The Kalam Cosmological Argument

[JDaniel]

It’s just straightforward critical reasoning being applied. There’s nothing complicated about the question: what is the warrant for this assertion? If there is warrant for it, then provide it. If there’s not, then it either gets classified as axiomatic – necessary or self-evident – or just unwarranted.

Ok, so what it “potentiality”, and how does it work? What gives ‘potentiality’ its ‘potentiality-ness’? In terms of physics this is a fairly coherent concept; we can describe potentiality in terms of potential energy, for example, and understand that background factors in nature provide “potentiality”. Splitting an atom the right way can exploit the energy that holds the nucleus together, to devastating effect if caused in a cascading chain.

Hey, Touchstone:

I agree with you, but not completely. Here is one of those places that I mentioned to you, in an earlier post, about the greater difficulty we Catholics have - than the atheist might - in expressing our thoughts. We have to be so careful not to confuse the meanings of the terms we use. For example, while cause and the coming to be of a baby would be synonymous, or, in this case, tautologous, a principal does not have to be, especially a first principle.

A good definition of principle would be, “that from which anything flows in any manner whatsoever.” So, obviously, although principle and cause are close to being the same (tautologous) in meaning, there are very important distinctions between them. Principle is from the Latin word, principium, which means beginning. In that sense, it can be the same as cause, such as a parent is the cause, or, principle of a child, but, cause implies dependence.

There are principles that are not causes, such as the point on a line which is the principle (or beginning) from which the line flows, but, the line is not dependent upon that point for its existence. One could say that a line is dependent upon a large number of points in a sense, but, it is dependent upon them in a very different way. Are we OK so far? Or, did I effectively confuse you?

So, a principle is not the same as a cause, but, a cause is the same as a principle. A principle implies orderly origin, but, does not imply dependence. A cause implies necessary dependence. A new child is quite dependent upon its parents to come to be, unlike the point on a line which is not the cause of the line. These are two words that are, however unfortunately, often used to mean the same things. And, in the majority of cases, can be.

Don’t we really know what “potentiality” is? An example in terms of local motion: it is a word used to indicate the starting position of the object that is in motion, or, is about to to be motion. From the POV of “about to be in motion” it is pretty clear that this is rightly called potential. If I move my hand, in a line, so to speak, from left to right in front of me, then my hand at any point within that action is in potency to be at the next point, and so on, or at the end of the action, a point which we call “act” (derived from actual).

How do we relate this to metaphysics? You have indicated on more than one occasion that metaphysics should not be presupposed by science, or nature. Wouldn’t that seem to be more a definition of Theology than Metaphysics? Or, do you think these two terms are tautologous? I think they are not. Theology derives from revelation, and, Metaphysics studies Being and God, and, it derives its truths from first principles, in other words, from a more general science of nature (rather than a specific branch). A good definition of first principle is that it is the, “source of all that is in the order under consideration, and, is underived - in other words, without presuppositions.”

The idea of “being” has undergone innumerable attempts by all of the philosophers at a full understanding of it. You and I would probably agree that anything that is perceived by our senses exists, is in being, so to say, or, more properly, “has being.” Science tries to discover how it exists, while metaphysics tries to discover why it exists. I understand that this dichotomy has been discussed, in these forums, many times. But, there really is a difference between them, isn’t there? They are not tautologous. The components and the mechanism for the building of a house are all the scientist is concerned with. He does not care a wit why the house is being built, or, for whom the house is being built, right? But, aren’t “why” and “for whom” legitimate questions to be asked?

I won’t go into more examples than that, but our concept of “potentiality” in terms of physics comes by way of experience and empirical knowledge. But what do we know of metaphysical potentiality, and how do we know it? It turns out these are exceedingly difficult to answer with any substance, and very easier to answer with pat answers: *I just know, *or I trust my intuition. If that’s the answer then it’s my turn to be boggled in the mind by such hubris – man’s intuition as metaphysical oracle! Heh.

There will be more to come, but, I’m too tired now. I hope I didn’t bore you with this absurd soliloquy. I knew I shouldn’t have been writing it from a tired state of mind.

jd

 

[JDaniel]

Good morning, Touchstone.

punkforchrist’s first premise is a good example of the problem of promiscuity in language, divorced from real-world experience that is problematic throughout the entire landscape of metaphysics, and acutely in Thomistic metaphysics:

1. Whatever begins to exist has a cause.

This is a tautology masquerading as a premise. Philosophically, we would says this is “tautologically true” or “trivially true”. And that is a charitable way of speaking about it when our goal is to make statements about reality, for such a premise as (1) is perfectly unattached to any observation or interaction with reality. It is a definition, restated as:

1a. Whatever has a cause has a cause.

To continue: If we understand the word, cause, the way St. Thomas did, as principle, which it is, and also as dependent cause, when and where appropriate, then this problem goes away. And, I have attached it to reality. So, we may say:

(1) Whatever begins to exist has a cause, in the sense that said cause is also a principle, and the new thing that is the effect is dependent upon it

Now the cause may be pure causal, in that the effect is dependent upon it, and such is the case of the coming to be of a child. So, we do, in reality, see causes and causation, and we distinguish these realities from pure first principles. Such causes are defined as “that from which anything flows in any manner whatsoever and is dependent upon it in some way.” In the case of the effect being a new child, the effect is dependent upon the causes for its very being.

Thus, when we speak of coming to be, we are refining the object under consideration. We are not speaking of the merely accidental relationship between two billiard balls on a pool table. We are speaking, in fact, of the relationship between two, or more, things where the effect is a change that is substantial, and, usually, essential. Thus, in the case of a new child coming from the gametes of his, or her, parents, we have two essentially different parental gametes coming together to form a substantially new entity that is essentially different from his/her parents. This new entity contains some of the old entities within it, but, in an entirely new way, such that, from that point on it begins - and is able - to replicate itself into a new human person.

I contend that this is not from intuition, per se. Rather, it is from something that man can easily see and study, for it comes from nature. The biological mechanism is, to some extent, irrelevant, except as a subject of human inquiry.

But (1) isn’t stated as (1a) which is much more clear, because it’s clearly problematic, and the sophistry of (1) is made evident by comparing it to (1a). What do we mean by “begin”, then? Why, we mean something which is caused by something else! This is very useful in our own physical world; we might say a human life “begins” when a sperm and an ovum unite to form a zygote. A Zygote doesn’t just “poof” into existence, we understand. No, it requires causal elements – the sperm, the egg, the chemical context for them to interact and for the sperm to fertilize the egg.

But we’ve perfectly ZERO knowledge – forget knowledge, we’ve got ZERO EVIDENCE about how causality works in terms of metaphysics, how “something” comes from “nothing”. The strong temptation is just to use the ideas we have about the real world and steal those concepts, supposing, just because we just feel that’s how it is, that metaphysical causality is like physical causality. Totally unwarranted in terms of reasoning and epistemology, but very hard to resist, as we are creatures that have a hard time just plodding on without some answers to such questions.

As I pointed out to punkforchrist, even our physical concepts of potentiality and causality are problematic. A zygote doesn’t “begin to exist” de novo, ex nihilo. Matter and energy that already exist in the form of sperm, egg, and surrounding materials are just rearranged into a zygote. Nothing fundamentally new is created (*First Law of Thermodynamics *and all that).

The metaphysical concept of coming to be is not, as I have mentioned, something from nothing. Now, it may be, in the first actions of creation by God, but, once that initial action was complete, the rest is nature. With the caveat that there must be essential and substantial change taking place.

Now, you may continue to say that all we’ve got is from ideas from the real world and we steal those concepts for metaphysics, but, what else do you really expect us to do? We are not creatures from an alien world. We are mere earthlings. What we know, as you have rightly pointed out, is from our senses. We are able to ask the questions, "what?, when?, where?, how?, plus the questions why? and for whom? In the case of the building of a house, for example, not asking the latter two questions would result in the nonsensical building of a structure that could merely be a huge waste of time and resources.

It is not unreasonable for man to ask those questions about his origins. And, no matter what science discovers, neither of us should be the judge of whether or not such questions should be asked. You know as well as I do that science and natural explanations can only go so far. And, that leaves us both in the dilemma of needing to know more. Then, once we get at those questions, do we now suppose that we should be able to use the exact same tools to answer them as we do for science? Is that not a tad bit arrogant, to believe that we can, with our real limitations, understand that which is the essence of metaphysical study? Call it “intuition” if you’d like, but, without it, we are left with chasms of want not even begun to be filled by any other means.

I am looking forward to your thoughts.

jd

 

[Touchstone]

It is not unreasonable for man to ask those questions about his origins. And, no matter what science discovers, neither of us should be the judge of whether or not such questions should be asked. You know as well as I do that science and natural explanations can only go so far. And, that leaves us both in the dilemma of needing to know more. Then, once we get at those questions, do we now suppose that we should be able to use the exact same tools to answer them as we do for science? Is that not a tad bit arrogant, to believe that we can, with our real limitations, understand that which is the essence of metaphysical study? Call it “intuition” if you’d like, but, without it, we are left with chasms of want not even begun to be filled by any other means.

I am looking forward to your thoughts.

jd

Hi JDaniel,

Thanks for the comments. Too much good stuff to do it justice in between work stuff here today. I’m on an airplane for the west coast this evening, so I likely will not be able to respond to this until tomorrow, so will just leave this as a “marker” until then. This is a very tough, but very interesting topic to wrestle with, so I appreciate the thought and articulation you’ve invested here. I look forward to pushing the discussion forward soon.

-TS

 

[tr1954]

Why should we think (1) is true? Please be precise in telling me what “begins to exist” means. The hallmark of WLC is vague terms that lend themselves to convienient equivocations.

-TS

This is an excellent question, and I let Peter Kreeft answer you in his book "Handbook of Christian Apologetics:

Did the universe, the collection of all things bounded by space and time, begin to exist? This premise has recently received powerful support from natural science, from so called Big-Bang Cosmology. But there are philosophical arguments as well… Can an infinite task ever be completed, or done? If, in order to reach a certain end, infinitely many steps had to precede it, could the end ever be reached?..Of course not! Not even in an infinite time. For an infinite time would be unending, just as the steps would be. In other words, no end would ever be reached. The task, would, could never be completed.

But what about the steps just before the end? Could that point ever be reached? Well, if the task is really infinite, then an infinity of steps must also have preceded it. And therefore the step just before the end could also never be reached. But then neither could the step just before that one! In fact, no step in the sequence could be reached, because an infinity of steps must always have preceded any step; must always have been gone through one by one before it. The problem comes from supposing that an infinite sequence could ever reach, by temporal succession, any point at all.

Now if the universe never began, then it always was. If it always was, then it is infinitely old. If it is infinitely old, then an infinitely amount of time would have to have elapsed before (say) today. And so an infinite number of days must have been completed, one day succeeding another, one bit of time added to what went before…in order to the present day to arrive. BUT this exactly parallels the problem of an infinite task. If the present day has been reached, then the actual infinite sequence of history has reached this present point: in fact, it has been completed up to this point…for at any present point the whole past must already have happened. But an infinite sequence of steps could never have reached this present point…or any point before it.

So either the present day has not been reached, or the process of reaching it was not infinite. But obviously the present day HAS BEEN REACHED. So the process of reaching it was not infinite. In other words…the universe began to exist. Therefore the universe has a cause for its coming into being…a Creator.

 

[Touchstone]

Hey, Touchstone:

I agree with you, but not completely. Here is one of those places that I mentioned to you, in an earlier post, about the greater difficulty we Catholics have - than the atheist might - in expressing our thoughts. We have to be so careful not to confuse the meanings of the terms we use. For example, while cause and the coming to be of a baby would be synonymous, or, in this case, tautologous, a principal does not have to be, especially a first principle.

OK. Understand, conceptually.

A good definition of principle would be, “that from which anything flows in any manner whatsoever.” So, obviously, although principle and cause are close to being the same (tautologous) in meaning, there are very important distinctions between them. Principle is from the Latin word, principium, which means beginning. In that sense, it can be the same as cause, such as a parent is the cause, or, principle of a child, but, cause implies dependence.

There are principles that are not causes, such as the point on a line which is the principle (or beginning) from which the line flows, but, the line is not dependent upon that point for its existence. One could say that a line is dependent upon a large number of points in a sense, but, it is dependent upon them in a very different way. Are we OK so far? Or, did I effectively confuse you?

No, that’s well put, I think. But it’s crucial to keep the examples and propositions we look at here sorted, as this is the substance of my objection, the force of my argument, that while abstract propositions are quite free to introduce divergence between *principle *and cause, as a matter of statements about the state of affairs of the world. That is, anything *abstract *can be “non-causal”, as “cause” is a completely plastic term when you are dealing in abstractions.

So what you are telling me, with your example, is that “cause” loses its meaning in abstractions like conceptual geometry. That’s fine, but it’s very important to keep clear where statements and propositions involve the state of affairs of the world and where they do not. There’s nothing wrong with tautologies and abstractions, we just have to be disciplined in understanding they are themselves inert with respect to building knowledge about reality.

So, a principle is not the same as a cause, but, a cause is the same as a principle. A principle implies orderly origin, but, does not imply dependence. A cause implies necessary dependence. A new child is quite dependent upon its parents to come to be, unlike the point on a line which is not the cause of the line. These are two words that are, however unfortunately, often used to mean the same things. And, in the majority of cases, can be.

As above, I think if you look at how those words are applied, tremendous clarity is achieved by determining which statements implicate the state of affairs of the world, and keeping them distinct from those that do not. Here, the birth of a baby isn’t confusing as dependent vis a line being dependent on a point, because a baby, and her parents, are statements about the real world, where physical causality obtains.

A simple razor: if *X *is a statement about the state of affairs in the world, then causality obtains in a cause->effect relationship. If you apply this, I suggest you can keep things from getting confused and conflated in terms of principles.

-TS

(to be continued…)

 

[Touchstone]

Don’t we really know what “potentiality” is? An example in terms of local motion: it is a word used to indicate the starting position of the object that is in motion, or, is about to to be motion. From the POV of “about to be in motion” it is pretty clear that this is rightly called potential. If I move my hand, in a line, so to speak, from left to right in front of me, then my hand at any point within that action is in potency to be at the next point, and so on, or at the end of the action, a point which we call “act” (derived from actual).

I agree that we can invest meaning in “potential” in terms of physical phenomena, such as the example you offer here. I think you can guess what my observation is going to be here, then: it’s a meaningful concept as you’ve described it, but its something we must steal if we are going to talk about “potential” in non-physical/metaphysical terms. If you doubt this, perhaps think of an analogous “metaphysical example” that you might match with your physical example here, for comparison.

How do we relate this to metaphysics? You have indicated on more than one occasion that metaphysics should not be presupposed by science, or nature. Wouldn’t that seem to be more a definition of Theology than Metaphysics? Or, do you think these two terms are tautologous? I think they are not. Theology derives from revelation, and, Metaphysics studies Being and God, and, it derives its truths from first principles, in other words, from a more general science of nature (rather than a specific branch). A good definition of first principle is that it is the, “source of all that is in the order under consideration, and, is underived - in other words, without presuppositions.”

I think that metaphysics is not theology, and theology is not metaphysics. But I there are seams they share that where things get a little blurry. They often get confused, though, in that they both conspicuously lack a feedback loop such as science has, and as such, they are both purely conjectural endeavors.

The force of that being that while I agree that theology often relies on metaphysical “grounding” in the “principle of being” – those first principles are not statements about the state of affairs of the world, and thus inert as predicates for real knowledge.

The idea of “being” has undergone innumerable attempts by all of the philosophers at a full understanding of it. You and I would probably agree that anything that is perceived by our senses exists, is in being, so to say, or, more properly, “has being.” Science tries to discover how it exists, while metaphysics tries to discover why it exists. I understand that this dichotomy has been discussed, in these forums, many times. But, there really is a difference between them, isn’t there? They are not tautologous. The components and the mechanism for the building of a house are all the scientist is concerned with. He does not care a wit why the house is being built, or, for whom the house is being built, right? But, aren’t “why” and “for whom” legitimate questions to be asked?

I think that is manifestly not a distinction science recognizes. Science seeks explanations via mechanisms, and “why” is a legitimate question in seeking mechanisms. For example, if we find a fossilized tool in a dig, we ask not just “how” that tool was made, but “why” – for what purpose? And sciene considers hypothesis that can (hopefully) be tested that will support or falsify the “why” hypotheses as well as the “how” hypotheses.

I do understand that you are likely trying to point at “ultimate why” questions, so to speak, but that’s just a non-starter, in my view. There’s no “end” of the “why” chain. If you say “Because God”, I say “but why”? In any case, I’ll say, just to be provocative, that the distinctions we make between “how” and “why” are largely artificial in this context, as any “why” can be restated as “how did agent X come to select choice A?”

There will be more to come, but, I’m too tired now. I hope I didn’t bore you with this absurd soliloquy. I knew I shouldn’t have been writing it from a tired state of mind.

jd

This is really difficult to talk about, thanks for the thoughtful post. In my opinion, the reason people are so reckless with metaphysics is because intuition is trivially easy, and really understanding the linguistic challenges that inhere in talking about metaphysics is really, really, hard. Hard unto discouraging.

-TS

EditedToAdd: I realize punkforchrist really isn’t using this thread anymore, but we really ought to split this off into a separate thread.

 

[Touchstone]

This is an excellent question, and I let Peter Kreeft answer you in his book "Handbook of Christian Apologetics:

Hi tr9154,

Did the universe, the collection of all things bounded by space and time, begin to exist? This premise has recently received powerful support from natural science, from so called Big-Bang Cosmology.

I agree that BBT supports the idea that the universe had a beginning. It’s not conclusive in anyway, as we might imagine that the “bang” for our “chapter” of this universe is just the continuation of the “crunch” of the previous chapter – the beginning of a cycle in a cyclic universe. But if the universe had a singular beginning, this is what we might expect to find, something like the Big Bang, something where t=0 is conceptually and empirically coherent. BBT supports (2), but does not establish it.

But there are philosophical arguments as well… Can an infinite task ever be completed, or done? If, in order to reach a certain end, infinitely many steps had to precede it, could the end ever be reached?..Of course not! Not even in an infinite time. For an infinite time would be unending, just as the steps would be. In other words, no end would ever be reached. The task, would, could never be completed.

This is mystifying to read from a professional philosopher. I know Craig makes this claim: “[the] impossibility of traversing the infinite… belongs to the nature of infinity that it cannot be so formed”. What??? Just how Craig discerns this “nature of infinity” he does not say. Kreeft’s defense of “Not even in an infinite time”, wobbles in a similar fashion. He allows that an infinite time would be “unending”, which is, I think, the wrong term to use here – he should have said “unbeginning”, or “beginningless”, but for some unstated reason thinks that somehow prevents today (say) from being reached/reachable. A beginningless past is the implication of an actual infinite of past events.

But what about the steps just before the end? Could that point ever be reached? Well, if the task is really infinite, then an infinity of steps must also have preceded it. And therefore the step just before the end could also never be reached. But then neither could the step just before that one! In fact, no step in the sequence could be reached, because an infinity of steps must always have preceded any step; must always have been gone through one by one before it. The problem comes from supposing that an infinite sequence could ever reach, by temporal succession, any point at all.

Now if the universe never began, then it always was. If it always was, then it is infinitely old. If it is infinitely old, then an infinitely amount of time would have to have elapsed before (say) today. And so an infinite number of days must have been completed, one day succeeding another, one bit of time added to what went before…in order to the present day to arrive. BUT this exactly parallels the problem of an infinite task. If the present day has been reached, then the actual infinite sequence of history has reached this present point: in fact, it has been completed up to this point…for at any present point the whole past must already have happened. But an infinite sequence of steps could never have reached this present point…or any point before it.

So either the present day has not been reached, or the process of reaching it was not infinite. But obviously the present day HAS BEEN REACHED. So the process of reaching it was not infinite. In other words…the universe began to exist. Therefore the universe has a cause for its coming into being…a Creator.

Kreeft here makes the same mistake Craig does in objecting on terms of “temporal succession”, or “successive addition” in Craig’s terms. It’s (again!) a language trick, one which both Kreeft and Craig should be quite capable of identifying as professional philosophers, but which is, nonetheless, subtle.

When Kreeft says “So either the present day has not been reached, or the process of reaching it was not infinite. But obviously the present day HAS BEEN REACHED. So the process of reaching it was not infinite”, he confuses the *formation *of an actual infinite through adding (or even arriving at) elements inside the bounds of finite time with the *formation *of an actual infinite number of discrete and ordered past events in the context of an infinite past. That is, Kreeft, like Craig, assumes the finitude of time, which is a beg to the very question at hand in the Kalam. What about the *
beginningless past, *Dr. Kreeft?

Let me guess: a beginningless past doesn’t resonate with his intuitions about infinity, similar to Craig’s reaction.

-TS

 

[punkforchrist]

Hi Touchstone,

I just wanted to comment on this aspect of the argument:

Touchstone:

When Kreeft says “So either the present day has not been reached, or the process of reaching it was not infinite. But obviously the present day HAS BEEN REACHED. So the process of reaching it was not infinite”, he confuses the formation of an actual infinite through adding (or even arriving at) elements inside the bounds of finite time with the formation of an actual infinite number of discrete and ordered past events in the context of an infinite past. That is, Kreeft, like Craig, assumes the finitude of time, which is a beg to the very question at hand in the Kalam. What about the beginningless past, Dr. Kreeft?

Oppy and Morriston make the same objection. What the original argument states is this:

1. An actual infinite cannot be formed by successive addition.
2. A beginningless universe is an actual infinite formed by successive addition.
3. Therefore, a beginningless universe cannot exist.

Of course, (2) assumes an A-theory of time, and it is a theory of time that I and most people accept. This is probably because it is more intuitive, but Craig more vigorously defends an A-theory in his excellent book, Time and Eternity.

What Oppy and Morriston object to is not the first premise, but the second, and not because they reject an A-theory. Rather, they claim that a beginningless universe is not formed by successive addition, since there was no beginning point at which this succession began. I have just two points to make about this.

First of all, the central idea of the objection is that every finite time in the past can be traversed, and since there is no infinite point in the past, then the entire infinite past can be traversed without having to form an actual infinite by successive addition. However, this view commits a composition fallacy. Just because every finite moment of the past can be traversed, it does not mean that the entire infinite past can be so traversed.

Secondly, even if the past were infinite, we are left with a number of strange paradoxes. Why, for example, did the present arrive today and not yesterday, or the day before, or at any time in the finite past - since by then, an actually infinite amount of time had already elapsed?

In sum, I believe this argument against an infinite past is sound, but it’s distinct from the argument I raised in the OP. The latter is merely an inductive argument.

 

[buffalo]

I like the argument and it is backed by astronomy and physics.

“If the universe has a finite stock of order, and is changing irreversibly towards
disorder - ultimately to thermodynamic equilibrium - two very deep inferences follow immediately. The first is that the universe will eventually die, wallowing, as it were, in its own entropy. This is known among physicists as the ‘heat death’ of the universe. The second is that the universe cannot have existed forever, otherwise it would have reached its equilibrium end state an infinite time ago. Conclusion: the universe did not always exist.” Paul Davies - God and the New Physics

 

[JDaniel]

OK. Understand, conceptually.
No, that’s well put, I think. But it’s crucial to keep the examples and propositions we look at here sorted, as this is the substance of my objection, the force of my argument, that while abstract propositions are quite free to introduce divergence between *principle *and cause, as a matter of statements about the state of affairs of the world. That is, anything *abstract *can be “non-causal”, as “cause” is a completely plastic term when you are dealing in abstractions.

Touchstone:

Thank goodness! I was so tired, but, so wanted to get my initial ideas on paper that I just rambled. If it were not for your experience with this subject, I am sure you would have ended up as confused as I was, at least as confused as I was becoming.

So what you are telling me, with your example, is that “cause” loses its meaning in abstractions like conceptual geometry. That’s fine, but it’s very important to keep clear where statements and propositions involve the state of affairs of the world and where they do not. There’s nothing wrong with tautologies and abstractions, we just have to be disciplined in understanding they are themselves inert with respect to building knowledge about reality.

As above, I think if you look at how those words are applied, tremendous clarity is achieved by determining which statements implicate the state of affairs of the world, and keeping them distinct from those that do not. Here, the birth of a baby isn’t confusing as dependent vis a line being dependent on a point, because a baby, and her parents, are statements about the real world, where physical causality obtains.

Well, but, let’s not forget that there really are three orders of abstraction. The first order is the physical, the second, is the mathematical, and, the third, the metaphysical order. Wouldn’t you agree?

So, while “cause” might lose meaning in mathematical order of abstraction, for example, it may not necessarily lose meaning in one, or both, of the others. (I know this separation was not quite what you were referring to, but, it serves to better define abstraction as it really is.) Now, I regard abstraction as the ability of the mind to form a common, or, universal, concept of that which is its object. What sort of “concept”, and how does it do that?

Well, in the order of physical abstraction:

The “object” (or, subject) must not be flux. In other words, it must be made immobile. Or, as the adage of the man standing in the stream goes, so goes our intelligibility of things. The objects of abstraction become fleeting. What we think we know right now, may well be different a second or two from now. Also, the concept must be made immaterial. Since we cannot hold matter, or better, mobile being, in our minds - without some sort of painful physical accident occurring - we must hold it in some other way. We call this other way, an “illusion” of sorts, but, not illusion in a deleterious way.

We can safely say that when a man abstracts from the physical order, he is performing two tasks: he is dematerializing, and, immobilizing the object. Only by doing these two things can he abstract the common, or, universal from sensible matter, or, mobile being, both of which are synonymous, into a meaningful concept.

Now, in the order of mathematical abstraction, the mathematician already begins with objects that are immaterial and immobile. In fact, in the mathematician’s capacity as a mathematician, or, scientist, he is said to leave aside all sensible matter and retain, in the form of an abstraction, universal intelligible matter. I know that I do not have to define “intelligible” for you, but for others reading this, it simply means arithmetical realities, such as a number, e.g., 2, or 3, or geometrical realities, such as squares or triangles. Since these sorts of realities have no sensible matter, they a simply called intelligible.

We won’t get into metaphysical abstraction just yet. I believe we have both have to agree here and understand what we’re defining with regard to the subject matter at hand. Now, you said above that, “. . .we just have to be disciplined in understanding they [abstractions] are themselves inert with respect to building knowledge about reality.” Here I disagree. If this were the case, then there would be no dialectic, and thus, no dialectical induction. Dialectic and dialectical induction are precisely how science arrives at many, if not most, of its conclusions.

continued:

 

[JDaniel]

from:

The dialectic is the initial utterances of possibilities set to be considered by the scientist, regarding the subject, or object, of his consideration. This is so that the scientist does not have to go through every single possibility and potentiality, for every object, or subject, under the sun to arrive at pre-conclusions (dialectical inductions) that allow him to go deeper into what he is considering. Then, to prove his hypotheses, he performs actual inductions. The discovery of how swine flu is transferred from the pig to a human, then, from human to human, are forms of dialectic and dialectic induction, but, they do not give us actual proof until someone actually allows himself to be sneezed on by an infected pig. Then, for the second part, we have to have someone not just be in proximity to an infected person, we would have to touch the infected person’s hands, for example, where bodily fluids may have deposited the virus then touch fuidic areas of our bodies.

As regards the bolded line in your second paragraph above, don’t you think that mathematical realities, such as the point and the line, are realities that can have causality ascribed to them? The action of joining the two ends of a line together causes a circle, or some other desired geometric figure, right? The unit, aka, the one, is the cause of 1 + 1 = 2, and 1 + 2 = 3, correct? Is there any more confusion here than there is in the physical world where a mom and a dad cause a baby?

A simple razor: if *X *is a statement about the state of affairs in the world, then causality obtains in a cause->effect relationship. If you apply this, I suggest you can keep things from getting confused and conflated in terms of principles.

See above . . .

jd

 

[Touchstone]

Hi Touchstone,

I just wanted to comment on this aspect of the argument:

Oppy and Morriston make the same objection. What the original argument states is this:

1. An actual infinite cannot be formed by successive addition.
2. A beginningless universe is an actual infinite formed by successive addition.
3. Therefore, a beginningless universe cannot exist.

Of course, (2) assumes an A-theory of time, and it is a theory of time that I and most people accept. This is probably because it is more intuitive, but Craig more vigorously defends an A-theory in his excellent book, Time and Eternity.

I’ve not read Time and Eternity. Does “more vigor” means that Craig grounds his hostility to beginningless time in something other than/more than intuition? If not, that’s just not interesting to me, since intuition as validation of metaphysical propositions is a basic point of objection for me, a failure point in the reasoning chain.

What Oppy and Morriston object to is not the first premise, but the second, and not because they reject an A-theory. Rather, they claim that a beginningless universe is not formed by successive addition, since there was no beginning point at which this succession began. I have just two points to make about this.

I’m familiar with Oppy’s work on this, will go read some Morriston (the Colorado guy, right?). For Oppy’s part – for my part – there’s no need to assert that the universe was beginningless and thus not formed by succession. Rather, it’s simply a logical possibility that can’t be ruled out, especially for the very weak reason that it’s “non-intuitive”. So the objection doesn’t consist of: no, it was this other way! but rather: hey, you’ve got no basis for ruling that out!

Besides expedience for religious conviction, that is.

First of all, the central idea of the objection is that every finite time in the past can be traversed, and since there is no infinite point in the past, then the entire infinite past can be traversed without having to form an actual infinite by successive addition. However, this view commits a composition fallacy. Just because every finite moment of the past can be traversed, it does not mean that the entire infinite past can be so traversed.

Secondly, even if the past were infinite, we are left with a number of strange paradoxes. Why, for example, did the present arrive today and not yesterday, or the day before, or at any time in the finite past - since by then, an actually infinite amount of time had already elapsed?

Isn’t this just a paradox if you are fixing a “beginningful” timeline in there? I agree it’s certainly counter-intuitive, but that’s not problematic itself – science reveals a wealth of knowledge that turns out to be counter to our intuitions (science in one sense may be viewed as a systematic revolt against intution as authoritative); how is this different than wondering why 6 follows 5, when to “get there” you’d never get there by counting up from the ‘beginning’ of the set of integers? Maybe you are just asking “why is now now?”

In sum, I believe this argument against an infinite past is sound, but it’s distinct from the argument I raised in the OP. The latter is merely an inductive argument.

Right, I was repsonding to Kreeft, via pr1954, a name which I now realize I misspelled in my previous post – apologies pr1954! Sorry to have pushed the discussion off topic so much here.

-TS

 

[Touchstone]

We won’t get into metaphysical abstraction just yet. I believe we have both have to agree here and understand what we’re defining with regard to the subject matter at hand. Now, you said above that, “. . .we just have to be disciplined in understanding they [abstractions] are themselves inert with respect to building knowledge about reality.” Here I disagree. If this were the case, then there would be no dialectic, and thus, no dialectical induction. Dialectic and dialectical induction are precisely how science arrives at many, if not most, of its conclusions.

continued:

JDaniel,

Pressed for time again due to real life (work!), but just quickly wanted to comment on this now – will visit the rest later…

Abstractions themselves are inert in terms of attachment to the state of affairs in the world. That’s why we call them “abstractions”. But they can be, and often are, abstractions that derive from statements about the real world. In that case, abstractions can and do facilitate real knowledge, because they are grounded in real world experience.

This is very easy to illustrate using math. Setting up mathematical principles themselves tells us NOTHING about the real world (save for transcendental conclusions like 'reality is such that minds can conceive of abstract maths, etc.). Nevertheless, mathematical abstracts are crucial to building knowledge about the real world. The example I use often is the *Inverse Square Law *connecting mass and gravity. The simple math involved there is an abstraction we derive(d) from sensory experience, and as an abstraction becomes “portable”, such that we can treat it as knowledge, an abstraction that can be applied to future situations in the real world to good effect.

The Inverse Square Law is essential to our knowledge because it is an abstraction – that gives it its utility in applying to natural contexts in a general way. But it is perfectly useless as an abstraction in building real knowledge if its grounding in statements about the real world are removed. I can conceive of a variation of the *Inverse Square Law:

**F = G ((Ma Mb )/ r^2)
*
that becomes an “Inverse Cube Law”:

*F = G ((Ma Mb )/ r^3)

*I’m simply applying the cube of the distance instead of the square of the distance as the basis for the relationship.

As stated, we might possibly find some use for that abstraction, my newly minted Inverse Cube Law, but it’s not right now tied to anything real, any statements about the affairs of the world. It’s an ungrounded abstraction. That’s fine, but when it becomes decoupled from predicates obtaining from the real world, it’s impotent with respect to building real knowledge.

I point that out as a way of saying that this is why science and discourse can proceed apace. Abstractions are NOT problematic themselves; indeed they are essential to scientific epistemology. The problems arise when abstractions that are not grounded empirically or axiomatically get relied upon as “load bearing” elements for building real knowledge. This, you will note, is why scientific dialectics typically eschew metaphysics – abstractions without grounding in the real world (or necessity) are rightly suspect, and corrupting epistemologically.

-TS

 

[JDaniel]

Hello, Touchstone:

In one of your replies to me you suggested that we take this consideration to another thread. With punkforchrist’s permission, I’d like to hold it here, as I think that the conclusions we might reach will have a definite bearing on the OP’s original induction. So, punkforchrist, is it OK to leave these considerations in this thread? Also, would you please step in whenever you wish.

Here was the OP’s OA:

1. Whatever begins to exist has a cause.
2. The universe began to exist;
3. Therefore, the universe has a cause.

Above, I called this OA an induction. I did not call it a dialectic, but, that being said, it is a dialectical induction, a qualified induction. Why did I do that? I did that either because I have lost my mind, or else, I fully think that the argument satisfies all of the requirements of what a proper induction is, as dialectical, i.e., with qualifiers.

If I might, I’d like to simplify it slightly, hopefully, without changing any of its meaning:

1. Whatever begins to exist is caused.
2. The universe began to exist;
3. Therefore, the universe was caused.

What are the dialectics? What are the pre-conditions that make the premises underived and the conclusion true?

Well, we have a number of dialectics:

1.) from the entirety of our own experiences;
2.) from the entirety of the experiences of (all) others;
3.) from the three first principles of nature, namely, (primary) matter, possession and privation;
4.) from the standard model and all of its implications;
5.) from the myriad difficulties that replacement models are having, and, have had in trying to explain the universe’s beginning(s);
6.) from the difficulty scientists are having, and have had, with being able to examine such possibly uncaused things such as “virtual particles”;
7.) from the difficulties arising from attributing no cause to such occurrences as radioactive decay, especially in light of randomness having been deemed a cause;
to name some.

I don’t think it is necessary to run each of these dialectics through until each obtains its own inductive conclusion. Thus, as regards the OA, we can arrive at the ultimate dialectical induction (argument, or logic), which is: either all things are caused, or, they are not.

Now, the OA is true but only in a “qualified” way. Since it is (at least currently) impossible to actually go back to the actual beginnings of the universe, we have arrived at that upon which we, and scientists, can rely, unless we are recalcitrant. The universe was caused. But, we have not said what (or who) caused it. The answer to this requires another set of dialectical inductions, and these are the propositions (the dialectics) that science is running through as we speak - with great difficulty, I might add.

At this point, I merely offer the veracity of punkforchrist’s argument, nothing more. I leave it to the OP, or, others, with the OP’s permission to go further.

Thoughts?

jd

 

[punkforchrist]

Gentlemen, feel free to explore whatever points you wish. It’s all very good and interesting.

 

[punkforchrist]

I’ve not read Time and Eternity. Does “more vigor” means that Craig grounds his hostility to beginningless time in something other than/more than intuition? If not, that’s just not interesting to me, since intuition as validation of metaphysical propositions is a basic point of objection for me, a failure point in the reasoning chain.

Yes, he touches upon arguments that aren’t merely based upon intuition. Nevertheless, I do believe intuition is a sound way of arriving at conclusions, so long as there is no available defeater. Craig, in any event, explores the B-theory’s dependence on perdurantism, and explores the latter’s implausibility. That’s just one example, though.

I’m familiar with Oppy’s work on this, will go read some Morriston (the Colorado guy, right?). For Oppy’s part – for my part – there’s no need to assert that the universe was beginningless and thus not formed by succession. Rather, it’s simply a logical possibility that can’t be ruled out, especially for the very weak reason that it’s “non-intuitive”. So the objection doesn’t consist of: no, it was this other way! but rather: hey, you’ve got no basis for ruling that out!

I’m not so sure I would call it logically impossible, either, since a B-theory isn’t logically absurd the way a square-circle is. It is, however, very unlikely, especially on an A-theory of time.

And yes, Morriston is a professor at the University of Colorado at Boulder. He recently debated Craig, for what it’s worth, so everyone might wish to check that out. Just as a matter of interest, Morriston is actually a Christian; he just doesn’t accept the KCA as a rationally compelling argument.

Isn’t this just a paradox if you are fixing a “beginningful” timeline in there? I agree it’s certainly counter-intuitive, but that’s not problematic itself – science reveals a wealth of knowledge that turns out to be counter to our intuitions (science in one sense may be viewed as a systematic revolt against intution as authoritative); how is this different than wondering why 6 follows 5, when to “get there” you’d never get there by counting up from the ‘beginning’ of the set of integers? Maybe you are just asking “why is now now?”

I think it’s a paradox only if the universe were beginningless. The fact that the present has arrived when it did, under the paradigm of a universe with a beginning, isn’t at all surprising. There would be no question as to why today has arrived today, since only a finite amount of time has elapsed to begin with.

 

[JDaniel]

Gentlemen, feel free to explore whatever points you wish. It’s all very good and interesting.

Thank you, sir. This is an interesting thread, to which I am continuing to look forward to.

One question:

Do you understand the meaning of the words potential infinity to be essentially synonymous with the words actual infinity?

jd

 

[Charlemagne_II]

1. Whatever begins to exist has a cause.
2. The universe began to exist;
3. Therefore, the universe has a cause.

Is this a valid syllogism? Reason: the “cause” in the conclusion strikes me as outside the realm of “causes” we can observe in the major premise. “Cause” in the conclusion really seem to mean a “creator.”

The major premise concerns itself with one thing being “produced” by another in the way that, for example, men can cause the first automobile to exist, and therefore they are the “cause.” But the automobile is merely a mix of physical elements that already existed and are designed into something new … an automobile.

We cannot say the universe began to exist in that sense, and therefore it cannot be caused in the sense that we are familiar with. Rather, it was created from … the mind of God? God then is a Creator, not a first cause. In effect, God may be viewed as the **creator **of the principle of causality. The Big Bang, on the other hand, could be viewed as the first cause of everything that followed.

 

[punkforchrist]

JDaniel:

Do you understand the meaning of the words potential infinity to be essentially synonymous with the words actual infinity?

I would say the two are distinct. A potential infinite approaches infinity as a limit, but never arrives there. An actual infinite, on the other hand, is a set with a number of integers that can be used to form a one-to-one correspondence with any other set. With actual infinites, we have the odd conclusion that (2, 4, 6, 8, … n) contains just as many integers as (1, 2, 3, 4, … n). Craig, following Hilbert, believes this constitutes a sound reason for rejecting any notion of an actual infinite in the physical world whatsoever.
Charlemagne II:

Is this a valid syllogism? Reason: the “cause” in the conclusion strikes me as outside the realm of “causes” we can observe in the major premise. “Cause” in the conclusion really seem to mean a “creator.”

That’s a good question. “Cause” in both premises refers not just to a change (as in the Aristotelian-Thomistic arguments), but literally to something coming into being. (1) is merely denying that something can arise from literally nothing. In other words, the KCA doesn’t rest its contention upon any physical observations or physical laws. Rather, the causal principle in question is specifically metaphysical in nature.

 

[warpspeedpetey]

Gentlemen, feel free to explore whatever points you wish. It’s all very good and interesting.

i havent trolled the whole thread, but has any one mentioned the following problems with the idea of the universe being uncaused?

1. that saying cause isnt necessary, is making the logicall fallacy called special pleading?

that the universe being uncaused is a special pleading in the light that all we have ever observed is caused?

1. the principle of sufficient reason?
2. causality is as bedrock a law as any other physical law? david hume said, "universal experience amounts to proof.

i.e. if causality were not a law, then neither can we consider any of the physical constants to be laws?

1. or that there is no reason if things can be uncaused , that it doesnt happen all the time.
   shouldn’t we then expect to see things randomly appearing all the time?
2. no physical thing can be eternal because to be eternal means not to change. therefore physical things, which are in a constant state of change cannot be eternal?

number 5 kills the idea entirely, of anything physical being uncaused.