The Existence of Forms - Argument from Perfection

[punkforchrist]

One of Plato’s arguments for the existence of “Forms” (the equivalent to Aristotle’s “universals,” often known today as “abstracta”) is the so-called “argument from perfection.” We might start by observing a line drawn on a piece of paper. The line is not perfectly straight, but how do we know it’s not perfectly straight unless we already know what a perfectly straight line looks like?

The same type of question can be asked about circles and any shape, and indeed, many other things. Let’s put this in the form of a reductio ad absurdum:

Prove A: Forms exist.
Assume ~A: Forms do not exist.
~A → B: If Forms do not exist, then we cannot know that a shape is imperfect.
~B: We can know that a shape is imperfect.
~~A: by modus tollens.
Therefore, A: Forms exist.
Q.E.D.

This is a subject I find enormously interesting to the whole field of philosophy. I welcome any thoughts.

 

[James_S_Saint]

Define what it means “to exist”. Until you do, you cannot answer the questions of what exists and what doesn’t.

Your (2) seems to be presumptuous. What is the foundation for “then, we cannot know…”?

 

[Oreoracle]

One of Plato’s arguments for the existence of “Forms” (the equivalent to Aristotle’s “universals,” often known today as “abstracta”) is the so-called “argument from perfection.” We might start by observing a line drawn on a piece of paper. The line is not perfectly straight, but how do we know it’s not perfectly straight unless we already know what a perfectly straight line looks like?

The same type of question can be asked about circles and any shape, and indeed, many other things. Let’s put this in the form of a reductio ad absurdum:

Prove A: Forms exist.
Assume ~A: Forms do not exist.
~A → B: If Forms do not exist, then we cannot know that a shape is imperfect.
~B: We can know that a shape is imperfect.
~~A: by modus tollens.
Therefore, A: Forms exist.
Q.E.D.

This is a subject I find enormously interesting to the whole field of philosophy. I welcome any thoughts.

I think all this talk about Forms is complicating something that is rather simple. We don’t need to reference an abstract aspect of reality to devise standards of perfection.

For starters, most definitions of lines require that they be straight, else they’re not lines. In other words, a line is defined as a figure maintaining 180 degree angles without having endpoints. Indeed, there is no such thing as an “imperfectly straight” line; if it isn’t straight, it’s not a line at all according to this definition. So the options are not “perfect” or “imperfect,” but instead “line” or “not a line.” And, of course, we don’t need to invoke any Forms to determine if the line maintains those 180 degree angles–a protractor should be proficient at that.

But let’s say you were to demonstrate this idea of yours (or rather, Plato’s) using something more concrete, where degrees of quality could exist. Notice that our idea of what is “perfect,” when judging concrete entities, is always based on some sort of goal. For example, if I were to define the perfect chess victory as “a game of chess won in the fewest turns possible,” could we not measure such a success without Forms? And a less than perfect chess victory’s imperfection could be measured relative to the qualities of a perfect chess victory. In other words, it’s safe to say that taking one turn longer than required is still of a higher quality than taking two turns longer than required.

See? No Forms are needed, as “perfection” is simply the complete satisfaction of arbitrary standards. The existence of Forms is used to explain quality when it is actually definitions that do all the work. And guess who posits those definitions? Us.

 

[Oreoracle]

One of Plato’s arguments for the existence of “Forms” (the equivalent to Aristotle’s “universals,” often known today as “abstracta”)…

By the way, I don’t see how you draw a connection from Forms to universals. Universals are just statements that refer to all members of a given class/set. Example: “All cats are mammals.” This is to say, “All members of the class of cats are within the class of mammals.” No Forms here.

 

[Earnest_Bunbury]

By the way, I don’t see how you draw a connection from Forms to universals. Universals are just statements that refer to all members of a given class/set. Example: “All cats are mammals.” This is to say, “All members of the class of cats are within the class of mammals.” No Forms here.

A prominent subject of philosophical discussion in the Middle Ages was what came to be known as the problem of universals, which concerned the ontological status, or type of existence, to be assigned to the referents of general words. One of Plato’s critics had said, “I see particular horses, but not horseness”; and Plato had answered, “That is because you have eyes but no intelligence.” There can be no doubt that Plato thought that horseness, the Form of horse, or Horse itself, to use his own expression, was something that existed separately; it could be discerned not by the bodily eyes but by the eye of the soul. The view that besides individual horses there also exists the Form of horse was known in the Middle Ages as Realism. Aristotle was also alleged to be a Realist, because he too thought that Forms were really there, although only as embodied in particular instances. More skeptical philosophers denied the reality of universals altogether, some identifying them with thoughts (conceptualists), others with mere names (nominalists).

britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/377923/metaphysics/15810/The-existence-of-forms-categories-and-particulars

 

[punkforchrist]

I should clarify that I’m not a Platonist. With that said, however, I do think there is much to be gained from studying his works.
James S Saint:

Define what it means “to exist”. Until you do, you cannot answer the questions of what exists and what doesn’t.

Some words, I think, have a properly basic meaning. What I could do is provide a list of synonyms. X exists so long as X is real, or if X is. To be is to exist.

Your (2) seems to be presumptuous. What is the foundation for “then, we cannot know…”?

We all know what a perfect circle would look like, yet nothing physical is perfectly circular. If the Form of Circle is not real, then, it seems that an architect would not be able to use a perfect circle as a blueprint, so-to-speak.

 

[punkforchrist]

Oreoracle:

For starters, most definitions of lines require that they be straight, else they’re not lines. In other words, a line is defined as a figure maintaining 180 degree angles without having endpoints. Indeed, there is no such thing as an “imperfectly straight” line; if it isn’t straight, it’s not a line at all according to this definition. So the options are not “perfect” or “imperfect,” but instead “line” or “not a line.” And, of course, we don’t need to invoke any Forms to determine if the line maintains those 180 degree angles–a protractor should be proficient at that.

I empathize with this reply. Nevertheless, even protractors are not perfectly straight. We call a physical line “straight” relative to the standard of straightness - that is, one line is straighter than another if it more resembles the Form of Straightness.

A protractor is a good illustration of this. If we look close enough, we can see that the particles which compose the protractor are not perfectly straight. Yet, how is this possible, unless our observations are guided by the knowledge we already possess of perfectly straight lines?

But let’s say you were to demonstrate this idea of yours (or rather, Plato’s) using something more concrete, where degrees of quality could exist. Notice that our idea of what is “perfect,” when judging concrete entities, is always based on some sort of goal. For example, if I were to define the perfect chess victory as “a game of chess won in the fewest turns possible,” could we not measure such a success without Forms? And a less than perfect chess victory’s imperfection could be measured relative to the qualities of a perfect chess victory. In other words, it’s safe to say that taking one turn longer than required is still of a higher quality than taking two turns longer than required.

The difficulty I see with this is that we still know that a “one-turn-too-long” chess victory would be imperfect. Plato would ask, why?

See? No Forms are needed, as “perfection” is simply the complete satisfaction of arbitrary standards. The existence of Forms is used to explain quality when it is actually definitions that do all the work. And guess who posits those definitions? Us.

I can see how that might be the case for certain things. My idea of the perfect vacation may be different than yours, for example. However, from this it doesn’t follow that there are no Forms whatsoever. It seems reasonable to say that even if there were no human beings, the moon as a whole would still be more spherical than a mountain.

By the way, I don’t see how you draw a connection from Forms to universals. Universals are just statements that refer to all members of a given class/set. Example: “All cats are mammals.” This is to say, “All members of the class of cats are within the class of mammals.” No Forms here.

Earnest’s citation is quite helpful in making this distinction. For the record, I’m actually a conceptualist. I see universals as being thoughts in the mind of God, but that’s not why I started this thread.

 

[Oreoracle]

britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/377923/metaphysics/15810/The-existence-of-forms-categories-and-particulars

Okay, I guess you guys were using Forms and universals in a slightly different way than myself. So Forms and universals are commonalities among members of a class. Why can’t we simply look at the definition that describes what constitutes membership in the class to determine commonalities? If all rectangles are defined as quadrilaterals with four 90-degree interior angles, then we can only be sure that those qualities are the commonalities among all rectangles. I don’t see how determining this is any more complicated than looking at the definition. None of Plato’s mysticism (his talk of the world of Forms being a reality made by God) is present in this reasoning.

 

[Oreoracle]

I empathize with this reply. Nevertheless, even protractors are not perfectly straight. We call a physical line “straight” relative to the standard of straightness - that is, one line is straighter than another if it more resembles the Form of Straightness.

A protractor is a good illustration of this. If we look close enough, we can see that the particles which compose the protractor are not perfectly straight. Yet, how is this possible, unless our observations are guided by the knowledge we already possess of perfectly straight lines?

And I suppose you could dig further and discover that even our mental picture of a straight line isn’t perfectly straight at all times (wrap your head around that! ). Regardless, I don’t see how this necessitates the existence of Forms. The idea of straightness is just that: an idea. There’s no reason to think the cause or reality of this idea is external of our own minds. Indeed, this proposal would fall on its knees if we were to invoke Occam’s Razor; your insistence in Forms offers no value to our explanations of concepts such as “straightness” but rather devalues it with additional abstractions and, in Plato’s case, realities.

The difficulty I see with this is that we still know that a “one-turn-too-long” chess victory would be imperfect. Plato would ask, why?

Because “perfection,” in terms of chess victories, has been defined as a victory with only the fewest turns possible used. Without any parameters being set, as this definition has done for us, “perfect” and “imperfect” don’t exist (in terms of chess victories, in this case).

The dictionary definition of “perfection” is something like “maximal excellence.” This tells us that we need to define excellence, and so we need to devise standards that can be met for something to be excellent. Without standards, “perfect” is an incoherent idea.

I can see how that might be the case for certain things. My idea of the perfect vacation may be different than yours, for example. However, from this it doesn’t follow that there are no Forms whatsoever.

I’ve already agreed that there are commonalities among members of particular classes. Isn’t that what a Form is, according to the link Earnest provided? What I don’t agree with is additional realities being posited to explain something that definitions and physical properties can already explain (and perhaps a bit of psychology).

It seems reasonable to say that even if there were no human beings, the moon as a whole would still be more spherical than a mountain.

Of course, and that is because the moon is more similar to the geometrical figure of a sphere than a mountain. The standards that determine what is or isn’t a sphere still exist and are still satisfied and dissatisfied by the moon and mountains. Without the model of a sphere, we have no “spherical-ness.” I don’t see how Forms, as Plato has described them, are necessary to explain any of this. God didn’t have to create the idea of a sphere, we’ve just proposed it, nor does the model of a sphere have to lie in some alternate reality.

I’m aware that you aren’t a Platonist, so perhaps we’re on the same page here.

 

[Earnest_Bunbury]

None of Plato’s mysticism (his talk of the world of Forms being a reality made by God) is present in this reasoning.

As a teacher of philosophy, Plato wanted, insofar as possible through this medium, to be what the initiator was in the Mysteries. Well does Plato know himself to be at one with the methods of the Mysteries! He considers his method to be the right one only if it leads to the place to which the mystic should be led! He expresses this in the Timaeus: “All men who possess even a small share of good sense call upon God always at the outset of every undertaking, be it small or great: we therefore who are purposing to deliver a discourse concerning the Universe, how far it is created or is uncreated, must needs invoke gods and goddesses (if so be that we are not utterly demented), praying that all we say may be approved by them in the first place, and secondly by ourselves.” (see Note 39) And to those who seek along such a path, Plato promises “that the Godhead, as Savior, makes it possible that such a distant and difficult investigation — one so prone to error — can be accomplished through an enlightened philosophy.”

wn.rsarchive.org/Books/GA008/English/RPC1961/GA008_c04.html

 

[Oreoracle]

As I said, Earnest, I don’t need any of Plato’s mysticism that you have so kindly reported to explain things like “perfection.”

 

[Touchstone]

One of Plato’s arguments for the existence of “Forms” (the equivalent to Aristotle’s “universals,” often known today as “abstracta”) is the so-called “argument from perfection.” We might start by observing a line drawn on a piece of paper. The line is not perfectly straight, but how do we know it’s not perfectly straight unless we already know what a perfectly straight line looks like?

The same type of question can be asked about circles and any shape, and indeed, many other things. Let’s put this in the form of a reductio ad absurdum:

Prove A: Forms exist.
Assume ~A: Forms do not exist.
~A → B: If Forms do not exist, then we cannot know that a shape is imperfect.
~B: We can know that a shape is imperfect.
~~A: by modus tollens.
Therefore, A: Forms exist.
Q.E.D.

This is a subject I find enormously interesting to the whole field of philosophy. I welcome any thoughts.

Perfection is tautology, a a way to restate a set of conceptual relationships. By “perfect circle”, for example, we mean a shape where every point on the perimeter is precisely the same distance from the center as every other point. It’s a conceptual distinction which focuses on precisely, as a circle occurs algorithmically in that case. That is, it’s a definition built out of other definitions.

All of which are removed from the actual. The concept is real (a ‘brain-state’ for the person holding that concept in mind), but the referent of the perfect circle concept – the perfect circle itself – is wholly imaginary, perfectly unreal (hence the name “abstracta”!). The concept as reified symbol is ever confused with its imaginary referent, a kind of mirror image of the ‘map is not the territory’ error.

Applying this your formulation above, I agree with James S. Saint that your language is lazy, and the problem obtains in your use of “exist”. He asked for more, and you refused, which I think just highlights the problem here: “Forms” as you use them do NOT exist, or at least, you have done nothing to show they exist. Rather, the casual language equivocates between “concepts of forms exist” and “forms exist”. These are not the same thing, not nearly; this to confuse the reality of a dream about fire breathing dragons and actual fire breathing dragons.

So, if we apply some precision here, I think we say:

Prove A: concepts about forms exist.
Assume ~A: [Bconcepts** about Forms do not exist.
~A → B: If [Bconcepts** about Forms do not exist, then we cannot know that a shape is imperfect with respect to a concept about that shape.
~B: We can know that a shape is imperfect with respect to a concept about that shape.
~~A: by modus tollens.
Therefore, A: concepts about Forms exist.
…

This is now nominally clear in its semantics, so long as we can agree that a concept is a ‘state of mind’ (materialist version or no), and that concepts are NOT the thing being conceptualized (the dream about dragons are not the dragons).

But the argument seems to lose all of its relevance and promise, and goes nowhere, which, cynically, I note as a long time observer of these kinds of of philosophical treatments, is quite possibly why the equivocation and casual language was deployed in the first place.

It is perfectly [sic] uncontroversial to note that concepts exists, or to affirm that concepts, real concepts, can be about just about anything at all. But this provides perfectly [sic] no traction towards the actuality of any “Form Giver”, or “Actualization of Perfection”, because once we are nominally careful about our terms, we see that the “forms” themselves have not been shown to exist, at all.

The only way to proceed from this, then, seems to be an “argument from concepts”, rather than “Argument from Perfection”, since that argument is in fact an “Argument from Concepts About Perfection In Hopes The Audience Cannot Distinguish Concepts from Referents”. Plato got this error off to a solid, early start – confusing “horseness” as an actuality apart from concept rather than a concept about horses, the “horseness” as real as opposed to the conceptualization of horse as real.

What can be argued from the existence of concepts rather than the existence of ‘forms’ themselves, then? All I can see is an argument from ignorance, and the intelligent design hypothesis: we can’t imagine how brains with conceptual faculties could arise naturally, therefore God. I know you haven’t announced where you are trying to go with this, but once some clarity on concepts versus referents is applied, and some rigor on the use of ‘exist’ as well, it doesn’t seem there’s anywhere for this argument to go. What did I miss?

-TS

 

[punkforchrist]

Thanks everyone for your contributions. I actually agree with much of the criticism of Plato’s doctrine. Particularly helpful to me was Colin Cheyne’s book, Knowledge, Cause, and Abstract Objects, which presents a causal objection to the Platonic interpretation of universals.

To put it succinctly, whenever we have knowledge of an external object, there is a causal relationship between the mind and the thing known (i.e. the eyes are involved in a causal relationship between the mind and the computer screen). Yet, universals (or Forms; I don’t mind what you call them) don’t stand in causal relations. It seems, then, that if universals exist at all, they exist as concepts of the mind.

The only additional problem (maybe there are more ) is that universals also appear to have some kind of necessity. This has been touched upon a bit already. I find the arguments of nominalists, Platonists, and conceptualists to all be persuasive to an extent. This becomes a relevant theological issue, since universals could not, therefore, be grounded in any contingent minds. Rather, they would have to exist first and foremost, as concepts of a necessary mind.

We don’t have to get into conceptualism at this point, though. I was just curious to hear everyone’s ideas about the necessity of universals, whether Plato’s argument for Forms is sound, and so forth.

 

[Earnest_Bunbury]

What can be argued from the existence of concepts rather than the existence of ‘forms’ themselves, then? All I can see is an argument from ignorance, and the intelligent design hypothesis: we can’t imagine how brains with conceptual faculties could arise naturally, therefore God. I know you haven’t announced where you are trying to go with this, but once some clarity on concepts versus referents is applied, and some rigor on the use of ‘exist’ as well, it doesn’t seem there’s anywhere for this argument to go. What did I miss?

-TS

I would say you missed :“I think therefore I am”. We know existence by our existence. It is demonstrated to us in us.

At the beginning of the second meditation, having reached what he considers to be the ultimate level of doubt — his argument from the existence of a deceiving god — Descartes examines his beliefs to see if any have survived the doubt. In his belief in his own existence he finds it is impossible to doubt that he exists. Even if there were a deceiving god (or an evil demon, the tool he uses to stop himself sliding back into ungrounded beliefs), his belief in his own existence would be secure, for how could he be deceived unless he existed in order to be deceived?

en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cogito_ergo_sum

Forms and universals are paramount in ideas and in communicating these ideas.

The question of the nature of universals is closely connected with that of the origin and nature of ideas. – Ideas are universal; by them we apprehend the universal. The solution of the problem of ideas is, therefore closely connected with that of the problem of universals, nor is the latter problem less important than the former. As universals are the proper object of our intellectual knowledge, we can easily understand the lively controversy to which the question of universals has given rise in the history of philosophy.

maritain.nd.edu/jmc/etext/cp12.htm

But what is the use of forms and universals but knowing what we know?

In common usage, existence is the world of which we are aware through our senses and persists independently without them. In Philosophy the word has a more specialized meaning, and is often contrasted with essence which tends to individuate different forms of existence as well as different identity conditions for objects and properties. Philosophers investigate questions such as “What exists?” “How do we know?” “To what extent are the senses a reliable guide to existence?” “What is the meaning, if any, of assertions of the existence of categories, ideas, and abstractions.”

The word “existence” comes from the Latin word existere meaning “to appear,” “to arise,” “to become,” or “to be,” but literally, it means “to stand out” (ex- being the Latin prefix for “out” added to the Latin verb stare, meaning “to stand”).

en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Existence

Once we get beyond endless critique, reducing something so much we lose sight of its nature and essence, we are able to use forms and universals to enter into this essence and nature of what we want to know. Hellen Keller was deaf and blind but she was able to come to know things by this essence and nature. Catholicism’s answer to Plato’s cave or the blind men feeling an elephant.

This nature of objects is central to Catholicism and its denial is seen in reducing reality to individual impressions, which is demonstrated in this thread by arguments over semantics and the inability to arrive at a dialogue because of the denial of forms and universals. The proof for the need of forms and universals seems to be demonstrated right here in this thread.

Science in general, inasmuch as it is the knowledge of the necessary and permanent drawn from the nature of things, is impossible without the recognition of the universals. Without such recognition, it is degraded into the description of successive individual impressions. … A history of the controversy concerning the universals and their relation to existence must necessarily be a presentation of the most fundamental differences of all philosophical systems. It would reveal that a deviation from Aristotelean Thomistic moderate Realism leads, on the one side, over Conceptualism and Nominalism to Scepticism and Agnosticism, or to barren Empiricism and Materialism, and on the other side over extreme Realism to false Idealism and Pantheism.

newadvent.org/cathen/15182a.htm

St. Thomas Aquinas equates the knower and the known, a metaphysical concept tied in to form and essence.

The Aristotelian-Thomistic account, then, neatly sidesteps indirect realism/phenomenalism that has plagued philosophy since Descartes. It claims that we directly know reality because we are formally one with it. Our cognitive powers are enformed by the very same forms as their objects, yet these forms are not what we know, but the means by which we know extramental objects. We know things by receiving the forms of them in an immaterial way, and this reception is the fulfillment, not the destruction, of the knowing powers.

aquinasonline.com/Topics/identity.html

The message of Christianity is belief, through which one accepts the metaphysical and thus the nature and essence of things. This leads to knowing the end and perfection of all things which is found in God and redemption of all creation in Christ.

 

[Touchstone]

I would say you missed :“I think therefore I am”. We know existence by our existence. It is demonstrated to us in us.

Granted. A point I’ve made here before on several occasions.

en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cogito_ergo_sum

Forms and universals are paramount in ideas and in communicating these ideas.
maritain.nd.edu/jmc/etext/cp12.htm
Yes, but they are communicated as concepts – relations between subject and objects. As said, that concepts are actual is not controversial. What is controversial is the idea that the object of those concepts are actual. “Horseness”, for example, was an actuality, in Plato’s view, a spurious claim he justified by pointing out that his critics “have eyes but no intelligence.” Not his finest moment, there.

If universals – “horseness” are conceptualizations, we understand the concept to be real, but the “horseness” to be imaginary; it doesn’t exist in any discrete sense.

But what is the use of forms and universals but knowing what we know?
en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Existence

It’s not useful for that at all. A universal has no bearing on the acuality or non-actuality of its referent. “Unicorn-ness” is just as universal as “horse-ness”. The fact that unicorns are (believed to be) wholly imaginary doesn’t affect the universality of “unicorn-ness” at all.

Universals are tools for concept building. Wonderful useful, but a linguistic and conceptual apparatus, not something we can substantiate as actual entities.

Once we get beyond endless critique, reducing something so much we lose sight of its nature and essence, we are able to use forms and universals to enter into this essence and nature of what we want to know. Hellen Keller was deaf and blind but she was able to come to know things by this essence and nature. Catholicism’s answer to Plato’s cave or the blind men feeling an elephant.

Uh, Hellen Keller was as thoroughly sensory-driven as you or I. She didn’t have eyesight, but that doesn’t mean she didn’t perceive and process her perceptions and sense which did function (and as you likely know, the senses can compensate for the failure of others – a blind person’s hearing is typically more adept and acute than a sighted person’s, by necessity…)

Keller was no privvy to some “essence” than anyone else, and arguably (though not necessarily) at a disadvantage where a full appreciation of the subject depended on sight and visual apprehension.

This nature of objects is central to Catholicism and its denial is seen in reducing reality to individual impressions, which is demonstrated in this thread by arguments over semantics and the inability to arrive at a dialogue because of the denial of forms and universals. The proof for the need of forms and universals seems to be demonstrated right here in this thread.

newadvent.org/cathen/15182a.htm

I haven’t seen anyone deny the reality of universals as concepts here. As for “real abstracts”, well, the term itself should signal the poverty of that idea. I realize this idea of “real abstracts” has intuitive appeal, but all that it unites is a corpus of lazy thinking. If you doubt that, then perhaps tell me what it means to “exist” for a universal, say for “horse-ness”. What does “exist” mean in the context of “horse-ness”.

You may be the exception, but all who try and have a go at this in my experience end up tying themselves in knots, and burying the conversation is meaningless, incoherent terms. The reason we are at pains to make distinction about concepts and the things-the-concepts-are-about is because the failure to do so produces all manner of absurdities and incoherent implications.

St. Thomas Aquinas equates the knower and the known, a metaphysical concept tied in to form and essence.

aquinasonline.com/Topics/identity.html

Aware. Aquinas can be forgiven much because of the era he lived in. But by today’s standards, much of his thinking was very primitive, and extremely self-indulgent. Someone promoting his ideas today would be quite a peculiar thinker, but as I said, we have a lot more to draw upon in terms of knowledge and critical thinking than in Aquinas’ day. He deserves some slack for that.

The message of Christianity is belief, through which one accepts the metaphysical and thus the nature and essence of things. This leads to knowing the end and perfection of all things which is found in God and redemption of all creation in Christ.

All that does, I’m afraid is debase the term ‘knowledge’. Such beliefs cannot give any account of themselves that merits the term ‘knowledge’. It’s an utterly self-serving co-option of the term.

-TS

 

[geometer]

All that does, I’m afraid is debase the term ‘knowledge’. Such beliefs cannot give any account of themselves that merits the term ‘knowledge’. It’s an utterly self-serving co-option of the term.

You can know God. It is the second mitzvah of the first commandment of the decalogue.

Further on in the book God tells them that keeping his law is not hard to do.

If you do accomplish this first commandment you will know through your own experience that the origin of all things is spiritual.

 

[Oreoracle]

You can know God. It is the second mitzvah of the first commandment of the decalogue.

Further on in the book God tells them that keeping his law is not hard to do.

Yeah, because we all know that if a book says it, it must be true…unless other books contradict this particular book, that is.

 

[stenlis]

One of Plato’s arguments for the existence of “Forms” (the equivalent to Aristotle’s “universals,” often known today as “abstracta”) is the so-called “argument from perfection.” We might start by observing a line drawn on a piece of paper. The line is not perfectly straight, but how do we know it’s not perfectly straight unless we already know what a perfectly straight line looks like?

The same type of question can be asked about circles and any shape, and indeed, many other things. Let’s put this in the form of a reductio ad absurdum:

Prove A: Forms exist.
Assume ~A: Forms do not exist.
~A → B: If Forms do not exist, then we cannot know that a shape is imperfect.
~B: We can know that a shape is imperfect.
~~A: by modus tollens.
Therefore, A: Forms exist.
Q.E.D.

This is a subject I find enormously interesting to the whole field of philosophy. I welcome any thoughts.

Prove A: Unicorns exist.
Assume ~A: Unicorns do not exist.
~A → B: If Unicorns do not exist, then we cannot know that an observed object is not a unicorn.
~B: We can know that an observed object is not a unicorn.
~~A: by modus tollens.
Therefore, A: Unicorns exist.
Q.E.D.

 

[geometer]

Yeah, because we all know that if a book says it, it must be true…unless other books contradict this particular book, that is.

The Way to know the Truth about Life is completely empirical. You must become something delivered by the most high god, yehoshuah…

 

[punkforchrist]

Prove A: Unicorns exist.
Assume ~A: Unicorns do not exist.
~A → B: If Unicorns do not exist, then we cannot know that an observed object is not a unicorn.
~B: We can know that an observed object is not a unicorn.
~~A: by modus tollens.
Therefore, A: Unicorns exist.
Q.E.D.

The key distinction between these two that Plato would point out is that while unicorns do not exist necessarily, certain Forms arguably do. For example, even if no humans existed, it would still be true that the circumference of a circle is equal to pi times its diameter.

So, while unicorns do not have necessary existence, certain Forms (or universals, etc.) do, at least according to anyone sympathetic to capital-R Realism.