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geometer
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Why would logic by itself prove existence?
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M
MindOverMatter
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This doesn’t make sense to me either. There is only a quantitative difference between a smaller fire and a bigger fire. There is no qualitative difference. A fire is a fire. If we wish to avoid the dreaded straw-man, we must be sure to keep things in context.Why would a given fire be caused by a greater fire? That doesn’t make sense to me…
On the other hand, it would be unreasonable to say that the fire just exists for no reason.
Peace.
M
MindOverMatter
Guest
To speak of an unchanging eternal being, is one thing. To speak of something that begins to change, is something quite different. To say that anything which begins to exist has a cause, is perfectly reasonable, since the potentiality for change has to come from somewhere; the cause. Otherwise, there is no logical reason for an inert thing to change or to move by itself; since it has no potentiality to even exist. Therefore, in-so-far as one is speaking about change, one is not speaking logically when one suggests that something is moving by itself uncaused, since to speak of logic or reason is to infer causality, or a reason for something being in existence. The same is true of the first event. To say that the first event is just there for no reason, is to suspend reason. You are saying, in effect, that logic does not apply to the first event. The problem is you give no logical justification for thinking so. Secondly, if there is no potentiality for change, then change ought not to exist. If there is potentiality, then something is causing that potentiality, hence the necessity of causality. I have no logical justification for supposing that something can happen for no reason; necessity permeates causality.A physical notion, the idea that change must have some kind of cause is not a logical necessity. Why is “uncaused change” any more a logical problem, even in a physical context, than “uncaused existence” (which I say is a distinction without a difference, ultimately, anyway)?
Science, practices methodological naturalism as principle of understanding physical reality. Hence; when it comes to quantum events, they can only say, as a matter principle, that such events have no cause, as in, no “physical cause”. To say that quantum events have no cause, is a valid scientific statement, but it is not a valid metaphysical statement in so far as** logic** is concern. They are not saying that the universe has no cause, they are saying that it has no physical cause. There are some scientists who have a naturalistic agenda whom wish to promote the idea that science is observing the Universe coming out of nothing. But that is logically impossible. It is not the authority of the physical sciences to make metaphysical statements about reality. What science has unveiled at the quantum level of reality, is not the end of causality, but the end of physical explanations for existence.What is the cause of randomness at the quantum level? We can’t say there is no transcendent cause, but by the same token, neither can we say we have a cause.
If i saw a blue elephant pop into the middle of the room, it would certainly appear as if it had no cause, because i cannot see it; i can only see the existence of the blue elephant. But that is not a logical justification for inferring that it popped out of nothing. Firstly, nothing is not something in which a thing can have the potentiality for being. Nothing is a negation of being; it is not a real thing. Therefore Occam’s razor only allows for a cause that already exists. A thing is either unchanging and necessary, or it began to exist. If it began to exist, then it must have the potentiality to exist, otherwise there is no logical explanation for its existence; it ought not to exist. One cannot speak of logic when supposing wild concepts such as something coming out of nothing. Such concepts mark the end of logic.The witness of our physical environment contradicts your necessity, for change at that level very much looks like it happens without a cause.
As far as i know, noble prizes are for scientific achievements, not metaphysical achievements. I think i will just stick toIf you can substantiate such a cause, you will be world famous tomorrow, and can expect a Nobel or three at the least for your insight.
Anybody that suggests that things can happen for no reason, do not know how to think. Its even more of a joke when that same person attempts to mock religion and belief in God.Ah, yes, the “you just don’t understand” retort.
Being is existence as apposed to non-existence. A different order of being, means to have a different nature as apposed to some other nature. God is not physical in nature; thus God is a different order of being. God is qualitatively greater then physical reality if it is true that God is Existence or Being in itself, while physical things only participate in existence. Hence God would be a necessary being, since nothing can exist outside of being; and God would be perfect being, because God exists by necessity of its own nature, while physical reality only participates in the nature that is existence by the power of existence.what does “being” mean.
I would like to, but i suspect that a part of you does not really care to understand.I’ve asked for a coherent explanation of this idea dozens of times over many years, and I can’t point you to a coherent explanation in response, something that amounts to anything more than pure intuition or naked assertion. But I invite you to clear that up for me.
Correct; and so you do understand that God is a different order of being and is hierarchically greater then physical beings. The first cause of all physical beings is necessarily being in itself; since being in itself comes first before all participatory beings, and is therefore perfect being. Anything less then perfect existence, is participatory, and thus existence is the only necessary being or first cause, hierarchically speaking. The first cause cannot be qualitatively less then what it produces; otherwise there is no potentiality for physical reality or any of the things that are produced in it. Existence is the eternal cause of all things.For Aquinas’ part, he tells me that God is not a “being in general” (sorry, I forget the Latin for that one), but “being itself” – ipsum esse. God has a “divine simplicity” that nothing else can have, etc. Fine, that is indeed different than what we observe as “being” in the physical sense (extended in space-time).
J
JDaniel
Guest
A Priori Factual Assumptions and Examples
Predication from the negative (least):
1.) We cannot truly know being directly.
2.) We can only truly know being indirectly, from its effects.
3.) These effects we call the predicates of the thing, or being.
4.) The less a predicate says about its correlative thing the less the thing’s being is able to be known or understood.
5.) The less a thing’s being is known or understood, the less true it is.
6.) The less true it is, the more it resembles a fake, illusion, or, even some other being.
Predication from the positive (most):
1.) The more a predicate says about its correlative thing the more its being can be known or understood.
2.) The more the being is known or understood, the truer it is.
3.) The truer it is, the more it resembles the being itself.
Some examples of things that have being and their correlative predicates:
1.) Photon (or, photons) and brightest;
2.) Heat energy and hottest;
3.) God and truest.
and others.
Assumptions continued:
1.) Upon considering beings and the predicates said of them, we recognize a “gradient” up from the worst predicate of a being to the best predicate of a being. The topmost, or best, predicate of a being we call the “pinnacle” of that gradient.
2.) When we consider gradients themselves, we discover that in some cases going up the gradient we arrive at its pinnacle of being, where the being and the predicate appear to become one with each other, but, in others they do not.
3.) When they do not, the predicate is said to be a weaker, or, the weakest, predicate as it says the least about a thing, e.g., “darkest” is the absence of photons, thus it says the least about photons, whereas, “brightest” says the most.
4.) Furthermore, when the thing and its topmost predicate are so correlative that they are essentially one, we notice that together they have the power to cause their genus. For, example, photons cause the predicable genus and all of the rest of the bright things all the way down to the darkest things, despite being caused themselves.
The Argument
A. That being which is most perfectly predicated is the cause of its genus and all beings of that predicable genus;
B. But, there are no natural things that so predicate their being, yet, being does exist;
C.) Therefore, that which perfectly predicates being must be outside of the natural/physical and this being we call “God”.
jd
Predication from the negative (least):
1.) We cannot truly know being directly.
2.) We can only truly know being indirectly, from its effects.
3.) These effects we call the predicates of the thing, or being.
4.) The less a predicate says about its correlative thing the less the thing’s being is able to be known or understood.
5.) The less a thing’s being is known or understood, the less true it is.
6.) The less true it is, the more it resembles a fake, illusion, or, even some other being.
Predication from the positive (most):
1.) The more a predicate says about its correlative thing the more its being can be known or understood.
2.) The more the being is known or understood, the truer it is.
3.) The truer it is, the more it resembles the being itself.
Some examples of things that have being and their correlative predicates:
1.) Photon (or, photons) and brightest;
2.) Heat energy and hottest;
3.) God and truest.
and others.
Assumptions continued:
1.) Upon considering beings and the predicates said of them, we recognize a “gradient” up from the worst predicate of a being to the best predicate of a being. The topmost, or best, predicate of a being we call the “pinnacle” of that gradient.
2.) When we consider gradients themselves, we discover that in some cases going up the gradient we arrive at its pinnacle of being, where the being and the predicate appear to become one with each other, but, in others they do not.
3.) When they do not, the predicate is said to be a weaker, or, the weakest, predicate as it says the least about a thing, e.g., “darkest” is the absence of photons, thus it says the least about photons, whereas, “brightest” says the most.
4.) Furthermore, when the thing and its topmost predicate are so correlative that they are essentially one, we notice that together they have the power to cause their genus. For, example, photons cause the predicable genus and all of the rest of the bright things all the way down to the darkest things, despite being caused themselves.
The Argument
A. That being which is most perfectly predicated is the cause of its genus and all beings of that predicable genus;
B. But, there are no natural things that so predicate their being, yet, being does exist;
C.) Therefore, that which perfectly predicates being must be outside of the natural/physical and this being we call “God”.
jd
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