The dilemma of free will and necessary evil

[Anonymous_1]

Hitetlen:

The example is not very good. If your brother would have monitored your actions and rushed in to prevent you from pulling the trigger, that would have been preventing you to act freely, wouldn’t it? Your suicide attempt in the scenario you presented was just a botched attempt, nothing more. After your recuperation you could attempt it again, this time making sure that the attempt is successful. If your brother - sensing that - would tie you to your bed permanently and feed you intravenously, that would prevent you from acting freely. And that is all there is to it.

I maintain that my example accuratley represents what it is intended to.

We were created to love and serve God and one another. In order to love we must do so freely and willfully. Thus, God allows us to make choices. God also allows us to freely and willfully make choices that are opposed to Him and His ways. This is evil. There is no necesarry evil in the sense that evil is necesary to bring about the means and good for which we were created. But the choice has been made, therefore evil exists. But it was not and is not necesarily so. God in His omnibenevolence and omnipotence works in spite of our choices and the existence of evil and brings about that ultimate good, namley the sanctification and salvation of our souls. This clearly highlights the omnibenevolence, omniscience, omnipotence of our Creator. For Him to continue to work with us despite our imperfections, sturborness and obstinance and outright rebellion and rejection of Him shows His benevolence. For Him to be capable of bringing about good in spite of our worst intentions and best efforts clearly highlights His power and wisdom.

Anyway, I began earlier in this thread that there is no dilemma between evil and free will. If this is true this discussion is irrelevant.

I hope I am understanding your proposition correctly. If not, correct me so I may revise my arguments as necessary.

 

[Hitetlen]

Philthy:

It is not indisputable - it is simply a necessary assumpition for your argument. I disagree with the assumption, and that was my point. You have ARBITRARILY assigned the spanking as the ONLY necessary evil capable of achieving the desired end.Not really. I do not consider spanking per se as a good pedagogical tool in the first place. It was just an example, which was supposed to support the theist theory that sometimes, some pain can have good consequences. Which theory is true, by the way. What is not true that causing a proper amount of pedagogical pain can be extrapolated outside some boundaries.

Philthy:
And on what basis have you done this? I disagree with your “eye for an eye” characterization of Gods judicial providence and believe it is a product of our limited capacity to understand the depth with which a blend of goods and evils can be matched by an omniscient God.First, there is nothing of the “eye to eye” correspondance in my example. That is a misunderstanding. Second, as long as we are not given the pertinent facts about an event (omnisicence would be nice, but not necessary), we are left to our own devices to make value judgments.

Philthy:

Is it possible that both good and evil result from the spanking? How would that fit into your paradigm? Is it possible some other good unrelated to the spanking can counter balance the same evil that the spanking was meant to offset? How does that fit into your paradigm?

Yes, they are possible, but possibility does not entail actuality. If you want to argue for these hidden “good” side effects, I am willing to contemplate your arguments. But I do not accept that God is a-priori good. I am willing to accept it if a logical and reasonable argument leads to that conclusion.

 

[Hitetlen]

adamlsp:

I was under the impression Heisenberg’s equation stated when you try and find a more exact position of the electron you lose the ability to determine where it’s going. And if you focus the equation on where it’s going you don’t where it is currently. It looks like the equation just a limit of our perceptive powers.

No, not OUR perceptive powers. In theory it is impossible to measure these two traits simultaneously, no matter how perceptive the observer happens to be.

adamlsp:

How does it prove randomness in the electron position if it can be predicted? Heisenberg said it was the act of measuring and that disturbed the next measurement thus limiting our ability to measure, nothing else. This just plays up wave particle duality does it not?

Randomness is the impossibility to predict. Prediction depends on knowledge, which depends on observation. If something cannot be observed, then it cannot be known, and therefore it cannot be predicted.

I suggest we return to the original topic of the thread. This side-discussion does not shed light on it.

 

[Hitetlen]

Anonymous_1:

We were created to love and serve God and one another.

Unsubstantiated assumption.

Anonymous_1:

In order to love we must do so freely and willfully. Thus, God allows us to make choices. God also allows us to freely and willfully make choices that are opposed to Him and His ways. This is evil.

Unacceptable definition.

There is no necesarry evil in the sense that evil is necesary to bring about the means and good for which we were created.

I accept this.

Anonymous_1:

But the choice has been made, therefore evil exists. But it was not and is not necesarily so. God in His omnibenevolence and omnipotence works in spite of our choices and the existence of evil and brings about that ultimate good, namley the sanctification and salvation of our souls.

Unsubstantiated assumption and unnecessary mysticism.

Anonymous_1:

This clearly highlights the omnibenevolence, omniscience, omnipotence of our Creator.

Maybe for you, but not for me.

Anonymous_1:

Anyway, I began earlier in this thread that there is no dilemma between evil and free will. If this is true this discussion is irrelevant.

You did not, not to my satisfaction. You posited your opinion, but did not substantiate it.

Anonymous_1:

I hope I am understanding your proposition correctly. If not, correct me so I may revise my arguments as necessary.

I don’t really know what is your understanding. I can state my position again, if that is what you want.

 

[john_doran]

Hitetlen:

No, not OUR perceptive powers. In theory it is impossible to measure these two traits simultaneously, no matter how perceptive the observer happens to be.

this is only true on the copenhagen interpretation of QM - there are other models in which it does not hold.

in fact, it doesn’t even hold on the copenhagen interpretation if you consider the retrodictive qualities of measurement.

karl popper wrote a good paper on this.

 

[Anonymous_1]

Hitetlen:

Unsubstantiated assumption.

Humor me for a second.

Unacceptable definition.

What is an unacceptable definition? That love must be free and willful or that evil is the rejection of God and His ways. If God is the embodiment and source of all that is good, thus omnibenevolence, then a free and
willful rejection of Him and His ways is to choose that which is not good, thus evil.

I don’t really know what is your understanding. I can state my position again, if that is what you want.

Please…clearly state what the intent of this thread is. What is your proposition.

 

[Hitetlen]

Anonymous_1:

What is an unacceptable definition? That love must be free and willful or that evil is the rejection of God and His ways.

The second one. The first one is OK.

Anonymous_1:

If God is the embodiment and source of all that is good, thus omnibenevolence, then a free and willful rejection of Him and His ways is to choose that which is not good, thus evil.

That is only your definition of good. Mine happens to differ.

Anonymous_1:

Please…clearly state what the intent of this thread is. What is your proposition.

I will, later. That is a longer undertaking than I can afford at this moment. (You know… that ugly four-letter word: “work”)

 

[doomhammer]

Anonymous_1:

Please…clearly state what the intent of this thread is. What is your proposition.

you are asking the same question from post #23 without having any answer…
but it is clear that Hiteltlen, an atheist, like a pharisee of the new testament, ask not to believe, but to accuse, he does not want to be freed by God, but to blame God.

 

[doomhammer]

Hitetlen:

Unsubstantiated assumption.Unacceptable definition.
Unsubstantiated assumption and unnecessary mysticism.not for me.
not to my satisfaction.

words, words without the Word: pure nothingness

 

[Hitetlen]

Anonymous_1:

Please…clearly state what the intent of this thread is. What is your proposition.

I really don’t know how to say it any clearer than in the opening statement, but I can try.

The theist assertions are that:

1. God does not interfere with people’s free will.
2. God only tolerates “evil” as long as it is a “necessary evil”.
3. An evil is “necessary evil” if,

a) it brings along some greater good, which cannot be done without this evil or,
b) prevents an even greater evil from happening. (lets call these “substantial benefits”)

This results in the conclusion that whatever people do, God will not stop them, AND God will not tolerate any evil which does not contain substantial benefits.

These two can collide, IF some people do evil which has no substantial counterbalancing “good” emanating from those evils. The collision occurs because on one hand God does not interfere with human free will, on the other hand he does not allow unnecessary evil to happen, and these two are mutually contradictory.

These two do NOT collide if anything and everything that people do will have some unknown positive side effects associated with them. If apologists wish to argue that ALL the evils have some positive benefits associated with them, they are welcome to try.

A friendly reminder: I do not accept any kind of “mystical” arguments, nor any argument that refers to our lack omniscience. If something cannot be substantiated using secular arguments, then it cannot be substantiated, period.

For my side it is enough to find one “evil” which cannot be justified.

 

[Anonymous_1]

Hitetlen:

I really don’t know how to say it any clearer than in the opening statement, but I can try.

The theist assertions are that:

1. God does not interfere with people’s free will.
2. God only tolerates “evil” as long as it is a “necessary evil”.
3. An evil is “necessary evil” if,

a) it brings along some greater good, which cannot be done without this evil or,
b) prevents an even greater evil from happening. (lets call these “substantial benefits”)

This results in the conclusion that whatever people do, God will not stop them, AND God will not tolerate any evil which does not contain substantial benefits.

These two can collide, IF some people do evil which has no substantial counterbalancing “good” emanating from those evils. The collision occurs because on one hand God does not interfere with human free will, on the other hand he does not allow unnecessary evil to happen, and these two are mutually contradictory.

These two do NOT collide if anything and everything that people do will have some unknown positive side effects associated with them. If apologists wish to argue that ALL the evils have some positive benefits associated with them, they are welcome to try.

A friendly reminder: I do not accept any kind of “mystical” arguments, nor any argument that refers to our lack omniscience. If something cannot be substantiated using secular arguments, then it cannot be substantiated, period.

For my side it is enough to find one “evil” which cannot be justified.

Your original post was entirley to long and unclear as to what exactly the dilemma you were presenting.

Let me see if I have this straight

You propose that because we are free to do anything, we are capable of making a choice which can not possibly be justified because of a lack of good that eminates from it. However, because God has given us free will he must let us do this evil even though no good comes from it. This is in conflict with God’s omnibenevolence and omnipotence for if God was omnibenevolent He would want to stop something that was unjustifiably evil, and due to His omnipotence, He is efficacious in His ability to prevent such evil thus preserving His omnibenevolence but jepordizing our free will.

Am I correct in my understanding that you propose that there exists a logical conundrum, a dilemma between our absolute free-will and the possibility of unjustifiable evil that procedes from it and God’s goodness and power? So really the dilemma you propose isn’t between our free will and necessary evil but between the possible unjustifiable evil that results from out free will and God’s omniscience, omnibenevolence and omnipotence?

Before I attempt to examine your arguement(if possible) I would like to make sure I udnerstand what you are proposing. Am I correct in my understanding?

 

[Anonymous_1]

Hit you propose that there is an evil, that God must allow in order to respect our free-will. This evil is unjustifiable because of a lack of substantial benefits. An allowance of such an evil is in conflict with His nature. A prevention of such an evil jeapordizes our free-will. I desire to refute your proposal. But I am tired.

to be continued…

 

[Hitetlen]

Anonymous_1:

Your original post was entirley to long and unclear as to what exactly the dilemma you were presenting.

Let me see if I have this straight

You propose that because we are free to do anything, we are capable of making a choice which can not possibly be justified because of a lack of good that eminates from it. However, because God has given us free will he must let us do this evil even though no good comes from it. This is in conflict with God’s omnibenevolence and omnipotence for if God was omnibenevolent He would want to stop something that was unjustifiably evil, and due to His omnipotence, He is efficacious in His ability to prevent such evil thus preserving His omnibenevolence but jepordizing our free will.

Am I correct in my understanding that you propose that there exists a logical conundrum, a dilemma between our absolute free-will and the possibility of unjustifiable evil that procedes from it and God’s goodness and power? So really the dilemma you propose isn’t between our free will and necessary evil but between the possible unjustifiable evil that results from out free will and God’s omniscience, omnibenevolence and omnipotence?

Before I attempt to examine your arguement(if possible) I would like to make sure I udnerstand what you are proposing. Am I correct in my understanding?

Yes, your understanding is correct.

Anonymous_1:

Hit you propose that there is an evil, that God must allow in order to respect our free-will. This evil is unjustifiable because of a lack of substantial benefits. An allowance of such an evil is in conflict with His nature. A prevention of such an evil jeapordizes our free-will. I desire to refute your proposal. But I am tired.

to be continued…

I am eagerly awaiting your refutation, at your convenience.

 

[Anonymous_1]

I have been scouring over this problem all day. I hope this answer suffices.

1. God does not interfere with people’s free will.
2. God only tolerates “evil” as long as it is a “necessary evil”.
3. An evil is “necessary evil” if,

a) it brings along some greater good, which cannot be done without this evil or,
b) prevents an even greater evil from happening. (lets call these “substantial benefits”)

Premises:
A.) Proceeding from His omnipotence and benevolence, God can not permit unjustifiable evil.
B.) Being incapable of achieving some impossible end does not negate free-will.

The dilemma:
There is a possible evil that is not necessary, that God must allow in order to respect our free-will. This evil is unjustifiable because of a lack of substantial benefits. An allowance of such an evil is in conflict with His nature. A prevention of such an evil jeapordizes our free-will.

To differentiate between a possible/theoretical evil and evil which exists as a result of Gods permissive will is logically absurd.
1.)Only that which is tolerated in concordance with Gods permissive will exists.
2.)(A) Proceeding from His omnipotence and benevolence, God can not allow unjustifiable evil.
3.) This theoretical/possible evil is unjustified
4.)Therefore this theoretical evil can not exist.
5.) There exists no dilemma.

Counter-point:
Gods disallowance of a certain possible/theoretical evil negates free-will.

Solution:
1.) (B)Being incapable of achieving some impossible end does not negate free-will.

No evil is neccesary as a means to achieve somethine good(substantial benefit). Evil was never neccesary.

If anything need be clarified let me know. I hope you find this to be a sufficient and reasonable solution to the problem you have presented. I will continue to pray for you.

5With these weapons we break down every proud argument that keeps people from knowing God.

If this suffices, I hope it helps you come closer to God my friend.

 

[Hitetlen]

Anonymous_1:

I have been scouring over this problem all day. I hope this answer suffices.

I replied in your new thread.

 

[doomhammer]

Hitetlen:

How our brain works, we simply do not know.
(Side remark: Yay, post number 666!)

…but “non serviam” pretends to “understand” God…

 

[Philthy]

Hitetlen:

Not really. I do not consider spanking per se as a good pedagogical tool in the first place. It was just an example, which was supposed to support the theist theory that sometimes, some pain can have good consequences.

Actually, the spanking example was an explanation of YOUR understanding of the theist theory of good and evil. Your understanding is flawed and therefore the example - which accurately represents your understanding - is flawed. That is the problem - your understanding.

Hitetlen:
First, there is nothing of the “eye to eye” correspondance in my example. That is a misunderstanding.

Simply claiming it does not make it so. In your flawed attempt, you specifically - and repeatedly - emphasized that a specific amount of spanks will result in just the right amount of good; too much wont do and too little wont do. That is practically verbatum from post 1 and is an “eye for an eye” mentality in the quantitative sense.

Hitetlen:

Second, as long as we are not given the pertinent facts about an event we are left to our own devices to make value judgments.

We are not making a value judgement - we are critiquing your attempt at arguing for the absense of free will. Your argument lacks specificity, and is impossibly contingent upon things which we have no knowledge. This does not mean that we “must make a value judgement” it means that your argument lacks value.

Hitetlen:

Yes, they are possible, but possibility does not entail actuality. If you want to argue for these hidden “good” side effects, I am willing to contemplate your arguments.

I dont need to argue for them. It is impossible to quantify the good that results - in the fullness of time - from a spanking. When a child receives a deserved spanking after being naughty, is the only good that they learn to not be naughty?? In how many situations does the value of that lesson apply?? And in situations where it is applied to another person, and that person learns from it, and applies it in there life, does the good that results from the application of it by this second person count towards the original spanking of the first individual? I think if you give it a little thought it becomes absurdly complex and renders your argument - though theoretically interesting - practically useless. Sorry.

Hitetlen:

But I do not accept that God is a-priori good. I am willing to accept it if a logical and reasonable argument leads to that conclusion.

Im not sure why you mentioned this - it doesnt follow from your discussion. You were the one who posited evil and good. We can posit that independent of “God is good”. The failure of your theological premise to account for the variable and immeasurable good - both in quantity and quality - which might result from a single evil event (spank) renders it impractical. That impracticality has nothing to do with God, it has to do with the foundations of your argument.