Just because it hasn’t been a sentence is not proof that the truth of the sentence hasn’t always been true.
You can’t have the “truth of the sentence” without having the sentence!
If something is true, then it is true regardless of ones knowledge. Your perspective is like saying that one can have knowledge of a true proposition, but if somebody does not know about it, then its truth is not universally true, because its being true is instead relative to your knowledge of it. That doesn’t make sense to me.
Perhaps not, but that’s likely because it’s usually not useful to analyze truth in this way. But if you are going to analyze it, then you may want to become accustomed to the relativism involved.
Let’s have a brief example…
2+2=4, right? Well, suppose we’re working with ordinary addition in the group of integers modulo 3. In that case, 2+2=1. So, 2+2=4 with respect to integers modulo 3 is actually incoherent, and not true at all. Meanwhile, 2+2=1 is true in the group of integers modulo 3, but false in the group of integers.
One way to try to escape this relativity of truth is to say that, rather than propositions, truth is a value on ideas and/or concepts. After all, 2+2=1 may be a single sentence, but it expresses radically different ideas depending on the underlying system of language. But then we’re faced with a myriad of novel problems, not the least of which is the potential uniqueness of each idea to a single human mind. More importantly, though, if we’re going to say that truth is a value on concepts, then we have a similar issue of concepts having come about only with the advent of complex life. In other words, truth still wouldn’t be eternal or transcendent.
What kind of value are you talking about? And what arguement proves that it hasn’t been around forever? I seem to have missed it.
Human beings, who are responsible for constructing such sentences, evolved a finite time ago.
But the fact of 3 + 3 = 6 is an abstract and necessary truth that cannot change, and we are able to perceive this truth because we have seen the order of 6 things.
We have already seen that 2+2=4 is not a true statement with respect to the group of integers modulo 3. We changed the truth by redefining the terms. We can do similar things for the sentence 3+3=6. Considering that, in what sense is 3+3=6 a “necessary truth that cannot change”?
I agree that, that there are some truths that are relative and are heavily reliant on invented language. In order for us to know those truths we must make propositions which require the invention of certain ideas, such as integers.You are certainly correct to say that some logical truths and mathematical truths, are tautological in some respects, as in dependent on one inventing words or numbers like** -1**. It is not necessarily consistent to speak of -1 accept within the context of integers, which is an invented language. However it is still reliant on order to have any consistency at all. The reality of integers was always a possible derivative of order, and in this sense it is an eternal mathematical truth at least in regards to its possible creation; and yet not all the concepts involved in the world of integers are purely creations but are instead derivative of other abstractions which have a more closer relationship to ontological truth which is the realm of being. With out order, abstract truth would not exist at all. And there is no reason to believe that order is the creation of language, and neither is there any reason to believe that all mathematical truths have no basis in experience. In reality, we are speaking about consistent patterns which are ultimately abstractions from the order that we find in being. Or one can say that we are speaking about invented systems of language which are the eternal possibilities of an intrinsic order of being, in so far as they use that order. In any case they reflect a being that is absolute and ordered.
Well, if we somehow traveled back through time, we could still use math to talk about the world. But we couldn’t
just use math. We’d have to use some kind of natural language, as well, like English or Latin.
But notice we don’t get to infer much based on that.
So you are agreeing that there are truths which do not rely on our ability to create language in order for it to be true?
Not at all. “Truth” does not refer to a physical state of affairs. At most, it refers to a relationship between such a physical state of affairs and some proposition or idea. But even that is not always going to be so, such as in the case of abstract statements like f(x)=y.
What does that mean? I know what truth is and what it isn’t and what you are talking about is not the true definition of truth. Some truth is rooted in the observation of that which is real, such as i saw a cat cross the road. The fact that i use the word “cat” does not change the truth of what i saw, accept that i gave an object of my experience a symbolic definition. Definition is important and language is important but i see no reason to make it synonymous with that which causes truth. It certainly plays a part in some truths as is true we tautologies. But Absolute order is the cause of any truth, for with out that we could not construct any coherent propositions. Everything would be a meaningless jumble of symbols and sounds. A square is necessarily different from a circle, not because we describe them as circles and squares, but because the concepts that we are describing are necessarily opposed according to their natures. There natures are eternally opposed, and this is eternally true regardless of my knowledge of circles and squares. If something is real in some way, whether its an abstraction of being or a concrete being in its self, then its reality is true in some sense depending on the context. It seems to me that you believe that the use of descriptive language is the absolute cause of truth. I don’t know what that means, especially with out an underlying reality of order.
en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Truth
I have shown you why this is a flawed perspective. I refuse to do it again.
Then I will also refrain from repeating myself.
So you are saying that the mathematics of science is nothing more then tautological hearsay? Simply saying that something is this or that doesn’t help me to understand the truth of your statement. I guess that all truth is not dependent on language after all.
You seem to have an unusual understanding of truth, which is why axiomatic systems might throw you for a loop. But that’s how math works.