I am going to send several controversial shots across the bow. And since we’re indulging the psychology of belief and unbelief, I’m going to indulge a bit too. I fear that you’ve caught me at my most obnoxious!
It’s all too typical for intellectuals to be worried about being seen as respectable, and the modern and contemporary eras are no different. For some reason-- probably because some philosophers try to seem careful and intellectually respectable, and they think that by rejecting out of hand one class of arguments for God’s existence that this makes them seem balanced and objective-- nearly everyone in the modern era has taken Kant’s awful argument against existence as a predicate* as a good argument. I mean, it’s convenient to our psychology. If you’re an atheist or anti-rationalist it lets you reject it out of hand
tout court, in much the same way that the old guard scholastic Aristotelians use methodological considerations to try to exclude
a priori,
a priori proofs of God. And if you’re a contemporary theist trying to play the ‘look respectable and fair’ game in front of agnostics and atheists, it’s oh-so-easy to purchase your supposed objectivity by proving your objectivity: dismissing one possible candidate for evidence in your belief out of hand. (See! Look! I’m so fair!)
Sorry, I’m ranting. But let me keep going. We are, after all, indulging in degenerate talk of the psychologies of belief. We even have wanstronian, just above!, discussing some genetic reason why the ontological proof fails. Silly me, I forgot that one evaluates an argument on the motives of its proponents, and not on its premises. You know, a valid and sound argument demonstrates its conclusion, unless of course a theist creates the argument to prove his belief. If that’s the case, then it doesn’t matter whether or not the premises are valid and sound… we can dispense with such perfunctory examination and declare it
fishy and
suspicious, and additionally
in bad taste [don’t forget, to the modern, proofs of God are always in bad taste]. Because after all, if you
try to reach a conclusion via demonstrative argument it just spoils the whole thing; true philosophy requires a method of inadvertence whereby we
chance upon conclusions as if we were playing darts blindfolded.
*Thus if anyone examines Kant’s famous (attempted) refutation of one version of the ontological argument, one sees a very interesting strategy. It is often
simplified by saying that Kant denies that existence is a predicate. This is wrong. Kant denies that existence is a predicate in the
same sense in which other predicates are predicates. He divides ‘sorts’ of predicates into two types: real and logical. Note of course that one cannot exclude existence as a predicate
simply. It after all can be said of an object. One needs to press this distinction to exclude it as a valid
type of predicate to be a great-making property. But note that the burden of proof on the distinction… is Kant’s!
Funny enough, it seems to be a distinction custom made to force a conclusion rather
convenient to Kant’s skepticism. Thankfully, the psychology of his argument is irrelevant, but I’d be happy to indulge in it further for wanstronian’s sake. After all, the argument for this distinction, “
… is not an argument that reaches a conclusion based on a set of logical steps. It’s an argument that is crafted so as to arrive at a predetermined conclusion. And this is why it fails when subjected to scrutiny.”
In the first case, there is no credible argument offered to make substantiate this distinction between real and logical predicates. There is only the disputed case of
existence which Kant offers as (supposed) evidence in favor of his distinction. And it turns out that existence is a special predicate. Well, we already knew that. But that doesn’t bring us one whit closer to excluding it as a merely ‘logical’ predicate-- whatever that means! Kant’s biggest argument is the one which R Daneel uses above. Isn’t it absurd to say that there is a difference between these two objects, both apples, that we wouldn’t normally
list existence as an ordinary predicate? The idea is that existence “makes no difference.” (Again, a poorly defined objection… what exactly does one mean by this?) This argument only has so much traction.
Besides, I can easily find circumstances where one would most definitively say that existence “makes a difference!” Existence, in fact, makes
all the difference in these cases.
Would you rather be paid in existent gold coins, or non-existent gold coins, as per Kant’s famous example? Well, since it makes no difference, friends, I will take the existent gold coins, and you may take the non-existent ones. It certainly won’t “make a difference” in
your bank accounts!
Would you like to be locked in a cage with an “existent” tiger or a non-existent tiger? Well, since it makes no difference I’ll take the non-existent tiger and you can take the existent tiger.
Or if you’d prefer, can you tell me, what’s the “difference” between a man who has a phobia of existent tigers and a man who has a phobia of non-existent tigers? Namely-- sanity!
I can make little sense of Kant’s objection. If it takes accepting this little piece of modern dogma to be a
respectable philosopher, then I admit that I am not a respectable philosopher.
I’d better stop before I make any more offensive or obnoxious comments.
God bless,
Rob