The logical condtradiction of "pro-choice"

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To start off, if you are reading this and you are pro-choice, and you have not read Peter Kreeft’s “The Unaborted Socrates,” I highly encourage you to do so. That being said…

If there is a debate between a pro-life and a pro-choice person, as always the issue comes down to the personhood of the fetus. This is a topic that the pro-choice person will usually avoid because they claim that the humanity of the fetus is abstract or subjective (a claim that is absurd for obvious reasons that I won’t delve into here, because I am focusing on the heart of the pro-choice argument). Anyways, the basic argument behind the pro-choice philosophy is as such: The humanity of the child is open to debate and there is a variety of belief on this matter, therefore people should be allowed to abort or not abort according to their own conscience: pro-aborts should be allowed to abort as their beliefs see fit and pro-lifers should not be required to abort for any reason. There are some people who do believe in the humanity of the fetus but still buy into this claim. They call themselves “personally pro-life” but legally “pro-choice.” However this is a logical contradiction:
  1. Pro-life Dan believes that a fetus is a human being.
  2. Pro-life Dan believes (as does a liberal) that a human being is important and has rights is worthy of protection.
  3. Pro-life Dan is expected by liberals to honor the variety of opinions, and in effect become pro-choice.
  4. Pro-life Dan must support abortion because it honors the rights of the mother to make a judgment based on her views about the humanity of the fetus, thus respecting her individual rights as a human being (fulfilling statement 2).
  5. Abortion involves killing the fetus, and according to statement 1 the fetus is a human being. To kill someone is the most severe way to deprive them of their rights. So in promoting abortion Pro-life Dan must violate his beliefs in statements 1 and 2.
Do you see why it is unreasonable to expect someone to be “personally pro-life” but politically “pro-choice”? The question of the personhood of the fetus is one that cannot be ignored or dismissed, it is the crux of the whole argument. And what better way to address it than using science and philosophy? Those two branches seem to be leaning toward the pro-life side.
 
Anyways, the basic argument behind the pro-choice philosophy is as such: The humanity of the child is open to debate and there is a variety of belief on this matter, therefore people should be allowed to abort or not abort according to their own conscience: pro-aborts should be allowed to abort as their beliefs see fit and pro-lifers should not be required to abort for any reason. There are some people who do believe in the humanity of the fetus but still buy into this claim. They call themselves “personally pro-life” but legally “pro-choice.”
This is one argument against criminalization, but it’s not the only one. There are arguments that try to show that fetuses are not people and arguments that try to show that, even if fetuses are people and we can show that they’re people, abortion should not be criminalized.

I agree that you have a good challenge to this particular argument.
 
I felt a great disturbance in the Force, as if millions of Politicians suddenly cried out in terror, and were suddenly silenced.
 
There are arguments that try to show that fetuses are not people…
This is the only kind of argument that is really worthy to be considered because it addresses the core issue.
…and arguments that try to show that, even if fetuses are people and we can show that they’re people, abortion should not be criminalized.
Then on what basis do we not criminalize the “abortion” of either a young child fully developed adult?

Another point that is made in Kreeft’s book is that if a person is unsure of the humanity of the fetus, then the default position should be pro-life, not pro-choice, because the latter would risk something truly terrible. The analogy is given of a hunter seeing movement in nearby brush: should he assume it is a deer and shoot at it, or should he ensure that it is not a human first to avoid the risk of killing another hunter?
 
Then on what basis do we not criminalize the “abortion” of either a young child fully developed adult?
The same basis as you think, but many people think it’s only prima facie, rather than absolutely, wrong to kill an adult. For example, most people believe there is such a thing as a just war.
 
The same basis as you think, but many people think it’s only prima facie, rather than absolutely, wrong to kill an adult. For example, most people believe there is such a thing as a just war.
Would you agree that a just war is one that is fought in self defense? In other words, to prevent an enemy from unjustly attacking and destroying you, the innocent? In the case of abortion, a fetus is innocent and does not threaten the mother (even in the case of a pregnancy that is considered life-threatening, the threat is from the physical condition of the mother, and not from the offspring itself). In order to justify abortion in this case, we would have to establish cases in which abortion is justified and why, and the reasons would have to be able to stand in all circumstances, not just in the case of abortion. For example, if abortion is considered necessary in order to ensure future financial success of the mother, then a poor married couple should also be allowed to abort their three year old if it is a financial burden.
 
Well, perhaps Eleve is referring to the argumetns put forward by the likes of J. J. Thompson, Eileen Mcdonough, and David Boonin. These are more bodily rights arguments and things of that nature. I think Boonin’s is one that builds off of Thompson. These arguments are quite interesting and can be difficult (though I do not believe they ultimately succeed). Francis Beckwith does a very good job of addressing them, Boonin in particular in his book Defending Life.
 
The argument that fetuses are not persons suffers from the fact that, under philosophical naturalism, the human person exists only conceptually and not ontologically. It is defined arbitrarily and so has no rational basis. One can’t say, “It’s clear that fetuses are not persons because they are lumps of cells/are less intelligent than a pig/aren’t cute yet/etc.,” because such an argument ascribes an arbitrary standard for personhood.

One must admit that law ascribes human value for the sake of convenience and mutual benefit rather than because rights exist. The rights of an adult are arbitrary, although that an adult should have rights is the consensus. What has to be decided is when a human begins to have rights (or when a human begins to be a human). But human (in the legal sense) and rights must be constructed under philosophical naturalism if they are to be respected at all, so one cannot rationally argue that something genetically human of some age should begin to have rights while something genetically human of a slightly lower age does not yet have rights.
This is the only kind of argument that is really worthy to be considered because it addresses the core issue.

Then on what basis do we not criminalize the “abortion” of either a young child fully developed adult?
I actually find the latter arguments that Eleve mentioned more threatening. Once society decides that life is not a definite right among human persons, life becomes vulnerable to the tyranny of a majority that benefits from depriving others of life. There ceases to be a logical basis for whose right takes precedence. Those who have been born have a voice and those who have not been born do not.
 
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