "performative model." Obviously, everyone thinks their ideas  perform in some respect, so it seems to me more a red herring than an  actual answer to anything.*

Indeed. With the exception of TS, I think we can all agree on that.

I’m quite convinced everyone thinks their ideas perform in some respect. Otherwise, why have them? “Some respect” doesn’t narrow anything down, and doesn’t need to satisfy any objective conditions for performance, prediction, correction, etc. whatsoever.

“everyone thinks their ideas perform in some respect” describes my view as well.

-TS

 

[hecd2]

I think our difference here is purely terminological. If you prefer to express it that way, that’s fine.

OK

It seems that you are doing violence to the analogy here. Billy is invited to act based on the assumption of an epistemic warrant constituted by the other kids’ behaviour. The unbeliever is also invited to act based on a similar assumption of epistemic warrant constituted by the belief of believers

Indeed, and here you illustrate my point. We all agree that Billy is unwise to seek evidence before acting on the invitation because the assumption of the other kids’ epistemic warrant is based on the nature of that warrant. That is just where the analogy breaks down for theism, because no such obvious epistemic warrant is available to believers and so the unbeliever is quite justified in his rejection of the invitation until such time as the believer can produce some more solid justification for her invitation. In one case the assumption of epistemic warrant is justified and in the other it is not.

I don’t see why you introduce the notion of “unwise to seek evidence,” as if this is or needs to be an essential component in both cases in the analogy (it’s not - there is no question of Billy needing to “seek evidence”; the question is simply whether he understands the situation or not). Whether or not it is wise to seek evidence is a contingent matter, based on one’s judgment in a particular case about the probable legitimacy of the testimony in question; but the invitation to ‘action’ in question seems logically independent from possible subsequent evidence-seeking as such.

The *invitation *might be logically independent of the decision to seek evidence in support of the proposition, or at least in support of the likelihood of there being a strong warrant, I grant you that, but the reasonable response of the invited is not. All invitations to act are logically independent of the underlying strength of the warrant for the persuader, and the fact of being invited does not in itself constitute evidence or provide reason to act. The case that the analogy seeks to make depends on whether one thinks that the reasonableness of response of Billy and the unbeliever are analogous or not. I think that it is clear that they are not.

I think that the force of the analogy should be to neutralize the unbeliever’s tendency to stack the deck against belief by assuming that testimony of the kind in question is inherently suspicious such that it constitutes no prima facie epistemic warrant.

That might be the point, but it fails by presenting a case where being suspicious is unreasonable and then asking us to apply the analogy to a case where being suspicious is reasonable. The invitation itself carries zero epistemic warrant as far as I can see (perhaps you could help me with an explanation of just what constitutes an epistemic warrant in the theistic invitation absent all other argument and evidence), in the theistic case and in many other cases.

…]

 

[hecd2]

…]

Regardless of whether in the case in question one feels the need to include evidence-seeking as part of the action that is called for, that question is logically posterior to the point about testimony as such.

Nevertheless it forms a part of the analogy, so I don’t understand why you think that the analogy can make a valid case independent of that consideration.

This all sounds rather complicated, but I think it just boils down to the simple fact that reasonable people don’t simply dismiss what others have to say, unless they have a good reason for doing so. And the contention made in the analogy is that unbelievers don’t have a good reason for doing so.

Well, this might just be my preference, but in matters of moment, I see no reason whatsoever to accept what others have to say, simply because they say so. In that case, you would have to accept all sorts of bizarre and ludicrous ideas. As soon as you start rejecting the claims of those who believe in astrology or ouija boards or get-rich-quick schemes, you are exercising a good reason. A good reason for dismissing what others have to say is that they have no epistemic warrant for saying it - a reasonable argument that unbelievers in theism have and that Billy has not.

Arguments from authority are rarely perfectly clear cut, but we most certainly do just accept that they are legitimate in many cases. I would say that these are cases “where the behaviour of those testifying constitutes evidence for us that the proposition is true.”

I don’t know about you, but I do not accept arguments from authority unless I have good reason to think that the authority has a strong epistemic warrant for its position, which warrant I could, in principle, personally explore should I wish to do so.

But you want to say that their behaviour [their assertion of a proposition] is not evidence for the truth of the proposition? …it is only evidence for the merits of their warrant for believing the proposition? Okay, but it seems clear enough to me that evidence for the merits of the warrant for believing a proposition is evidence that the proposition is true.

That’s true, but it doesn’t save the claim that behaviour is evidence per se for the truth of the proposition. It is only evidence for the truth of the proposition in so far as it is evidence for the strength of the warrant.

If you want to claim that it *is *reasonable to say that a default stance of scepticism is generally justified, then you will naturally accept it as reasonable on my part when I tell you that I am sceptical of your claim, and ask you to justify it. (And so far as I can see you haven’t yet even attempted to do so.)

On the other hand if your contention is that a default stance of acceptance is justified, then you will accept it as reasonable that I expect you to accept my claims without seeking any further justification for me making them

The fact is that life would be untenable if we are credulous in the face of all the myriad competing and incompatible claims that bombard us in our lives. I think that the idea of a default stance of acceptance without considering the merits of the underlying warrants of those making the claim has such obviously absurd consequences and is so clearly what reasonable people do not do, that no further justification for my point is required. But if you want, we can start another thread on the positive role of scepticism and doubt in a reasonable epistemology and the negative epistemic consequences of unwarranted credulity.

Alec
evolutionpages.com

 

[hecd2]

What remains unclear here is: to whom are you referring, when you refer to “those who claim to be committed to objective reality and performative criteria,” and with what justification are they referred to as “those who claim to be committed to objective reality and performative criteria”? (Are you referring to a guy like Touchstone, whose verbal behaviour seems to belie his verbal claim?)

Not sure if you are wanting me to list names. I’d rather you just take my statement at face value - I’m referring to “those who claim to be committed to objective reality and performative criteria”. You’ll excuse me if I don’t get sucked into discussing individuals here and whether or not this or that person meets the criterion (but for the record, I think that TS’s position on many subjects is very close to my own).

On the one hand, I appreciate and admire the way you play the game and respect the rules. On the other, your statement here is again unfortunately vague: what is the game and what are the rules? how do we avoid turning the kind of language you use here into empty rhetorical posturing, which serves only to make the one using such language feel “warm and cuddly”? (perhaps there are those who smugly cultivate their own “warm and cuddly” feelings precisely by lampooning those who admit to valuing the “warm and cuddly” - and this might be an embarrassment for them, but perhaps they just never notice)…

Of course thinking that you are right and knowing that your perspective is shared can lead to warm and cuddly feelings and there’s nothing wrong with that, so long as the reason for thinking what you think is not solely that it makes you feel warm and cuddled.

When I referred to the game and the rules that was shorthand for a foundation for a worldview and for exploring beliefs which is based on an acceptance that there is an objective external reality and that there are objective criteria by which one’s beliefs about reality can be shown to align more or less with that reality.

…and how do you suppose we know when an alternative proposition is “potentially within the game”?

That, on the face of it, the proposition is about an external reality and that there are, at least potentially, means by which its truth (ie alignment with reality) can be demonstrated.

Alec
evolutionpages.com

 

[LogisticsBranch]

I’d like to resume where I left off on this topic and return later but before I do, I’d like to say that I have totally overcome my youthful immature metaphysical fantasies by being enlightened to the truth that no dualities of any kind exist. Hence, I adamantly refuse to erect any untenable distinctions between reality and illusion, cause and effect, inner and outer, subject and object, mind and body, nobility and baseness, right and wrong, self and other, or speaker and hearer.

 

[Betterave]

I’m quite convinced everyone thinks their ideas perform in some respect. Otherwise, why have them? “Some respect” doesn’t narrow anything down, and doesn’t need to satisfy any objective conditions for performance, prediction, correction, etc. whatsoever.

“everyone thinks their ideas perform in some respect” describes my view as well.

-TS

So what are you saying when you claim, “I’m an ardent defender of performative models and objective analysis and skeptical thinking, but I don’t suppose if the value of those are denied outright – and here on this forum that’s something to contend with…”

“everyone thinks their ideas perform in some respect”
seems to contradict
“the value of [performative models] is denied outright…here on this forum”

Like Alec, you may not want to name names, but perhaps this is only a measure of your intellectual dishonesty? If you care to deny this, then please tell us: who denies outright the value of these things you claim to “ardently defend”?

 

[Betterave]

OK
Indeed, and here you illustrate my point. We all agree that Billy is unwise to seek evidence before acting on the invitation because the assumption of the other kids’ epistemic warrant is based on the nature of that warrant.

But I think you’re still missing the point that an “assumption of the other kids’ epistemic warrant” is incidental to the analogy. What matters is Billy’s recognition of the epistemic warrant that is constituted by the other kids behaviour. Can you see the difference? It is not a matter of the other kids *having *a good epistemic warrant, then of Billy needing to grasp that they *have *a good epistemic warrant. It’s that the other kids’ behavior is a good (prima facie) epistemic warrant.

That is just where the analogy breaks down for theism, because no such obvious epistemic warrant is available to believers and so the unbeliever is quite justified in his rejection of the invitation until such time as the believer can produce some more solid justification for her invitation. In one case the assumption of epistemic warrant is justified and in the other it is not.

That just begs the question. And please remember: it is of the very nature of an analogy that what is obvious in one case is argued to obtain in another case which is not so obvious.

The *invitation *might be logically independent of the decision to seek evidence in support of the proposition, or at least in support of the likelihood of there being a strong warrant, I grant you that, but the reasonable response of the invited is not. All invitations to act are logically independent of the underlying strength of the warrant for the persuader, and the fact of being invited does not in itself constitute evidence or provide reason to act. The case that the analogy seeks to make depends on whether one thinks that the reasonableness of response of Billy and the unbeliever are analogous or not. I think that it is clear that they are not.

Yes, you think that is clear. But if I invite you to reconsider that judgment, what is your response? You might say: “the fact of being invited does not in itself constitute evidence or provide reason to act.” But what is that assertion based on? How is it justified? Is that a pure preference on your part? In that case, what game are you playing here and what are the rules? (Is “believe whatever you like” really a rule? Presumably not.)

That might be the point, but it fails by presenting a case where being suspicious is unreasonable and then asking us to apply the analogy to a case where being suspicious is reasonable. The invitation itself carries zero epistemic warrant as far as I can see (perhaps you could help me with an explanation of just what constitutes an epistemic warrant in the theistic invitation absent all other argument and evidence), in the theistic case and in many other cases.

You are free to be suspicious, I never claimed that was unreasonable. The “zero epistemic warrant” claim, however, seems to be pure assertion and to make a very basic mistake: a failure to apprehend the nature of “testimony” as such (in a very broad sense) as constituting a basic and unavoidable - though often defeasible - kind of epistemic warrant. If one is to discount a proposition that is sincerely believed by the great majority of people (such as, arguably perhaps, certain theistic propositions), the burden of proof is on the skeptic to actually justify his skepticism, rather than just assuming that it is justified.