The Leibnizian Cosmological Argument

[CatholicSoxFan]

I did a thread while back on the Modal Ontological Argument, and while I’ve learned a lot more about how to better defend it, we had a very interesting dialogue. Well, now I’ll do another one of these threads, only now it will be on a more familiar argument to Thomists, so I might be less shorthanded . So as with before, I will just post the argument here, and defend the premises and address some common objections in a future post that I’ll work on after I post this one. Most of my material will come from this excellent YouTube video.

P1: Everything that exists has an explanation of its existence, either in the necessity of its own nature or in an external cause.
P2: If the universe has an explanation of its existence, then that explanation is grounded in a necessary being.
P3: The universe exists.
C1: The universe has an explanation of its existence.
C2: The explanation of the universe’s existence is grounded in a necessary being.

 

[CatholicSoxFan]

P1: Everything that exists has an explanation of its existence, either in the necessity of its own nature or in an external cause.
This is a basic metaphysical principle on which much of science relies. The goal of science is to find sufficient reasons for why things are so. If things came into existence for no reason, then science would be destroyed. As Alexander Pruss says:

Once we admit that some contingent state of affairs have no explanations, a completely new skeptical scenario becomes possible: there is no demon deceiving you, but your perceptual states are occurring for no reason at all. thus we cannot even say that violations of the PSR are even probable if the PSR is false.

P2: If the universe has an explanation for its existence, then that explanation is grounded in a necessary being.
This is where most objections will lie. One of the common objections to this is that the universe’s existence is explained by the necessity of its own nature. Metaphysical necessity entails two things: that something must exist as is in all possible worlds, and that such a thing must be eternal. Now, if the universe exists as is in all possible worlds, then nothing that happens in the universe could have been different, ergo hard determinism (no free will.) But apart from the intuitive implausibility of this notion, recent advances in quantum mechanics show that an observer could have measured a subatomic particle differently, thus refuting hard determinism. But there have also been recent scientific advances indicating that the universe had a beginning. Friedmann and Lemaitre predicted based on the Theory of Relativity that the universe is expanding, and Edwin Hubble empirically confirmed this. Projecting backwards, this observation led to the conclusion that the universe came into existence at some point in the past. Numerous models have been proposed to save an eternal universe, but they have all failed to do so. In 2003, the Borde-Guth-Vilenkin theorem was presented which showed that any universe expanding on average throughout its history can not be eternal but must have come into existence at some point in the finite past. Some have tried to avoid this by postulating that the universe was contracting prior to expansion, but a contracting universe would be extremely unstable, and would not re-expand. So the scientific evidence strongly suggests that the universe is not past eternal and thus can fail to exist, and is not necessary.

Now, some try to get around this second premise by postulating that a necessary substance exists which created the universe. But let’s see what that would mean; this necessary substance couldn’t have been made up of anything which our universe is made up of, because that would mean it would be made of contingent substances and wouldn’t be necessary after all. Also, such a substance would have to be conscious in order to do something by itself, namely create a universe (if it had to be caused to create the universe, then that would be the sufficient reason for the existence of the universe, and that would just push the question back.) Thus agent causation must be true, rather than event causation, because the latter just leads to an infinite regress. But then it just sounds like the same thing as a necessary being, and it should be obvious; a conscious, eternal, necessary being with the power to create the universe, which is what we call God.

P3: The universe exists.
No sincere seeker of truth can reject this premise.

C1: The universe has an explanation for its existence.
It would be an obvious taxi cab fallacy to just say that everything has an explanation for its existence except the universe, which could just come i to being by itself. If the universe can come into being by itself, why doesn’t just anything do this?

C2: The explanation of the universe’s existence is grounded in a necessary being.

Now, we’ll look at some objections to this argument that I’ve heard (that haven’t already been addressed):

Quantum mechanics proves that something can come from nothing.
This is simply false. nothing.not

If everything has a cause, then what caused God?
This is based on a misreading of the first premise. Something can have an explanation of its existence in an external cause, but something can also have an explanation of its existence in the necessity of its own nature. Both theist and atheist philosophers accept this; many philosophers believe that abstract objects, like numbers, exist by the necessity of their own nature.

If the universe is contingent, how can its explanation be necessary? Necessary explanations can only explain necessary effects.
This is based on Leibniz’s original first premise, which seemed to imply that an explanation has to entail the thing it is explaining, which is false. The first premise of the argument has been modified specifically to avoid this objection.

One day, future scientists will find a natural explanation for the universe’s existence.

• This is a leap of blind faith. We theists could just say that future scientists will have irrefutable proof that God exists, and it would be equally good a refutation.
• If our universe had a physical cause, Leibniz would just ask what the explanation for that thing is. To avoid an infinite regress, the chain of causes must end at a necessary being.

 

[belorg]

P1: Everything that exists has an explanation of its existence, either in the necessity of its own nature or in an external cause.
This is a basic metaphysical principle on which much of science relies. The goal of science is to find sufficient reasons for why things are so. If things came into existence for no reason, then science would be destroyed. As Alexander Pruss says:

I know what Pruss says about this, but he is wrong. If there is an unexplained contingent fact, all that means is that that particular contingent fact is unexplained. It has no bearing on other facts.

P2: If the universe has an explanation for its existence, then that explanation is grounded in a necessary being.
This is where most objections will lie. One of the common objections to this is that the universe’s existence is explained by the necessity of its own nature. Metaphysical necessity entails two things: that something must exist as is in all possible worlds, and that such a thing must be eternal. Now, if the universe exists as is in all possible worlds, then nothing that happens in the universe could have been different, ergo hard determinism (no free will.) But apart from the intuitive implausibility of this notion, recent advances in quantum mechanics show that an observer could have measured a subatomic particle differently, thus refuting hard determinism.

So, if God exists in all possible worlds, then nothing God did/does could have been different, which means God has no free will.

Now, some try to get around this second premise by postulating that a necessary substance exists which created the universe. But let’s see what that would mean; this necessary substance couldn’t have been made up of anything which our universe is made up of, because that would mean it would be made of contingent substances and wouldn’t be necessary after all. Also, such a substance would have to be conscious in order to do something by itself, namely create a universe (if it had to be caused to create the universe, then that would be the sufficient reason for the existence of the universe, and that would just push the question back.)

No, it doesn’t have to be conscious at all. A quantum vacuum, e.g. is a necessary condition for quantum fluctuations, but it is not a sufficient condition for any particular QF.

Thus agent causation must be true, rather than event causation, because the latter just leads to an infinite regress. But then it just sounds like the same thing as a necessary being, and it should be obvious; a conscious, eternal, necessary being with the power to create the universe, which is what we call God.

If we analyse ‘agent causation’ we find that it is nothing more than a combination of chance and determinism, so it doesn’t solve the problem.
Besides, it doesn’t take infinite power to create the universe, so only a finite (but very large) portion of power is necessary, hence, an omnipotent being is not necessary, hence, God is impossible.

P3: The universe exists.
No sincere seeker of truth can reject this premise.

That’s true.

C1: The universe has an explanation for its existence.
It would be an obvious taxi cab fallacy to just say that everything has an explanation for its existence except the universe, which could just come i to being by itself. If the universe can come into being by itself, why doesn’t just anything do this?

Because the universe has certain laws, which prevent things coming into existence within it.

Quantum mechanics proves that something can come from nothing.
This is simply false. The quantum vacuum is not nothing.

True, but irrelevant.

If everything has a cause, then what caused God?
This is based on a misreading of the first premise. Something can have an explanation of its existence in an external cause, but something can also have an explanation of its existence in the necessity of its own nature. Both theist and atheist philosophers accept this; many philosophers believe that abstract objects, like numbers, exist by the necessity of their own nature.

In order to succesfully claim that God (a concrete being) is necessary, it has to be proven that the absense of every concerte being is contradictory. And nobody has ever succeede in doing so.

If the universe is contingent, how can its explanation be necessary? Necessary explanations can only explain necessary effects.
This is based on Leibniz’s original first premise, which seemed to imply that an explanation has to entail the thing it is explaining, which is false. The first premise of the argument has been modified specifically to avoid this objection.

Yet, you use this argument yourself to argue against the necessity of the universe.

One day, future scientists will find a natural explanation for the universe’s existence.

• This is a leap of blind faith. We theists could just say that future scientists will have irrefutable proof that God exists, and it would be equally good a refutation.
• If our universe had a physical cause, Leibniz would just ask what the explanation for that thing is. To avoid an infinite regress, the chain of causes must end at a necessary being.

There are , in fact, explanations for the universe, they may be bad explanations, but God is not an explanation, not even a bad one.

 

[CatholicSoxFan]

I know what Pruss says about this, but he is wrong. If there is an unexplained contingent fact, all that means is that that particular contingent fact is unexplained. It has no bearing on other facts.
If a contingent being doesn’t have an explanation, why only that contingent being? Why doesn’t just anything have no explanation?

So, if God exists in all possible worlds, then nothing God did/does could have been different, which means God has no free will.
You are confusing a person’s nature with what it does, which are clearly two different things. Something can necessarilly have attributes and yet still have free will (preferences are not properties, btw, as you seemed to imply in another thread.)

No, it doesn’t have to be conscious at all. A quantum vacuum, e.g. is a necessary condition for quantum fluctuations, but it is not a sufficient condition for any particular QF.
**How else can something act to create a universe?

Exactly; the quantum isn’t a sufficient reason, which is why Krauss’ answer to the question of why there is something rather than nothing doesn’t work.**

If we analyse ‘agent causation’ we find that it is nothing more than a combination of chance and determinism, so it doesn’t solve the problem.
Besides, it doesn’t take infinite power to create the universe, so only a finite (but very large) portion of power is necessary, hence, an omnipotent being is not necessary, hence, God is impossible.
Just because this argument doesn’t establish that God is omnipotent, doesn’t mean that therefore there is a possible world where He isn’t. That doesn’t follow.
EDIT: Well, it would take infinite power to create something from nothing. So actually, this argument would establish that. But the previous point still holds.

That’s true.

Because the universe has certain laws, which prevent things coming into existence within it.
Except the PSR is not a law of nature, it’s a metaphysical principle.

True, but irrelevant.
I was responding to an objection that some other people make to the argument.

In order to succesfully claim that God (a concrete being) is necessary, it has to be proven that the absense of every concerte being is contradictory. And nobody has ever succeede in doing so.
Well, this argument would establish that there is a necessary being from another angle. You don’t have to establish that the absense of concrete beings is impossible for this argument to go through.

Yet, you use this argument yourself to argue against the necessity of the universe.
But my objection to the universe’s necessity is the scientific evidence of the universe’s beginning. I have a reason to believe that the univedse is not necessary.

There are , in fact, explanations for the universe, they may be bad explanations, but God is not an explanation, not even a bad one.
Assertions are not arguments.

 

[belorg]

If a contingent being doesn’t have an explanation, why only that contingent being? Why doesn’t just anything have no explanation?

Because contingent beings are known to explain other contingent beings.
A can explain B, even though Aµistself is unexplained.

You are confusing a person’s nature with what it does, which are clearly two different things. Something can necessarilly have attributes and yet still have free will (preferences are not properties, btw, as you seemed to imply in another thread.)

You are confusing the nature of the univesre with what it does, which are clearly two diffrent things. If the nature of the univesre is that it exhibits indeterminism, then your argument doesn’t work.
And if preferences are not properties, then they violate the PSR, which would render the LCA unsound anyway.

Exactly; the quantum isn’t a sufficient reason, which is why Krauss’ answer to the question of why there is something rather than nothing doesn’t work.

The quantum isn’t a sufficient reason for an individual quantum fluctuation to occur, but nothing beside the QV is needed for QF’s to occur somewhere in the vacuum.

Well, it would take infinite power to create something from nothing. So actually, this argument would establish that. But the previous point still holds.

Since Ex nihilo nihil fit , it is impossible to create something from nothing. That’s why God cannot be an explanation for the universe.

Except the PSR is not a law of nature, it’s a metaphysical principle.

That within the universe, things do not pop into existence is a law of nature and that law explains why, in the absense of the PSR, even if things could pop into existence (and I don’t hold to that position) we don’t observe things popping into existence

Well, this argument would establish that there is a necessary being from another angle. You don’t have to establish that the absense of concrete beings is impossible for this argument to go through.

If you don’t establish that the absense of concrete beings is impossible, you have’nt established that necessary concrete beings are possible, so you are stuck with an assertion. And assertions are not arguments.

But my objection to the universe’s necessity is the scientific evidence of the universe’s beginning. I have a reason to believe that the univedse is not necessary.

You said , “Now, if the universe exists as is in all possible worlds, then nothing that happens in the universe could have been different”.Translated: Necessary explanations can only explain necessary effects. And yet you also claim that that it is false that an explanation has to entail the thing it is explaining. You are shooting your own foot here.

Assertions are not arguments

.

That’s true. And you are the one who is asserting that God is an explanation without even trying to clarify what the relationship between God and his creation actually is.

 

[CatholicSoxFan]

Because contingent beings are known to explain other contingent beings.
A can explain B, even though Aµistself is unexplained.
That’s not an answer. I acknowledge that contingent things can explain contingent things, but there has to be a beginning of the causal chain to avoid an infinite regress.

You are confusing the nature of the univesre with what it does, which are clearly two diffrent things. If the nature of the univesre is that it exhibits indeterminism, then your argument doesn’t work.
And if preferences are not properties, then they violate the PSR, which would render the LCA unsound anyway.
**How am I confusing the nature of the universe with what it does!? Imam arguing that it is contingent, and thus doesn’t have an explanation of its existence in itself. And an agent’s will is the sufficient reason for the agent’s decision. Also, you can rephrase this argument in such a way that quantum indeterminacy wouldn’t stop it from going through:
P1: Everything has a reason for it existence.
P2: The totality of contingent reality does not have an explanation of its existence in itself.
C: The explanation of the totality of contingent reality is a necessary being.

Quantum indeterminacy wouldn’t refute P1, P2 just follows by what it means to be contingent, and the conclusion follows by process of elimination; an impossible being can’t do anything since it doesn’t exist, a contingent thing can’t explain itself, and thus a necessary being becomes the only alternative.**

The quantum isn’t a sufficient reason for an individual quantum fluctuation to occur, but nothing beside the QV is needed for QF’s to occur somewhere in the vacuum.
So it’s a sufficient reason.

Since Ex nihilo nihil fit , it is impossible to create something from nothing. That’s why God cannot be an explanation for the universe.
The potentiality of the universe’s existence would exist in God’s ability to create it. Nothing can come from nothing without a cause, but not with one (a cause of something coming from nothing would be a sufficient reason that would satisfy the PSR.)

That within the universe, things do not pop into existence is a law of nature and that law explains why, in the absense of the PSR, even if things could pop into existence (and I don’t hold to that position) we don’t observe things popping into existence
Again, the PSR is a metaphysical principle, not a physical law. And by (at least it seems like) implying that the universe is all there is, you are begging the question.

If you don’t establish that the absense of concrete beings is impossible, you have’nt established that necessary concrete beings are possible, so you are stuck with an assertion. And assertions are not arguments.
Um, how is it impossible to establish the existence of a necessary being by another route?

You said , “Now, if the universe exists as is in all possible worlds, then nothing that happens in the universe could have been different”.Translated: Necessary explanations can only explain necessary effects. And yet you also claim that that it is false that an explanation has to entail the thing it is explaining. You are shooting your own foot here.
Not really. The argument is that nothing about the universe could be different, which would include the locations of subatomic particles.

.

That’s true. And you are the one who is asserting that God is an explanation without even trying to clarify what the relationship between God and his creation actually is.
A mind causing things is the type of cause which we are most directly presented with. Whether you think our minds actually do cause anything, it’s clear that we’d at least have an idea of how a Mind like God could create a universe if He had the power to do so.

 

[rossum]

P1: Everything that exists has an explanation of its existence, either in the necessity of its own nature or in an external cause.
P2: If the universe has an explanation of its existence, then that explanation is grounded in a necessary being.
P3: The universe exists.
C1: The universe has an explanation of its existence.
C2: The explanation of the universe’s existence is grounded in a necessary being.

First you need to define your terms. What do you mean by “universe”? Is the universe that which stated at the Big Bang, call it the BB universe, or it is the philosophical “all that exists” universe, the ATE universe?

What universe are you attempting to explain here? The BB universe has an external cause: God, Vishnu, the Multiverse or whatever. The ATE universe cannot have an external cause because such an external cause cannot exist, by definition.

Getting down to the details, I do not accept your P2. Any necessary entity (N) cannot be the sole cause of anything contingent (C). If we have the logical implication N → C and N is eternal, then C is also eternal because its cause is eternally present. To avoid this we need some contingent additional entity (C1), giving (N + C1) → C. C only begins to exist when both N and C1 are present. N alone is not enough to cause C.

Of course C1 is itself contingent, so it needs a cause. Again, by a similar argument, that cause cannot be purely necessary so we have a contingent C2 required in the cause of C1: (N1 + C2) → C1. You have an infinite regress. Your basic problem is that no necessary entity is capable, on its own, of causing a contingent entity. If that were the case then the contingent entity would actually be itself eternal and hence necessary.

rossum

 

[belorg]

CatholicSoxFan:
That’s not an answer. I **acknowledge that contingent things can explain contingent things, **but there has to be a beginning of the causal chain to avoid an infinite regress.

Your question was ,“Why doesn’t just anything have no explanation?” Which you answered yourself (the bolded part). The beginning of the causal chain is another question, that can be answered by a necessary being or a brute fact, or an infinite regress.

How am I confusing the nature of the universe with what it does!? Imam arguing that it is contingent, and thus doesn’t have an explanation of its existence in itself.

By claiming that, if the universe were necessary then everything in the universe would be the same in every possible world.
And I am willing to grant that an agent’s will is a sufficient condition for an agent’s decison, but if the agent is a sufficient condition for the agent’s will, it follows that only a different agent can account for a different will, in which case the agent has no free will. If , on the other hand, the agent is not a SC for his decision, the agent’s will is not explained, and violates the PSR.
In any case, this is lethal for your argument.

P1: Everything has a reason for it existence.
P2: The totality of contingent reality does not have an explanation of its existence in itself.
C: The explanation of the totality of contingent reality is a necessary being.

Quantum indeterminacy wouldn’t refute P1

Quantum indeterminacy refutes the argument that if the qunatum vacuum is necssary, the outcome is fully determined.

So it’s a sufficient reason.

Not at the level of the individual quantum fluctuation. Which means that, if we take a quantum vacuum or something similar as the “necessary being”, it can lead to several possible universes.

The potentiality of the universe’s existence would exist in God’s ability to create it.

God is pure act and has no potentialities whatsoever.

Again, the PSR is a metaphysical principle, not a physical law. And by (at least it seems like) implying that the universe is all there is, you are begging the question.

Your question was why if the PSR were false, and if the universe can come into being by itself, why doesn’t just anything do this? The answer is that the universe has laws and that those laws prevent things in the universe from just coming into being by themselves. Nowhere do I imply that the universe is all there is. There may be things coming into being all by themselves outside the universe, in parallell universes with diffrent laws, e.g., but this doesn’t effect our universe.

Um, how is it impossible to establish the existence of a necessary being by another route?

Because, by definition, if it hasn’t been established that nothingness is impossible, there are no necessary concrete beings.

Not really. The argument is that nothing about the universe could be different, which would include the locations of subatomic particles.

Your argument was that if the universe were necessary, everything about it would be the same in every possible world because necessary explanations can only explain necessary effects. Since you now seem to deny that it is true that necessary explanations can only explain necessary effects, you have destroyed your own argument.

A mind causing things is the type of cause which we are most directly presented with. Whether you think our minds actually do cause anything, it’s clear that we’d at least have an idea of how a Mind like God could create a universe if He had the power to do so.

I am very interested in your ideas of how a Mind like God could create a universe if He had the power to do so.
Also anything can create a universe if it has the power to do so, so without some clarification, this phrase is meaningless.
.

 

[belorg]

First you need to define your terms. What do you mean by “universe”? Is the universe that which stated at the Big Bang, call it the BB universe, or it is the philosophical “all that exists” universe, the ATE universe?

What universe are you attempting to explain here? The BB universe has an external cause: God, Vishnu, the Multiverse or whatever. The ATE universe cannot have an external cause because such an external cause cannot exist, by definition.

Getting down to the details, I do not accept your P2. Any necessary entity (N) cannot be the sole cause of anything contingent (C). If we have the logical implication N → C and N is eternal, then C is also eternal because its cause is eternally present. To avoid this we need some contingent additional entity (C1), giving (N + C1) → C. C only begins to exist when both N and C1 are present. N alone is not enough to cause C.

Of course C1 is itself contingent, so it needs a cause. Again, by a similar argument, that cause cannot be purely necessary so we have a contingent C2 required in the cause of C1: (N1 + C2) → C1. You have an infinite regress. Your basic problem is that no necessary entity is capable, on its own, of causing a contingent entity. If that were the case then the contingent entity would actually be itself eternal and hence necessary.

rossum

Great argument here, rossum.

 

[CatholicSoxFan]

First you need to define your terms. What do you mean by “universe”? Is the universe that which stated at the Big Bang, call it the BB universe, or it is the philosophical “all that exists” universe, the ATE universe?
Well, the first form of the argument, the one you quoted, had the former definition.

What universe are you attempting to explain here? The BB universe has an external cause: God, Vishnu, the Multiverse or whatever. The ATE universe cannot have an external cause because such an external cause cannot exist, by definition.
Well, in the second form of the argument which I introduced to belorg, it would be all that CONTINGENTLY exists, not all that exists; since I (obviously) think God exists, I think God would be in the ATE universe.

Getting down to the details, I do not accept your P2. Any necessary entity (N) cannot be the sole cause of anything contingent (C). If we have the logical implication N → C and N is eternal, then C is also eternal because its cause is eternally present. To avoid this we need some contingent additional entity (C1), giving (N + C1) → C. C only begins to exist when both N and C1 are present. N alone is not enough to cause C.

Of course C1 is itself contingent, so it needs a cause. Again, by a similar argument, that cause cannot be purely necessary so we have a contingent C2 required in the cause of C1: (N1 + C2) → C1. You have an infinite regress. Your basic problem is that no necessary entity is capable, on its own, of causing a contingent entity. If that were the case then the contingent entity would actually be itself eternal and hence necessary.
Who says a timeless being can’t create time?

rossum

 

[CatholicSoxFan]

That’s not an answer. I **acknowledge that contingent things can explain contingent things, **but there has to be a beginning of the causal chain to avoid an infinite regress.

Your question was ,“Why doesn’t just anything have no explanation?” Which you answered yourself (the bolded part). The beginning of the causal chain is another question, that can be answered by a necessary being or a brute fact, or an infinite regress.
If a metaphysical law can be violated to begin the universe, who says a physical law can’t be violated afterwards? It seems you are not merely equating physical laws with logical laws (which is itself absurd, because it seems to presuppose naturalism/materialism), you are actually putting physical laws OVER logical laws.

By claiming that, if the universe were necessary then everything in the universe would be the same in every possible world.
And I am willing to grant that an agent’s will is a sufficient condition for an agent’s decison, but if the agent is a sufficient condition for the agent’s will, it follows that only a different agent can account for a different will, in which case the agent has no free will. If , on the other hand, the agent is not a SC for his decision, the agent’s will is not explained, and violates the PSR.
In any case, this is lethal for your argument.
Listen to what you are saying; you are begging the question, by saying that the same agent can’t account for different decisions.

Quantum indeterminacy refutes the argument that if the qunatum vacuum is necssary, the outcome is fully determined.

Not at the level of the individual quantum fluctuation. Which means that, if we take a quantum vacuum or something similar as the “necessary being”, it can lead to several possible universes.
What I am talking about here is the location of subatomic particles, which could be different.

God is pure act and has no potentialities whatsoever.
Says who?

Your question was why if the PSR were false, and if the universe can come into being by itself, why doesn’t just anything do this? The answer is that the universe has laws and that those laws prevent things in the universe from just coming into being by themselves. Nowhere do I imply that the universe is all there is. There may be things coming into being all by themselves outside the universe, in parallell universes with diffrent laws, e.g., but this doesn’t effect our universe.
See the first response.

Because, by definition, if it hasn’t been established that nothingness is impossible, there are no necessary concrete beings.
You can establish that there is a necessary concrete being otherwise and then by that truth establish that nothingness is impossible.

Your argument was that if the universe were necessary, everything about it would be the same in every possible world because necessary explanations can only explain necessary effects. Since you now seem to deny that it is true that necessary explanations can only explain necessary effects, you have destroyed your own argument.
See above.

I am very interested in your ideas of how a Mind like God could create a universe if He had the power to do so.
Also anything can create a universe if it has the power to do so, so without some clarification, this phrase is meaningless.
My point is that something cannot act to create something by itself if it isn’t conscious. If you have a better inference of what else CAN do so, I’d love to hear it.
.

 

[rossum]

Well, the first form of the argument, the one you quoted, had the former definition.

You are assuming that the ATE universe is eternal. It might have a beginning in time but not have a cause. It could have arisen randomly. Better to define your terms more strictly.

Who says a timeless being can’t create time?

I do. It impossible to create in the absence of time,because there is no “before” and hence it is impossible to state that the cause/creator is “before” the effect/created.

The logical relationship between cause (C) and effect (E) is an implication: C-> E. If we reverse the implication we get: ~E → ~C. In the absence of the effect then there is no cause. If there is no time then there can be no cause of time. The absence of time is, obviously, timeless. Hence the absence of the cause of time is also timeless.

You have also diverted from my point that any causation by a necessary entity requires an infinite regress of contingent entities.

rossum

 

[belorg]

Y
If a metaphysical law can be violated to begin the universe, who says a physical law can’t be violated afterwards?

I have answered that question and so have you, so why are you still persisting with this sort of questions?

It seems you are not merely equating physical laws with logical laws (which is itself absurd, because it seems to presuppose naturalism/materialism), you are actually putting physical laws OVER logical laws.

The PSR is not a logical law. And I am not presuppsoing anything.

Listen to what you are saying; you are begging the question, by saying that the same agent can’t account for different decisions.

I said, “If the agent is a sufficient condition for the agent’s will, it follows that only a different agent can account for a different will”. If you want to address ly actual argument, you’re welcome, but please stop erecting strawmen.

What I am talking about here is the location of subatomic particles, which could be different.

So, you agree with me that a necessary universe does not mean that everything in it is necssary. Fine.

God is pure act and has no potentialities whatsoever.
Says who?

Says Thomas of Aquino.

You can establish that there is a necessary concrete being otherwise and then by that truth establish that nothingness is impossible.

That would be question-begging.

Your argument was that if the universe were necessary, everything about it would be the same in every possible world because necessary explanations can only explain necessary effects. Since you now seem to deny that it is true that necessary explanations can only explain necessary effects, you have destroyed your own argument.
See above.

I see above that you admit that you were wrong about this.

My point is that something cannot act to create something by itself if it isn’t conscious. If you have a better inference of what else CAN do so, I’d love to hear it.

A quantum vacuum.

 

[CatholicSoxFan]

You are assuming that the ATE universe is eternal. It might have a beginning in time but not have a cause. It could have arisen randomly. Better to define your terms more strictly.
Then you can’t explain how just anything does the same thing, unless you put physical laws over logical laws as belorg has.

I do. It impossible to create in the absence of time,because there is no “before” and hence it is impossible to state that the cause/creator is “before” the effect/created.

The logical relationship between cause (C) and effect (E) is an implication: C-> E. If we reverse the implication we get: ~E → ~C. In the absence of the effect then there is no cause. If there is no time then there can be no cause of time. The absence of time is, obviously, timeless. Hence the absence of the cause of time is also timeless.
You are assuming that an effect can’t be simultaneous to its cause. That would be how I think time was created.

You have also diverted from my point that any causation by a necessary entity requires an infinite regress of contingent entities.
**That would be the same objection as belorg basically. I think that God’s choices are contingent, and that is how a neccessary being can cause contingent effects. My argument from indeterminacy was about the location of particles though, so the two are not analogous. **

rossum

 

[CatholicSoxFan]

I have answered that question and so have you, so why are you still persisting with this sort of questions?
Because the way you answer the question is by putting physical laws over logical laws.

The PSR is not a logical law. And I am not presuppsoing anything.
Um, it is.
plato.stanford.edu/entries/sufficient-reason/

The Principle of Sufficient Reason is a powerful and controversial philosophical

This has been a very good discussion, btw.

 

[rossum]

Please do not inline your responses, it makes for more work in replying to them. Simply add “[noparse][/noparse]” after the bit you are responding to, and then add "[noparse]

[/noparse]" after you have finished your part response.

Then you can’t explain how just anything does the same thing, unless you put physical laws over logical laws as belorg has.

This has no relationship that I can see to a possible random origin of an ATE universe.

You are assuming that an effect can’t be simultaneous to its cause. That would be how I think time was created.

 

[belorg]

This has been a very good discussion, btw.

CatholicSoxFan

I would like to repeat rossums advise to you:
Please do not inline your responses, it makes for more work in replying to them. Simply add “” after the bit you are responding to, and then add "

" after you have finished your part response.

Because the way you answer the question is by putting physical laws over logical laws.

The question was, “Why doesn’t just anything have no explanation.” And you answered that question yourself, when you said , “I acknowledge that contingent things can explain contingent things”. I am OK with that answer.

The Principle of Sufficient Reason is a powerful and controversial

philosophical principle stipulating that everything must have a reason or cause.

I have bolded the relevant parts for you here. While indeed some people describe the PSR as a fourth law, nexts to the classic laws of logic, this is quite controversial and as long as it hasn’t been proven or it isn’t obvious that the PSR is true, I don’t consider it a law.

Well, agents can make contingent choices though (sorry for the misunderstanding.) It doesn’t seem you’ve been able to establish that it can’t. I’ll have to look further int this though.

I very much doubt that** necessary** agents (if they exist) can make contingent choices, but let me repeat what I actually said.
“I am willing to grant that an agent’s will is a sufficient condition for an agent’s decision, but if the agent is a sufficient condition for the agent’s will, it follows that only a different agent can account for a different will, in which case the agent has no free will.”

So in case a necessary agent is a SC for his will, it follows that he cannot make contingent choices.

“If , on the other hand, the agent is not a SC for his decision, the agent’s will is not explained, and violates the PSR.”

So, in this case, the agent can make a contingent choice, but this choice is unexplained, and violates the PSR.

Well, it would seem that it would require that the locations of particles couldn’t have been different.

A quantum vacuum is not a sufficient condition for the location of the virtual particles, hence, if a QV (or something similar to it) is necessary, it is not true that the universe resulting from it would be the same in every possible world.

Says Thomas of Aquino.
I would love to see the quote, because omnipotence is all about potentiality. That’s what power is for crying out loud. It’s a being’s potential to do something.

If that is what power is, then the Thomist God has no power. But, you’ll have to take that up with a Thomist.

That would be question-begging.
No, because you’d have another reason to say that there is a necessary being. Begging the question is when the only reason you have for accepting a premise is that you already accept the conclusion, and that’s not the situation we would have.

In that case you have two conflicting arguments. So until it is porven that the PSR is correct, you cannot just assert without begging the question that nothingness is impossible.

What? I was referring to my point about my point being about the LOCATIONS of particles, which would seem to have to be as is if the universe is necessary.

If the locations can be different, it is false that a necessary quantum vacuum can only give one result.

Well, without the quantum vacuum having free will, I think Peter van Inwagen’s objection would work on it. Again I have to look into this more though.

What exactly is Van Inwagen’s objection?

 

[levinas12]

… The explanation of the universe’s existence is grounded in a necessary being.

I hesitate to jump into the middle of this discussion which at times is more than a bit daunting to follow.

But I need to ask a question (which may be irrelevant).

Would this metaphysical argument have been possible without Genesis? That is, did a “revealed truth” have to come first?

The reason why I even raise this issue is that the radical contingency of the world is a notion completely foreign to ancient Greek philosophy. So how could such notion have occurred in the first place?

 

[levinas12]

… The explanation of the universe’s existence is grounded in a necessary being.

I hesitate to jump into this discussion which is a bit daunting to follow. But I need to ask an irrelevant question.

How did the notion of the radical contingency of the world get on the screen in first place?

It certainly didn’t occur to Aristotle (the father of metaphysics).

So what happened?

The book of Genesis. A “revealed truth”.

 

[tdgesq]

That is not possible. If they are simultaneous, then neither came before the other so the cause cannot be in place before the effect.

Well, that’s another way of saying that cause and effect are simultaneous. I don’t agree with the “not possible” part though.

Hence the cause is not required for the effect to be in place.

My arm is resting on a cushioned chair arm right now, causing the cushioning to be depressed. Is the weight of my arm and the resulting effect of an indentation in the cushion an instance of simultaneous cause and effect? It certainly appears to be. What about the EPR Paradox?

If they are simultaneous, then either they are both the effects of some earlier cause

Unless the cause is timelessly eternal.