The illogic of selfishness

[Qoeleth]

It would seem that there is no rational or objective grounds for selfishness. Why should my mind care about what happens to person A (myself) more than what happens to person B (not-myself, i.e. someone else)?

Let’s imagine winning a million dollars in the lottery. Now, if that event is ‘good’ in itself (whatever that means), it is equally good if it happens to person A (myself) or person B (not-myself). So, what conceivable grounds are there for prefering one over the other? Or the same with pain. If pain is bad, it is just as bad whether one person (me) or another experiences it.

If the mind is not ‘localized’ (in the sensed of being physically located), why should ‘my’ mind care particularly about what happens to this one chunk of matter which I call ‘my’ body?

And if my mind receives one set of messages it calls ‘pain’, and another set called ‘pleasure’, surely both are of equal indifference to the observing agent, the mind? It is my body which experiences pleasure or pain. Why should the mind care? Of what interest to my mind is the continuity or destruction of my body, more so than any other body, animate or inanimate? Indeed, since I know that the elements of my body will continue after death (due to the principle of conservation of matter), why should I care if they are arranged differently? Then, of what interest to my mind can its own continuitry be? Does a computer care if it gets turned off?

It seems as if any form of selfishness is inherently illogical…

 

[JohnMichaels]

It would seem that there is no rational or objective grounds for selfishness. Why should my mind care about what happens to person A (myself) more than what happens to person B (not-myself, i.e. someone else)?

Let’s imagine winning a million dollars in the lottery. Now, if that event is ‘good’ in itself (whatever that means), it is equally good if it happens to person A (myself) or person B (not-myself). So, what conceivable grounds are there for prefering one over the other? Or the same with pain. If pain is bad, it is just as bad whether one person (me) or another experiences it.

If the mind is not ‘localized’ (in the sensed of being physically located), why should ‘my’ mind care particularly about what happens to this one chunk of matter which I call ‘my’ body?

And if my mind receives one set of messages it calls ‘pain’, and another set called ‘pleasure’, surely both are of equal indifference to the observing agent, the mind? It is my body which experiences pleasure or pain. Why should the mind care? Of what interest to my mind is the continuity or destruction of my body, more so than any other body, animate or inanimate? Indeed, since I know that the elements of my body will continue after death (due to the principle of conservation of matter), why should I care if they are arranged differently? Then, of what interest to my mind can its own continuitry be? Does a computer care if it gets turned off?

It seems as if any form of selfishness is inherently illogical…

I don’t think you are arguing against selfishness. I think you’re arguing against self interest, you just used a worse sounding word “selfish” makes it sound bad
Self-interest isn’t illogical. 1st. the brain keeps functioning not because you ask it to, but because that is it’s purpose. To function until it can no longer. so it doesn’t share your carefree notions of your consciousness continuing after death.
But even you likely have self interest. Allow me to set an example.

Ever see tragedy on TV? Shootings, floods, hurricanes. you know, the news. You ever thank the Lord for your families safety, or feel lucky you weren’t affected? Self-interest.
Surely you don’t watch news of a horrible car crash killing 6 people and say “I wish that was me” or “Wouldn’t have mattered if that was me”

THAT, would seem illogical

 

[Portofino]

It would seem that there is no rational or objective grounds for selfishness. Why should my mind care about what happens to person A (myself) more than what happens to person B (not-myself, i.e. someone else)?

Let’s imagine winning a million dollars in the lottery. Now, if that event is ‘good’ in itself (whatever that means), it is equally good if it happens to person A (myself) or person B (not-myself). So, what conceivable grounds are there for prefering one over the other? Or the same with pain. If pain is bad, it is just as bad whether one person (me) or another experiences it.

If the mind is not ‘localized’ (in the sensed of being physically located), why should ‘my’ mind care particularly about what happens to this one chunk of matter which I call ‘my’ body?

And if my mind receives one set of messages it calls ‘pain’, and another set called ‘pleasure’, surely both are of equal indifference to the observing agent, the mind? It is my body which experiences pleasure or pain. Why should the mind care? Of what interest to my mind is the continuity or destruction of my body, more so than any other body, animate or inanimate? Indeed, since I know that the elements of my body will continue after death (due to the principle of conservation of matter), why should I care if they are arranged differently? Then, of what interest to my mind can its own continuitry be? Does a computer care if it gets turned off?

It seems as if any form of selfishness is inherently illogical…

I do enjoy your topics An initial thought:

—if one can say – perhaps rightly – that it is illogical to value the happiness of another over my own, one could also say – on similar grounds of neutrality – that it is illogical to value happiness over unhappiness, period. It would seem that subjective preference must enter the equation, at some point. True neutrality would be complete stoicism, indifferent to either pleasure or pain. But if I am partial to pleasure vs pain, then I am no less illogical than if I am partial to self vs other.

I like those ideas you’re expressing, though, and I think they are very much in the spirit of Immanuel Kant and of John Rawls (author of the famous book “A Theory of Justice”).

From a certain viewpoint, the answer to the dilemma “why should I value pleasure over pain” – namely, because you will feel it, not merely think about it – could also be applied as an answer to the dilemma, “why should I value my pleasure over the pleasure of another?” Namely, “because you will feel it, not your neighbor; and when your neighbor feels it, you will not.”

When empathy exists, of course, this is not entirely true, although – as I think Adam Smith pointed out – few are capable of being as sensible to the pleasures and pains of others, as they are of their own. This relates to the dilemma, so disturbing to moral sensibilities, “why should I not value the destruction of the entire world, to a bit of discomfort in my little finger?”
This reminds me of the phrase “après moi, le déluge.”

 

[Portofino]

Of what interest to my mind is the continuity or destruction of my body, more so than any other body, animate or inanimate? Indeed, since I know that the elements of my body will continue after death (due to the principle of conservation of matter), why should I care if they are arranged differently?

The dilemma I see in this – from a traditionally moral perspective, at least – is that it could be used to justify indifference both to self and to other.

Thus, it is not merely saying, “why should I care about my life?” but also “why should I care about your life?” and even “why should you care about your life?”

 

[GEddie]

Your mind is the mind of your body.

I don’t know why you claim that rationally, the mind is not physically located. Most people in 2013 would say that your mind and brain are one and the same; I’d say that your mind is a process that resides in the brain; either way, that places it within your head and therefore local to your human body. As such, what your body experiences, and only that, is experienced by the mind or the being called “you.”

As such, it is perfectly natural to be self-centered or “selfish”. If it were not, there would be no need for Christ or other religious founders to preach against it. We only need to be taught not to do things we already have a propensity for.

God Bless, ICXC NIKA

 

[Flimmy]

Must be harp over simplicities?

 

[Qoeleth]

I do enjoy your topics An initial thought:

—if one can say – perhaps rightly – that it is illogical to value the happiness of another over my own, one could also say – on similar grounds of neutrality – that it is illogical to value happiness over unhappiness, period. It would seem that subjective preference must enter the equation, at some point. True neutrality would be complete stoicism, indifferent to either pleasure or pain. But if I am partial to pleasure vs pain, then I am no less illogical than if I am partial to self vs other.

I like those ideas you’re expressing, though, and I think they are very much in the spirit of Immanuel Kant and of John Rawls (author of the famous book “A Theory of Justice”).

From a certain viewpoint, the answer to the dilemma “why should I value pleasure over pain” – namely, because you will feel it, not merely think about it – could also be applied as an answer to the dilemma, “why should I value my pleasure over the pleasure of another?” Namely, “because you will feel it, not your neighbor; and when your neighbor feels it, you will not.”

When empathy exists, of course, this is not entirely true, although – as I think Adam Smith pointed out – few are capable of being as sensible to the pleasures and pains of others, as they are of their own. This relates to the dilemma, so disturbing to moral sensibilities, “why should I not value the destruction of the entire world, to a bit of discomfort in my little finger?”
This reminds me of the phrase “après moi, le déluge.”

It seems natural, though, as if the decisive thing is the quantity of happiness/pain, not the body who happens to receive it. For example, you have a donut. No, you don’t really care much for donuts, and would get 10c worth of joy from eating it. But another person really wants or needs it, and would get $1 worth of joy from eating it. Clearly, they total amount of happiness floating around will be greater if the other person has it. Now, happiness, by definition, is a desirable outcome. So, it would be rational to give the donut to the person who would enjoy it most.

I believe most people in such a situation would give the donut to the other person. So, extrapolating the same principle, why do we not give bigger things (say, the house or car we might own) to a person who would experience greater happiness from it?

 

[ServantPD]

I can’t say that what I’m about to say is right, but I think it’s as closest as I can get to it…

Your brain plays a part on your body, and it loves you more than it loves anyone else. It may seem illogical from a certain point of view, but humans still have their animal instinct that doesn’t obey to reason, but to their own sense of survival. Living in the maximum of pleasure and the minimum of pain, regardless of whoelse gets affected (unless you have a love-type of connection to the individual in question) has been rule #1 in our instinct. Not that it is morally correct just because we’re wired like that, we are sinful by nature…

Now, the mind resides in your brain, and more often than not it works accordingly as to what the brain thinks it’s best, so to speak. If you have time to make your personal deliberation on the matter and bring reason, selfishness would be illogical to occur, as you don’t pay as much attention as to what your body acts. Selfishness either comes when you have no time or no intent to make such deliberation, thus making the world spinning around yourself in your point of view, as instinct demands. People that are self-centered care about their pleasures more than the suffering of their neighbours, which isn’t very rational to begin with (maybe they don’t even think reason is worth using, which is common when you don’t find it being a gift from God like we Catholics do), as men that apply to reason are more likely to see what’s going on with the world that those who don’t.

And all in all, seeing it from a Catholic perspective, it’s really easy to conclude that it is illogical, since the pinnacle of holiness that we seek doesn’t really care about our own instincts. I mean, we do love martyrs that died honourably for what they believed was right, don’t we?

 

[prodigalson2011]

It would seem that there is no rational or objective grounds for selfishness. Why should my mind care about what happens to person A (myself) more than what happens to person B (not-myself, i.e. someone else)?

Yes, there is a rational ground for it. A person cannot care about anything if he isn’t alive to care. Further, your mind directly experiences the effects of whatever happens to the person of which it is a part. It does not directly experience the effects of the things that happen to other people. You do not experience the physical pain of a gunshot victim; you do not experience the mental suffering of a schizophrenic. Pain, like an opposing force, repels and thus the natural reaction of a mind to pain is to withdraw. It is perfectly logical

Let’s imagine winning a million dollars in the lottery.
Now, if that event is ‘good’ in itself (whatever that means), it is equally good if it happens to person A (myself) or person B (not-myself). So, what conceivable grounds are there for prefering one over the other?

Because the mind is attached to a body which, to the best of its purely earthly perception (i.e. strictly biological; barring revelation of an afterlife) it depends upon for its continued existence. Being is preferable to non-being, so it is in the best interest of the mind to take care of its respective body. Financial security is one form of self-preservation.

Or the same with pain. If pain is bad, it is just as bad whether one person (me) or another experiences it.

If the mind is not ‘localized’ (in the sensed of being physically located), why should ‘my’ mind care particularly about what happens to this one chunk of matter which I call ‘my’ body?

For the aforementioned reason, not to mention…

And if my mind receives one set of messages it calls ‘pain’, and another set called ‘pleasure’, surely both are of equal indifference to the observing agent, the mind? It is my body which experiences pleasure or pain. Why should the mind care?

This is absolutely wrong. Your mind is what experiences pleasure or pain, not your body. “Experience” is a primarily mental event, though it may be mediated through physical events. To prove the point, once you die, i.e. your mind stops functioning altogether (for atheists) or your mind is separated from your body (for theists), the body is completely inanimate. It does not feel pain or pleasure any more than a rock does. Sensation is mental.

Of what interest to my mind is the continuity or destruction of my body, more so than any other body, animate or inanimate? Indeed, since I know that the elements of my body will continue after death (due to the principle of conservation of matter), why should I care if they are arranged differently? Then, of what interest to my mind can its own continuitry be? Does a computer care if it gets turned off?

A computer is not self-aware. Are you saying you are nothing more than a computer? If the implication here is that your mind is nothing more than some arbitrary and accidental arrangement of matter–that you have no soul; that what you call “you” is just an illusion–then I would agree, there is no rational reason for selfishness because there is no rational reason to believe there is a “self” to begin with. But in that case, everything becomes irrational, so it’s really a moot point. The very cosmos itself is, in fact, a cosmic fluke.

It seems as if any form of selfishness is inherently illogical…

It is not illogical in and of itself. Depending on one’s philosophical foundation, it may or may not follow logically from that foundation. For a nihilist, it is neither logical nor illogical. For an atheist, it may be logical or illogical depending on his personal philosophy. For a theist, it is indeed illogical, not because it is arbitrary, but because it defies the moral order which stems from the very fact of God.

 

[Portofino]

It is not illogical in and of itself. Depending on one’s philosophical foundation, it may or may not follow logically from that foundation. For a nihilist, it is neither logical nor illogical. For an atheist, it may be logical or illogical depending on his personal philosophy. For a theist, it is indeed illogical, not because it is arbitrary, but because it defies the moral order which stems from the very fact of God.

I think Qoheleth’s reasoning is sound, though your own contribution complements his worldview (assuming he is a theist).

Thus, the atheist, nihilist, or non-theist can agree, superficially, with the theist, that:

–at face value, the preference of pleasure over pain, life over death is, indeed, a preference. There is no inherent logical necessity in it, anymore than there is in choosing vanilla over strawberry and saying “personally, I prefer vanilla.” Even to say that all human beings – or all creatures – prefer pleasure to pain, life to death, is simply to multiply subjective preferences into inter-subjective preferences. The fact that most of us prefer similar things does not mean they are objective in the “logical necessity” sense of the word. A preference is but a preference.

–both, also, can agree that our preference for pleasure over pain, life over death, is based on the way we are wired, biologically. We have nerve endings that enable us to feel pleasure and pain. We fear death and bodily harm. These are universal preferences, based on hardware that, for the most part, is unalterable.

Where the theist and the non-theist part ways, is in the following:

–For the non-theist, the wiring that we have is based on chance or, at the very least, on natural selection. There is no way things ought to be, in an inherent logical sense, there is simply the way things are. Pragmatically, those who were wired for survival, survived; those who were not wired for survival, did not. Aside from this, however, there is no inherent superiority of survival versus non-survival. Both are simply things that happen, X and Y, value-neutral.

–For the theist, the way we are wired is the way that the Creator wired us; we are meant to be wired, in the way we are, at least to a fundamental degree (with one’s morality then fine-tuning one’s biological proclivities).

In short, for the theist, if the way we are wired is God’s preference for us, then it is not illogical but inherently logical. But if values are simply something in us, not out there in the world, then our preferences are neither logical nor illogical, they are simply preferences (to prefer strawberry over vanilla is not illogical, but it is partial and preferential). To prefer strawberry over vanilla is not irrational so much as it is non-rational. What would be irrational, however, is to maintain that strawberry over vanilla is the only inherently rational choice to make.

 

[Qoeleth]

–For the theist, the way we are wired is the way that the Creator wired us; we are meant to be wired, in the way we are, at least to a fundamental degree (with one’s morality then fine-tuning one’s biological proclivities).

In short, for the theist, if the way we are wired is God’s preference for us, then it is not illogical but inherently logical.

Yes, that is a reasonable way of seeing it. A point, though, is that Christ’s teaching (such as turn the other cheek, love those who hate you, sell everything you own and give the money to the poor), do actually seem to contradict (or at least radically to modify) our ‘hard-wiring’.

A theist could, I suppose, argue, “The instincts I have are the way God made me- greedy, lustful, envious, proud. Therefore, I will simply follow all my instincts.” Has anyone ever actually argued such a position? It seems plausible, but also absurd.

I suppose the fallness of our nature is an essential part of Christian anthropology, which means our instincts must be subjected either to Divine Law or to reason (or both).

 

[Qoeleth]

Yes, there is a rational ground for it. A person cannot care about anything if he isn’t alive to care. Further, your mind directly experiences the effects of whatever happens to the person of which it is a part. It does not directly experience the effects of the things that happen to other people. You do not experience the physical pain of a gunshot victim; you do not experience the mental suffering of a schizophrenic. Pain, like an opposing force, repels and thus the natural reaction of a mind to pain is to withdraw. It is perfectly logical

Because the mind is attached to a body which, to the best of its purely earthly perception (i.e. strictly biological; barring revelation of an afterlife) it depends upon for its continued existence. Being is preferable to non-being, so it is in the best interest of the mind to take care of its respective body. Financial security is one form of self-preservation.

What you say is true. If we take it as given that ‘life’, ‘well-being’ and ‘happiness’ are inherent goods, though the preference to who has these (Person A or Person B) does seem to be a matter only of instinct. If Person A had an ice-cream that would give her 10c worth of happiness, and there was a child (Person B) nearby who would receive from it $1 worth of happiness, Person A would (normally) give the ice-cream to Person B. If happiness is the inherent good, whether the happiness is experienced by Person A or Person B seems moot. Most people would probably also lay down their lives without much regret or worry, if it meant saving the life of a younger, happier or more ‘useful’ person.

Now, true, there is a strong ‘instinct’ to attach more consideration to the happiness of Person A (the self). But then, there is also a strong instinct to be afraid of the dark, to be repelled by people with disfiguring diseases, to desire to have sexual relations with attractive bodies if the chance presents itself. Yet, all of these instincts (once we recognize them as instincts and nothing more) can be, arnd are, contradicted or ignored by reason.

Why not apply the same principle to more fundamental instincts, such as the giving preference to the self than the other, or to life over death?

 

[Portofino]

Yes, that is a reasonable way of seeing it. A point, though, is that Christ’s teaching (such as turn the other cheek, love those who hate you, sell everything you own and give the money to the poor), do actually seem to contradict (or at least radically to modify) our ‘hard-wiring’.

Radically modify our hard-wiring, yes. One could also say that human beings are in a state of evolving. From reptile to mammalian; from mammalian to specifically human; from human to more and more divine. One could interpret Jesus as saying, “there is still more evolving to be done.”

theist could, I suppose, argue, “The instincts I have are the way God made me- greedy, lustful, envious, proud. Therefore, I will simply follow all my instincts.” Has anyone ever actually argued such a position? It seems plausible, but also absurd.

To my knowledge, Hinduism and other forms of spirituality that believe in reincarnation posit something like this – that there is no other way, you have to go through less evolved states before you can attain to more evolved ones. So, there is a time when lust, ambition, envy need to be surpassed, mastered, so that one can evolve further. But there are others who still need to learn the lessons of those behaviors. Even if you were to preach to them, that they should surpass these experiences, they either won’t understand and won’t listen, or they will make quixotic attempts to surpass these experiences, which actually may impede their evolution. They have to move through them, they cannot move around them.

This idea is hard to refute, in a way, because indeed there are people in the world who will not listen, when you preach to them. And there are also people who, in trying to be “good”, end up doing things are considered very bad (a like of radical Islamicists are “trying to be good”, as they understand it, and have a strong sense of morality).

William Blake’s “Proverbs of Hell” would be a good example of this kind of thinking. He writes:

“If the fool would persist in his folly, he would become wise.”

and

“You never know what is enough until you know what is more than enough.”

and

“If others had not been foolish, we should be so.”

It is the time of youth to experience and to make mistakes; and it is the time of maturity to reap the lessons of those mistakes, and to do better – to have the wisdom that comes from experience. Many view this in terms of reincarnation, such that they understand youth and maturity in terms of “young souls” and “old souls.”

Of course, even one who does not believe in reincarnation can view this in terms of childhood, adolescence, young adulthood, maturity, old age – the stages of life. Young people are more vulnerable to making mistakes.

 

[Portofino]

Why not apply the same principle to more fundamental instincts, such as the giving preference to the self than the other, or to life over death?

Careful One could also say, “why should I care if my neighbor lives or dies” or even say to one’s neighbor, “why should you care if you live or die?” It’s not clear that, if the maker intended us to surpass our instincts, that maker intended us to transcend the desire for life over death, pleasure over pain in so radical a sense, as this would undermine a very ethics of altruism. Not being a slave to it is one thing, but being utterly indifferent to it is another.

“When I was hungry, you fed me; when I was thirsty, you gave me to drink; when I was homeless, you gave me shelter.” Alternately, “why do you prefer satiation over hunger, or thirst; having your needs met, over not having your mets met; life, over death?”

Nietzsche once wrote, playing devil’s advocate, “myself I will sacrifice – and my neighbor as myself”