The laws of identity and Gods

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So, I am troubled with this problem and I hope that you can help me to resolve it. So lets put facts together:

(1) No one can prove a negative, prove that Gods do not exist.
(2) The laws of identity simply says that “A is A.” where the first “A” is the subject and the second “A” is predicate.
(3) Two beings that share exactly the same attributes are not same contrary to what the law of identity proposes.

I think we can agree on (1). (2) can be used to prove that two Gods are one. The idea is as following: “B=C” and “A=C” therefore “A” and “B” are identical.

The problem in my opinion is that this law cannot be applied to two beings, in another word conscious things, meaning that the conclusion of the last argument doesn’t follow from premises. Consciousness is not an attribute but it tells a being that “It is” therefore each being can distinguish itself regardless of how many beings exist.
 
So, I am troubled with this problem and I hope that you can help me to resolve it. So lets put facts together:

(1) No one can prove a negative, prove that Gods do not exist.
(2) The laws of identity simply says that “A is A.” where the first “A” is the subject and the second “A” is predicate.
(3) Two beings that share exactly the same attributes are not same contrary to what the law of identity proposes.

I think we can agree on (1). (2) can be used to prove that two Gods are one. The idea is as following: “B=C” and “A=C” therefore “A” and “B” are identical.

The problem in my opinion is that this law cannot be applied to two beings, in another word conscious things, meaning that the conclusion of the last argument doesn’t follow from premises. Consciousness is not an attribute but it tells a being that “It is” therefore each being can distinguish itself regardless of how many beings exist.
Given two beings, one labeled A. By definition, the second cannot also be A, because they are not the same being, no matter how many attributes they share. See here.

Since this is a misapplication of the law of identify, your so called problem is a myth.
 
Given two beings, one labeled A. By definition, the second cannot also be A, because they are not the same being, no matter how many attributes they share. See here.

Since this is a misapplication of the law of identify, your so called problem is a myth.
Ok. I choose being A to be davidv. I choose being B to be davidv. According to you, you are now two beings.

You will object “but when I said two beings, I meant two different beings.”

And I will say: “Different in what respect?”

And you will have to list some attributes that we can use to determine whether the beings A and B are actually different. (E.g. you might say: the beings must be in different locations! You can’t choose davidv and davidv because those beings share the same location!)
 
God is not a being. He is being.

I am not sure the identity predicate applies to God? God does not say “I am God”, God says “I AM”.

tee
 
3 isn’t true anyway.

Even if there were two “davidv’s”, it would be the one on the left and the one on the right, so rest easy!

(I’m a henotheist so I know these things! 😉 )
 
3 isn’t true anyway.

Even if there were two “davidv’s”, it would be the one on the left and the one on the right, so rest easy!

(I’m a henotheist so I know these things! 😉 )
In this case, they’d be distinct, because they are made up of separate matter in different points in time and space. So they are not truly identical in terms of our application here.
 
To make a quick comment this morning, humans are material beings all sharing the same form (in an Aristotlean sense), or essence. What allows us to be distinguished from each other is matter. The matter that makes me up is different than the matter that makes up other human individuals, and also places us at specific and different moments of time and space.

Immaterial beings, should they exist, have no such distinction. There is nothing that differentiates one immaterial being from another besides what it is, that is, it’s essence. It does not occupy a space. It is not “made” of anything that could differentiate it from another being of the same essence. Hence each immaterial being has a different essence. Angels, should they exist, are not all part of a single genus, like multiple humans sharing the same form. Each angel has a different essence.

The same is pretty much true for God. Two beings that are the same thing with no distinction between them in time or space and sharing the same knowledge, will, etc… are not two different beings. It is one knowledge and one will and there’s no way to get two out of it. You can’t localize one over there and one over here, because it is not “localizable” to there or here.

Two beings that don’t share the same will and don’t share the same knowledge but can’t be localized cannot have the same essence. Furthermore, for God, He is Existence. Existence as a transcendental, as a universal. Asking if there could be two is like asking if there is a reason to distinguish between Triangularity Type A and Triangularity Type B when A = B, that is, the essence is the same. You’re proposing that there is Existence Type A and Existence Type B, but that there is no difference between the two types of existence. As stated in other topics, God is not a being with the most existence, He is existence, full stop. It’s just non-sensual to speak of there being two. Rambling again.

I also think I’m putting too strong of a Platonic interpretation on this. It was an attempt to illustrate an idea. In one of my books there is an explanation of why there can’t be more than one prime mover, more than one first cause, etc… and then why all these must be the same. I’d like to find that.

There’s just so much background info. Essence and existence, form and matter, act and potentiality, four causes, existence as an act (not an attribute).
 
God is not a being. He is being.
That I agree.
I am not sure the identity predicate applies to God? God does not say “I am God”, God says “I AM”.

tee
I think he is subjected to identity predicate too. You already used it, He is being. I think it is correct to say that I am being instead of I am unless one claims that predicate is hidden in the second sentence.
 
3 isn’t true anyway.

Even if there were two “davidv’s”, it would be the one on the left and the one on the right, so rest easy!

(I’m a henotheist so I know these things! 😉 )
There is no location in the case of God. All other attributes could be shared between Gods.
 
Ok. I choose being A to be davidv. I choose being B to be davidv. According to you, you are now two beings.

You will object “but when I said two beings, I meant two different beings.”

And I will say: “Different in what respect?”

And you will have to list some attributes that we can use to determine whether the beings A and B are actually different. (E.g. you might say: the beings must be in different locations! You can’t choose davidv and davidv because those beings share the same location!)
Your choosing it does not make it so. Either being A and being B are the same, in which case you are giving two names to one being, or they are not the same in which case one of them is not the davidv you are looking for.

In any case “A=A” does not mean that two identical things are the same thing. It means either that two identical things are identical, or that a thing is itself.
 
To make a quick comment this morning, humans are material beings all sharing the same form (in an Aristotlean sense), or essence. What allows us to be distinguished from each other is matter. The matter that makes me up is different than the matter that makes up other human individuals, and also places us at specific and different moments of time and space.
I think matter in case of human is the same. What is the difference between the matter which built your body and the matter which built mine? I have always thought that the difference between two beings is in their form.
Immaterial beings, should they exist, have no such distinction. There is nothing that differentiates one immaterial being from another besides what it is, that is, it’s essence. It does not occupy a space. It is not “made” of anything that could differentiate it from another being of the same essence. Hence each immaterial being has a different essence. Angels, should they exist, are not all part of a single genus, like multiple humans sharing the same form. Each angel has a different essence.
Isn’t that against Aristotlean notion?
The same is pretty much true for God. Two beings that are the same thing with no distinction between them in time or space and sharing the same knowledge, will, etc… are not two different beings. It is one knowledge and one will and there’s no way to get two out of it. You can’t localize one over there and one over here, because it is not “localizable” to there or here.
That I agree.
Two beings that don’t share the same will and don’t share the same knowledge but can’t be localized cannot have the same essence. Furthermore, for God, He is Existence. Existence as a transcendental, as a universal. Asking if there could be two is like asking if there is a reason to distinguish between Triangularity Type A and Triangularity Type B when A = B, that is, the essence is the same. You’re proposing that there is Existence Type A and Existence Type B, but that there is no difference between the two types of existence. As stated in other topics, God is not a being with the most existence, He is existence, full stop. It’s just non-sensual to speak of there being two. Rambling again.
No. I am proposing that there are two existences because they are two conscious beings. All other attributes like, knowledge, power, etc are the same.
I also think I’m putting too strong of a Platonic interpretation on this. It was an attempt to illustrate an idea. In one of my books there is an explanation of why there can’t be more than one prime mover, more than one first cause, etc… and then why all these must be the same. I’d like to find that.
I would be happy to hear your argument.
There’s just so much background info. Essence and existence, form and matter, act and potentiality, four causes, existence as an act (not an attribute).
I would be happy if you could expand this.
 
Your choosing it does not make it so. Either being A and being B are the same, in which case you are giving two names to one being, or they are not the same in which case one of them is not the davidv you are looking for.

In any case “A=A” does not mean that two identical things are the same thing. It means either that two identical things are identical, or that a thing is itself.
When you are writing a computer program, you might want to make a function which does something with two integers. For example:

SpecialRatio(integer x, integer y) => x / (x - y)

Now merely asking for two integers, called x and y, does not guarantee that x and y are different integers. Indeed, when x and y ARE the same, this program will fail, and this kind of oversight on the part of the programmers is the cause of many software flaws. A careful programmer would either require that x and y be different, or explicitly check that they are different and do something else when they are the same.

Davidv’s post committed the same kind of algorithmic oversight the minute he said “given two beings” when he meant “given two different beings.”
 
When you are writing a computer program, you might want to make a function which does something with two integers. For example:

SpecialRatio(integer x, integer y) => x / (x - y)

Now merely asking for two integers, called x and y, does not guarantee that x and y are different integers. Indeed, when x and y ARE the same, this program will fail, and this kind of oversight on the part of the programmers is the cause of many software flaws. A careful programmer would either require that x and y be different, or explicitly check that they are different and do something else when they are the same.

Davidv’s post committed the same kind of algorithmic oversight the minute he said “given two beings” when he meant “given two different beings.”
I committed no oversight, You assumed that which is not there.
 
I think matter in case of human is the same. What is the difference between the matter which built your body and the matter which built mine? I have always thought that the difference between two beings is in their form.
We share the same (Aristotlean-Thomistic) form. The matter (atoms, molecules) that comprise you are not the same atoms and molecules that comprise me.
Isn’t that against Aristotlean notion?
I’m not familiar with Aristotle alone, but it is not contradictory with Saint Thomas’ Aristotlean system and is in fact what he proposes.
 
No. I am proposing that there are two existences because they are two conscious beings. All other attributes like, knowledge, power, etc are the same.
Do you mean two different wills? Anyway, If one being knows, “I am this being (A) but not that being (B)” and the other knows, “I am this being (B) but not that being (A),” then their knowledge is not the same.

Sorry I haven’t gotten back with anything else.
 
Do you mean two different wills? Anyway, If one being knows, “I am this being (A) but not that being (B)” and the other knows, “I am this being (B) but not that being (A),” then their knowledge is not the same.
No, two different consciousness. The will could different or same, create or not create.
Sorry I haven’t gotten back with anything else.
That is nice of you. It would be nice of you if you could discuss more. I have many questions.
 
Alright, so I found a relevant point in W. Norris Clarke’s book The One and the Many. We may encounter some issues, because this comes at the end of the book, after much discussion already regarding act and potency, substance and accidents, the transcendentals, form and matter, essence and existence, intrinsic and extrinsic causes… And furthermore the entire argument of this subsection of this chapter is arguing from any conditioned being to one infinite source of all being, and I’m starting smack dab in the middle, not the beginning. Anyway, there are two points which must be discussed, the first of which is that any being self-sufficient for its own existence must be infinite in perfection, that is, unlimited in its qualitative fullness of all perfections, and therefore no finite being can be self-sufficient.

Why? Let us suppose it were finite. This means it would be one determinate, limited mode of being (limited in qualitative intensity of perfection) among at least several other modes possible, such that at least one higher mode were possible (i.e., this one does not exhaust all possible fullness of perfection). Otherwise, it would not be finite or limited. Now there must be some sufficient reason why the being in question exists in this limited, determinate mode of being and not in some other possible. Why this being, or this whole finite world-system, in fact, and not some other? A principle of selection is needed to select this mode of being from the wider range of possibility and give actual existence to it according to this limited mode (or “essence,” as the metaphysician would call it). But no finite being can do this election of its own essential mode of being and confer existence on itself in this mode. For then it would have the impossible task of preexisting its own determinate actual existence in this mode, picking out what it wills to be before it actually exists, and then conferring actual existence on itself in this mode. All of this is obviously absurd, unintelligible. It follows that no determinate finite being can be the self-sufficient reason for its actual existence as this particular finite being. Therefore it requires an independent efficient cause or source of being to determine it to exist as this finite mode of being. But since no finite cause can ever be self-sufficient, we must eventually come to some infinite (in terms of being the fullness of being/goodness/knowledge) cause or ultimate source of all these finite beings. Something that is not conditioned or limited in any way and simply is unconditioned being/existence.

The same conclusion can be reached by a slightly different approach. Suppose that a finite being were self-sufficient. This would mean that it would have to be the total ultimate source of all attributes within it, including the central, all-embracing perfection of existence itself. Now it does not make sense that the ultimate source of a perfection should possess this perfection in some limited, imperfect way, less than the full plenitude possible of the perfection in question, when it is the very source of this perfection itself. Nor does it make sense that it should deliberately restrict its own possession of this perfection of which it is the ultimate source to some limited degree when it could enjoy the full plenitude of it. The notions of ultimate, self-sufficient source of a perfection and limited possession of the same clash irreconcilably and cancel each other out. No being self-sufficient for its own existence, therefore can possess existence – or any other perfection – only in some limited, incomplete, imperfect way.

Now, there can only be one such infinite being. For suppose there were two such. Then one could not be the other, must be really distinct from the other. But this is impossible unless at least one of the two lacks something that the other one has. Otherwise, they would coincide into total indistinguishable identity. But if either one lacked some positive perfection, it could not also be absolutely infinite in all perfections. If there were two self-sufficient infinite beings, they could not both know each other. For to know another real being one must either have caused it, or been acted on, caused, by it. But in this case one would have to e dependent in some way on the other, and hence could not be self-sufficient for its own existence and all its perfections. Hence there can be only one infinite self-sufficient being.
 
Anyway, two beings with different consciousness are therefore not simply unconditioned existence. One is therefore existence WITH consciousness A and existence WITH consciousness B. I emphasize the ‘with’ for a reason as the point is easily missed. As soon as you have existence with something else that’s not simply existence, it’s not longer simply self-subsistent being, but some mode of existence with a particular consciousness. Furthermore, you suddenly place being into a genus of which at least two possible modes could be (one with consciousness A and one with consciousness B), but that undermines the entire point, because they are no longer unconditioned. If it could be A or B, then there must be a sufficient reason for this one to be A and for that one to be B, and the being could not preexist itself to determine its own mode of existence. Therefore both of these beings require some type of extrinsic cause or dependence on something else to sufficiently explain being type A as opposed to B.
 
I would be happy if you could expand this.
Sometimes these arguments feel circular because we haven’t covered the foundation material. It’s like trying to speak about calculus proofs without first touching on algebra or even arithmetic.

Now certainly metaphysics is more flexible than mathematics, but Scholastic Philosophy is sufficiently different in its approach and definitions than contemporary philosophy, which isn’t taught only in schools, but has filtered down in “pop” form into everybody’s common thinking, even if they’re unaware of it. People grow up in it and don’t realize it. So in some senses, it feels like we’re speaking different languages, or different topics entirely. To some degree, a person really has to go back to the beginning, break ingrained habits, and learn to think in a different way.
 
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