The Leibnizian Cosmological Argument

[rossum]

We do? And all this time I thought the assertion of an uncaused timeless immaterial cause broke the infinite regress. Of course, we never get there as long as you insist without any demonstration that simultaneous cause and effect are logically impossible.

You assert that God caused/created the universe: G → U. However, God did not suddenly appear 13.5 billion years ago. Therefore there must be some other non-timeless element in the logical implication: (G + X) → U. It is the X which determines that the universe is 13.5 billion years old rather than 100 billion years old or 5 billion years old.

The infinite regress does not derive from God, but from the X. What caused X? What caused the cause of X etc. This is a standard problem for a necessary entity (God) causing a contingent entity (the universe).

rossum

 

[Prodigal_Son]

I like the argument a great deal. Of course, it doesn’t prove that the Christian God exists, only that the universe is caused by some necessary being.

A few comments:

Metaphysical necessity entails two things: that something must exist as is in all possible worlds, and that such a thing must be eternal.

Does the metaphysical necessity of objects entail eternality? I would have assumed it doesn’t, since the metaphysical necessity of propositions doesn’t entail eternality. Why couldn’t there be a cheeseburger that necessarily exists during the first few seconds of every possible world, and stops existing afterward?

Now, if the universe exists as is in all possible worlds, then nothing that happens in the universe could have been different, ergo hard determinism (no free will.) But apart from the intuitive implausibility of this notion, recent advances in quantum mechanics show that an observer could have measured a subatomic particle differently, thus refuting hard determinism.

Those experiments don’t disprove hard determinism. They *might *disprove that every hard-determined is in principle predictable by human beings, but they don’t disprove that (ontologically) the events necessarily follow from previous events.

Also, I don’t understand where you’re getting the assumption that, if a necessary being exists, then the universe exists as it is in all possible worlds. Why couldn’t a necessary being make one world one way, and another world another way? After all, we are thinking of the necessary being as a free being who can cause things according to free will, no?

Now, some try to get around this second premise by postulating that a necessary substance exists which created the universe. But let’s see what that would mean; this necessary substance couldn’t have been made up of anything which our universe is made up of, because that would mean it would be made of contingent substances and wouldn’t be necessary after all. Also, such a substance would have to be conscious in order to do something by itself, namely create a universe (if it had to be caused to create the universe, then that would be the sufficient reason for the existence of the universe, and that would just push the question back.) Thus agent causation must be true, rather than event causation, because the latter just leads to an infinite regress.

I don’t understand why agent causation is necessary. Presumably because of the principle of sufficient reason? Supposing we had a necessary thingamabob that mindlessly created all things, you might ask the question, “Why did the thingamabob create *these *things, instead of other things?”

But this same problem applies to God, too, so far as I can tell. If we apply the PSR here, we will ask the question why God creates these things rather than other things, or more precisely, why God has these characteristics rather than other characteristics. That question isn’t answered by agent causation, so I don’t see how your argument proves a necessary God rather than a necessary thingamabob.

 

[tdgesq]

We have agreed that a non-existent cause cannot have any effect. If cause and effect are simultaneous, as you claim, then how do you distinguish cause from effect? You cannot use temporal priority, but must use some other distinguisher. If you cannot distinguish, then you will have difficulty arguing about cause and effect, since you cannot tell them apart.

Rossum, I answered this fully in the previous post. 1) There are temporally prior remote causes that let us distinguish the immediate (simultaneous) cause from the effect; and (2) there is final causality, where the nature of certain objects let us know that they can only produce certain types of effects, whether simultaneous or not. You may not be convinced by these answers, but you did receive them.

I am using Nagarjuna’s logic here, not Aristotle’s or Aquinas’. A non-existent cause cannot cause anything. Hence, the cause must exist. Existence is divided into three phases: arising, sustaining and decay. The cause can only have an effect during the sustaining phase, because it is not present until after the arising phase.

I only brought up Aquinas and Aristotle so you did not think this was my own peculiar philosophy of causation. I don’t expect you to agree with it, but to demonstrate its impossibility, since that’s what you asserted. I am interested here in the sustaining phase, because I find it difficult to comprehend how something can be presently sustained by a cause that temporally preceded it. The very word “sustaining” implies that there is something “now” supporting the effect.

I do not deny that there are causes that precede effects. Nor do I deny that an effect may be the cause of a subsequent effect. What I am asserting is that there must be an immediate cause of any effect, which is simultaneous to it. Otherwise at the time of the effect, there is no cause.

That is not simultaneous. There is a short, measurable, delay before cell division starts.

Please read carefully what I wrote: “the moment conjoined egg and sperm produce a division of cells.” I am talking about the exact moment of cell division - that specific point in time. I’m not discussing more remote causes ie. the movement of the sperm toward the egg. You never want to focus on the exact moment in time of the effect. Why not? There is a certain bio-chemical processing in place that is the immediate cause of the moment of cell division. Otherwise there is no cause at the time of the effect. Are you saying that something that happened prior in time is currently sustaining the effect?

There are other secondary causes (necessary conditions) that are also simultaneous with the effect here. In the case of the initial cell division that forms the human zygote, there are necessary conditions of temperature and surrounding material. Usually this occurs inside the human body, but can be simulated in a laboratory environment. At the moment of cell division - that exact moment in time - is there not a simultaneous cause of temperature of the human body? I mean, I can give you example after example of this, from a bat striking a ball (no, it isn’t the moment before the bat strikes the ball that is the immediate cause of the effect of the ball’s movement) to pushing one’s car off of the highway. The fact that there are prior causes does not negate the reality of an effect also having a simultaneous “sustaining” cause.

I disagree. According to your logic, a human placenta is a human child. I do not accept that.

I think it’s fairly apparent that I’m not attempting to debate here when human life begins. These are all examples to show whoever is reading this that it is absurd to deny concurrent and simultaneous causes of effects. It is fine that you have a competing philosophy of causation, but you asserted that concurrent causation is impossible. That is your burden to prove, and you haven’t done it.

 

[tdgesq]

What is the meaning of t=0 from a timelessly eternal point of view?

I’m not sure what you are asking, but I assume it’s how would God view the beginning of the universe and time from a timeless perspective. While the obvious answer is I don’t know how without experiencing it, there are possible ways in which it could be viewed. I suppose from God’s standpoint it would all appear a timeless “now” to him, including all future events in time. Then again, as an omnipotent creator he would at least have a concept of how we as human beings would view it 13.7 billion years later. So I think both of these options are viable.

The problem is everything about God is timelessly eternal, not only God’s decision, but also God’s act of creation. So t=0 co-exists eternally with God’s decision, and, if t =0 appears 13.6 billion years ago to us, so does God’s decision.
So, the universe is necessarrily co-eternal with God.

You are failing to take into account what God’s decision is. God’s timeless decision is to create a universe that today appears to us (and in fact is) 13.7 billion years old. I tend to think that you are asserting that it is logically impossible that God could decide to and create any such thing if he is timelessly eternal. But then you would have to demonstrate that it is impossible.

And no, it does not follow that God’s decision to create the universe at t=0 means that the universe is co-eternal with God. Eternal means “no time, timeless,” but what God creates is time. If the universe was co-eternal with God then there would be no universe, because the universe exists in time. All you are stating (so far as I can tell) is that a timeless cause cannot create time. But at the end of the day that is just a platitude - not an argument that such a thing is logically impossible.

 

[rossum]

I am talking about the exact moment of cell division - that specific point in time.

There is no single moment. Cell division is a process. First the chromosomes duplicate within the nucleus, a process that takes time. Then the duplicated chromosomes separate into two groups within the nucleus, another process which takes time. Then the nucleus divides into two within the single cell, another process which takes time. Finally the cell itself divides, another process which takes time. You are looking for an “exact moment” when there is no such thing.

A non-existent cause cannot cause anything. A cause cannot exist until after it has come into existence. Before it has come into existence it obviously does not exist.

rossum

 

[belorg]

I’m not sure what you are asking, but I assume it’s how would God view the beginning of the universe and time from a timeless perspective. While the obvious answer is I don’t know how without experiencing it, there are possible ways in which it could be viewed. I suppose from God’s standpoint it would all appear a timeless “now” to him, including all future events in time. Then again, as an omnipotent creator he would at least have a concept of how we as human beings would view it 13.7 billion years later. So I think both of these options are viable.

It doesn’t matter how human beings view things, what matter is what really **is **the case.

You are failing to take into account what God’s decision is. God’s timeless decision is to create a universe that today appears to us (and in fact is) 13.7 billion years old. I tend to think that you are asserting that it is logically impossible that God could decide to and create any such thing if he is timelessly eternal. But then you would have to demonstrate that it is impossible.

There is nothing impossible in creating a universe that appears to us to have begun, the problem is that it can’t really have begun.
What is actually the case on your view is that the universe existed timelessly eternal at t=0 and then entered time, and the same holds for God.

And no, it does not follow that God’s decision to create the universe at t=0 means that the universe is co-eternal with God. Eternal means “no time, timeless,” but what God creates is time. If the universe was co-eternal with God then there would be no universe, because the universe exists in time. All you are stating (so far as I can tell) is that a timeless cause cannot create time. But at the end of the day that is just a platitude - not an argument that such a thing is logically impossible.

A timless eternal being cannot create beginning time.

 

[Anselm33]

What is the meaning of t=0 from a timelessly eternal point of view?
The problem is everything about God is timelessly eternal, not only God’s decision, but also God’s act of creation. So t=0 co-exists eternally with God’s decision, and, if t =0 appears 13.6 billion years ago to us, so does God’s decision.
So, the universe is necessarrily co-eternal with God.

According to St. Augustine and according to modern physics views of the Big Bang, time began with the beginning of the Universe. That does not pose a contradiction with God being timelessly eternal; to him all instants of time coexist.

 

[Anselm33]

A timless eternal being cannot create beginning time.

Why not? A omnipotent being can create anything that is logically possible.

 

[belorg]

According to St. Augustine and according to modern physics views of the Big Bang, time began with the beginning of the Universe. That does not pose a contradiction with God being timelessly eternal; to him all instants of time coexist.

Since God, God’s decision to create time and God’s creative act all coexist, it follows that God also coexists with all moments of time, which, in turn, means that time is coexternal with God. If St Augustine and modern physics view time as biginning, then either St Augustine and modern science are wrong or that the view that God is timelessly eternal is wrong, or that the view that a timlessly eternal God created time is wrong.

 

[belorg]

Why not? A omnipotent being can create anything that is logically possible.

It is not logically possible for a timelessly eternal being to create something that has an absolute beginning.

 

[Anselm33]

It is not logically possible for a timelessly eternal being to create something that has an absolute beginning.

Please show me the logical contradiction…Not trying to be contentious, just trying to understand your argument. If you could state it in the form of major, minor premises and conclusion that would make it easier for me.

 

[belorg]

Please show me the logical contradiction…Not trying to be contentious, just trying to understand your argument. If you could state it in the form of major, minor premises and conclusion that would make it easier for me.

I’ll give it a try.

1 God is timelessly eternal
2 God has no beginning (from 1)
3 God does not begin to do something.(from 2)
4 God’s decison has no beginning. (from3)
5 God’s decision is a necessary and sufficient condition for God’s creative act.
6 God’s creative act has no beginning (from 4 and 5)
7 God’s act to create time has no beginning.(from 6)
8 God’s act to create time is a necessary and sufficient condition for time to exist.
9 conclusion: time has no absolute beginning.

 

[Prodigal_Son]

I’ll give it a try.

1 God is timelessly eternal
2 God has no beginning (from 1)
3 God does not begin to do something.(from 2)
4 God’s decison has no beginning. (from3)
5 God’s decision is a necessary and sufficient condition for God’s creative act.
6 God’s creative act has no beginning (from 4 and 5)
7 God’s act to create time has no beginning.(from 6)
8 God’s act to create time is a necessary and sufficient condition for time to exist.
9 conclusion: time has no absolute beginning.

This proves, at most, that God’s decision is not an action, if we say that actions necessarily happen in time. But it doesn’t disprove that there is some timeless equivalent to action, which only God is capable of “doing”. I believe that theologians call God’s being “pure act”, and this is what they’re trying to get at: a type of action that does not begin, does not end, does not “persist” – but rather is.

 

[tdgesq]

It doesn’t matter how human beings view things, what matter is what really **is **the case.

I don’t see a dichotomy between the two propositions. I hold that the universe is in fact 13.7 billion years old, approximately.

What is actually the case on your view is that the universe existed timelessly eternal at t=0 and then entered time, and the same holds for God.

No, that isn’t my view. The standard use of t=0 in these discussions is to denote the boundary of time; the first moment of time. It does not mean “no time.” So no, the universe did not timelessly (eternally) exist at t=0.

 

[tdgesq]

There is no single moment. Cell division is a process.

I am aware of that. I am talking about a single moment within the process.

Finally the cell itself divides, another process which takes time. You are looking for an “exact moment” when there is no such thing.

Of course there is an exact moment when the cell is divided. There is a moment in time before it is divided, and then there is a moment in time when it is in fact divided.

A non-existent cause cannot cause anything. A cause cannot exist until after it has come into existence. Before it has come into existence it obviously does not exist.

None of this precludes concurrent cause with effect, unless you already presuppose that cause must precede effect. I understand that is your framework under Nagarjuna’s theory of causation. I found this interesting analysis in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy:

3.1.2 Causation from other things

To assume that cause and effect are distinct phenomena might strike us as the most natural understanding of causation. Yet Nāgārjuna argues that cause and effect cannot be substantially distinct. This is because the effect depends existentially on the cause (if the cause did not exist the effect would not exist) and cause depends at least notionally on the effect (if there was no effect the cause would not be called “cause”).

While it isn’t expressly claimed that cause and effect can be concurrent, one tends to wonder how an effect can presently exist when the cause doesn’t presently exist. I’m not going to tell you what your religion teaches, but this doesn’t seem so far removed from the teachings of Aquinas re: causality.

 

[orang]

Hold on a minute ,

An hour is an hour and a minute is a minute.

If a minute belongs to an hour it doesn’t mean an hour or even a clock belongs to a minute

 

[belorg]

This proves, at most, that God’s decision is not an action, if we say that actions necessarily happen in time. But it doesn’t disprove that there is some timeless equivalent to action, which only God is capable of “doing”. I believe that theologians call God’s being “pure act”, and this is what they’re trying to get at: a type of action that does not begin, does not end, does not “persist” – but rather is.

Your are absolutely right, and that is precisely why my conclusion follows.

 

[belorg]

I don’t see a dichotomy between the two propositions. I hold that the universe is in fact 13.7 billion years old, approximately.

And so is God.

No, that isn’t my view. The standard use of t=0 in these discussions is to denote the boundary of time; the first moment of time. It does not mean “no time.” So no, the universe did not timelessly (eternally) exist at t=0.

I have argued for why it does mean “no time”.

 

[Prodigal_Son]

Your are absolutely right, and that is precisely why my conclusion follows.

If you fix the meaning of “action” to imply time, then your conclusion follows.

If you deny that “actions” entail time, your conclusion doesn’t follow.

Then which should we pick? What is the privileged meaning of “action”? How could we decide such a thing?

In Wittgenstein’s term, we are no longer engaged in metaphysics; we are engaged in a language game. Every path forward involves question-begging. I’m not sure I agree with Wittgenstein that all metaphysics works this way, but your argument certainly does.

 

[Prodigal_Son]

And so is God.

Oooh, cool, it’s his birthday then!

Happy birthday to you! Happy birthday to you! Happy birthday, Lord of Aaaa-llll! Happy birthday to you!



:harp: