Let’s start off with the above. Always good to build from a point of agreement!
Now you’ve made a couple of similar statements to the above, such as:
Now, I agree with these statements
to a degree, but I resist the temptation (which you do not) to be rather flexible in determining the moral object, as I hope the following clarifies.
Your statements above touch on the nature of “Intrinsic Evil”. Let’s remember what that is:
So, here again we have the Pope saying Intentions and Circumstances can’t transform what is intrinsically evil [which is reflected in CCC1761]
It’s interesting to hunt around and make a list of just what “intrinsic evils” has the Church identified. There are quite a few actually and you can find them in various places such as in Guardium et Spes, Veritas Splendor, etc. And when you look at them, you discover that they are not themselves totally free of built-in “circumstances” – they include elements of Intentions or Circumstances in the nature of their Object, which sounds disturbingly similar to your comments noted above. What??

This sounds to be a problem, because we might have expected that the object of an intrinsically immoral object should be definable without reference to Intentions and Circumstances.
Yet, this is not always the case. Eg. Fornication includes a reference to the “circumstance” that neither of the parties is married. Adultry includes a reference to the circumstance that one of the parties is not married to the other. Lying includes a reference to the Intention to deceive. And so on….
The only sane conclusion to reach about this is that
references to Intentions and Circumstances CAN be included in the object of an intrinsically evil act. [Otherwise, you’d have to say that the Church doctrine on intrinsic evil, and its specific instances thereof, is all malarkey!]
Does this screw up the meaning of CCC1756 (“There are acts which, in and of themselves, independently of circumstances and intentions, are always gravely illicit by reason of their object”.)
Well – only if you are looking to create confusion! But it is easily avoided confusion when approached with a touch of common sense. When intention and circumstances are spoken of as sources of morality over and above the object of the act THEN we are speaking of intentions and circumstances over and above those
included in the definition of the act itself.
So yes, the Object of an intrinsically evil act can include references to circumstances or intent. In fact, the distinction between fornication and adultery relies exactly in the circumstances!
What the Pope is is saying in Veritas Splendor is: if the object of the act is sinful then intent or circumstance–intent or circumstances
over and above those referred to in the object – cannot make the act good
This makes sense. If the object of abortion includes killing someone in the circumstance that the person is innocent, and if killing innocents is wrong, then abortion is going to be wrong regardless of what other circumstances or intents may apply to it. You can’t justify abortion because of any **other **intent or circumstance because there is already an evil (the killing of a person who is in the circumstance of being innocent) built into the object of the act.
Similarly, if we define torture such that it involves the disproportionate infliction of pain then we have included a reference to an evil circumstance in the object of torture. Inflicting pain is not itself wrong–otherwise we could never punish people–but to inflict disproportionate pain is wrong.
Source:
jimmyakin.com/2006/11/intrinsic_evil.html