The Leibnizian Cosmological Argument

[belorg]

Oooh, cool, it’s his birthday then!

Happy birthday to you! Happy birthday to you! Happy birthday, Lord of Aaaa-llll! Happy birthday to you!



:harp:

I don’t know if “approximately 13.7 billion” calls for a a birthday celebration.

 

[belorg]

If you fix the meaning of “action” to imply time, then your conclusion follows.

No, my conclsion follows only if action doesn’t imply time.

If you deny that “actions” entail time, your conclusion doesn’t follow.

it’s exactly the other way round.

 

[tdgesq]

And so is God.

God is 13.7 billion years old? That’s an odd conclusion considering we both stipulate that God is timeless. Maybe you mean that my analysis necessarily leads to that conclusion, but you have yet to demonstrate that. You’ve made a number of conclusory allegations, but that’s about it. Begging the question isn’t an effective demonstration of logical impossibility.

I have argued for why it does mean “no time”.

I assume you mean this?:

I’ll give it a try

Well, let’s take a look:

1 God is timelessly eternal

Previously stipulated.

2 God has no beginning

What does this mean? I think it means:

2’ God does not begin to exist. That is true.

3 God does not begin to do something.

If you really meant God “does not,” then it is still possible that he could, but simply chooses not to. If you really meant just “something” then there could be other things that he could begin to do. I think you meant:

3’ God cannot begin to do anything.

But from:

2’ God does not begin to exist - does it really follow that:
3’ God cannot begin to do anything?

It certainly isn’t obvious that it follows. I mean, you may have other reasons for why you believe God can’t begin to do anything, but not simply because God does not begin to exist ie. he exists timelessly. What about atemporal causes? That is certainly possible in Thomistic metaphysics, in which case we just have a disagreement on whose metaphysic is correct. More instructively though, even Big Bang cosmologists allow for the possibility of atemporal causes vis a vis time. The initial singularity is considered to constitute a boundary to spacetime. So while it isn’t temporally prior to the universe, it is considered causally prior. If that is possible, why would you object to the same metaphysical possibility?

I suppose even if you could prove this wasn’t possible, there is always the alternative that while God can’t allegedly begin to do anything, he could just have always (I mean timelessly) been doing something. Such an act wouldn’t be a “beginning” in any sense of the word, temporal or causal.

4 God’s decison has no beginning.

I think this means:

4’ God’s decision to create the universe has no beginning.

While it doesn’t have any temporal beginning, it may have an atemporal causal beginning, as explained above. And it could never preclude that possibility that God’s decision is also timeless and has no beginning.

5 God’s decision is a necessary and sufficient condition for God’s creative act.

No problem with that.

6 God’s creative act has no beginning.

I think this means:

6’ God’s act of creating the universe has no beginning.

As in 3. and 4., While God’s act wouldn’t have a temporal beginning, it may have an atemporal causal beginning. It is also without a doubt possible that God’s act of creating the universe is co-eternal and timeless with himself.

7 God’s act to create time has no beginning.

It certainly doesn’t have a temporal beginning, but may have a causal beginning in relation to time, just like some cosmologists allow for. In any case, God’s creative act of time could once again be co-eternally timeless with himself. Please note, time in its most basic concept is a measure of motion, of objects that materially exist. Once the universe is created and there is motion, there is necessarily time.

8 God’s act to create time is a necessary and sufficient condition for time to exist.

No problems.

9 conclusion: time has no absolute beginning.

Now how does that conclusion follow from any of your premises? In fact, what does it mean? It can’t mean that time could not exist, because that would contradict your affirmation that there is time, just with no beginning. The only thing it can mean is that time must stretch back infinitely in the past. That would oppose my and other’s assertions that time has a beginning point. The problem is that none of your premises require that conclusion.

It obviously doesn’t follow if atemporal causes are possible, particularly if the atemporal cause is ultimately God’s decision to create a universe at t=0. But it doesn’t even follow if the act of creation is co-eternal (timeless) with God. Why? Because it is stipulated by everyone here (including you) that eternity means timelessness - no time. There was no time, and then (relationally, not temporally) there was time. There is simply nothing that compels us to believe that a timeless act would result in infinite time past.

A postscript. That I had to go through this to show you the problems with your premises and your reasoning tells me that you haven’t seriously thought through these issues. They just seem like a series of knee-jerk intuitions and presuppositions; as if someone needs to collect your thoughts for you and put them in some sort of rational order. I think it may be time for you to stop debating this subject until you spend the time and read the literature necessary to intelligently respond.

 

[belorg]

God is 13.7 billion years old? That’s an odd conclusion considering we both stipulate that God is timeless. Maybe you mean that my analysis necessarily leads to that conclusion, but you have yet to demonstrate that. You’ve made a number of conclusory allegations, but that’s about it. Begging the question isn’t an effective demonstration of logical impossibility.

Luckily for me I am not begging the question.

2’ God does not begin to exist. That is true.

That’s what it means.

3’ God cannot begin to do anything.

That’s what it means.

But from:

2’ God does not begin to exist - does it really follow that:
3’ God cannot begin to do anything?

Yes.

What about atemporal causes? That is certainly possible in Thomistic metaphysics, in which case we just have a disagreement on whose metaphysic is correct.

I don’t claim that God cannot do anything, I said he cannot begin to do something. If he is an atemporal cause of something then he doesn’t **begin **causing this thing.

More instructively though, even Big Bang cosmologists allow for the possibility of atemporal causes vis a vis time. The initial singularity is considered to constitute a boundary to spacetime. So while it isn’t temporally prior to the universe, it is considered causally prior. If that is possible, why would you object to the same metaphysical possibility?

Because in that case, the universe includes the singularity, which is an atemporal state,and it had no absolute beginning. So, yes, God could in principle do the same and he could create a universe that appears temporal, but in reality it also has an atemporal state.

I suppose even if you could prove this wasn’t possible, there is always the alternative that while God can’t allegedly begin to do anything, he could just have always (I mean timelessly) been doing something. Such an act wouldn’t be a “beginning” in any sense of the word, temporal or causal.

Sure, but then whatever He has been causing cannot begin to exist.

I think this means:

4’ God’s decision to create the universe has no beginning.

While it doesn’t have any temporal beginning, it may have an atemporal causal beginning, as explained above. And it could never preclude that possibility that God’s decision is also timeless and has no beginning.

There is no such thing as an atemporal beginning. There may be an atemporal cause, of course, but atemporal causes do not denote beginnings.

I think this means:

6’ God’s act of creating the universe has no beginning.

As in 3. and 4., While God’s act wouldn’t have a temporal beginning, it may have an atemporal causal beginning. It is also without a doubt possible that God’s act of creating the universe is co-eternal and timeless with himself.

Beginning is necessary temporal, there is no such thing as a causal beginning.
It’s either caused to begin (temporal beginning) or it is eternally caused (what you call “causal beginning”).

It certainly doesn’t have a temporal beginning, but may have a causal beginning in relation to time, just like some cosmologists allow for. In any case, God’s creative act of time could once again be co-eternally timeless with himself. Please note, time in its most basic concept is a measure of motion, of objects that materially exist. Once the universe is created and there is motion, there is necessarily time.

If time is eternally cause, then time must be eternal.

Now how does that conclusion follow from any of your premises? In fact, what does it mean? It can’t mean that time could not exist, because that would contradict your affirmation that there is time, just with no beginning. The only thing it can mean is that time must stretch back infinitely in the past. That would oppose my and other’s assertions that time has a beginning point.

Maybe it does mean that, and that would oppose the assertion (I’m glad you concede that that is merely an assertion).

The problem is that none of your premises require that conclusion.

Well, if they don’t then you haven’t shown this.

It obviously doesn’t follow if atemporal causes are possible, particularly if the atemporal cause is ultimately God’s decision to create a universe at t=0. But it doesn’t even follow if the act of creation is co-eternal (timeless) with God. Why? Because it is stipulated by everyone here (including you) that eternity means timelessness - no time. There was no time, and then (relationally, not temporally) there was time. There is simply nothing that compels us to believe that a timeless act would result in infinite time past.

Yes, it is stipulated also by me that eternity means timelessness - no time - and that’s exactly why an eternal being cannot create a temporal beginning, and since atemporal beginning is a contradictio in terminis,

A postscript. That I had to go through this to show you the problems with your premises and your reasoning tells me that you haven’t seriously thought through these issues. They just seem like a series of knee-jerk intuitions and presuppositions; as if someone needs to collect your thoughts for you and put them in some sort of rational order. I think it may be time for you to stop debating this subject until you spend the time and read the literature necessary to intelligently respond.

A friendly advice here, tdgesq. I received an official warning from the moderators here for something they erroneously considered an ad hominem.
So I would be very careful with these kinds of postscripts if I were you.

 

[tdgesq]

Luckily for me I am not begging the question.

Let’s see about that.

I don’t claim that God cannot do anything, I said he cannot begin to do something. If he is an atemporal cause of something then he doesn’t **begin **causing this thing.

Then we have no disagreement. God does not begin (temporally) to do anything, yet he can be the atemporal cause of something - say the universe and motion and, thus, time.

Because in that case, the universe includes the singularity, which is an atemporal state,and it had no absolute beginning. So, yes, God could in principle do the same and he could create a universe that appears temporal, but in reality it also has an atemporal state.

The universe includes the singularity? Isn’t it more accurate to say that the universe is the singularity? So the universe is in an atemporal state, but then changes (relationally) to a temporal state. The bizarre thing about your argument is that God and the cause of creation are atemporal, yet for some reason the effect - the universe, motion and time - must also be atemporal. Yet you have no problem with the universe being in an atemporal state, then being in a temporal state. Can you explain what exactly could cause a universe to be in an atemporal state?

Sure, but then whatever He has been causing cannot begin to exist.

This is a serious category error. We both agree God as cause of the universe cannot begin (temporally) to exist, yet such a cause can exist atemporally. Here comes the problem: You make a completely unwarranted assumption that the EFFECT cannot begin (temporally) to exist. And this is why it keeps being pointed out to you by me and others that you are simply begging the question on this. You’ve offered no demonstration, much less one that compels logical impossibility, that this conclusion is true.

There is no such thing as an atemporal beginning. There may be an atemporal cause, of course, but atemporal causes do not denote beginnings.

Do you not see your error? You have offered no proof that an atemporal cause must necessarily lead to an atemporal effect, but the theist’s argument is that an atemporal cause can result in a temporal effect. Your “syllogism” doesn’t even include the word “cause.” It only includes the word “begin.” You insist that these two words have different meanings. I’m fine with that. But how in the world do you expect to prove that an eternal cause must result in an atemporal effect when you don’t even use the term “cause?” I mean, what?

Beginning is necessary temporal, there is no such thing as a causal beginning.
It’s either caused to begin (temporal beginning) or it is eternally caused (what you call “causal beginning”).

We all agree on the nomenclature. You can’t prove that an atemporal cause must result in an atemporal effect unless you actually use the term “cause” in your syllogism! Everyone already agrees with you that the cause of the universe is not temporal, yet you use the word “begin” and then insist it denotes the temporal. You are fighting against something that nobody claimed in the first place.

If time is eternally cause[d], then time must be eternal.

Why? That’s exactly what you were supposed to demonstrate. Why must a timeless cause lead to a timeless effect? Perhaps treating causes and effects rather than “beginnings” in your syllogism might be a good first step.

Maybe it does mean that, and that would oppose the assertion (I’m glad you concede that that is merely an assertion).

It’s pretty telling that you don’t know what it means - that is - what it means for an effect to be eternal. Do you at least know what it means for the universe to be in an atemporal state, since you insist that is the case at the singularity?

Yes, it is stipulated also by me that eternity means timelessness - no time - and that’s exactly why an eternal being cannot create a temporal beginning, and since atemporal beginning is a contradictio in terminis,

The category error again that leads to your circular argument. Until you show how an eternal cause (rather than temporal beginning, a straw man that you’ve been beating up fairly effectively) must necessarily lead to an eternal effect, then you’ve done nothing except state your conclusion again. That’s what we call begging the question, particularly when we declare contradictio in terminis without demonstration.

 

[ccmnxc]

I know what Pruss says about this, but he is wrong. If there is an unexplained contingent fact, all that means is that that particular contingent fact is unexplained. It has no bearing on other facts.

So then how does on account for an explanation for a contingent fact? Regularity?

 

[ccmnxc]

So then how does on account for an explanation for a contingent fact? Regularity?

Or, more specifically, how does one account for the reliability of cognitive states without resorting to some post hoc - proptor hoc fallacy? Or something of that nature.
Since contingent facts don’t necessarily rely on past actions, how is it that we don’t have everything collapsing into some post hoc - proptor hoc fallacy? We don’t have things acting in accordance with their nature, or what have you.

 

[belorg]

tdgesq:

The category error again that leads to your circular argument. Until you show how an eternal cause (rather than temporal beginning, a straw man that you’ve been beating up fairly effectively) must necessarily lead to an eternal effect, then you’ve done nothing except state your conclusion again. That’s what we call begging the question, particularly when we declare contradictio in terminis without demonstration.

I have demonstrated this.
An eternal cause necssarily leads to an eternal eefct if the cause is a sufficient condition for the effect. And that is necessarily the case if God is the cause and it is not necessarily the case if the singularity is the cause, because in the latter case, quantum uncertainty might play a part.

 

[belorg]

Or, more specifically, how does one account for the reliability of cognitive states without resorting to some post hoc - proptor hoc fallacy? Or something of that nature.
Since contingent facts don’t necessarily rely on past actions, how is it that we don’t have everything collapsing into some post hoc - proptor hoc fallacy? We don’t have things acting in accordance with their nature, or what have you.

I do not quite understand your question.

 

[tdgesq]

I have demonstrated this.
An eternal cause necssarily leads to an eternal eefct if the cause is a sufficient condition for the effect.

Obviously not since you don’t use the term “eternal cause” anywhere in your syllogism. You’ve certainly shown that God’s act of creating the universe doesn’t have a temporal beginning - something everyone already agreed with. So, once again, the claim that a timeless God can cause a temporal effect remains untreated.

And that is necessarily the case if God is the cause and it is not necessarily the case if the singularity is the cause, because in the latter case, quantum uncertainty might play a part.

I’m not addressing the singularity as cause. I’m addressing the singularity as effect. What kind of cause (atemporal or temporal) could lead to the effect of the singularity, which you claim is originally in an atemporal state? I certainly hope you aren’t claiming a temporal cause could create the atemporal effect of the singularity, for that would seem quite inconsistent with your intuition about what types of effects necessarily follow from certain types of causes.

 

[belorg]

Obviously not since you don’t use the term “eternal cause” anywhere in your syllogism. You’ve certainly shown that God’s act of creating the universe doesn’t have a temporal beginning - something everyone already agreed with. So, once again, the claim that a timeless God can cause a temporal effect remains untreated.

I said “1 God is timelessly eternal”, which, combined with “God’s act to create time”
will make it clear that God is an eternal cause.
So, I did present an argument for why God , being timelessly eternal, cannot create an effect that is not eternal. You, on the other hand , have asserted that He can. I have yet to see a serious argument for that claim.

I’m not addressing the singularity as cause. I’m addressing the singularity as effect.

Who says it is an effect?

 

[Jaaanosik]

Thanks guys, very interesting thread.

Here is a suggestion. Logic within the spacetime should not be mixed with the logic outside of the spacetime.

The answer to many questions is the revealed truth - The Trinity.
God Father - outside of the spacetime
The Holy Spirit - the cause for the spacetime existence
The Son - God within the spacetime

One might argue that the quantum vacuum - the aether - is the Holy Spirit.
All particles exist within the Holy Spirit - within God.

 

[ccmnxc]

I do not quite understand your question.

My bad, that was poorly phrased.
In general, my question would be as to how you could rationally justify your response to Pruss. If we deny the necessity of causation, then it means that our cognitive and perceptual states are not necessarily caused. This leads to a rather problematic skepticism, since we have no reason to believe that our cognitive states are the way they are due to reason and evidence or due to some other non-rational (or irrational?) reason. Even trying to explain the problem away by saying that rejection of the PSR does not apply to all contingent facts does not seem to escape the problem, since if you reject that our cognitive and perceptual states are (primarily) caused by reason and evidence, you would be unable to discern if your previous response to Pruss was actually based upon reason and evidence or if you only believe so due to non-rational reasons.
I don’t think Pruss is saying that it is outright epistemically contradictory to deny the PSR, only that it leads to an inescapable skepticism when applied consistently.

 

[belorg]

My bad, that was poorly phrased.
In general, my question would be as to how you could rationally justify your response to Pruss. If we deny the necessity of causation, then it means that our cognitive and perceptual states are not necessarily caused. This leads to a rather problematic skepticism, since we have no reason to believe that our cognitive states are the way they are due to reason and evidence or due to some other non-rational (or irrational?) reason. Even trying to explain the problem away by saying that rejection of the PSR does not apply to all contingent facts does not seem to escape the problem, since if you reject that our cognitive and perceptual states are (primarily) caused by reason and evidence, you would be unable to discern if your previous response to Pruss was actually based upon reason and evidence or if you only believe so due to non-rational reasons.
I don’t think Pruss is saying that it is outright epistemically contradictory to deny the PSR, only that it leads to an inescapable skepticism when applied consistently.

Well, this goes a lot further than the actual LCA; Because even if God were the necessary cause of the initial singularity that caused the Big Bang, it would not be guaranteed that our cognitive states would be reliable.
I don’t think we can say a priori that our coginitive faculties are reliable. The only thing we can do is find out(a posteriori) that our cognitive faculties seem to be sufficient for us to properly function in a complex world. And that has nothing to do with whether the PSR is true or not.