The ludicrous overuse of evolutionary biology to explain everything about life

[Touchstone]

Hi Touchstone,

Sorry for delayed reply (still thinking about our other discussion by the way).

No worries.

I think you have misunderstood my point (or rather, Plantinga’s point which I am paraphrasing).

I wondered if you were working from EAAN here, but decided no. I guess I was mistaken.

If evolutionary processes are what molds our cognitive faculties i.e. our psychology, then the beliefs produced by our cogntive faculties are not setup to necessarily be true, rather they are setup to be survival promoting.

This is “philosophy-speak” from Plantinga, but it’s kind of a laugher when it actually gets applied to humans (or any other animal). When you take a look at the physiology and wiring of an animal, you can see the necessity of “truth” (truth == correspondence to reality) as a matter of biology. The rods and cones in your eyes, for example, are sophisticated light receptors, and fire away based on light patterns that enter the eyes. Cognitively, the perceptions modulate along with the (name removed by moderator)uts – the brain is a machine. So when Plantinga says survival-promoting is not necessarily linked to “true”, he is either committed to a equivocation on “true”, where “true” does not mean “corresponds to reality” but some kind of Calvinist theological indulgence of the term, or else he is playing the solipsist card, that reality isn’t real. In either case, it’s a waste of everybody’s time. Truth is survival. There’s nothing more ‘real’ or ‘corresponding to reality’ than to survive in it.

There is no essential connection between survival and reliable truth promoting cognitive faculties, this is especially the case for higher order beliefs, such as those regarding logic, worldviews and any beliefs regarding evolutionary psychology themselves.

Therefore the point is that if evolutionary processes have indeed fashioned our minds to such an extent that they govern our belief tendencies, then such beliefs should possibly be doubted.
Yes, of course. Everything should be doubted. That’s essential to building models of reality that work. But when you doubt the efficacy of the evolutionarily-honed physiology of a human or some other animal, it quickly runs into absurdities as doubt. Why does the spider trust the shaking it detects in its web? Why should the spider think that means a fly has become ensnared? What basis does it have to trust that? Well, it’s a natural process, and self-fixing by necessity; the spider that doesn’t trust those perceptions doesn’t survive and doesn’t reproduce. It’s only those organisms that have developed physiology that are effective in sensing and processing real-world (name removed by moderator)ut that have made it to this point. All that’s left now, after billions of years of ‘truth-filtering’ are highly refined truth machines.

(See above and the comments about higher faculties. Man is so successful, he can indulge in all sorts of nonsensical beliefs, beliefs in areas that are not tightly connected to survival.)

These beliefs of course also contain beliefs about evolutionary psychology for the evolutionary psychologist. Hence the possible self-refutation.

Sure, but that’s nothing more than pure solipsism – reality isn’t real. If reality is real, that whole point completely falls apart.If Plantinga or anyone else wants to pursue solipsistic arguments, they are welcome, but it’s a big yawn from me, a complete waste of time. It is interesting to note, though, that once again the ‘reality of reality’ becomes the nemesis of theology and theologians/theistic philosophers.

You can’t show that such beliefs are rational (and therefore not an “illusion”) by using the same kind of beliefs, that would be like using a possibly faulty thermometer to check whether another possibly faulty thermometer is functioning correctly.

Well, it’s tautologous. The “faulty thermometer” here CANNOT be faulty on a transcendental basis. It’s the reference standard for “temperature”. In an all-too-common bit of irony for Plantinga, he suspects reality – the world around us – of being an inadequate reference point for ‘truth’, which of course begs the question: what then, is the basis for truth? And then we get a good solid shot of the unreal as the basis for truth as a replacement for the real world as our reference.

The real world is our reference standard. There’s nothing more real, and nothing at all by which we may say it is faulty – if you disagree, then maybe you can tell me on what basis you might judge reality to faulty, the real world to be “unreal”. It’s the gold standard, and the ground for rational concepts of “true”.

-TS

 

[Sair]

I get the impression that it’s not so much the use of evolutionary biology to explain everything about life, as it is the use of the same to dismiss aspects of our experience as unimportant or irrelevant - you know, the whole “it’s just hormones” (used by the chauvinist man to deny a woman’s legitimate grievances!) or the “it’s just chemical” to devalue things like sexual attraction, love, or anything we might like to refer to as a spiritual experience.

My question would be not so much why people want to find biological explanations for experience, but why should our experience be valued any less because it stems from biological rather than supernatural causes?

 

[edwest2]

To Sair -

Are you just an ambulatory bag of chemicals programmed by your genes? If so, your only real purpose is to reproduce successfully, perform adaptive (and occasionally, maladaptive) behaviors and die. Just pick up a copy of the journal Evolutionary Psychology. Your genes decide, not you.

I will tell you the truth. Jesus Christ lived and died for you because he loves you. God was here on earth and lives today. You were willed by Him.

Peace,
Ed

 

[AndyT_81]

Hi Touchstone,

This is “philosophy-speak” from Plantinga, but it’s kind of a laugher when it actually gets applied to humans (or any other animal). When you take a look at the physiology and wiring of an animal, you can see the necessity of “truth” (truth == correspondence to reality) as a matter of biology. The rods and cones in your eyes, for example, are sophisticated light receptors, and fire away based on light patterns that enter the eyes. Cognitively, the perceptions modulate along with the (name removed by moderator)uts – the brain is a machine. So when Plantinga says survival-promoting is not necessarily linked to “true”, he is either committed to a equivocation on “true”, where “true” does not mean “corresponds to reality” but some kind of Calvinist theological indulgence of the term, or else he is playing the solipsist card, that reality isn’t real. In either case, it’s a waste of everybody’s time. Truth is survival. There’s nothing more ‘real’ or ‘corresponding to reality’ than to survive in it.

I think you may have misunderstood EAAN. EAAN does not argue against the (name removed by moderator)ut - processing - output type mechanics of a brain, rather it is concerned with beliefs. Plantinga does not doubt that in order for an organism to survive, its brain must be able to process information in a way which insures that it gets its body in the right place at the right time. However, the pure mechanics does not a belief make. Would you say a frog flicking its tongue out to catch a fly has some sort of “belief” about said fly? I think that would be a perversion of the word “belief”. What is important for survival is getting a body in the right place at the right time, there is no necessary connection between the truth of beliefs (which us higher order creatures possess) and truth. This can be demonstrated in a purely logical way by any number of examples. Heck, it is even put forth by some evolutionary psychologists with regards to religion! I have seen arguments from such people saying that the reason supernatural beliefs are so widespread is because such “false” beliefs were beneficial to our survival. So here we have an example of false beliefs giving a positive survival effect, which falsifies any necessary condition whereby truth = survival (at least in the context of beliefs, which is what EAAN is talking about).

But those faculties are generic – the mind that can be used toward “real world” topics can be used to contemplate, say, “the noetic effects of the Fall”, just to take one bit of fanciful musings from Plantinga, that DO NOT have a tight connection to reality.

Exactly! So why should we consider such higher order cognitive faculties to be reliable with regards to truth generation, given naturalism and evolution? Such higher order faculties have also created concepts regarding evolutionary psychology, so why should we consider EP to have a “tight connection” with reality.

Mr. Plantinga, fresh from sending off the paper detailing the arguments of EAAN, gets in his car and drives home, depending UTTERLY on the correct function of his perceptions and perceptual processing to make it home without getting into a head on (and possibly fatal) collision. Plantinga supposes God gives him this “truth”, but the machinery is all their to inspect, from the photons to the lens of the eyes, to the the cones, to the nerves, to the brain.

See above with regards to how he is not concerned in the EAAN with the “machinary” of (name removed by moderator)ut - output functions, but rather beliefs.

But when you doubt the efficacy of the evolutionarily-honed physiology of a human or some other animal, it quickly runs into absurdities as doubt. Why does the spider trust the shaking it detects in its web? Why should the spider think that means a fly has become ensnared? What basis does it have to trust that? Well, it’s a natural process, and self-fixing by necessity; the spider that doesn’t trust those perceptions doesn’t survive and doesn’t reproduce. It’s only those organisms that have developed physiology that are effective in sensing and processing real-world (name removed by moderator)ut that have made it to this point. All that’s left now, after billions of years of ‘truth-filtering’ are highly refined truth machines.

Would you consider a spider to have any beliefs, in our usual usage of the word?

Sure, but that’s nothing more than pure solipsism – reality isn’t real. If reality is real, that whole point completely falls apart.If Plantinga or anyone else wants to pursue solipsistic arguments, they are welcome, but it’s a big yawn from me, a complete waste of time. It is interesting to note, though, that once again the ‘reality of reality’ becomes the nemesis of theology and theologians/theistic philosophers.

I have seen this argument being labelled things like this before. I find this curious as prominent athiest philosophers have actively engaged this argument in its many complexities, which clearly goes to show that it is certainly not a waste of time or mere solipsism, at least to them. At the very least, it seems to me that you have not engaged fully with the argument.

Well, it’s tautologous. The “faulty thermometer” here CANNOT be faulty on a transcendental basis. It’s the reference standard for “temperature”. In an all-too-common bit of irony for Plantinga, he suspects reality – the world around us – of being an inadequate reference point for ‘truth’, which of course begs the question: what then, is the basis for truth? And then we get a good solid shot of the unreal as the basis for truth as a replacement for the real world as our reference.

The real world is our reference standard. There’s nothing more real, and nothing at all by which we may say it is faulty – if you disagree, then maybe you can tell me on what basis you might judge reality to faulty, the real world to be “unreal”. It’s the gold standard, and the ground for rational concepts of “true”.

Again, this seems to show me that you have not properly understood the argument. We of course all start with the basic belief that our belief producing faculties are reliable. However, the purpose of the EAAN is a defeater for such a basic belief (if valid) given E and N. The Christian is not presented with a defeater for such basic beliefs when presented with Christian based epistimology. Plantinga, being a Christian, certainly has no reason to doubt reality as being a reference point for truth.

 

[Sair]

To Sair -

Are you just an ambulatory bag of chemicals programmed by your genes? If so, your only real purpose is to reproduce successfully, perform adaptive (and occasionally, maladaptive) behaviors and die. Just pick up a copy of the journal Evolutionary Psychology. Your genes decide, not you.

And yet that same evolutionary biology also gave humans (many of them, at least) the ability to analyse, understand and thus overcome the dictates of biological determinism. We have the ability to determine or define our own purpose and act accordingly. Why should such abilities be any less wonderful for having a biological rather than a spiritual origin?

 

[fhansen]

And yet that same evolutionary biology also gave humans (many of them, at least) the ability to analyse, understand and thus overcome the dictates of biological determinism. We have the ability to determine or define our own purpose and act accordingly. Why should such abilities be any less wonderful for having a biological rather than a spiritual origin?

Humans evolving beyond their mother, Evo-lution? How will they know if their self-determinism will lead them down the right path, once freed from the wise guidance of natural selection? What if these self-determining beings disagree with each other on how to behave or on the correct direction for the human race? Evo’s gotten us this far, producing fitter, more complex, and now even freer beings. But now has She shot herself in the foot? If She no longer has control, can we really be trusted with that chore? Sounds like we could be getting set up to fall all over again-or for the first time depending on your perspective.

 

[Touchstone]

Hi Touchstone,

I think you may have misunderstood EAAN. EAAN does not argue against the (name removed by moderator)ut - processing - output type mechanics of a brain, rather it is concerned with beliefs. Plantinga does not doubt that in order for an organism to survive, its brain must be able to process information in a way which insures that it gets its body in the right place at the right time. However, the pure mechanics does not a belief make. Would you say a frog flicking its tongue out to catch a fly has some sort of “belief” about said fly? I think that would be a perversion of the word “belief”.

Hmmm. interesting. I can’t see why that be a problem at all. The frog has external stimuli that it processes (visuals, for example) and uses to integrate into its “model of reality”, it’s beliefs. It’s certainly a much more… mundane belief than contemplating a belief in the Trinity or some such, but this a frog we’re talking about. Humans have the same mode of beliefs, too, though. I just reached for my coffee cup, based on my belief that it was right where I was reaching, according to my visual cues about my surroundings. If that’s not “belief”, then I’m not sure what you would call it.

What is important for survival is getting a body in the right place at the right time, there is no necessary connection between the truth of beliefs (which us higher order creatures possess) and truth.

There’s clearly a hang-up here on the word “belief”. My belief in the actual location of my coffee cup is no different from a frog’s belief in the location of a nearby fly, excepting that maybe I’m more careless about the precision as my coffee is not my link to survival. But you’re using “belief” here like it’s some kind of magic essence, rather than a cognitive disposition based on the brain’s model of reality.

This is a key point, because as we consider different subjects of belief, some topics get farther and farther from what Mirza called the “filter of unreliable cognitive faculties”. When a human considere’s belief in God, there’s little available that might serve as a defeater for such an idea; it’s “detached” from the real-world feedback loop in which the frog misses the fly if his model is wrong, or I spill my coffee all over the desk if my visuals are incorrectly processed. It’s all belief, from my belief as to the location of the coffee mug on my desk to the cosmic absence or presence of God. But the real world has much to say about the former, and is useful in enforcing “truth”. The real world has little to say about the latter, and thus I am “free” to wander off into all manner of spurious beliefs with little to no cost.

This can be demonstrated in a purely logical way by any number of examples. Heck, it is even put forth by some evolutionary psychologists with regards to religion!

Well, yes, and that’s an example I support, and have advanced here on this forum I think. Supernaturalism may indeed have some very positive soothing and placating effects psychologically that make it useful – enabling positive, hopeful dispositions that may lend themselves to increased productivity, less stress, etc. Some illusions are decidedly useful.

But it’s a mistake to identify that as any kind of defeater for the idea that truth-discovery remains an unavoidable requirement for the same brain that might indulge in religious fantasy for anodyne reasons.

-TS

 

[RobbyS]

The antropic principle sure sounds like a gap theory to me.

No, it is an acknowledgement that life as we know it is unique, because our world is unique. It does not mean that God exists but that we are alone.

 

[Touchstone]

I have seen arguments from such people saying that the reason supernatural beliefs are so widespread is because such “false” beliefs were beneficial to our survival. So here we have an example of false beliefs giving a positive survival effect, which falsifies any necessary condition whereby truth = survival (at least in the context of beliefs, which is what EAAN is talking about).

This is a simplistic rendering (and it’s Plantinga’s, so the criticism doesn’t get pointed at you, here) of the evolutionary basis for truth discovery. The model does NOT say that humans or other animals must have some unimpeachable faculty in order to survive, or that false beliefs overturn the reliability of process that do depend on truth-discovery. That is, there’s never been any necessary condition whereby truth = survival. Rather, the observation that survival requires some nominally effective correspondence model, some level of isomorphisms between the mental model and the extramental world. That allows for all manner of false beliefs on top of or in addition to that, but demands that any organism capable of surviving in its environment have some “truth” core that enables it to navigate that environment in such a way as to survive and reproduce (statistically, anyway – all of this is applied at the population level, an animal with a particularly keen “truth model” may still be happened upon by a potent predator by chance and get eaten, despite its superior model).

Exactly

! So why should we consider such higher order cognitive faculties to be reliable with regards to truth generation, given naturalism and evolution? Such higher order faculties have also created concepts regarding evolutionary psychology, so why should we consider EP to have a “tight connection” with reality.

We wouldn’t, if “evolutionary naturalism” was just some kind of intuition, or some belief that wasn’t empirically grounded. See, this is where Plantinga (unwittingly?) projects the folly of his own religious beliefs (read Warranted Christian Belief for vivid examples of this) on to the scientific thinker. We don’t grant credence to evolutionary theory because it philosophically must be true, or because evolutionary biology we somehow suppose necessitates some epistemic disposition which is invincible. That’s a conspicuous straw man to the extent Plantinga (or anyone else) supposes that is the warrant for belief in evolution.

Instead, we can use empirical evidence itself to provide more than sufficient warrant, NOT as an a priori guarantor for our beliefs, but as a conclusion based on that analysis. We can see that the spider must have some level of coordination with the real world in order to build a web, detect ensnared prey, and eat it. We take a belief like our own belief in evolution and test that, empirically, too. As millions of disbelievers in evolution prove, you don’t need to embrace belief in evolution as a condition for survival. But by the same token, we do not simply rely on intuition, or on cultural inertia (see Plantinga’s “farm boy”, for example) as our warrant for that belief. Instead, we employ a two step process. 1) We validate the model-building faculties humans have that do require truth discovery for survival, which is what we can call “empiricism” for our purposes here, and then 2) we deploy empiricism to subjects which do NOT have the kind of lethal penalties exacted for false beliefs.

See above with regards to how he is not concerned in the EAAN with the “machinary” of (name removed by moderator)ut - output functions, but rather beliefs.

Yes, but that lies at the core of Plantinga’s error, this kind of Platonic dualism, a separation of “belief” from “belief”. As if man is not an animal, as if the mind is not the brain, functioning in a natural, physical context. I suspect that because Plantinga simply reaches for his coffee cup and successfully grabs it most of the time without having to grab a note pad and “reason about it” that that somehow does not rely on the very same machinery that this syllogisms for theological propositions do.

See my above comments about the two step process in providing warrant for MET. Empiricism works – provably – in what you call the machinery level, where a tight feedback loop is available to validate it. It is just that same (validated) heuristic which is being applied to judgments which do not afford such a feedback loop that provides the warrant for belief in MET, and which makes what Plantinga sees as a defeater for naturalism no defeater at all.

Would you consider a spider to have any beliefs, in our usual usage of the word?

Sure. It’s beliefs are much more rudimentary in terms of abstraction, but it, like a human, has a cognitive process that is constantly building and refining a mental model of extramental reality. That mental model, whatever you want to call it, is analogous to the mental model that humans have. When I tap on the threads of a spider web in my garden, if I’m careful about it, I can get the spider to come toward the disturbance to investigate, moving just like he does when he’s got prey to paralyze and wrap up for later eating. I’ve “fooled” the spider, in that case. His mental model is inaccurate as to what is happening. His beliefs are “false”. No dinner for him, as he hoped, this time.

I have seen this argument being labelled things like this before. I find this curious as prominent athiest philosophers have actively engaged this argument in its many complexities, which clearly goes to show that it is certainly not a waste of time or mere solipsism, at least to them. At the very least, it seems to me that you have not engaged fully with the argument.

Well, I’ve been round and round on EAAN before, many times now. And I’ve read a lot of Plantinga. But I would offer the same criticism of atheist philosophers who engage the “complexities” in terms of an “epistemic necessity” demanded by evolutionary naturalism. Such atheists are as far out to lunch as Plantinga is to the extent they are willing to divorce “beliefs” from the animal that holds them and develops them, as an animal. If Plantinga can get you to consider truth-discovery out in the ether, so to speak, then an atheist engaging on that level has already assented to Plantinga’s folly, accepted the straw man, so to speak.

-TS

 

[RobbyS]

Hmmm. interesting. I can’t see why that be a problem at all. The frog has external stimuli that it processes (visuals, for example) and uses to integrate into its “model of reality”, it’s beliefs. It’s certainly a much more… mundane belief than contemplating a belief in the Trinity or some such, but this a frog we’re talking about. Humans have the same mode of beliefs, too, though. I just reached for my coffee cup, based on my belief that it was right where I was reaching, according to my visual cues about my surroundings. If that’s not “belief”, then I’m not sure what you would call it.

There’s clearly a hang-up here on the word “belief”. My belief in the actual location of my coffee cup is no different from a frog’s belief in the location of a nearby fly, excepting that maybe I’m more careless about the precision as my coffee is not my link to survival. But you’re using “belief” here like it’s some kind of magic essence, rather than a cognitive disposition based on the brain’s model of reality.

This is a key point, because as we consider different subjects of belief, some topics get farther and farther from what Mirza called the “filter of unreliable cognitive faculties”. When a human considere’s belief in God, there’s little available that might serve as a defeater for such an idea; it’s “detached” from the real-world feedback loop in which the frog misses the fly if his model is wrong, or I spill my coffee all over the desk if my visuals are incorrectly processed. It’s all belief, from my belief as to the location of the coffee mug on my desk to the cosmic absence or presence of God. But the real world has much to say about the former, and is useful in enforcing “truth”. The real world has little to say about the latter, and thus I am “free” to wander off into all manner of spurious beliefs with little to no cost.

Well, yes, and that’s an example I support, and have advanced here on this forum I think. Supernaturalism may indeed have some very positive soothing and placating effects psychologically that make it useful – enabling positive, hopeful dispositions that may lend themselves to increased productivity, less stress, etc. Some illusions are decidedly useful.

But it’s a mistake to identify that as any kind of defeater for the idea that truth-discovery remains an unavoidable requirement for the same brain that might indulge in religious fantasy for anodyne reasons.

-TS

“Supermaturalism” is more than a “comforting” idea, or opiate. Properly understood it has little to do with spooks and gobblins. What it does do is point people in a certain direction. For instance, it took the Children of Abraham and formed them into a nation, a nation that survived the destruction of their state and has kept them alive for more than two thousand years. Even Jewish atheists warm themselves by the “fire” generated by
the “faith” of others in the Law. The law being the" constitution" of the Jewish people. Even an apostate like Spinoza could not help being “Jewish” in his pantheism, for he eschews the “gods” even as he embraced “nature.” Now I am saying that this “law” did not come from nowhere and its survival cannot easily be explained on utilitarian grounds. Zionism is a contemporary effort to reanchor it in politics, but even if it proves to be a false start, as many rabbis believe, the Jews will go on.

Much the same thing can be said of Christianity. Until the 4th Century, Christianity was “stateless,” but after the collpse of Rome, it remained stateless in the West, although the papacy provided it with a kind of shadow state. That it survived and spread had less to do with The “Romanity” that prevailed in Constantinope, but the monastic movement, which often bucked the papacy in its efforts to establish Christiandom as a state. Statism did not win until the Reformation, when the Church was subordinated by both Protestant and Catholics kings. The Reformation repudiated monasticism in favor
of sectarianism, which provided the same kind of freedom as found in the monastic orders but without the doctrinal unity offered by allegiance to the pope.

The monks and Friars also served as the vehicles for intellectual culture through the middle ages. What we know of Greek thought has been so filtered by Christians that
only a handful of scholars can actually understand the mindset of Plato and Aristotle.
My guess is that they would be bewildered by what we say about their teachings. In particular, the idea of Creation permeates even modern "secular"commentaries that
the metaphysics of either is distorted. That is especially true today when our intellectuals totally lack a classical education. That was very useful. The old monks took the remains of the old Classical culture and made a savory stew liberally spiced with Christian doctrine. In the 20th Century we have come up with nothing better. Instead we have “science fiction” Where a Arthur C. Clarke has more purchase than a Richard Feynman.

 

[Touchstone]

Again, this seems to show me that you have not properly understood the argument. We of course all start with the basic belief that our belief producing faculties are reliable. However, the purpose of the EAAN is a defeater for such a basic belief (if valid) given E and N. The Christian is not presented with a defeater for such basic beliefs when presented with Christian based epistimology. Plantinga, being a Christian, certainly has no reason to doubt reality as being a reference point for truth.

Well, here’s something to consider, which I suggest makes the EAAN argument at least as forceful a defeater for theism as it is a defeater for EN. I don’t see EAAN as being potent either way, myself, but for those who do see it as a defeater for the EAAN, it appears to cut theism down just as efficiently:

N => Naturalism
E => Evolutionary theory
R => Reliability of our cognitive faculties
T => Theism (austere version, just that God exists)

a) Thesis on probability from Plantinga: P(R/N&E) is inscrutable
b) Proposed defeater for R: accepting N and E along with a) undermines R.
c) If b) then a naturalist has a defeater for ALL of his beliefs, which necessarily includes naturalism.

Now, with respect to theism, a)-c) become a tu quoque objection for theism (and any other -ism besides solipsism):

d) Thesis on probability: P(R/T) is inscrutable
e) Proposed defeater for R : accepting T and d) undermines R.
f) Hence, the theist has a defeater for all of his beliefs, which necessarily includes theism. Theism, on Plantinga’s terms, is similarly self-defeating.

On that level, both EN and T stand or fall together. But this ignores a crucial distinction between EN and T. EN can point to a filter that discourages false belief (and here you can see why it’s important for Plantinga to drive artificial wedges between “marchinery-beliefs” and “higher beliefs”) – the harsh consequences of the enrvironment are a strict taskmaster in punishing false beliefs under EN. Can theism propose any such filters, and process or mechanism that works to weed out or discourage false beliefs? I can’t think of any, save for what Plantinga offers – the purely subjective conjectures of the individual, which is to say no filters at all on objective terms.

This is where the real world intrudes rudely on Plantinga’s argument. EN does not propose infallibility or a maximal R, across the spectrum of topics and possible beliefs. But EN can point to a high-value R for a whole bunch of beliefs and conclusions, which is valuable in its own right, but is distinguishing in terms of epistemology from theism in that THOSE BELIEFS ARE VALIDATED BY FILTRATION; false beliefs are demonstrably punished in those areas, which provides the crucial asset for N than T does not have – a demonstrable feedback loop.

Lastly, here’s a counterargument to the EAAN that should put the folly of making this all disjoint from empirical grounding in perspective:

g) Either EAAN is a sound argument or it is not
h) If EAAN is sound, I have no warrant for accepting its conclusion
i) If EAAN is unsound, I have no warrant for accepting its conclusion.
j) Hence, I have no possible basis for accepting the conclusion of EAAN.

EAAN, if it has weight at all, defeats way more than Plantinga intends, and is a treatise for solipsism. I think that may be part of the goal, given the Calvinist background on which Plantinga operates. Cornelius van Til would have loved to read this, as the apologetic strategy he and his fellow presuppositionalists embraced was a kind of philosophical nihilism; philosophy as a defeater of philosophy, only as a means to make the caprice of theism innocuous. It’s all caprice once you reduce philosophy to solipsism.

-TS

 

[Touchstone]

“Supermaturalism” is more than a “comforting” idea, or opiate. Properly understood it has little to do with spooks and gobblins. What it does do is point people in a certain direction. For instance, it took the Children of Abraham and formed them into a nation, a nation that survived the destruction of their state and has kept them alive for more than two thousand years. Even Jewish atheists warm themselves by the “fire” generated by
the “faith” of others in the Law. The law being the" constitution" of the Jewish people. Even an apostate like Spinoza could not help being “Jewish” in his pantheism, for he eschews the “gods” even as he embraced “nature.” Now I am saying that this “law” did not come from nowhere and its survival cannot easily be explained on utilitarian grounds. Zionism is a contemporary effort to reanchor it in politics, but even if it proves to be a false start, as many rabbis believe, the Jews will go on.

Well, when I say it’s comforting or anodyne, I don’t see that as disparagement, necessarily. And I’m fully aware of the power and utility of myth as an organizing social influence. I doubt that Remus and Romulus were fathered by the god Mars and were feral children raised by wolves, as an explanation of the founding/founders of Rome. But as a bit of mythology, giving grounding to the Roman sense of toughness, austerity, resourcefulness and sheer determination to overcome, Romulus provided a useful bit of historical fiction which we can say emphasized a truth all the same: the toughness, austerity, etc. of the Romans. It’s no accident that wherever you find human culture you find mythology. It’s a powerful and useful organizing force for a culture.

Much the same thing can be said of Christianity. Until the 4th Century, Christianity was “stateless,” but after the collpse of Rome, it remained stateless in the West, although the papacy provided it with a kind of shadow state. That it survived and spread had less to do with The “Romanity” that prevailed in Constantinope, but the monastic movement, which often bucked the papacy in its efforts to establish Christiandom as a state. Statism did not win until the Reformation, when the Church was subordinated by both Protestant and Catholics kings. The Reformation repudiated monasticism in favor
of sectarianism, which provided the same kind of freedom as found in the monastic orders but without the doctrinal unity offered by allegiance to the pope.

OK, I’m fine with that assessment.

The monks and Friars also served as the vehicles for intellectual culture through the middle ages. What we know of Greek thought has been so filtered by Christians that
only a handful of scholars can actually understand the mindset of Plato and Aristotle.
My guess is that they would be bewildered by what we say about their teachings. In particular, the idea of Creation permeates even modern "secular"commentaries that
the metaphysics of either is distorted. That is especially true today when our intellectuals totally lack a classical education. That was very useful. The old monks took the remains of the old Classical culture and made a savory stew liberally spiced with Christian doctrine. In the 20th Century we have come up with nothing better. Instead we have “science fiction” Where a Arthur C. Clarke has more purchase than a Richard Feynman.

I think you are being too hard on myth, and too hard on fiction, here. I’m the first one to object (I hope) when myth and fiction are advanced as fact, but there are many “truths” that are not factual propositions, but rather collective social insights that myth and story-telling cultivate toward good ends: social cohesion, moral calibration, and creative productivity, which, paradoxically, is an important catalyst for factual kinds of investigations. Feynman, one of my intellectual heroes, was extraordinary among extraordinary scientist because he grasped the power of imagination as the path to sceintific problem solving. It’s not that we aren’t smart enough or hardworking enough, when we get stuck on a problem, he said. The failure usually obtained from a poverty of imagination. Feynman was unusual in his ability to “craft a story” of reality, seemingly out of pure imagination as a means of breaking this deadlock; he did it time after time, developing a key insight that broke the logjam through alternative ways of visualizing and conceptualizing the problem (cf. Feynman Diagrams).

The point there is that Arthur C. Clarke and Feynman are much more tightly linked than (I think) you are allowing here. Of course Clarke as more popular appeal. This is a religious forum we’re on – story-telling and imagination are far more interesting and compelling than austere analytics. And sometimes, it’s even more useful than the actual reality underneath.

-TS

 

[AndyT_81]

Hi Touchstone,

Hmmm. interesting. I can’t see why that be a problem at all. The frog has external stimuli that it processes (visuals, for example) and uses to integrate into its “model of reality”, it’s beliefs. It’s certainly a much more… mundane belief than contemplating a belief in the Trinity or some such, but this a frog we’re talking about. Humans have the same mode of beliefs, too, though. I just reached for my coffee cup, based on my belief that it was right where I was reaching, according to my visual cues about my surroundings. If that’s not “belief”, then I’m not sure what you would call it.

I am personally of the opinion that stretching the concept of the term “belief”, as it is usually used amongst humans, to refer to the cognitive mechanics of frogs to be quite dubious. If we stretch the concept of belief this far (i.e. the processing between stimuli and response), why not say a venus fly trap has beliefs, or a car? In both instances we have stimuli (a fly landing in the trap, a foot on the accelerator), some processing (some sort of nerve signals, operation of circuitry to control fuel flow etc.) and response (trap closing, car increasing speed). In addition to this, how do we distinguish between non-conscious brain processing (such as the regulation of our heart beat) and conscious thoughts (i.e. beliefs) about say, the truth of some proposition? I think if we limit the concept of belief to the pure processing involved in tie-ing stimuli to response, the term loses its meaning.

But you’re using “belief” here like it’s some kind of magic essence, rather than a cognitive disposition based on the brain’s model of reality.

Not at all, beliefs do not need to be some kind of “magic essence”, simply something more than pure (name removed by moderator)ut-output processing. For the term belief to be used sensibly, all that is required is consciousness, which does not necessarily need some immaterial interpretation.

Well, yes, and that’s an example I support, and have advanced here on this forum I think. Supernaturalism may indeed have some very positive soothing and placating effects psychologically that make it useful – enabling positive, hopeful dispositions that may lend themselves to increased productivity, less stress, etc. Some illusions are decidedly useful.

You seem to be arguing my point for me here. You agree here that the evolutionary process can produce a tendency for (at least higher order) beliefs in humans which are false. Why couldn’t this tendency extend to other beliefs, such as those regarding naturalism, evolutionary psychology etc.?

This is a simplistic rendering (and it’s Plantinga’s, so the criticism doesn’t get pointed at you, here) of the evolutionary basis for truth discovery. The model does NOT say that humans or other animals must have some unimpeachable faculty in order to survive, or that false beliefs overturn the reliability of process that do depend on truth-discovery. That is, there’s never been any necessary condition whereby truth = survival. Rather, the observation that survival requires some nominally effective correspondence model, some level of isomorphisms between the mental model and the extramental world. That allows for all manner of false beliefs on top of or in addition to that, but demands that any organism capable of surviving in its environment have some “truth” core that enables it to navigate that environment in such a way as to survive and reproduce (statistically, anyway – all of this is applied at the population level, an animal with a particularly keen “truth model” may still be happened upon by a potent predator by chance and get eaten, despite its superior model).

All I can say here is that this again seems to prove my point. Also, your sentence in the paragraph above seems to contradict your earlier statement that “truth is survival”.

We wouldn’t, if “evolutionary naturalism” was just some kind of intuition, or some belief that wasn’t empirically grounded. See, this is where Plantinga (unwittingly?) projects the folly of his own religious beliefs (read Warranted Christian Belief for vivid examples of this) on to the scientific thinker. We don’t grant credence to evolutionary theory because it philosophically must be true, or because evolutionary biology we somehow suppose necessitates some epistemic disposition which is invincible. That’s a conspicuous straw man to the extent Plantinga (or anyone else) supposes that is the warrant for belief in evolution.

Well first you seem to be equating evolutionary psychology with evolutionary naturalism with evolutionary theory in this paragragh. Second, I’ve never seen Plantinga claim that the only way that credence can be granted to evolutionary theory is if it is “philosophically” true. I’m not even sure what that means. The conclusion of EAAN is that the naturalist has a defeater for his beliefs if evolutionary theory is true. This says nothing about the truth or validity of evolutionary theory, it only refers to the conjunction of certain world-views. You saying that “evolutionary naturalism” is empirically verified is a massive claim that I think needs better defence also.

Continued…

 

[AndyT_81]

1. We validate the model-building faculties humans have that do require truth discovery for survival, which is what we can call “empiricism” for our purposes here, and then 2) we deploy empiricism to subjects which do NOT have the kind of lethal penalties exacted for false beliefs.

How do you employ empiricism for your belief that naturalism is true? What about other beliefs you may hold, such as the belief that empiricism is a good way of acheiving true beliefs etc.? In any case, Plantinga is NOT arguing against the benefits of using empirical methods. What Plantinga is arguing with the EAAN is that the naturalist is not warranted in holding that her basic beliefs are reliable IF she continues to hold that naturalism is true. This of course leads to total epistemic skepticism and therefore naturalism should be rejected and substituted for a world-view which removes this total epistemic skepticism.

It helps to dissociate this problem from ourselves. If we consider an animal on some other world whose cognitive faculties have evolved in the same way as our, why would we expect that such an animal’s cognitive faculties should produce reliable beliefs (especially higher order beliefs) when there is no necessary connection between the truth of beliefs (in the way that the term “belief” is usually used) and survival? You seem to have already admitted that no such necessary connection exists.

Yes, but that lies at the core of Plantinga’s error, this kind of Platonic dualism, a separation of “belief” from “belief”. As if man is not an animal, as if the mind is not the brain, functioning in a natural, physical context. I suspect that because Plantinga simply reaches for his coffee cup and successfully grabs it most of the time without having to grab a note pad and “reason about it” that that somehow does not rely on the very same machinery that this syllogisms for theological propositions do.

Plantinga, in the EAAN, certainly does not argue for some sort of immaterial mind, the argument does not require this at all. Remember this is an argument levelled against naturalism and doesn’t necessarily refer to theism at all. As for your last sentence, Plantinga would surely agree with you! This is not a problem for a Christian theist. The problem lies in the mind of a person who holds the conjunction of naturalism and evolution and with the coherency of their beliefs.

With regards to your next post, there are two broad comments I would make. Perhaps with pure unadulerated theism your counter argument works, but Plantinga (and myself) are Christian theists, and have every reason to think God produced us with the capacity to produce reliable beliefs. Second, your other points are only valid if Plantinga has indeed driven an “artificial wedge” between (name removed by moderator)ut-output processing and beliefs. I think that I have adequetely countered that claim.

Finally:

g) Either EAAN is a sound argument or it is not
h) If EAAN is sound, I have no warrant for accepting its conclusion
i) If EAAN is unsound, I have no warrant for accepting its conclusion.
j) Hence, I have no possible basis for accepting the conclusion of EAAN.

I don’t really understand your (i). If EAAN is unsound (if reasoning in a warranted way to determine it is unsound) then you have warrant for denying its conclusion. As for (h), your conclusion doesn’t necessarily follow. If EAAN is sound it does not mean that your cognitive faculties really are unreliable, only that your world view and evolution conflict. Therefore you can accept EAAN and just ditch naturalism.

EAAN, if it has weight at all, defeats way more than Plantinga intends, and is a treatise for solipsism.

It certainly is not. It provides no problem at all for Christian based epistemological systems.

 

[Touchstone]

I am personally of the opinion that stretching the concept of the term “belief”, as it is usually used amongst humans, to refer to the cognitive mechanics of frogs to be quite dubious. If we stretch the concept of belief this far (i.e. the processing between stimuli and response), why not say a venus fly trap has beliefs, or a car? In both instances we have stimuli (a fly landing in the trap, a foot on the accelerator), some processing (some sort of nerve signals, operation of circuitry to control fuel flow etc.) and response (trap closing, car increasing speed). In addition to this, how do we distinguish between non-conscious brain processing (such as the regulation of our heart beat) and conscious thoughts (i.e. beliefs) about say, the truth of some proposition? I think if we limit the concept of belief to the pure processing involved in tie-ing stimuli to response, the term loses its meaning.

I’m not saying belief is a simple result of stimuli. Consciousness – awareness of one’s surroundings in the cognitive sense – is required to give meaning to “belief”. A pigeon working the buttons in a Skinner box has a “belief” about the causality of pecking a button and receiving food. It’s not abstract philosophy, but it is contingent on consciousness and cognitive processing – processing that is not deterministic (i.e. some pigeons may not make the connection, or associate the causality with something else).

So, consciousness is a qualifier that will screen out the automatic response you are offering.

Not at all, beliefs do not need to be some kind of “magic essence”, simply something more than pure (name removed by moderator)ut-output processing. For the term belief to be used sensibly, all that is required is consciousness, which does not necessarily need some immaterial interpretation.

Ok, as above, I’m requiring consciousness as a predicate for belief. But abstract philosophy is (name removed by moderator)ut-output processing, just processing with more subroutines and layers of abstraction. If it’s more than that, I think I must return to the idea that it is magic, or some such, in your usage. Here’s a test, to see if I’m onto something or not. What separates “non-belief” (name removed by moderator)ut/output processing in a brain from “belief” (name removed by moderator)ut/output processing. In the case of the spider, if my teasing him with finger taps on the web is something he can adjust to, adjusting his responses to stay put, or move more cautiously when he detects “finger-type” disturbances on his his web (my fingers are a crude simulation of a housefly ensnared, after all), then even a spider is corrigible in terms of beliefs – the output changes based on different processing of the same (name removed by moderator)ut.

I see nothing but an arbitrary distinction from that right on up to conjectures about Kant, Hume, and Aquinas. The processing is certainly more complex, and involves “strange loops” like self-reflection, etc., but its still just processing that varies in degree – you have (name removed by moderator)uts and outputs and a conscious brain in the middle in all these cases.

You seem to be arguing my point for me here. You agree here that the evolutionary process can produce a tendency for (at least higher order) beliefs in humans which are false. Why couldn’t this tendency extend to other beliefs, such as those regarding naturalism, evolutionary psychology etc.?

It may, on an a priori basis. But that’s the fundamental error, thinking this is an area where an *a priori *assertion is being applied by EN subscribers. For example, consider the case of an optical illusion – a “bent reed” coming through the water’s surface that is not in fact bent, but appears so due to refraction. People regularly bring this kind of “false belief” up to me, saying this means our perceptions are not trustworthy. But all I have to do is ask them how they know that really is an optical illusion, and that the reed is actually straight. Their response, of course, proves the case. They rely on the trustworthiness of perceptions in order to identify the mistake, the illusion itself. The fact that they know that refraction is superficially illusory refutes their objection.

It seems you are using a stolen concept in the same way. It’s only by accepting the basic truth-finding abilities of our senses and cognitive process that you can provide meaning for the idea of ‘truth’ or ‘error’ in the first place, just like you must trust your senses and reason to arrive at the decision that a “bent reed” in the water is an optical illusion, after all. Optical illusions and other false beliefs are the proof of the reliability of our senses and processing, rather than the disproof.

-TS

 

[Touchstone]

All I can say here is that this again seems to prove my point. Also, your sentence in the paragraph above seems to contradict your earlier statement that “truth is survival”.

Empirically, we observe that impediments to accurate models of extramental reality spell trouble for the organism. A baby fox born blind is at a serious disadvantage in developing and maintaining a model of reality – visual (name removed by moderator)ut is a huge advantage in navigating the environment and acquiring food. So, blindness denies that fox a means of acquiring truth, an additional measure of additional modeling of reality.

This isn’t a deductive conclusion, but an empirical one. Empricially, we observe that enhanced perceptual and model-building faculties tends to increase survival and propagation probabilities; sighted foxes will statistically outperform blind foxes because they have additional means of acquiring truth about their environment, and this additional truth is efficacious to survival: they can see the mouse that may become their next meal, and visual ‘truth’ is helpful in making the hunt a success.

That produces the following empirical observation. In the wild, empirical heuristics in organisms of all kinds are advantageous and effective for survival. Empiricism as epistemology works, we observe, empirically. Given that, we have a reasonable basis for understanding that empiricism is performative in acquiring truth – building correspondence models beteween concepts and extramental reality.

Well first you seem to be equating evolutionary psychology with evolutionary naturalism with evolutionary theory in this paragragh. Second, I’ve never seen Plantinga claim that the only way that credence can be granted to evolutionary theory is if it is “philosophically” true.

Plantinga wonders what warrant we have for R – the relaibility of our senses and our cognitive processing. But that’s not an empirical question on his part, but an a priori epistemological one. No such warrant is needed, or even possible – humans, like all other animals, are empiricists by necessity of their physiology. The idea of warrant for R is something asking what justification an animal might have for wanting to survive. It’s not an epistemic issue, but a matter of biology. Humans are wired for empirical truth-discovery, and cannot do otherwise. We can certainly ask how reliable or accurate that disposition is for humans, or other organisms, but wondering why we trust R at all is no more coherent than wondering we bother breathing: we are hardwired to do so.

I’m not even sure what that means. The conclusion of EAAN is that the naturalist has a defeater for his beliefs if evolutionary theory is true. This says nothing about the truth or validity of evolutionary theory, it only refers to the conjunction of certain world-views. You saying that “evolutionary naturalism” is empirically verified is a massive claim that I think needs better defence also.

Continued…

As I said previously, EAAN is only effective as ‘nuclear defeater’, an invitation to solipsism that defeats all beliefs, including Plantinga’s, and your own. EN, via *post facto *analysis (empirical review) offers a strong defeater-defeater that theism doesn’t have, which paradoxically makes EAAN a good bit of self-refuting irony on Plantinga; evolution provides an objective means out any solipsism demanded by EAAN. Theism has no such relief, but can only resort to subjective faith.

-Touchstone

 

[edwest2]

You are just an ambulatory bag of chemicals whose primary purpose is to reproduce successfully, perform adaptive behaviors and die. Just pick up the journal Evolutionary Psychology.

In the meantime the worship of the human mind continues here. Along with the worship of science. The fly in the ointment, the monkey wrench in the Atheist-Technocracy that a few long for is that it will be run by fallible human beings, and I guarantee they will not have your best interests in mind.

Meanwhile, Ray Kurzweil dreams of the day when man will be entirely obsolete, replaced by a synthetic version of himself. This is nihilism. A lot of sound and fury…

God loves you. The living God wants you to know that.

Peace,
Ed

 

[Touchstone]

You are just an ambulatory bag of chemicals whose primary purpose is to reproduce successfully, perform adaptive behaviors and die. Just pick up the journal Evolutionary Psychology.

You say that like it’s a bad thing. That’s ‘life’ you are describing, and life is good! Being “chemical” or “real” or “adaptive” diminishes things, how?

In the meantime the worship of the human mind continues here. Along with the worship of science. The fly in the ointment, the monkey wrench in the Atheist-Technocracy that a few long for is that it will be run by fallible human beings, and I guarantee they will not have your best interests in mind.

Yikes. Do you take medicine? If so, why would you do that, given your stance above? How about flying in an airplane? Isn’t that the product of science, the product of fallible researchers and engineers?

Meanwhile, Ray Kurzweil dreams of the day when man will be entirely obsolete, replaced by a synthetic version of himself. This is nihilism. A lot of sound and fury…

Now, it seems being a “bag of chemicals” is very precious indeed, after all, eh? If not, what’s the problem if our consciousness and sentience becomes silicon-based rather than carbon-based. If our true self is not organic, then what’s the problem?

God loves you. The living God wants you to know that.

Peace,
Ed

Thanks!

-TS

 

[Charlemagne_II]

And it’s certainly ludicrous to suppose that evolution explains anything about the** origin **of life.

Nor does it even pretend to. So we can rest assured that evolution is the antidote to intelligent design of the first living organism.

 

[AndyT_81]

Hi Touchstone,

I’m not saying belief is a simple result of stimuli. Consciousness – awareness of one’s surroundings in the cognitive sense – is required to give meaning to “belief”. A pigeon working the buttons in a Skinner box has a “belief” about the causality of pecking a button and receiving food. It’s not abstract philosophy, but it is contingent on consciousness and cognitive processing – processing that is not deterministic (i.e. some pigeons may not make the connection, or associate the causality with something else).

So, consciousness is a qualifier that will screen out the automatic response you are offering.

I’m comfortable if, in providing a response to the EAAN, you are required to suggest that frogs/spiders/insects etc. have some sort of consciousness that is in any way relevant to our own cognitive function and beliefs. This seems to me to be a very unattractive option. It seems to me that beliefs (in the usual sense of the word) require some sort of possibility of choice, in that I can choose to believe in some proposition or I cannot. Also, there seems to be a need for some conception of self-consciousness for such a choice (i.e. I think there is a tree over there, I think that God exists). If a creature is determined (even in a probablistic sense) and has no concept of self-choice (even if such choices are ultimately illusory), then I think using belief in such instances is misguided. If you are suggesting that a pigeon in some way has a belief about the causality of pushing a button and getting food, then you may as well assign beliefs to neural network algorithms in computing or optimisation problems. Such algorithms receive (name removed by moderator)uts, produce outputs and are adaptive, so why can’t we say that these processes also involve beliefs?

I guess it comes down to how you define “awareness of one’s surroundings in the cognitive sense”, this is pretty ambiguous.

What separates “non-belief” (name removed by moderator)ut/output processing in a brain from “belief” (name removed by moderator)ut/output processing.

Exactly! Would you say that you have “beliefs” about your heart rate, adrenelin levels, sweat response or any other subconscious processing your brain engages in? Surely not. So clearly a belief is something that requires some level of consciousness and concept of self-choice. To apply that to pigeons, spiders, insects and even higher order mammals I believe is a real stretch.

The processing is certainly more complex, and involves “strange loops” like self-reflection, etc., but its still just processing that varies in degree – you have (name removed by moderator)uts and outputs and a conscious brain in the middle in all these cases.

Yes perhaps, but it is these “strange loops” which seem to be necessary to make the concept of belief meaningful. A belief involves the conscious notion of a subject and an object of belief (say a proposition). If this conscious notion of a subject is missing (which I would argue to be the case for likely all (or most) animals except for us) then to apply the term belief in such cases is to distort the term.

It’s only by accepting the basic truth-finding abilities of our senses and cognitive process that you can provide meaning for the idea of ‘truth’ or ‘error’ in the first place, just like you must trust your senses and reason to arrive at the decision that a “bent reed” in the water is an optical illusion, after all. Optical illusions and other false beliefs are the proof of the reliability of our senses and processing, rather than the disproof.

You seem to be getting caught up with this. EAAN does not give us reason to universally doubt our cognitive faculties, it provides no dramas for a Christian who has no defeater for such faculties. It provides a defeater for the naturalist who believes in E, but that does not mean that his/her faculties are in fact unreliable. It simply means that their world-view is self-defeating. Yes you do need to have the basic belief that your faculties are reliable in order to think about things like truth or error, but that doesn’t automatically mean that N&E caused such faculties to be reliable. Therefore, faced with EAAN, the believer in N&E, if they wish to rationally keep their basic belief in reliable faculties, must reject N&E and adopt a world-view that is consistent with reliable belief producing cognitive faculties.

The above paragraph is my main point, however, here is a side point with regards to your above quote. If your beliefs are fundamentally unreliable, you can’t simply say that by using one such belief to show another belief to be false is somehow proving the reliability of your beliefs. For example, who’s to say that your beliefs regarding optical behaviour are true and therefore the bent reed is really an illusion? You could say that you know such beliefs to be true using some utilitarian concept, but all this guarantees is coherentism, not fundamental truth or reliability. For instance, I could be a brain in a vat somewhere using a utilitarian concept of truth (i.e. what works is what is true) which gives my beliefs a certain coherence and yet they are all fundamentally false. Plantinga has shown elsewhere that warrant cannot really be achieved via coherentism, rather a notion of proper function seems to be required. But anyway, this is a side note and probably a diversion.