The Fourth Way

  • Thread starter Thread starter JDaniel
  • Start date Start date
Status
Not open for further replies.
J

JDaniel

Guest
From The New Advent Summa:
The fourth way is taken from the gradation to be found in things. Among beings there are some more and some less good
, true, noble and the like. But “more” and “less” are predicated of different things, according as they resemble in their different ways something which is the maximum, as a thing is said to be hotter according as it more nearly resembles that which is hottest; so that there is something which is truest, something best, something noblest and, consequently, something which is uttermost being; for those things that are greatest in truth are greatest in being, as it is written in Metaph. ii. Now the maximum in any genus is the cause of all in that genus; as fire, which is the maximum heat, is the cause of all hot things. Therefore there must also be something which is to all beings the cause of their being, goodness, and every other perfection; and this we call God.

I believe that the “fourth way” of St. Thomas Aquinas is perhaps the toughest of the five ways to get agreement on, probably because it does not appear to be a logical syllogism with precise premises. Essentially, when people don’t read the actual words, they postulate all sorts of meanings to it. What is essential to a proper replay and subsequently a proper understanding of the fourth way, is that one understands that the key word therein is the word “being” - not “beings”, but, “being”.

St. Thomas means “being” in the existential sense. He does not mean “beings”, as in individual birds, dogs, horses, or man. He means being as the essences of real things. And, what is the essence of real being? For example, what is it in you that you refer to when you say, “Darn, I’m good!”? Is it mere “ability”? Is it ability perfected? If it is in regard to ability, it is ability understood to be greater than (almost) anyone else’s ability. No matter what it is, we still compare. And, our comparisons are usually valid. But to what do we compare?

We all pretty much know what it is to be “human”. We all know the frailties humanity is beset with. We all know excellent examples of humans that we can compare ourselves to - heroes, exceptionally charitable people, very self-giving people, etc. But, we still understand even them not to be “gods”. Sometimes we call them saints; sometimes we call them truly selfless. But, not gods. We almost intuitively know that there is a “standard” to which we compare people and things to.

We do the same with other species as well. We compare our dogs to those that are well trained, for example. Or, we compare ours to that rare dog that somehow saved its master’s life. Or, we compare ours to the outward beauty of another. And so on. But, even here we recognize an ideal dog-ness beyond even the well trained one. So, we have a pretty good idea that there exists gradations of predications of being in the physical world.

However, St. Thomas quotes Aristotle and says that whatever is greatest in truth is greatest in “being” - paraphrased. What does it mean to be “greatest in truth”? It means, to be greatest in “good”. When we witness anything that exceeds anything else we call it “better”, that is actually to say, “good-er”. But, we know that there exists a better, or, as is used herein, a good-er, standard for the highest predicate of being. We “know” it, but, it is fleeting. No physical explanation truly explains it. Nevertheless, it is still there: that standard.

Some call it, “I don’t know what it is, I just know it’s there.” Christians call it, “God.”

I am sure that the above is lacking in some way, or ways. I request your (name removed by moderator)ut. Or, if you want to refute it, feel free.

jd
 
My recollection is that St. Thomas rejected St. Anselm’s ontological argument. But this seems faintly ontological to me.

Anselm says God is a being of which no being greater can be conceived. If no being greater can be conceived then He must exist in reality as well as in my mind, or he would not be the greatest being conceived.

Seems circular to me. So does the fourth argument. If fire, the supreme heat, causes all other things to be hot, then a Supreme Being must cause all other beings to exist, is the essence of that argument. Is that how you read it? But we already know that fire exists, whereas we do not already know that Being exists. This argument will fail with an atheist, who can always fall back on the notion that all beings just exist, have always existed (in different forms), and therefore do not need a supreme Being to bring all other things into being.:confused:
 
My recollection is that St. Thomas rejected St. Anselm’s ontological argument. But this seems faintly ontological to me.

Anselm says God is a being of which no being greater can be conceived. If no being greater can be conceived then He must exist in reality as well as in my mind, or he would not be the greatest being conceived.

Seems circular to me. So does the fourth argument. If fire, the supreme heat, causes all other things to be hot, then a Supreme Being must cause all other beings to exist, is the essence of that argument. Is that how you read it? But we already know that fire exists, whereas we do not already know that Being exists. This argument will fail with an atheist, who can always fall back on the notion that all beings just exist, have always existed (in different forms), and therefore do not need a supreme Being to bring all other things into being.:confused:
Interesting that you should point that out as I was just thinking about it. I think I have come up with a syllogism that will better explain it and, hopefully, prove the conclusion. I will post it as soon as I am through with it.

jd
 
My recollection is that St. Thomas rejected St. Anselm’s ontological argument. But this seems faintly ontological to me.

Anselm says God is a being of which no being greater can be conceived. If no being greater can be conceived then He must exist in reality as well as in my mind, or he would not be the greatest being conceived.

Seems circular to me. So does the fourth argument. If fire, the supreme heat, causes all other things to be hot, then a Supreme Being must cause all other beings to exist, is the essence of that argument. Is that how you read it? But we already know that fire exists, whereas we do not already know that Being exists. This argument will fail with an atheist, who can always fall back on the notion that all beings just exist, have always existed (in different forms), and therefore do not need a supreme Being to bring all other things into being.:confused:
**But isn’t Aquinas saying that for humans, perfection is a *relative *quality, having the possibility of more or less perfection, and so this perfection must be derived from and relative to something else, the perfection of which may be relative to nothing else. This would imply that whatever beingness we have must be caused.

If the source of heat existing within a body were not readily identifiable but we could find no evidence for the cause of the heat within the body itself, we would search for the cause outside of the body, knowing what we know of the laws at work in the universe we live in.
**
 
If the source of heat existing within a body were not readily identifiable but we could find no evidence for the cause of the heat within the body itself, we would search for the cause outside of the body, knowing what we know of the laws at work in the universe we live in.

Yes, and I think this was why Einstein referred to “God” and refused to call himself an atheist. He would have seen in mathematics a divine intelligence ruling the universe. Or as Paul Dirac put it, “God is a mathematician of a very high order and He used advanced mathematics in constructing the universe.”

But I don’t see how we persuade an atheist, using Aquinas’ fourth argument alone, because the atheist (especially a contemporary of Aquinas) could insist that both the laws and the universe are equally eternal. The modern atheist, however, runs into trouble with the developments of modern science, which it seems to me are more partial to the possibility of God than Nogod. There are no end to the wild scenarios of atheist scientists trying to find anything but God behind the Big Bang.
 
If the source of heat existing within a body were not readily identifiable but we could find no evidence for the cause of the heat within the body itself, we would search for the cause outside of the body, knowing what we know of the laws at work in the universe we live in.

Yes, and I think this was why Einstein referred to “God” and refused to call himself an atheist. He would have seen in mathematics a divine intelligence ruling the universe. Or as Paul Dirac put it, “God is a mathematician of a very high order and He used advanced mathematics in constructing the universe.”

But I don’t see how we persuade an atheist, using Aquinas’ fourth argument alone, because the atheist (especially a contemporary of Aquinas) could insist that both the laws and the universe are equally eternal. The modern atheist, however, runs into trouble with the developments of modern science, which it seems to me are more partial to the possibility of God than Nogod. There are no end to the wild scenarios of atheist scientists trying to find anything but God behind the Big Bang.
**In the wine world we have a term, ABC, Anything But Chardonnay, to denote an attitude of some wine drinkers towards what’s otherwise the most popular white wine in the world. I guess ABG could work for an a priori anti-supernaturalist attitude some have about the existence of God.
**
 
JDaniel
*
I think I have come up with a syllogism that will better explain it and, hopefully, prove the conclusion. I will post it as soon as I am through with it*.

Go for it!

Charlie
 
*In the wine world we have a term, ABC, Anything But Chardonnay, to denote an attitude of some wine drinkers towards what’s otherwise the most popular white wine in the world. I guess ABG could work for an a priori anti-supernaturalist attitude some have about the existence of God. *

I’m a Chianti man myself. I can’t believe Jesus drank Chardonnay.:bowdown:
 
*In the wine world we have a term, ABC, Anything But Chardonnay, to denote an attitude of some wine drinkers towards what’s otherwise the most popular white wine in the world. I guess ABG could work for an a priori anti-supernaturalist attitude some have about the existence of God. *

I’m a Chianti man myself. I can’t believe Jesus drank Chardonnay.:bowdown:
Nah, it *had *to be red Zinfandel, AKA Primitivo, originally known by a Croatian name I can’t spell or pronounce and definitely not the rose stuff known as White Zinfandel they peddle in huge quantities. But Chianti might’ve been the stuff they served first at Cana. 😉
 
JDaniel
*
I think I have come up with a syllogism that will better explain it and, hopefully, prove the conclusion. I will post it as soon as I am through with it*.

Go for it!

Charlie
Charlie:

Here’s what I have so far. I know its not perfect, but, I will put it out there in hopes that we’ll get some help perfecting it:
1. The more perfectly a thing possesses its being-ness, such that it is, or, most closely resembles, its utmost predicate(s), the more perfect it is seen to be on the gradient of being. For example, fire possesses its being-ness quite remarkably, insofar as its utmost predicate, the hottest, and is thus the pinnacle of perfect when seen on its gradient of being.
  1. The utmost thing, on a gradient of being, is most accurately understood to be the cause of that genus, thus fire is the cause of its genus, hot, as it is the hottest; and, each genus must have a cause. But, living things, such as plants, animals and man are not the causes of their genera and therefore are not the pinnacles of being on the gradient of being.
  1. Therefore, as regards these latter genera, there must be something that more perfectly possesses its being-ness in that it causes
being, and that something we call God.

Anyone interested feel free to help us.
jd
 
From The New Advent Summa:

I believe that the “fourth way” of St. Thomas Aquinas is perhaps the toughest of the five ways to get agreement on, probably because it does not appear to be a logical syllogism with precise premises. Essentially, when people don’t read the actual words, they postulate all sorts of meanings to it. What is essential to a proper replay and subsequently a proper understanding of the fourth way, is that one understands that the key word therein is the word “being” - not “beings”, but, “being”.

St. Thomas means “being” in the existential sense. He does not mean “beings”, as in individual birds, dogs, horses, or man. He means being as the essences of real things. And, what is the essence of real being? For example, what is it in you that you refer to when you say, “Darn, I’m good!”? Is it mere “ability”? Is it ability perfected? If it is in regard to ability, it is ability understood to be greater than (almost) anyone else’s ability. No matter what it is, we still compare. And, our comparisons are usually valid. But to what do we compare?
Obviously, I suppose, for a thing to have “goodness” it must be. St. Thomas is pointing out that “being” is both “existence” and “essence”, and that the degrees of perfection relate to the essence (or nature) of the thing. Ironically, the only proof for atheism is the problem of evil, which necessarily admits to gradations of goodness. Gradations of goodness implies the existence of a greatest good (aka God.) St. Thomas addresses the problem of evil in the reply to objection one in the Quinque Viae. (Start another thread if you want to discuss that topic.)
 
Just had some Chianti with my pepperoni pizza. I may not be rational at this point.

Again the fourth argument from Aquinas:

The fourth way is taken from the gradation to be found in things. Among beings there are some more and some less good, true, noble and the like. But “more” and “less” are predicated of different things, according as they resemble in their different ways something which is the maximum, as a thing is said to be hotter according as it more nearly resembles that which is hottest; so that there is something which is truest, something best, something noblest and, consequently, something which is uttermost being; for those things that are greatest in truth are greatest in being, as it is written in Metaph. ii. Now the maximum in any genus is the cause of all in that genus; as fire, which is the maximum heat, is the cause of all hot things. Therefore there must also be something which is to all beings the cause of their being, goodness, and every other perfection; and this we call God.

As you will see, I’ve shortened the list of being, goodness, and perfection to being alone for the sake of avoiding confusion (mine, anyway). Wait a second while I fill up my glass.

MAJOR: The maximum (Cause) in every genus is the cause of all things in that genus. (Example: Fire is the cause of all heat.)

CONCLUSION: The universe itself must have a maximum Cause for its genus. (Which we call God)

Correct me if this is not an accurate summation of his syllogism (Haven’t done syllogisms in twenty years!) I do think the conclusion I’ve stated is what Aquinas was striving for, and the major premise would almost have to be the starting point. But I had difficulty finding a minor premise. There seems to be a leap here that cannot be justified unless I have missed something. If there is no minor premise, it’s not a valid syllogism, even though the conclusion may still be true.

That’s all I remember from my syllogism days. If you can see the minor premise, please put it in for me. Thankssh!

The example that Aquinas gives is true. Without the sun’s fire there no doubt would be no heat anywhere in our solar system. In that sense the maximum in the genus of heat is fire. (But a modern astronomer might disagree, in that the sun itself had to be produced by something even hotter than itself, a supernova explosion that produced an abundance of stars, of which our star is only a minor one. But what caused the heat of the supernova? etc, etc. Where is the maximum? the atheist will ask. (I know this is post-Aquinas objection, but we have to consider whether the argument is valid in our day as well as his.)

There is nothing I can find in the fourth argument to convince atheists that the series of causes has to stop at some point,* that there must be a maximum*. Moreover, it seems to me that the fourth argument is really not so very different from the cosmological argument, because he is still talking about causes.

In short, I think the cosmological and teleological arguments will survive very well with some help from modern science … the Big Bang and Intelligent Design … both arguments at least convincing enough to convert atheist Antony flew to some kind of God…
 
Obviously, I suppose, for a thing to have “goodness” it must be. St. Thomas is pointing out that “being” is both “existence” and “essence”, and that the degrees of perfection relate to the essence (or nature) of the thing. Ironically, the only proof for atheism is the problem of evil, which necessarily admits to gradations of goodness. Gradations of goodness implies the existence of a greatest good (aka God.) St. Thomas addresses the problem of evil in the reply to objection one in the Quinque Viae. (Start another thread if you want to discuss that topic.)
That’s a very astute observation. I hadn’t thought of that, but, you know, I believe you’re right. Atheism is denial of God, thus absence of God, which is “evil”. It’s a good thing that very few atheists are really that atheistic.

jd
 
Just had some Chianti with my pepperoni pizza. I may not be rational at this point.

Again the fourth argument from Aquinas:

The fourth way is taken from the gradation to be found in things. Among beings there are some more and some less good, true, noble and the like. But “more” and “less” are predicated of different things, according as they resemble in their different ways something which is the maximum, as a thing is said to be hotter according as it more nearly resembles that which is hottest; so that there is something which is truest, something best, something noblest and, consequently, something which is uttermost being; for those things that are greatest in truth are greatest in being, as it is written in Metaph. ii. Now the maximum in any genus is the cause of all in that genus; as fire, which is the maximum heat, is the cause of all hot things. Therefore there must also be something which is to all beings the cause of their being, goodness, and every other perfection; and this we call God.

As you will see, I’ve shortened the list of being, goodness, and perfection to being alone for the sake of avoiding confusion (mine, anyway). Wait a second while I fill up my glass.

MAJOR: The maximum (Cause) in every genus is the cause of all things in that genus. (Example: Fire is the cause of all heat.)

CONCLUSION: The universe itself must have a maximum Cause for its genus. (Which we call God)

Correct me if this is not an accurate summation of his syllogism (Haven’t done syllogisms in twenty years!) I do think the conclusion I’ve stated is what Aquinas was striving for, and the major premise would almost have to be the starting point. But I had difficulty finding a minor premise. There seems to be a leap here that cannot be justified unless I have missed something. If there is no minor premise, it’s not a valid syllogism, even though the conclusion may still be true.

That’s all I remember from my syllogism days. If you can see the minor premise, please put it in for me. Thankssh!

The example that Aquinas gives is true. Without the sun’s fire there no doubt would be no heat anywhere in our solar system. In that sense the maximum in the genus of heat is fire. (But a modern astronomer might disagree, in that the sun itself had to be produced by something even hotter than itself, a supernova explosion that produced an abundance of stars, of which our star is only a minor one. But what caused the heat of the supernova? etc, etc. Where is the maximum? the atheist will ask. (I know this is post-Aquinas objection, but we have to consider whether the argument is valid in our day as well as his.)

There is nothing I can find in the fourth argument to convince atheists that the series of causes has to stop at some point,* that there must be a maximum*. Moreover, it seems to me that the fourth argument is really not so very different from the cosmological argument, because he is still talking about causes.

In short, I think the cosmological and teleological arguments will survive very well with some help from modern science … the Big Bang and Intelligent Design … both arguments at least convincing enough to convert atheist Antony flew to some kind of God…
See my post # 10. It has a syllogism. I suspect that it is imperfect, though.

jd
 
Further…
MAJOR: The maximum (Cause) in every genus is the cause of all things in that genus. (Example: Fire is the cause of all heat.)
Think of the genus as “hotness”, not “heat”. Hotness has levels from coldest all the way up to hottest. Now, you see the levels, or gradations, Aquinas was talking about.
CONCLUSION: The universe itself must have a maximum Cause for its genus. (Which we call God)
The genus of beings must have a topmost being, that includes and incorporates within it the maximum of its predicated perfection, or, perfections. This perfection is maximized insofar as it defines the being, such as fire = hottest. If this being is the topmost perfect being of the genus, it causes the genus. Thus, fire causes the genus hotness and all of its levels, from coldest to hottest.

Since there is no such being on earth that holds that position with regard to living beings, one must be found. The genus exists, therefore it must have a topmost being that includes and incorporates within it the maximum of its predicated perfection, or perfections. That being can only be God.

This is a tough one to wrap ones mind around, I must admit.

jd
 
JDaniel

Your syllogism may or may not be valid. Please understand that I never was anything but a novice at syllogisms. When I studied them, the major, minor, and conclusion were always one sentence each (reducing every argument to its simplest form).

All men are mortal.
Socrates is a man.
Socrates is mortal.

This syllogism is easily seen as both valid and true.

My problem is wrapping my head around the fourth argument to produce the same kind of syllogism and I can’t seem to do it. I admire your effort, but because there are so many subjects and predicates in your major, minor, and conclusion, I can’t tell if they work.

I take it you don’t agree that there is an excluded middle, as you have supplied one.

Could you reduce the parts of your syllogism to one sentence each and state the argument in its simplest form (if there is one)?
 
Think of the genus as “hotness”, not “heat”. Hotness has levels from coldest all the way up to hottest. Now, you see the levels, or gradations, Aquinas was talking about.
Sorry, actually I was wrong to make the above statement. Instead, think of the genus as “hot things”, not “hotness”. Now, we can see gradations of perfection towards hottest thing, which is the ultimate perfection of the genus of hot things. As St. Thomas says, fire is that hot thing that most resembles the “hottest” of hot things. Thus, fire is the pinnacle gradation and, as it happens, is the cause of all hot things, at any level in the genus.

So too with the genus of “good things”. As we move up the gradient, we start with Satan, on the bottom (interestingly, Satan is the ultimate perfection of the genus of evil things), and move upwards to God, as the ultimate of the perfection of “good” in good things. And so with “true things”, we start with levels of false things, at the bottom, and move up through the levels of true(er) things to God as the utmost perfection of a true thing.

If we scrutinize the aforementioned genera, it is easy to see that there are no in-between things that come close to representing (being or resembling) the utmost good thing or the utmost true thing. We clearly cannot posit man as the ultimate perfection of either genera. So, God must be the cause of those perfections not perfected in us, and only predicated of us, but known to exist in us at lower levels.

“Being” is real thing existing. Since there are no real things existing that represent the perfection of the predicates “good-est”, or, truest" to perfection, we have no choice but to look elsewhere and outside of the physical realm.

The only argument one can make against the fourth “proof” is that at the level of those predicate-perfections, e.g., goodness and truth, and so on, there might not be perfected real things existing. That, perhaps, the highest being on earth, man, is sufficient in his intellect to “reason-up” perfect goodness and perfect truth. The problem with these arguments is that they are in the the realm of “thoughts” only, and are not real things existing. IOW, they are without being.

jd
 
JDaniel

Your syllogism may or may not be valid. Please understand that I never was anything but a novice at syllogisms. When I studied them, the major, minor, and conclusion were always one sentence each (reducing every argument to its simplest form).

All men are mortal.
Socrates is a man.
Socrates is mortal.

This syllogism is easily seen as both valid and true.

My problem is wrapping my head around the fourth argument to produce the same kind of syllogism and I can’t seem to do it. I admire your effort, but because there are so many subjects and predicates in your major, minor, and conclusion, I can’t tell if they work.

I take it you don’t agree that there is an excluded middle, as you have supplied one.

Could you reduce the parts of your syllogism to one sentence each and state the argument in its simplest form (if there is one)?
Occam’s razor does not need to be invoked at the level of syllogism, especially when terms need defining within the syllogism. I am working on a more sussinct version of the thing almost as we speak. It was causing my head to hurt, so I am taking a break. 🙂

jd
 
Status
Not open for further replies.
Back
Top