The Nature of Material Things

[Tannhauser_1509]

Correct me if I’m wrong, because this definition will serve as the basis for my question, but would Aristotle and Aquinas define matter as the principle of substances that allows their forms to move in and out of existence?

If this is the case, then is it so that our ability to perceive “matter” (though matter is not a thing in actuality capable of being beheld, technically) is possible only when change is occurring? For example, if I exercise my sensory capabilities on the computer-mouse on my desk (feeling it, looking at it), then is it the case that the mouse’s (or any material object’s) form is in a constant state of flux and never subsistent for any real period of time?

I hope this question isn’t too confusing. Also, I’d appreciate any links to relevant resources.

 

[GEddie]

Correct me if I’m wrong, because this definition will serve as the basis for my question, but would Aristotle and Aquinas define matter as the principle of substances that allows their forms to move in and out of existence?

If this is the case, then is it so that our ability to perceive “matter” (though matter is not a thing in actuality capable of being beheld, technically) is possible only when change is occurring? For example, if I exercise my sensory capabilities on the computer-mouse on my desk (feeling it, looking at it), then is it the case that the mouse’s (or any material object’s) form is in a constant state of flux and never subsistent for any real period of time?

I hope this question isn’t too confusing. Also, I’d appreciate any links to relevant resources.

Define real period of time, first off.

Our own being is unstable over any sufficiently long period of time, maddeningly.

And what do you mean by matter cannot be “beheld”? Technically, our eyes only see light, not matter. Or are you thinking metaphysically, in which case you need to redefine beheld?

ICXC NIKA

 

[Aloysium]

. . . would Aristotle and Aquinas define matter as the principle of substances that allows their forms to move in and out of existence? . . . is it so that our ability to perceive “matter” (though matter is not a thing in actuality capable of being beheld, technically) is possible only when change is occurring? For example, if I exercise my sensory capabilities on the computer-mouse on my desk (feeling it, looking at it), then is it the case that the mouse’s (or any material object’s) form is in a constant state of flux and never subsistent for any real period of time? I hope this question isn’t too confusing. Also, I’d appreciate any links to relevant resources.

I don’t know what Aristotle or Aquinas would say. Seeing that you are not Googling them and are here asking for the opinions of random Internet idiot’s, I’m at your service:

You and I are complex, yet one entity in being ourselves. We interact with stuff that is “out there” as itself. The structure of the interaction with physical stuff is along the lines of our physical nature, more specifically our nervous system, which determines most of the contents that constitute our minds. You probably have not noticed the pressure of your chair on your behind. Because it is ongoing and not otherwise noteworthy, the messages from the spinal cord do not impact on your thoughts and the perceptual areas of your brain. The totality that is you focusses on that which concerns you. Now that I have mentioned it, you begin to explore those sensations. You might say they have come into existence, but you have remained who you are and your body is what it is. It comes in and out of existence the way notes do when you hear music. Although I would say that all this comes into existence now, it does so in the sense that everything happens in its moment. It all exists as an ongoing tranformation in time, from one Source.

We are a form of being. One-celled creatures are individual forms of being. The cells of our body “combine” their being as they interact and constitute what is the unity of the person. Atoms come together to form molecules, which have their particular properties. Atoms are thought of as being made up of individual particles, which can exist as part of the whole or individually.

What would any discussion these days be without some convoluted reference to quantum physics. Here’s an interesting article that may also be of relevance to the other poster above. It deals with the issue of time but has some relevance to the idea of things coming in and out of existence:
bbc.com/earth/story/20160708-the-past-is-not-set-in-stone-so-we-may-be-able-to-change-it
The article is an interpretation of the theories which require an appreciation and knowledge of the math and technology involved. I have a most rudementary understanding of the area; here’s my take on it, hoping it is not too idiosyncratic:

Events happen. They are whole and made up of parts, which can be isolated by exerting an influence which changes the event. The article suggests that the future can cause events in the past.

Take the double-slit experiment, in which a quantum particle such as a photon of light is fired at two narrow slits in a screen.
Suppose we do not measure which way the particle went, and so cannot tell which slit it went through. In this case, we see an interference pattern – a series of light and dark bands – when the particles emerge on the far side.
This reflects the wave-like character of quantum particles, because interference is a wave property. The interference even persists when the particles pass through the slits one at a time, which only “makes sense” intuitively if we imagine each particle passing, wave-like, through both slits at once.
However, now suppose we place a detector by the slits to reveal which one the particle passes through. In this case the interference pattern disappears, and the particles act more like sand grains being fired through holes. Measuring a particle’s path destroys its waviness.
Here is the really strange thing. We can set up the experiment so that we only detect which slit a particle passed through after it has done so. And yet we still see no interference.
How does the particle “know” that it is going to be detected after passing through the screen, so that when it reaches the slits it “knows” whether to go through both slits or just one? How can the later measurement seem to affect the earlier behaviour?
This effect is called “retrocausality”, and it seems to imply that the arrow of time is not as strictly one-way as it seems. But does it really?

My way of thinking about this is that it is all about events; they include time and space etc in their make-up. The context determines what is happening. In the case of the slit experiment, taking measurements brings the electron out of the wholeless of the beam, isolating it as a particle. An event happens involving the detection and the pattern on the screen; it is whole and it is only our intellect that places the detection as having happened before the electron behaves as either a particle or wave. You change one part of the whole, and it all changes whether we consider one aspect as having happened before or after.

TLDNR - It’s even more confusing than you think.

 

[e_c]

Matter is the individuating principle and the potential of a thing inasmuch as it is material.

Check out Thomas’s On Being and Essence.

 

[Latinitas]

Correct me if I’m wrong, because this definition will serve as the basis for my question, but would Aristotle and Aquinas define matter as the principle of substances that allows their forms to move in and out of existence?

If this is the case, then is it so that our ability to perceive “matter” (though matter is not a thing in actuality capable of being beheld, technically) is possible only when change is occurring? For example, if I exercise my sensory capabilities on the computer-mouse on my desk (feeling it, looking at it), then is it the case that the mouse’s (or any material object’s) form is in a constant state of flux and never subsistent for any real period of time?

I hope this question isn’t too confusing. Also, I’d appreciate any links to relevant resources.

No. The Thomists hold that the angels and human souls are absolutely immaterial, even though they’re created, and since it’s of faith that all creatures are of finite age, they all hold that purely spiritual beings can also be created and annihilated (it’s not impossible, even if in fact, God does not do this).

Benedicat Deus,
Latinitas

 

[fisherman_carl]

Correct me if I’m wrong, because this definition will serve as the basis for my question, but would Aristotle and Aquinas define matter as the principle of substances that allows their forms to move in and out of existence?

If this is the case, then is it so that our ability to perceive “matter” (though matter is not a thing in actuality capable of being beheld, technically) is possible only when change is occurring? For example, if I exercise my sensory capabilities on the computer-mouse on my desk (feeling it, looking at it), then is it the case that the mouse’s (or any material object’s) form is in a constant state of flux and never subsistent for any real period of time?

I hope this question isn’t too confusing. Also, I’d appreciate any links to relevant resources.

I have to prefix my answer by saying I am still learning and no expert on the subject, but I would say that, that definition would not be exactly correct for Aristotle or Aquinas. I don’t think Matter can be reduced to a principle that allows forms to come into existence. Dr. Feser says that in hylemorphism the things of our everyday experience are composed of a composite of form and matter. However, form and matter are mere abstractions. Without the composition of both together they are mere abstractions and can not be analyzed as anything separately. Since both are needed for there to be a substantial form. Matter by itself (without form) can not exist. And, Form without matter is an abstraction (except in the case of Angels, and human souls, which do not require any matter to exist).

Thus, hylemorphism is not a reductionist philosophy. The definition of matter is not the same as modern definitions. You can not isolate matter from form. Form and matter are a composite that describe the whole subject. The rubber ball is composed of rubber and in the form of a ball for instance. If you take away either the matter you have nothing. If you take away the form you have nothing. Now, if you melt the ball you have changed it from one substantial form to another, that is a melted pile of rubber.

As, to the second part of your question, I am not sure exactly what you are getting at. But, Under Aristotle a thing undergoes change when it has some actual potentency actualized by something else that has the potential to actualize it. We don’t really perceive matter on its own, but rather the composition of matter and form. In fact matter without any form is called prime matter and is only a conceptual tool or abstraction, but does not actually exist. As something that is only matter is in pure potency since it has not undertaken any substantial form. And anything in pure potency does not actually exist. There must be some substantial form for a material thing to exist. And, for it to change it must have a potency for that change that can be actualized by an actualizer. Thus, material things must have a substantial form. One could say then that it must have some substance or another that subsists in order to have a substantial form. It can not be pure potential. There has to be something that exists in order to have the potency to change in the first place. So I don’t think you can say that everything is in constant flux. That would be to take the philospher Hiraclitus’ position. Which is something Aquinas disagreed with. There has to be something that subsists. This is a question that ancient philosophers grappled with that I have been reading about in “A History of Philosophy”.

Now, Feser talks about 2 kinds, substantial forms and accidental forms. Aquinas says, “What makes something exist substantially is called substantial form, and what makes something exist accidentally is called accidental form”. What we perceive in the ball, things that can change but do not change it’s essential nature are accidents. For instance, the color of the ball can change but it does not stop being a ball. This is the accidental form. Whereas, if the ball was melted down it would have undergone a substantial change such that it is no longer the same substance, that is a ball. So, the ball has taken on a different substantial form. But, regardless of what form it takes it will always have one substantial form or another, and count as one substance or another. Aquinas says, “since all cognition and every definition are through form, it follows that prime matter can be known or defined, not of itself, but through the composite” (DPN 2.14).

Thus, hylemorphism is not reductionistic to either form or matter. In order to know a substance it must have both form and matter for us to perceive it. And, things, (other than the One) are also a composite of act and potency. There is only the One who is pure Actualization. That is what we call God, who is pure Act, and requires nothing else to actualize Him. So, I would say that perception of a thing does not require a change for us to perceive it, if it is already a substantial form. However, ultimately it required change for it to exist in the first place, for us to be able to perceive it. A mouse can be perceived by us without it changing, either in accidental form or substantial form. It can be perceived by us without it undergoing any motion. However, it required many changes for it to exist in the first place, taking it’s shape in the mouse factory, to what it is now. Ultimately, it’s existence can be traced back to the One.

 

[paduard]

No. The Thomists hold that the angels and human souls are absolutely immaterial, even though they’re created, and since it’s of faith that all creatures are of finite age, they all hold that purely spiritual beings can also be created and annihilated (it’s not impossible, even if in fact, God does not do this).

Benedicat Deus,
Latinitas

That is incorrect; only God is ‘absolutely’ immaterial.
paduard.

 

[fred_conty]

There seems to be confusion about “matter” and “material”.
A piece of cloth is made up of material such as cotton, rayon, silk,etc. This is not the “matter” of “matter and form”. Material is not the matter of “matter & form”.

“Matter and form” means that “form” is what the object is, and “matter” allows that “form” to exist. For example, let’s say that there is a pile of mud. Out of that mud a glob could be formed into a castle, bus, house, and so forth. The glob of mud is the “matter”. The form is the image of the castle, bus, or house. With out the glob of mud, the form(image) could not exist.

Every thing that is material, has matter and form.
Animals have matter and form. Rocks have matter and form. Material’s existence demands matter and form. Form tells you what it is, and matter allows it to be what it is. Matter and Form cannot exist without each other.