The Kalam Cosmological argument

[SeekingCatholic]

I agree that in the sub-atomic world the mechanics of “causation” is quite problematic. In the macro world it is not. If you smack a billiard ball into another one, it will cause a movement according to the laws of physics.

There are still error bars on the predicted movement (though they will be vanishingly small in the macro world due to the scale of Planck’s constant) from Heisenberg uncertainty principle. It’s impossible to predict with 100% accuracy the trajectory of the ball. So what “causes” this “extra” motion?

I have problems with accepting this, even though I try to view it from your standpoint. One is that in this case one of the words “cause” and “influence” is superfluous. Second, at what level of probability does one decide which prior “cause” is the determining factor? There can be several “influences”…

Your first objection is merely semantic. Your second objection is not to the point, for an event can admit of multiple causes - two billiard balls hit a third simultaneously. My “standpoint” is that of modern physics, which I presume you accept.

I cannot accept it. There are causes (100% determinant factors) and there are “influences”. The difference is significant.

Again, my worldview is not a 100% deterministic universe. I can accept the randomness of the subatomic particles.

This is contradictory. There are no 100% determinant factors is a non-100% deterministic universe. Randomness of subatomic particles implies randomness (albeit with much lower variance) at the macro-scale.

I find it interesting that these discussions can easily bog down due to linguistic disagreements. Jimmy defines the word “universe” differently, you define “cause” differently. I wonder, why?

Due to the findings of physics.

“Cause” can still be interpreted as “necessary cause” though, or as “probabilistic cause”, so there is no real redefinition of terms.

I find these objections “contrived” almost “desperate” in a sense.

Well it doesn’t matter what you “find”. You need to deal with the findings of modern physics, and the way the meaning of “causality” is interpreted by experts in various fields (e.g. described at en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Causality)

(Remember we’re dealing with the ways terms are understood by “experts”, and not the man on the street.)

Why do you care if there is no rational explanation for god? You accept it on faith, anyhow. Do you think that it would be more intellectually “satisfying” to have a rational foundation?

This is rather silly IMHO question-begging and ad hominem. I’ll decide to care about what I decide to care about, which has nothing whatsoever to do with the truth or falsity of my argumentation. And I should care here, for my faith teaches that there is a rational explanation for God; if there is none, my faith is false.

 

[ateista]

There are still error bars on the predicted movement (though they will be vanishingly small in the macro world due to the scale of Planck’s constant) from Heisenberg uncertainty principle. It’s impossible to predict with 100% accuracy the trajectory of the ball. So what “causes” this “extra” motion?

There is no “extra” motion. The error in predictability is due to the fact that these motions can only be described by high-degree differential equations, which do not have an “exact” solution.

This is contradictory. There are no 100% determinant factors is a non-100% deterministic universe. Randomness of subatomic particles implies randomness (albeit with much lower variance) at the macro-scale.

I don’t know where you got this. The micro and the macro world have different explanations, the laws of the macro world cannot be applied to the micro world, and vice-versa.

This is rather silly IMHO question-begging and ad hominem. I’ll decide to care about what I decide to care about, which has nothing whatsoever to do with the truth or falsity of my argumentation.

It certainly was not intended to hurt you, or demean you (or your views).

And I should care here, for my faith teaches that there is a rational explanation for God; if there is none, my faith is false.

If the existence of something can be rationally demonstrated, then faith is unnecessary. I am talking about epistemological faith, not religious faith. If faith is necessary, then it is not rational.

 

[SeekingCatholic]

There is no “extra” motion. The error in predictability is due to the fact that these motions can only be described by high-degree differential equations, which do not have an “exact” solution.

No, there’s uncertainty due to the Heisenberg uncertainty principle, even in cases where the differential equations can be exactly solved (such as the 2-body problem). The uncertainty is intrinsic rather than merely an artifact of mathematical inadequacy.

I don’t know where you got this. The micro and the macro world have different explanations, the laws of the macro world cannot be applied to the micro world, and vice-versa.

The laws of the macro world are that of statistical averages of what happens in the micro world. Hence there is nothing in the macro world that can be predicted to absolutely 100% accuracy.

If the existence of something can be rationally demonstrated, then faith is unnecessary. I am talking about epistemological faith, not religious faith. If faith is necessary, then it is not rational.

Yes, and the Catholic position is that the existence of God can be rationally demonstrated, and that thus faith is unnecessary insofar as assent to that proposition is concerned.

 

[The_Truthinator]

Answer to premise #2:

The definition of the universe is “everything that exists”. Therefore the universe cannot be caused by external causative agent(s), since they would be part of the universe.

The “universe” defined as “everything that exists” is an inadequate definition which seems to presuppose certain materialistic principles, from my vantage point. The universe is every material thing in existence, but no Christian defines God as material, but as incorporeal, transcendent, otherly–“Spirit,” if I recall, is the preferred designation.

God is defined theologically speaking as “pure Being.” His existence isn’t somehow disproven by the assertion that matter is all that exists. Christianity starts with the presupposition of spiritual realities, which transcend the regular order of the material world, God being the foremost (and source) of all these.

Rethink your logic.

Peace, my philosopher friend.

 

[ateista]

The “universe” defined as “everything that exists” is an inadequate definition which seems to presuppose certain materialistic principles, from my vantage point. The universe is every material thing in existence, but no Christian defines God as material, but as incorporeal, transcendent, otherly–“Spirit,” if I recall, is the preferred designation.

I have never said that everything that exists is purely material. Our thoughts are not material, though they depend on the underlying material.

The definition that the universe is everything that exists does not render God a material object. For this reason I cannot accept your objection. The definition does not preclude that the material world was created by some god.

God is defined theologically speaking as “pure Being.” His existence isn’t somehow disproven by the assertion that matter is all that exists. Christianity starts with the presupposition of spiritual realities, which transcend the regular order of the material world, God being the foremost (and source) of all these.

I was under the impression that the Kalam argument is purely philosophical, not theological. That is can demonstrate in a purely rational fashion that some kind of “god” must exist.

 

[ateista]

No, there’s uncertainty due to the Heisenberg uncertainty principle, even in cases where the differential equations can be exactly solved (such as the 2-body problem). The uncertainty is intrinsic rather than merely an artifact of mathematical inadequacy.

As I said, this proposition is new to me. By the way, if all the macro objects are viewed as a composition of subatomic particles, then there is no 2-body problem. Can you point me to some literature which seriuosly proposes that there is no determinism, only stochastic relationships?

It is my understanding of the Heisenberg principle that it only precludes to measure both the position and the speed of a subatomic particle. I never heard it being referred to as the source of stochasitc behavior.

The laws of the macro world are that of statistical averages of what happens in the micro world. Hence there is nothing in the macro world that can be predicted to absolutely 100% accuracy.

Let me see if I understand this correctly. Do you say that if I point a gun to my head and pull the trigger, there is a miniscule but positive probability that the bullet will pass through my head and not cause any harm? That a drink of pure, distilled water has a positive chance of being poisonous? That the speed of light in vacuum is only approximately “C”? That one can achieve a temperature below the absolute zero Kelvin?

If what you say is correct, it certainly has some very serious ramifications. But I am not convinced. The macro world is not simply a mathematical aggregate of sub-atomic particles. There are emerging attributes in composed materials, and even simple quantitative changes can result in qualitative jumps.

Yes, and the Catholic position is that the existence of God can be rationally demonstrated, and that thus faith is unnecessary insofar as assent to that proposition is concerned.

So it is your religious faith that the existence of a god (not necessarily the God of Christianity) can be demonstrated without appeal to epistemological faith? I would love to see such a demonstration.

 

[john_doran]

Answer to premise #1:

“Metaphysical intuition” is a nice phrase, but nothing more. Premise #1 is just an unsupported assumption.

A) the causal principle is about as “unsupported” as the proposition, “there are other minds”, or “there is an external, mind-independent reality”, or “our senses are reliable”, or “the past exists”, or…

B) we, all of us, live as thought the causal principle is true; science proceeds on the basis of its truth; the only putative exceptions to the principle come from a controversial interpretation of data in an area of the most recondite and highly speculative physical science we have, which utterly marginalizes the epistemic strength of those counterexamples.

ateista:

Moreover, if it were true, it would invalidate the concept of free will. By definition, an act of free will cannot be caused by external causes.

let’s assume, arguendo, that you are correct. the first 2 premises then become:

1’) everything that begins to exist that is not a free choice, has a cause

2’) the universe began to exist and is not a free choice;

and the argument still goes through.

ateista:

Answer to premise #2:

The definition of the universe is “everything that exists”. Therefore the universe cannot be caused by external causative agent(s), since they would be part of the universe.

sigh. you can’t argue on the one hand that “meaning is reducible to use”, and then tell theists what they really mean when they use the word “universe”…

i might as well tell you that the definition of “universe” is “everything that is caused by god”, and then claim that you must therefore believe that god exists because you believe that the universe exists…

 

[john_doran]

Premise 1 always struck me as contrived. I guess the analogy would be something meant for a choir.

perhaps you can explain to me how science is supposed to proceed without relying upon the causal principle.

as a part of this explanation, perhaps you can also reformulate general relativity without reference to causation or causal relationships between events in spacetime.

thanks.

crowonsnow:

Premise 2 is clearly false. The problem with t=0 is a mathematical problem, just as a singularity is a mathematical construction that only exists on paper.

how is it “clearly” false? it’s certainly not clear to me or a great many other individuals, from laypersons to philosophers, to physicists, to cosmologists.

and how, exactly, is a singularity only a “mathematical construct”? maybe you should let cosmologists know that they are using the word in the wrong way…

crowonsnow:

Therefore the conclusion is both contrived and false. Besides, with Feynman’s and Hawking’s use of imaginary time, we never get to a point of t=0, but only something very close, which renders an explanation for the existence of a singularity at t=0 unnecessary.

feynman did not make use of “imaginary time”, only hawkings did. and, speaking of “mathematical constructs”, it’s interesting that you claim that “singularities” have only mathematical existence, but then argue that a mathematical convention such as “imaginary time” has real existence.

how is that supposed to work?

crowonsnow:

More importantly, the disguised argument is:

1. Nothing exists without a cause.
2. The universe exists.
3. Therefore the universe needs a cause.
4. Therefore a cause for the universe must exist and this is a god.

Assuming statement 1 is true, statement 4 would violate it as this cause could not exist without having been caused itself, unless it is nothing, which isn’t real, therefore violating the entire argument.

why is this the “disguised” argument? why should anyone believe that what i really mean when i say “everything that begins to exist has a cause”, is actually “nothing exists without a cause”?

 

[SeekingCatholic]

As I said, this proposition is new to me.

It shouldn’t be. It’s standard physics.

By the way, if all the macro objects are viewed as a composition of subatomic particles, then there is no 2-body problem.

There isn’t, no. However such indeterminacy occurs even in a real 2-body problem in a universe consisting of 2 charged elementary point particles. You can solve exactly the classical equations of motion but can’t predict the position at a future time with 100% accuracy.

Can you point me to some literature which seriuosly proposes that there is no determinism, only stochastic relationships?

Well of course. Google for “Bell’s inequality”.

It is my understanding of the Heisenberg principle that it only precludes to measure both the position and the speed of a subatomic particle. I never heard it being referred to as the source of stochasitc behavior.

The HUP isn’t the “source” of stochastic behavior, but just its description. Although this depends on whose interpretation of quantum mechanics you want to accept. You can accept a deterministic universe, even with quantum mechanics, if you want to give up something else. It doesn’t contradict the data. People’s interpretations here are simply not based on evidence, but upon what they WANT to be true, because it fits their philosophical preconceptions. I don’t claim to be different here (in rejecting determinism), but I will say this: due to quantum mechanics determinism can no longer be taken as self-evident or obvious. Any philosophical argument therefore which claims to “prove” something that takes determinism as axiomatic is flawed.

Let me see if I understand this correctly. Do you say that if I point a gun to my head and pull the trigger, there is a miniscule but positive probability that the bullet will pass through my head and not cause any harm? That a drink of pure, distilled water has a positive chance of being poisonous?

Yes. But this is true even in a deterministic universe. The (highly unlikely) initial conditions could be such that the bullet passes right through the head. A highly unlikely reaction (with a very high reaction energy) could occur rendering the water poisonous. Of course this exactly the explanation which determinists give for quantum mechanics.

That the speed of light in vacuum is only approximately “C”? That one can achieve a temperature below the absolute zero Kelvin?

No. The difference is that the former involve predictions whereas the latter do not but only involve definitions. The speed of light in vacuum is, tautologically, c, because it is defined as such. The lowest temperature possible is 0K because that is where the zero point of the Kelvin scale is set.

If what you say is correct, it certainly has some very serious ramifications. But I am not convinced. The macro world is not simply a mathematical aggregate of sub-atomic particles. There are emerging attributes in composed materials, and even simple quantitative changes can result in qualitative jumps.

Yes, but these things are explained by the statistical averaging of laws at the micro-level over a large aggregate of particles (e.g. phase transitions can be predicted by statistical mechanics).

This is why there is an “arrow of time” in the macro but not in the micro world - because the macro world deals with averages.

So it is your religious faith that the existence of a god (not necessarily the God of Christianity) can be demonstrated without appeal to epistemological faith? I would love to see such a demonstration.

I don’t know exactly what you mean by “epistemological” faith. Laws of logic, etc., must be taken as axiomatic.

 

[ateista]

we, all of us, live as thought the causal principle is true; science proceeds on the basis of its truth; the only putative exceptions to the principle come from a controversial interpretation of data in an area of the most recondite and highly speculative physical science we have, which utterly marginalizes the epistemic strength of those counterexamples.

Of course we consider the causal principle correct. It has been observed, verified innumerable times. The problem is the jump from “we have never seen an uncasued event” to “therefore uncaused events cannot exist”. Maybe they do, maybe they do not.

But, for the purposes of this discussion, let’s accept it. Moreover I will use the word “universe” with the meaning “every natural object that exists”.

And now let’s be more precise, and rephrase the Kalam into the more precise form of:

1. Every natural object has an external, natural cause for its existence. (causality principle)
2. The universe be the collection of all natural objects.
3. Let the universe also be a natural object.
4. Therefore the universe must have an external, natural event or object as a cause for its existence.

I am sure you see the fallacy of this argument. Number 4) is obviously a contradiction since the universe contains all the natural objects.

One can resolve the contradiction in two different ways:

A) The assumption that the universe is both a collection and an object is false. The universe is not an object, therefore the causal principle cannot be applied. The universe is uncaused. This would not render the causal principle invalid, since causation can only be applied within the universe.

B) The universe is caused by some external “super”-natural causative agent.

Needless to say I accept the first one and you accept the second one.

My conclusion is that the Kalam failed to establish the necessity of solution B).

Can you bring up arguments to invalidate solution A) ?

 

[john_doran]

Of course we consider the causal principle correct. It has been observed, verified innumerable times. The problem is the jump from “we have never seen an uncasued event” to “therefore uncaused events cannot exist”. Maybe they do, maybe they do not.

sure. but the truth of “possibly the causal principle is false” is hardly a defeater for the kalam cosmological argument. or, if it is, then it is a defeater for every bit of reasoning which depends on that principle.

ateista:

But, for the purposes of this discussion, let’s accept it. Moreover I will use the word “universe” with the meaning “every natural object that exists”.

And now let’s be more precise, and rephrase the Kalam into the more precise form of:

1. Every natural object has an external, natural cause for its existence. (causality principle)
2. The universe be the collection of all natural objects.
3. Let the universe also be a natural object.
4. Therefore the universe must have an external, natural event or object as a cause for its existence.

I am sure you see the fallacy of this argument. Number 4) is obviously a contradiction since the universe contains all the natural objects.

One can resolve the contradiction in two different ways:

A) The assumption that the universe is both a collection and an object is false. The universe is not an object, therefore the causal principle cannot be applied. The universe is uncaused. This would not render the causal principle invalid, since causation can only be applied within the universe.

B) The universe is caused by some external “super”-natural causative agent.

Needless to say I accept the first one and you accept the second one.

My conclusion is that the Kalam failed to establish the necessity of solution B).

Can you bring up arguments to invalidate solution A) ?

sure:

A) nothing about the KCA depends on the universe being an object of any kind; the proposition “the universe began to exist” is roughly synonymous with “nothing existed at t=0”.

B) the KCA itself presents reasons to believe that the universe cannot always have existed: if it has existed eternally, then there have been an actually infinite number of moments of time prior to this one. but there can’t be an actually infinite number of moments of time, and even if there could, such an actually infinite number could not have been formed by successive addition (i.e. 1, then another, then another, then another…aleph-null).

 

[ateista]

sure. but the truth of “possibly the causal principle is false” is hardly a defeater for the kalam cosmological argument. or, if it is, then it is a defeater for every bit of reasoning which depends on that principle.

Oh, no! The idea that the causality principle may not be true in some instances, does not imply that it is false in general. .

sure:

A) nothing about the KCA depends on the universe being an object of any kind; the proposition “the universe began to exist” is roughly synonymous with “nothing existed at t=0”.

B) the KCA itself presents reasons to believe that the universe cannot always have existed: if it has existed eternally, then there have been an actually infinite number of moments of time prior to this one. but there can’t be an actually infinite number of moments of time, and even if there could, such an actually infinite number could not have been formed by successive addition (i.e. 1, then another, then another, then another…aleph-null).

Hmmm, it seems to me that you are changing goalposts here. You emphatically stressed that we are not talking about temporal relationships, rather about causal relationships.

We agreed before that it is nonsensical to speak about “time” ouside the material universe, and that time within the universe is not an independent variable - it is contingent upon the matter/space. And it is impossible to defime “time” within a singularity.

Let’s just go back to causality, which specifically talks about objects and events and the causes for their existence. That is what the Kalam is all about.

In the post you replied to, I explictly accepted your definition of the universe, and showed that the Kalam is simply a variant of the Russel-paradox. I offered a resolution to it in purely materialistic terms. Can you bring up arguments against it, and show that it is in error?

If you can, great. If you cannot, then we can agree that the Kalam fails to establish the necessity of a supernatural causative agent.

 

[john_doran]

Hmmm, it seems to me that you are changing goalposts here. You emphatically stressed that we are not talking about temporal relationships, rather about causal relationships.

i think maybe we missed each other somewhere along the road: i have never said that temporal relationships are not important in understanding causality, at least as it applies to the life of the universe - i merely pointed out that there are other relationships that are often equally or even more important (i.e. causal and logical)…

ateista:

We agreed before that it is nonsensical to speak about “time” ouside the material universe, and that time within the universe is not an independent variable - it is contingent upon the matter/space. And it is impossible to defime “time” within a singularity.

the KCA’s corollary about time is unaffected by current physics’ inability to describe the conditions at singularities: the KCA merely makes the logical point that there has either been an infinite or a finite number of moments of time prior to this one; since it can’t be infinite, then it must be finite; but then t=0 at some point in the past.

ateista:

Let’s just go back to causality, which specifically talks about objects and events and the causes for their existence. That is what the Kalam is all about.

hey, man - i didn’t introduce anything into the discussion that was not in your original post…

ateista:

In the post you replied to, I explictly accepted your definition of the universe, and showed that the Kalam is simply a variant of the Russel-paradox. I offered a resolution to it in purely materialistic terms. Can you bring up arguments against it, and show that it is in error?

i did present arguments to show your reasoning to be in error (and arguments, again, which were already in your original post) - you can’t simply dismiss those arguments and say, “forget those ones: what else do you have?”…

ateista:

If you can, great. If you cannot, then we can agree that the Kalam fails to establish the necessity of a supernatural causative agent.

that doesn’t follow at all, i’m afraid. for one thing, the argument you presented isn’t even the KCA, but simply one you made up yourself. unless, of course, you are able to present a formal proof that your version of the KCA is logically equivalent to the KCA as originally described…

 

[john_doran]

And now let’s be more precise, and rephrase the Kalam into the more precise form of:

1. Every natural object has an external, natural cause for its existence. (causality principle)
2. The universe be the collection of all natural objects.
3. Let the universe also be a natural object.
4. Therefore the universe must have an external, natural event or object as a cause for its existence.

this isn’t a form of the KCA at all, more precise or otherwise, so the failure of this argument has no bearing on the validity or soundness of the KCA.

what you originally did was try and establish the failure of the KCA simply by defining one of the constituent terms in a manner logically at odds with the conclusion.

what you’re doing here is just talking out of the other side of your mouth: after accepting the theistic definition of “the universe”, you then apply your lexical sleight-of-hand to the definition of the causal principle in an attempt to make it mean something logically at odds with the KCA’s conclusion (which you take to be that there must be some external non-natural cause of the universe).

so. instead of saying “the universe is everything that exists; therefore there can’t be anything “outside” the universe that causes the universe, since that cause would just be a part of the universe”, you instead say, “all natural objects need an external natural cause; but the universe isn’t an object, so it’s uncaused”…

and whatever the relative merits of this argument may be, it is not the KCA, and so fails to address the soundness of the KCA.

can you, e.g., demonstrate either that the causal principle decribed in the KCA is false, or that it is logically equivalent to your version?

ateista:

A) The assumption that the universe is both a collection and an object is false. The universe is not an object, therefore the causal principle cannot be applied. The universe is uncaused. This would not render the causal principle invalid, since causation can only be applied within the universe.

B) The universe is caused by some external “super”-natural causative agent.

Needless to say I accept the first one and you accept the second one.

My conclusion is that the Kalam failed to establish the necessity of solution B).

Can you bring up arguments to invalidate solution A) ?

1. i don’t need to invalidate solution A; i need only point out (again) that since your argument isn’t the KCA, you have failed to impugn the KCA in any way, shape, or form;
2. i reject premise 1, which is your version of the causal principle;
3. at time *t=*0+n, where n is a real number arbitrarily close to 0 (or the quantum of time, if there is such a thing), the universe arguably is an object, since our best cosmology tells us that the universe was one, infinitely dense singularity that that point;
4. your conclusion that the universe was “uncaused” does not follow: all that follows from your argument is that the universe has no natural,external cause. with which i and the KCA happen to agree. but that doesn’t mean that there isn’t a supernatural cause for the existence of the universe…