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Ghosty
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Nominalism is essential to this argument because the idea that “cause” and “effect” can’t be really known is a development on the idea that the “cause” and “effect” in themselves can’t be known as they are in themselves.First of all, I’m not “advocating Hume”, I’m advocating an argument. I gave credit where credit was do, but I have no interest in getting side tracked into a discussion of Hume. Secondly, I don’t see how nominalism is essential to this argument.
No, though I’m not sure where you are going with this question. Underlying everything, however, there must be a non-reducible reality. In this case Being suffices to indicate that reality.I wouldn’t think a moderate realist would have a problem with our concept of ‘one hour’ being reducible to our concept of ‘sixty minutes‘, or our concept of ‘heat’ being reducible to our concept of ‘molecular motion‘. Does EVERY idea have to represent a non-reducible reality?
There are many different kinds of cause. Which are you refering to? Efficient, formal, material, or instrumental? All of those would be valid, and all fall into the traditional “proof from causality”.If ‘causation’ captures something more than observed regularities under such and such conditions (The details discussed by philosophers of science are irrelevant to this discussion.) please, explain what it captures. Better yet, explained to me how one might learn to apply the term “causality” as you do. How would you teach it to a child?
I would say it’s definately a description. What exactly are you looking for in terms of description. More detail?Those are not descriptions, they are labels or vague metaphors at best.
I don’t know if I could do justice to Aquinas’ explaination in any kind of concise format. Literally the ENTIRE Summa is devoted to this. I must admit that I don’t use or know modern arguments from causality, except I know that they’re all likely derived in some way, perhaps poorly, from Aquinas and Maimonides.That sounds like Panentheism to me, the belief that the universe is part of God. For the record, I’m not targeting Aquinas specifically, contemporary theists use causal arguments all the time. If Aquinas has a “patch” for his causal arguments, please share it. My immediate response is this: To the extent that we are part of God, God is complex; there is more to him that exists unexplained and unexplainable. To the extent that we are not a part of God, God created us, and the argument that I began this thread with applies.
The major distinction between between Kant’s idea of “panentheism” and the Apostolic Christian idea (shared by Catholics and Orthodox) is that God is that in the secular Enlightenment model of Kant, as I understand it, God and the world can be likened to an iceberg, with the world being the part poking out over the top of the water. The world is still a direct “part of God”, but God is more than what we see in the world.
In the Apostolic Christian mindset, the most common description is fire and heated iron. The iron when heated by the fire shares the attribute of heat, but it never becomes fire. Fire remains a distinct and transcendant Nature from iron, but it intimately shares its Natural attribute of heat with the iron that does not naturally possess it. The fire is “in the iron” insofar as its natural attribute of heat is in the iron, and the iron is “in the fire” insofar as it’s held in the fire, but this in no way takes away the truly distinct aspects of either nature.
The rest of the understanding relies on concepts such as “potency” and “act”, but I don’t know if you’re interested in that particular pursuit. If you’re interest is piqued, I’ll do my best to share, otherwise we can continue when you explain which kind of “cause” you’re refering to
Peace and God bless!