The Fourth Way

[1holycatholic]

Yes, Aquinas is more a fusion of Aristotle and Plato (or neo-Platonism) than many scholars will admit.

Is that from the “Taffy” school of philosophy? It’s quite a stretch.

Where in St. Thomas’ writings can I find a description of the Demiurge, or any secondary deity for that matter?

 

[Charlemagne_II]

Is that from the “Taffy” school of philosophy? It’s quite a stretch.

No, it’s from the Catholic Encyclopedia, 1914 edition … oh you of little faith!

“In the* Summa* alone he quotes from the writings of 46 philosophers and poets, his favorite authors being Aristotle, Plato, and, among Christian writers, Boethius.”

 

[1holycatholic]

Is that from the “Taffy” school of philosophy? It’s quite a stretch.

No, it’s from the Catholic Encyclopedia, 1914 edition … oh you of little faith!

“In the* Summa* alone he quotes from the writings of 46 philosophers and poets, his favorite authors being Aristotle, Plato, and, among Christian writers, Boethius.”

This article? I don’t see him being labeled a neoplatonist.

I have quoted from those great writings too, that doesn’t make me a neoplatonist.

 

[Charlemagne_II]

Plato heavily influenced Plotinus (the greatest of the neo-Platonists) and Plotinus heavily influenced Augustine and Augustine heavily influenced Aquinas. If you don’t see the chain, I’m sorry. I didn’t mean to step on any Aristotelian toes! Of course among the ancients Aristotle is the heaviest influence on Aquinas.

Rather than sidetrack the thread, if you want to continue this, e-mail me please.

Thanks,
Charlie

 

[JDaniel]

The problem of evil is in no way a proof for atheism, and there is no possible proof for a universal, metaphysical negative. That’s a confused concept – a ‘proof’ for atheism. The problem of evil doesn’t help atheism, except as a kind of defeater for theism. But even then, it’s only problematic for some forms of theism (namely the Abrahamic renderings of God); it’s not hard to imagine a Shiva-like god for whom what we call evil is a kind of cosmic good, making an associated theodicy neat and simple.

As for gradations of goodness implying a greatest good, Aquinas’ own choice of “heat” as an example is a good refutation of that idea. We might affirm that something, somewhere is the “hottest” thing (and scientifically, this is a no-brainer – the ultra-dense, insanely hot plasma of our universe when it was just a few pico-seconds old wins the prize there… so hot that massive cooling was needed before phase transitions took place that even enabled basic elements to form), but only in a de facto sense. That thing, whatever it is just the ‘most hot’ by virtue of comparison with everything else, and would still have the potential to be hotter still.

I think the first Planck moment is considered the hottest temperature we could think of. That being said, how could one postulate something hotter, when nothing hotter has ever been attained, at least so it is thought. Such a postulation would be merely conceptual, wouldn’t it? Now, if something hotter yet were to be discovered, then we simply replace that extraordinary burst of energy suspected during that first Planck moment with the new one. After all, it’s just an analogy. Does this make sense?

I think it’s clear if you read Aquinas that he is not talking about *de facto *maxima, but a neo-Platonic ideal. Aquinas thought heat implied a maximal heat, as a logical maximum, and made the mistake you are making above, that gradations necessarily imply an ideal maximum. They don’t and that idea that it “implies” such is erroneous. Maybe it might “suggest” such in an informal way, but that’s all. Informal suggestions are a dime a dozen.

To my way of thinking, he didn’t use the fire/hottest analogy as a simile, he used it metaphorically.

jd

 

[Touchstone]

I think the first Planck moment is considered the hottest temperature we could think of. That being said, how could one postulate something hotter, when nothing hotter has ever been attained, at least so it is thought.

Becuase “we can’t think of anything hotter” is not a good basis for such a conclusion. We don’t know – can’t know – the setup for the Big Bang, if there was any setup. But some amount of energy some average kinetics (heat) began the process of rapid expansion, and thus rapid cooling. From what we know about heat in closed and open systems, there’s no reason to think the BB was any kind of limit condition. It may have been the “hottest thing ever” for our universe. But that’s not sufficient to conclude it was maximally hot, or even that there is such a thing as “maximally hot”.

Such a postulation would be merely conceptual, wouldn’t it?

We understand the physics, and that is what the conclusion is based on. Heat being the average kinetic energy of a system, there’s no barrier conceptually to a “hotter bang than our Big Bang”. If the temperature of the universe was 1032K at T=10-43seconds, when you ask a physicist why it couldn’t have been just a little hotter than it was, you just get a shrug. Perhaps in the future some kind of limit or constraint will be found that remains as yet undiscovered, but as it is, we do not have any justification for anything more than a de facto maximum.

Now, if something hotter yet were to be discovered, then we simply replace that extraordinary burst of energy suspected during that first Planck moment with the new one. After all, it’s just an analogy. Does this make sense?

Yes, but you are now clearly trafficking in de facto maxima, not logical maxima – ideals, which was what Aquinas was speaking about. Maybe we have to go back over Aristotelian metaphysics to make this clear, but as soon as you start simply scanning the available data for the local “best score”, you’ve undercut Aquinas, whether you know it or not. Aquinas is working the idea that the very idea of “hotter” implies an “ideal maximum heat”.

As it turns out, he picked a very good example that turns out to refute his intuitions. Of course if there is some way to measure “hotter”, then something will rank at the top as hottest. But that doesn’t help Aquinas at all, for if we apply that to “goodness”, we just end up with the “most good” human (however you want to measure that). But like heat, finding the “most good” human does nothing to establish a “maximally good person”, which Aquinas would tell us we call “God”, any more than the Big Bang right after t=0 being the “most hot” circumstance we can identify implies a “most hot” thing or circumstance.

-TS

To my way of thinking, he didn’t use the fire/hottest analogy as a simile, he used it metaphorically.

jd

That’s my understanding, too, and that is why I think the Fourth Way fails, and badly – the metaphor reveals the core intuition, that “hotter” implies something “maximally hot” (I’m speaking in isomorphisms here, like Aquinas), that “better” implies something maximally good, is not at all a reliable intuition.

-TS

 

[Charlemagne_II]

Touchstone

But like heat, finding the “most good” human does nothing to establish a “maximally good person”, which Aquinas would tell us we call “God”, any more than the Big Bang right after t=0 being the “most hot” circumstance we can identify implies a “most hot” thing or circumstance.

Deist physicists (Einstein, Hawking, etc) sometimes refer to God as Reason or Being. Even Darwin referred to God as Creator, upper case C. There is a pattern among scientists never to speak of God as a “maximally good person,” nor any other kind of person. “Person” is forbidden. It’s as if we may find a perfect degree of Reason (in the mathematical laws that govern the universe) but we may not find a perfect degree of Goodness because science cannot measure goodness or study it under a microscope.

Why would this Being (or Reason) go to the trouble of creating the universe, then go to the bother of creating laws that are intelligible, then exert Himself by creating intelligent beings who can find these intelligible laws – and finally leave those beings with a yearning to believe their Creator is something more than a colossal Scientist who cares not a fig for their yearning?

Half-baked science … gone cold.

Aquinas did not ask these questions, but why not follow his argument where it leads so far as a maximum degree of goodness is concerned?

Scientists don’t have to be just scientists. They can be philosophers too, if they will let themselves be. Maybe even latter-day theologians.

 

[Touchstone]

Touchstone

But like heat, finding the “most good” human does nothing to establish a “maximally good person”, which Aquinas would tell us we call “God”, any more than the Big Bang right after t=0 being the “most hot” circumstance we can identify implies a “most hot” thing or circumstance.

Deist physicists (Einstein, Hawking, etc) sometimes refer to God as Reason or Being. Even Darwin referred to God as Creator, upper case C. There is a pattern among scientists never to speak of God as a “maximally good person,” nor any other kind of person. “Person” is forbidden. It’s as if we may find a perfect degree of Reason (in the mathematical laws that govern the universe) but we may not find a perfect degree of Goodness because science cannot measure goodness or study it under a microscope.

I think that’s to be expected, given what we’ve found. I’m tempted to say here “there is no perfect degree of Reason” found in nature, but that’s conceding more than is warranted, even there; “perfect degree of reason” is just an incoherent concept to begin with. We wouldn’t be able to identify such, no matter what, any more than we might identify what the color nine smells like.

In terms of personal references, even the hardscrabble atheist unders the human proclivity for anthropomorphizing the world around her. When you are a hammer, everthing tends to like like a nail, and when you are a telic, design, ambitious human, the world tends to look 'humanified", because that’s our basic disposition, the lens we see reality through.

Why would this Being (or Reason) go to the trouble of creating the universe, then go to the bother of creating laws that are intelligible, then exert Himself by creating intelligent beings who can find these intelligible laws – and finally leave those beings with a yearning to believe their Creator is something more than a colossal Scientist who cares not a fig for their yearning?

Half-baked science … gone cold.

Doesn’t your question answer itself? You’re right, the predicates you lay out seem conspicuously awkward. That ought to suggest that that rationale has some structural problems. But it seems the only “fix” you are contemplating is to force a God, an interactive, involved, personal God there, as a way to “save the day” from your set up. That strikes me as very much like adding a mysterious variable X as a “fudge factor” to make your equation balance at the end.

Rather, consider that the narrative is mistaken right from the start. Perhaps no being went to any trouble at all in creating physical law. I understand that offends the anthropomorphic sensibility in many people, but it totally alleviates the tension you are wrestling with above. Intelligibility, as perceived by humans (or others), is just an emergent quality of those laws, given vast amounts of time and resources with which to interact. No God is needed to rectify the drama you set out there, because there was no such drama in the first place.

Hydrogen isnt “wet”, and neither is oxygen. But combine them in the right ratio, and at the right temperature, and you get “wetness”. It’s not magic, it’s an emergent feature of the interaction of those elements.

Aquinas did not ask these questions, but why not follow his argument where it leads so far as a maximum degree of goodness is concerned?

I agree. Why not? That’s a good urge in philosophy. But immediately we arrested by the incoherence of the terms we are using. Doing a quick scan, we can see that for all the properties we have talked about, the utlity of “more” and “less”, or “maximal” obtains from some measure of objectivity – some kind of objective basis for understanding the term: what is good and what is not? what makes “better” better, and “worse” worse? These are extraordinarily hard questions, which is why you don’t see “goodness” used the way mystical metaphysicists use the term.

So, have at it, and for what it’s worth, trying to define “good” and “better” and “maximally” good is likely to be more interesting and edifying than any applications you might find for it, Aquinas or otherwise.

Scientists don’t have to be just scientists. They can be philosophers too, if they will let themselves be. Maybe even latter-day theologians.

Science, until fairly recently, was known as “natural philosophy”, of course. The reason it has been ascendant, while other disciplines are flagging, is that “natural philosophy” has a strategic advantage that makes it valuable and “investable” in practical terms; it has a feedback loop, a binding to the natural, with objective means of finding and correcting errors. It’s a productive discipline, in other words, and one anyone who drives a car, or takes medicine, or uses a computer to do their work (or opinion posting) should be able to appreciate.

I know there are many who are scientists who also get involved in theology – something I was just reading by Polkinghorne comes to mind as I type that. I’m sure that scientists are as capable as any of being theologians, just because theology demands nothing beyond intuition to get going, something anyone, even scientists can readily provide. Science is in some ways a war against intuition, the practice of seeing the world without the distortive lens of intuition, and that is one reason I think you sense that scientists generally resist theology more than you’d like. It’s difficult to embrace theology as a scientist, as one repudiates the credentials of the other, in terms of epistemology.

-TS

 

[Charlemagne_II]

Rather, consider that the narrative is mistaken right from the start. Perhaps* no being went to any trouble at all in creating physical law.*

Says you. You are only substituting your perhaps for mine. Why is your perhaps better than mine? Some effort by Something might well have produced the universe and all the laws governing it. Sounds anthropomorphic? Why so disdainful? What are you, a robot?

No God is needed to rectify the drama you set out there, because there was no such drama in the first place.

Oh my, not even a perhaps?

I know there are many who are scientists who also get involved in theology –

Yes, here is one:

“Now we see how astronomical evidence leads to the biblical view of the origin of the world. The details differ, but the essential elements in the astronomical and biblical accounts of Genesis are the same: the chain of events leading to man commenced suddenly and sharply at a definite moment of time, in a flash of light and energy…. For the scientist who has lived by the faith in the power of reason, the story ends like a bad dream. He has scaled the mountains of ignorance; he is about to conquer the highest peak; as he pulls himself over the final rock, he is greeted by a band of theologians who have been sitting there for centuries.” Robert Jastrow, *God and the Astronomers
*

Science is in some ways a war against intuition, the practice of seeing the world without the distortive lens of intuition, and that is one reason I think you sense that scientists generally resist theology more than you’d like.

And, as you imply, in some ways intuition is basic to science … especially in many cases of monumental breakthroughs. Democritus’ intuition of the atom a case in point. One can intuit God or Reason, As Einstein did, even with what you would call “the distorted lens of intuition.”

It’s difficult to embrace theology as a scientist, as one repudiates the credentials of the other, in terms of epistemology.

Difficult, but certainly not impossible, as many scientists have found.

“Those who say that the study of science makes a man an atheist must be rather silly.” Max Born, Quantum physicist

 

[Touchstone]

Rather, consider that the narrative is mistaken right from the start. Perhaps** no being went to any trouble at all in creating physical law.

Says you. You are only substituting your perhaps for mine. Why is your perhaps better than mine?

Well, parsimony, for one thing. God just isn’t needed in the more economical rendering, right? That stilll demands a perhaps – parsimony is not a normative principle – but it is more efficient in terms of tis use of explanatory resources, wouldn’t you say?

, a robot?
We don’t have any basis for saying “might well have” beyond a logicla possibility. It is a logical possibility – we don’t have any principled basis for ruling it out. But that’s as far as it goes, as a matter of likelihood, it’s just inscrutable (if you doubt this, try to supply me some probabilities and the difficulty of numerators and denominators will be apparent, there). We can say the same thing for an “uncaused universe” – the probabilities as probabilities (discrete selections from a quantifiable phase space) are inscrutable, too.

No God is needed to rectify the drama you set out there, because there was no such drama in the first place.

Oh my, not even a perhaps?
Sorry, maybe it helps by inserting a hint: No God is needed [in the scenario I’m suggesting, where no God was around to create anything] to rectify the drama you set out there, because there was no such drama in the first place.

Does that help? In other words, under the “impersonal hypothesis”, there’s no need for a God in the picture, and thus the tension you were addressing doesn’t even arise…

I know there are many who are scientists who also get involved in theology –

Yes, here is one:

“Now we see how astronomical evidence leads to the biblical view of the origin of the world. The details differ, but the essential elements in the astronomical and biblical accounts of Genesis are the same: the chain of events leading to man commenced suddenly and sharply at a definite moment of time, in a flash of light and energy…. For the scientist who has lived by the faith in the power of reason, the story ends like a bad dream. He has scaled the mountains of ignorance; he is about to conquer the highest peak; as he pulls himself over the final rock, he is greeted by a band of theologians who have been sitting there for centuries.” Robert Jastrow, *God and the Astronomers *
Jastrow is obviously wearing his “theologian” hat in writing this. The limits of science are neither foreign or mysterious to the scientist. It is a given that at some point, the enterprise of natural explanatons for natural phenomena will exhaust itself, and give way to metaphysics.

I agree that once we turn to metaphysics, at least beyond what is necessary (“reality is real”), the scientist is thrown in with the theologian, the astrologer, the homeopath and the child telling fantastic stories. And I’m sure the scientist, like so many of us, would like to have some answers at the metaphysical level (beyond what is necesary to accept on faith – reality is real). But none avail, and I can see that that would be frustrating for one who has been working on building real knowledge, previously, That’s the nature of our reality, alas. Apparently, some like Jastrow glory in the futility of it, and the license they see they might take from it – the pleasures of a domain where you cannot be wrong, cannot have your ideas falsified! But for the working scientist, who surely has the capacity and interest in metaphysical question like anyone else, you might as well ask the astrologer there on the mountain top or the used car salesman as the theologian – they’re all standing on the same foundation.
Science is in some ways a war against intuition, the practice of seeing the world without the distortive lens of intuition, and that is one reason I think you sense that scientists generally resist theology more than you’d like.

And, as you imply, in some ways intuition is basic to science … especially in many cases of monumental breakthroughs. Democritus’ intuition of the atom a case in point. One can intuit God or Reason, As Einstein did, even with what you would call “the distorted lens of intuition.”
I think you misunderstand. Inuition and imagination are the engine of science, and its progress toward knowledge. But they are not sufficient. Knowledge demands testing, verification, performance, and liability to falsification – features theology conspicuously lacks. Einstein’s intuitions, so spectacularly validated in some cases, were proven wrong in others. Intuition and imagination are the (name removed by moderator)uts for science, the spur for new and novel hypotheses. But science demands performance and validation, and this is what separates it from theology, where intuition is the beginning and the end.

It’s difficult to embrace theology as a scientist, as one repudiates the credentials of the other, in terms of epistemology.

Difficult, but certainly not impossible, as many scientists have found.
That’s quite true. As I said, I was asked to read some Polkinghorne recently, and so I have. That’s a clear case of a man who is a serious scientist who also devotes many cycles to theology.

“Those who say that the study of science makes a man an atheist must be rather silly.” Max Born, Quantum physicist

I agree. Science can’t ever disprove God. If one supposes that science “makes” one an atheist, something has gone quite wrong in terms of reasoning.

-TS

[/QUOTE]

 

[Charlemagne_II]

Touchstone
*
I think you misunderstand. Inuition and imagination are the engine of science, and its progress toward knowledge. But they are not sufficient. Knowledge demands testing, verification, performance, and liability to falsification – features theology conspicuously lacks. Einstein’s intuitions, so spectacularly validated in some cases, were proven wrong in others. Intuition and imagination are the (name removed by moderator)uts for science, the spur for new and novel hypotheses. But science demands performance and validation, and this is what separates it from theology, where intuition is the beginning and the end.*

I really think it would have been much better if you had given me credit for already knowing this.

“Those who say that the study of science makes a man an atheist must be rather silly.” Max Born, Quantum physicist

You said:

I agree. Science can’t ever disprove God. If one supposes that science “makes” one an atheist, something has gone quite wrong in terms of reasoning.

Then why, according to one estimate, are 40% of scientists atheists?

Not that this has anything to do with Aquinas.

 

[MindOverMatter]

I am sure that the above is lacking in some way, or ways. I request your (name removed by moderator)ut. Or, if you want to refute it, feel free.

jd

Nice post.

The Fourth way, so far as i can tell, is based upon the concept of a hierarchy of being. Its difficult to defend when it is isolated from the other arguments; but i will give it a try non-the-less.

First of all, some people would attack this arguement as being subjective rather then an objective inference; but there is in fact a hierarchy of being in a qualitative sense. For example, Consciousness is qualitatively greater then non-consciousness. Our experiences testify to this fact.

Secondly; we must also come to understand that unless we can say that ultimately all things can come out of nothing, one has no choice but to conclude that the first cause of anything cannot be qualitatively less then what it produces; and therefore the first cause all things could not possibly be qualitatively less then personal in nature, although it can and must be qualitatively more then physical reality. To give another example; beings have the quality of existing, therefore the first cause of all beings must also have such a quality, but to a maximal degree, since it is the root of all existing things. The first cause is perfectly existing, while other beings only poses an imperfect participatory type of existence.

Thirdly and finally; since we regognise that there is in fact a qualitative hierarchy of being; there must be a being in a existence that possesses all qualities to a maximal degree.

I’m not sure if i have given much justice to Thomas, as this is my own interpretation of his arguement.

 

[Touchstone]

Nice post.

The Fourth way, so far as i can tell, is based upon the concept of a hierarchy of being. Its difficult to defend when it is isolated from the other arguments; but i will give it a try non-the-less.

First of all, some people would attack this arguement as being subjective rather then an objective inference; but there is in fact a hierarchy of being in a qualitative sense. For example, Consciousness is qualitatively greater then non-consciousness. Our experiences testify to this fact.
What does ‘qualitatively greater’ mean here (I’ve read my Aquinas, and would like to know what you think it means)? You say “in fact”, but this seems a bit of leger de main. No such facts are in evidence. If I’m wrong, maybe you can show me this hierarchy, as fact rather than mystical metaphysics?

Secondly; we must also come to understand that unless we can say that ultimately all things can come out of nothing, one has no choice but to conclude that the first cause of anything cannot be qualitatively less then what it produces; and therefore the first cause all things could not possibly be qualitatively less then personal in nature, although it can and must be qualitatively more then physical reality.

That is definitely the Fourth Way I recognize from Aquinas. I think your summarily tracks nicely with all I’ve read of the argument directly, and Aquinas’ attending background discussion in Summa. My objections are not in your rendering at all, for I recognize Aquinas’ ideas quite clearly in them. Aquinas just makes unwarranted, illogical leaps in all three points in this particular argument.

-Touchstone

 

[Touchstone]

Touchstone
*
I think you misunderstand. Inuition and imagination are the engine of science, and its progress toward knowledge. But they are not sufficient. Knowledge demands testing, verification, performance, and liability to falsification – features theology conspicuously lacks. Einstein’s intuitions, so spectacularly validated in some cases, were proven wrong in others. Intuition and imagination are the (name removed by moderator)uts for science, the spur for new and novel hypotheses. But science demands performance and validation, and this is what separates it from theology, where intuition is the beginning and the end.*

I really think it would have been much better if you had given me credit for already knowing this.

OK, apologies, then. I won’t make that mistake again. But that does raise the question of what the attraction/interest would be in an epistemology that is missing those key features that science brings to the table?

“Those who say that the study of science makes a man an atheist must be rather silly.” Max Born, Quantum physicist

You said:

I agree. Science can’t ever disprove God. If one supposes that science “makes” one an atheist, something has gone quite wrong in terms of reasoning.

Then why, according to one estimate, are 40% of scientists atheists?

Not that this has anything to do with Aquinas.

I think the measurements in some disciplines are far higher than that. Atheism cannot disprove God, but as I said elsewhere here recently (this thread?), science does to things that diminish mystical credulity. First, science provides law-based frameworks that obviate the need for supernatural intervention, and second, science introduces a rigorous discipline in its epistemology and praxis that makes theology, or even just metaphysics look gratuitous, self-indulgent, even. When you get used to thinking in terms of the scientific method and the accountability that it demands in terms of criticism, performance, and objectivity, it makes one much more aware of how much we tolerate and indulge our desires and subjective preferences in seeking “truth” in other disciplines.

For many scientists I’ve talked to, who’ve abandoned Christianity for atheism (I’m not a scientist, but a tech-dweeb who works with scientists and researcher), it wasn’t the science itself – the evidence and conclusions that science has produced, but the commitment to the epistemic discipline that made the theistic worldview very hard to maintain. That was true in my case, as well. The more I got engaged in that discipline, the more it revealed by comparison how much of my “metaphysics” was just projection of desire and preference. That’s a hard thing to bear in mind and maintain an honest faith, I think.

I hope that makes sense. Science cannot disprove God. But it does introduce a methodology and epistemology which makes theology and a theistic worldview hard to maintain. Assertions like the ones that Aquinas offers in the Fourth Way, for example, light up like a Vegas casino as gratuitously subjective and unwarranted, from that point of view. Obviously, there are many successful and proficient scientists who are faithful Christians (and Muslims, and Hindus, etc.) so it’s not a hard and fast obstacle. But it is a strong friction point, in my experience.

-TS

 

[MindOverMatter]

What does ‘qualitatively greater’ mean here?

What do you think it means?

You’re stuck either way. Positing a God in the chain just adds one more link. If God can be uncaused, anything else can.

Nobody has ever said, as far as what i have read on this forum, that something cannot exist uncaused. What one has argued, is that in order for something to change, it must have some kind of cause. Anybody with a basic knowledge of the philosophy of God, would know this.

I’ve explained this untold times in other threads and i don’t plan to do it again. So please look for those threads or read a good book on the subject if you really care about truth.

This runs intro trouble in its equivocation on “existing”. If we take a coherent, consistent definition, like “extended in space-time”, then these assertions run into trouble. On Christianity’s view, God doesn’t “exist” according to that definition (“God is spirit”, etc.). But if that definition doesn’t work, and it produces absurdities for Christians, then what does the “quality of existing” mean?

God is a different order of being in respect to physical reality. Perhaps you can explain why you think that such a being is absurd? Have you ever bothered to ask a Catholic meta-physician what he or she actually means by the term God? I doubt very much that you have read and understood Aquinian philosophy.

In all I’ve read of Aquinas, that quality of existing is impossible to distinguish from “imaginary”, where it doesn’t rely on physical characteristics (extended in space-time). So, when I read this, it’s fluff, and seems conspicuous in its evasion of declaring and quantifying its terms.

You are mixing up comprehension with contradiction. Not being able to conceive of God in the same sense of being able to conceive of physical reality, does not prove or disprove the possibility or actuality of Gods existence. God not fitting nicely into your naturalistic world view, is irrelevant in regards to truth. If Physical existence necessitates a non-physical cause, then it is a factual truth whether you like or not. Philosophy is not about flavors; it is about truth.

Doesn’t follow. I cannot identify how this conclusion is justified, at all.

If there is a hierarchy of being, then there is that which is the highest in that hierarchy.

I understand Aquinas supposes that “being” is a special kind of property that has “instantiated maximal root” built into it somehow, but neither he, nor anyone following him I’ve ever read, can be troubled to substantiate in stronger terms than intuition, or worse, a kind of special pleading aimed at affirming its desired conclusion. Really, one gets the sense that if pressed, Aquinas would have to throw up his hands in frustration, and say “there just is a being that possesses all qualities of being in a maximal way, OK?!?!?!”

I don’t believe that you have ever read Aquinas first hand in the SUMMA THEOLOGICA; neither have you grasped any of my arguments. Thats unfortunate.

If not, then I’d appreciate being pointed to the part of his discussion that establishes the necessity of such a hierarchy-with-maximal-root.

Its has already been established.

That is definitely the Fourth Way I recognize from Aquinas. I think your summarily tracks nicely with all I’ve read of the argument directly, and Aquinas’ attending background discussion in Summa. My objections are not in your rendering at all, for I recognize Aquinas’ ideas quite clearly in them.

Aquinas just makes unwarranted, illogical leaps in all three points in this particular argument.

Firstly i think that the fourth works best in relation to the other arguments. Secondly you haven’t really given any real refutations. You are misrepresenting arguments, and you are failing to understand a simple concept such as Qualitative Hierarchy. I was willing to give a more detailed representation of Aquinas’s arguments and my own, at least until you said the word fluff. It was then that i knew that you had already made up your mind about what is possible and what isn’t; and i don’t like wasting my time.

Peace.

 

[Charlemagne_II]

Touchstone

When you get used to thinking in terms of the scientific method and the accountability that it demands in terms of criticism, performance, and objectivity, it makes one much more aware of how much we tolerate and indulge our desires and subjective preferences in seeking “truth” in other disciplines.

Well this is certainly an important point. I’m afraid that there are certain kinds of intellectual (and emotional) methodologies that become addictive. I can see science (also music, mathematics, etc) as an addiction once you get used to the success it promises in the observation of nature’s laws. But the notion that philosophy and theology are somehow less important because they do not offer the same immediate gratification doesn’t work for me. The objects of philosophy and theology are far less verifiable or falsifiable, but they offer vastly more rewards than the sciences or the arts. Philosophy offers to teach us wisdom (do you know a falsifiable scientific theory about wisdom) and theology offers to aim us at virtue, hope, faith and an abundance of other treasures that are, in my opinion, just as likely to produce an addiction to the person who seriously adventures in those directions. I have said here, or in another thread, that I think the scientist is particularly prone to myopia (this would not apply to you, for sure, since you are a regular visitor here). The 40% average for atheists is in all the departments put together … much higher in biology than elsewhere. This infatuation with science could become deadly for the human race, despite all the boons and blessings we have been endowed by the scientific community. I’m not talking about nuclear warheads and such that the scientific community is willing to produce. No. I’m talking more about the decidedly half-baked mentality that science markets with so much success. And if atheism and science ever come together in one colossal and united community … I can imagine a time when science, going against the grain of mankind at large, will come to be viewed as an enemy of mankind.

If and when that time comes, science may at last be forced to learn not to be so cocksure of itself and so contemptuous of a larger, more fully human, and decidedly well rounded outlook.

 

[Touchstone]

What do you think it means?

I don’t think it’s a coherent term. I don’t use the term to advance my ideas.

In medieval lingo, these qualitatives were known as “transcendentals”, if I recall correctly: nobility, goodness, truth. Being “qualitative” rather than “qualitative” isn’t a problem *per se; *we use qualitative notions across domains all the time – the law of identity (a=a), for example, or the semantics of physical existence “extended in space-time”. But these are logical constructs validated by experience with the physical world. Aquinas’ transcendentals are a different kind of ‘qualitative’ – they are metaphysical notions. “That which is most true is most existent”, says Aquinas, or something to that effect (I’ll look up the reference if you don’t recognize that, but I think it should be immediately familiar to you). This is a qualification operating one some metaphysical level.

Which, to me, amounts to an anachronism; this was the metaphysical presupposition of Aquinas’ day. It’s not qualified, it’s not formalized, it’s not justified with some kind of epistemic warrant beyond being notional and current at the time.

That renders “qualitatively greater” conceptually analogous to “more existent by virtue of being more true”. Modernity, in pursuit of qualification because of the demands of skepticism, has those poles reversed; now, we say something is more true the more closely it corresponds with extant reality. A “more true” account of an event is one that hews more closely to the objective aspects of an event. To the extent the account is at odds with the objective facts, we would say that is “less true”.

That’s predicated on the metaphysical assertion that “reality is real”, or, rephrased “objective facts are true”. We have all manner of “truths” available through parable and myth, which are not dependent on factuality (the fact that the parable of the Good Samaritan may not have been a factual retelling doesn’t at all diminish the truth of the parable, for example), but contra Aquinas, truth is anchored in existence, rather then the other way around, in the modern view.

Simply being modern doesn’t make it more (or less) correct. Rather, it’s important because it is anchored by a correspondence model developed by our senses and experience.

Nobody has ever said, as far as what i have read on this forum, that something cannot exist uncaused. What one has argued, is that in order for something to change, it must have some kind of cause. Anybody with a basic knowledge of the philosophy of God, would know this.

Oh, I’m quite aware of the rejection of the idea that God needs a cause if the universe does. But I don’t think that clears of it being a case of special pleading. Moreover, even as a physical notion, the idea that change must have some kind of cause is not a logical necessity. Why is “uncaused change” any more a logical problem, even in a physical context, than “uncaused existence” (which I say is a distinction without a difference, ultimately, anyway)?

What is the cause of randomness at the quantum level? We can’t say there is no transcendant cause, but by the same token, neither can we say we have a cause. The witness of our physical environment contradicts your necessity, for change at that level very much looks like it happens without a cause. If you can substantiate such a cause, you will be world famous tomorrow, and can expect a Nobel or three at the least for your insight.

And all that is just gated to our physical context, and it doesn’t hold up as a necessity even there. When you move to metaphysics, all that goes out the window, and now we know nothin’. We have no basis for saying, as a metaphysical proposition, that change must have a cause. It’s an unsupportable assertion. Or, if it is supportable, you’ll be famous by Friday.

I’ve explained this untold times in other threads and i don’t plan to do it again. So please look for those threads or read a good book on the subject if you really care about truth.

Ah, yes, the “you just don’t understand” retort. OK, I understand that kind of response well.

God is a different order of being in respect to physical reality. Perhaps you can explain why you think that such a being is absurd?

I don’t suppose that such a being is absurd, but rather that the terminology you are using is incoherent. What is an “order of being”? What separates “orders of being”, and what does “being” mean, such that we might stratify it, or make it a scalar on a continuum? I’ve asked for a coherent explanation of this idea dozens of times over many years, and I can’t point you to a coherent explanation in response, something that amounts to anything more than pure intuition or naked assertion. But I invite you to clear that up for me.

For Aquinas’ part, he tells me that God is not a “being in general” (sorry, I forget the Latin for that one), but “being itself” – ipsum esse. God has a “divine simplicity” that nothing else can have, etc. Fine, that is indeed different than what we observe as “being” in the physical sense (extended in space-time).

-TS

 

[Touchstone]

continued…

Have you ever bothered to ask a Catholic meta-physician what he or she actually means by the term God? I doubt very much that you have read and understood Aquinian philosophy.I think you are simply choosing the easy route, here, and alleging ignorance on my part. If that’s the case, it should be teased out and made evident easily enough. I’ve had a good running (if sporadic) dialog on this for nearly twenty years now, parts of it with very thoughtful, patient Catholic thinkers. You may be right, and I’m just dense. But it also may be that when pressed, Thomist metaphysics don’t hold up beyond the level of “intuition” and “sensibility”, and “you don’t understand” gets thrown out as an evasion tactic.

You are mixing up comprehension with contradiction. Not being able to conceive of God in the same sense of being able to conceive of physical reality, does not prove or disprove the possibility or actuality of Gods existence. God not fitting nicely into your naturalistic world view, is irrelevant in regards to truth. If Physical existence necessitates a non-physical cause, then it is a factual truth whether you like or not. Philosophy is not about flavors; it is about truth.

When Aquinas says things like this:

*That which is said to be greatest in any kind causes everything of that kind.
*
That’s “flavors”. You can say it’s “truth”, but its got no more epistemic warrant as a necessity, from Aquinas, you or anyone else on this thread, than saying “Chocolate is the best flavor”.

It’s not a problem for me that God’s essence or attributes may be incomprehensible (or maybe just ineffable), if God exists. That’s a possibility. But that doesn’t salvage the necessities claimed by Aquinas, which are offered without justification as necessities. They are not self-evident, and they are not demonstrated to be unavoidable.

If there is a hierarchy of being, then there is that which is the highest in that hierarchy.

Well, consider this proposition – a Hierarchy of Baseball Playing:

*If there is a hierarchy of Baseball Playing, then there is a player which is highest in that hierarchy.

*Would you agree to this statement? I believe I would, with the clarification that the “highest” is a relative term, rather than an absolute reference to some “perfect root” in the hierarchy. In terms of baseball playing, I think the idea that no baseball player is the maximal cause and/or representation of all [the attributes of] Baseball Playing should be quite clear.

Baseball Playing isn’t God-ontology. But conceptually, this should be enough to show that God-ontology must be “special cased”, or arrived at by “special pleading”. Because it’s not at all self-evident that a hierarchy itself necessitates a Maximal Root Node, rather than just a *de facto *“highest node”.

I don’t believe that you have ever read Aquinas first hand in the SUMMA THEOLOGICA; neither have you grasped any of my arguments. Thats unfortunate.

Now who’se confusing contradiction with comprehension.

Its has already been established.

It has? Well give me the link, so I can catch up!

Firstly i think that the fourth works best in relation to the other arguments. Secondly you haven’t really given any real refutations. You are misrepresenting arguments, and you are failing to understand a simple concept such as Qualitative Hierarchy. I was willing to give a more detailed representation of Aquinas’s arguments and my own, at least until you said the word fluff. It was then that i knew that you had already made up your mind about what is possible and what isn’t; and i don’t like wasting my time.

Peace.

A “qualitative hierarchy” is not a simple concept! It’s precisely this kind of assertion that erodes the credibility of the argument. If by “simple”, you mean “subjective”, then I can agree, but it then just affirms itself as an exercise in “flavors”. As an objective concept, it’s very difficult.

-Touchstone

 

[Charlemagne_II]

It occurs to me that this discussion may be winding down. So before the moderator puts us all in the lock-up, it was for me a pleasure. Adios!

 

[geometer]

Why would a given fire be caused by a greater fire? That doesn’t make sense to me…