The Ontological Argument and the Loch Ness monster

[Touchstone]

Aquinas’ arguments, being limited to the limited philosophy and science of his day, have of course a foundational weakness in that sense. But his intuition, as I think you called it, was the foundation for his argument. It is the intuition that anyone can have, except those who choose to deny it.

Thomas Jefferson, in a letter to John Adams, fleshed out with more detail the “foundation” Aquinas had outlined in the teleological argument.

*The argument which they [the atheists] rest on as triumphant and unanswerable is that, in every hypothesis of cosmogony, you must admit an eternal pre-existence of something; and according to the rule of sound philosophy, you are never to employ two principles to solve a difficulty when one will suffice. They say, then, that it is more simple to believe at once in the eternal pre-existence of the world, as it is now going on, and may forever go on by the principle of reproduction which we see and witness, than to believe in the eternal pre-existence of an ulterior cause, or creator of the world, a being whom we see not, and know not, of whose form substance and mode or place of existence, or of action no sense informs us, no power of the mind enables us to delineate or comprehend. On the contrary, I hold (without appeal to revelation) that when we take a view of the Universe in its parts general or particular, it is impossible for the human mind not to perceive and feel a conviction of design, consummate skill, and infinite power in every atom of its composition. The movements of the heavenly bodies, so exactly held in their course by the balance centrifugal and centripetal forces, the structure of our earth itself, with its distribution of lands, waters, and atmosphere, animal and vegetable bodies, examined in all their minutest particles, insects mere atoms of life, yet as perfectly organized as man or mammoth, the mineral substances, the generation and uses, it is impossible, I say, for the human mind not to believe that there is, in all this, design, cause and effect, up to an ultimate cause, a fabricator of all things from matter and motion, their preserver and regulator while permitted to exist in their present forms, and their regenerator into new and other forms. We see too, evident proofs of the necessity of a superintending power to maintain the Universe in its course and order. Stars, well known, have disappeared, new ones have come into view, comets, in their incalculable courses, may run foul of suns and planets and require renovation under other laws; certain races of animals are become extinct; and, were there no restoring power, all existences might extinguish successively, one by one, until all should be reduced to a shapeless chaos. *

Interesting quote, thanks. That’s one I’ve not read. We have a “design reflex” as humans. We we see complexity, differentiation and integration, we intuitively make a “telic connection”; this is our nature as humans.

And I not that his last sentence fits nicely with secular science’s view; eventually, all will be reduced to a shapeless chaos, with the stars and everything else capitulating to entropy at long last, one by one.

I think at this point, we can see the outlines of the fundamental difference here, in terms of epistemology. As philosophical/epistemic principle, axioms (or more simply, unsubstantiated claims) are not admitted by simply observing that they are intuitive. Axiomata obtain only through necessity, or self-evidence (which is really just a form of necessity). Intuitions may be correct, and rigorous investigations often return results that validate the original intuition. But that is an *a posteriori *assigment. A priori, intuition carries no unassailable epistemic weight. Intuitively, we think a rock is “thoroughly solid”. And in an informal, macro-scale sense, indeed it is. But the reality of that rock is astonishingly counter-intuitive. There’s almost no actual “solid” to anything “solid”. “Solid” is a useful, practical, reliable illusion for the scale and speeds at which humans operate. But as a matter of knowledge, the intuition is actually a barrier to understanding, rather than an aid, on that question.

Thomistic philosophy, and other philosophies, assign unassailable epistemic weight to their metaphysics. Ask yourself, for example: what conditions would be necessary for Aquinas to conclude: Hey, my metaphysics are messed up! Aquinas, and fellow philosophers of his kind are incorrigible in that regard – ideas derived from intuition are “sublimated” to a point where they are axiomatic, and thus uncorrectable, unfalsifiable.

That’s a major, major liability in terms of rigorous thinking. This is where skepticism and methodical doubt pay spectacular dividends, epistemologically.

-Touchstone

 

[Charlemagne_II]

Touchstone

O.K. I guess the bottom line for you is any man’s theology is as good as any other man’s theology. Aquinas, Einstein, and all the gents listed below are just talking through their hats.

That being the case, what are you doing here at CA? Are you trying to justify yourself, or are you trying to win converts to atheism? In either case, it cannot really be so for you that any man’s theology is as good as any other man’s theology.

And in either case are you, along with the rest of us, just talking through your hat?

Nicolaus Copernicus Heliocentric Theory of the Solar System

“The universe has been wrought for us by a supremely good and orderly Creator.”

Johannes Kepler Kepler’s Laws of Planetary Motions

“[May] God who is most admirable in his works … deign to grant us the grace to bring to light and illuminate the profundity of his wisdom in the visible (and accordingly intelligible) creation of this world.”

Galileo Galilei Laws of Dynamics

“The Holy Bible and the phenomenon of nature proceed alike from the divine Word.”

Isaac Newton Laws of Thermodynamics, Optics, etc.

“This most beautiful system [the universe] could only proceed from the dominion of an intelligent and powerful Being.” Isaac Newton

Benjamin Franklin Electricity, Bifocals, etc.

”Here is my creed. I believe in one God, the creator of the universe. That he governs by his providence. That he ought to be worshipped.

James Clerk Maxwell Electromagnetism, Maxwell’s Equations

“I have looked into most philosophical systems and I have seen none that will not work without God.”

**Lord William Kelvin ** Laws of Thermodynamics, absolute temperature scale

“I believe that the more thoroughly science is studied, the further does it take us from anything comparable to atheism.”

**Charles Darwin ** Theory of Evolution

“There is grandeur in this view of life, with its several powers, having been originally breathed by the Creator into a few forms or into one; and that, whilst this planet has gone cycling on according to the fixed law of gravity, from so simple a beginning endless forms most beautiful and most wonderful have been, and are being, evolved.” Origin of the Species, 1872 (last edition before Darwin’s death).

“[Reason tells me of the] extreme difficulty or rather impossibility of conceiving this immense and wonderful universe, including man with his capability of looking far backwards and far into futurity, as the result of blind chance or necessity. When thus reflecting, I feel compelled to look to a First Cause having an intelligent mind in some degree analogous to that of man; and I deserve to be called a Theist.” from The Autobiography of Charles Darwin.

Louis Pasteur Germ Theory

“The more I study nature, the more I stand amazed at the work of the Creator.”

Max Planck Father of Quantum Physics

“There can never be any real opposition between religion and science; for the one is the complement of the other.”

J.J. Thompson Discoverer of the Electron

“In the distance tower still higher peaks which will yield to those who ascend them still wider prospects and deepen the feeling whose truth is emphasized by every advance in science, that great are the works of the Lord.”

Werner Heisenberg Heisenberg Uncertainty Principle

“In the course of my life I have been repeatedly compelled to ponder the relationship of these two regions of thought (science and religion), for I have never been able to doubt the reality of that to which they point.”

**Arthur Compton ** Compton Effect, Quantum Physicist

“For myself, faith begins with the realization that a supreme intelligence brought the universe into being and created man.”

**Max Born ** Quantum Physicist
“Those who say that the study of science makes a man an atheist must be rather silly.”
**
George LeMaitre ** Father of the Big Bang Theory,
“There is no conflict between religion and science.” Reported by Duncan Aikman, New York Times, 1933

Albert Einstein Special and General Theories of Relativity

“The fanatical atheists are like slaves who are still feeling the weight of their chains which they have thrown off after hard struggle. They are creatures who—in their grudge against traditional religion as the ‘opium of the masses’—cannot hear the music of the spheres.”

 

[Spock]

I’m not going to argue your straw-man.

Oh, yes the ever-present “strawman” when there are no arguments.

You don’t understand potentiality or actuality.

And of course the other ever-present: “you are too dumb to understand my fine reasoning”.

As you wish, buddy. I can do just fine without you. Join the company of the other non-posters. Fortunately there are quite a few good conversation partners out there. Good-bye.

 

[1holycatholic]

Oh, yes the ever-present “strawman” when there are no arguments.

And of course the other ever-present: “you are too dumb to understand my fine reasoning”.

As you wish, buddy. I can do just fine without you. Join the company of the other non-posters. Fortunately there are quite a few good conversation partners out there. Good-bye.

I didn’t say that you are “too dumb.” You’re simply unprepared to engage in an intelligent discussion of the topic at hand.

 

[TheWhim]

Dear Spock,

The concept of “greater” is a relationship operator. The idea of “greatest conceivable entity” assumes that for any two entities “A” and “B”, and for any relationship “R”, the proposition “A > B in relation to R” is meaningful, and it can be resolved. Clearly false, and I gave a few examples to the contrary. What is greater, a “great meal” or a “great movie” - whatever “great” means?

For heaven’s sake, haven’t you realized yet that in speaking of a being with most possiblities actualized we are speaking about objectively quantifiable properties?
“A great meal” and a “great movie” both fail to be objectively quantifiable. But surely enough you won’t indulge in such a wild reasoning as to claim that 2 isn’t more than 1(numbers being objectively quantifiable)? Look, as I already posted two times now, and post now again: every proposition that can be possibly known belongs to the realm of the objectively quantifiable(it’s like with the numbers - if you know two propositions instead of one you obviously know more; and if you know every proposition that is possibly to be known you’ve reached most that could possibly be known, that is, omniscience); every possible action or thing that could happen also belongs to this realm…

The Ontological Argument says not the least about subjective qualifications like a great movie or a great meal. And if you would have showed the simple politeness to read my posts in a less superficial manner, or if would have taken the pain to read Anselms answer to Gaunilo, you would already have known as much.

I really wonder if it’s any use arguing with you at all - sorry, but I feel very much like I’m wasting my time.

 

[Kilbourne]

The idea was that the whole is “greater” than its parts. It all depends on how “greater” is defined. By the way, “potentiality” to what? That is yet another undefined category. Obscuring the terms is not helpful. It only makes the waters murky…

It does ot matter if you call something “greater” or “has more potential”, or “more perfect”. It is still a relational operator. And the “A > B in respect to R” sometimes can be meaningfully resolved, sometimes it cannot. Sometimes it cannot even be defined.

For the “n-th” time, what is “greater”? A “great dinner” or a “great sleep”? Who is “greater”? A “great politician” or a “great athlete”?

With regard to what is greater, I have proposed that the whole of reality is the A which is always greater than any B. For now let us assume that The Whole of Reality (every thing that exists considered as a totality) is a “whole.” Given that, it is inconceivable that any fragment of the whole of reality could surpass the whole. When comparing the WOR to any of its parts, the whole contains that part and all the value inherent therein PLUS everything else.

Now I am not saying that all concrete comparisons between the WOR and any of its parts in terms of any R will be meaningful, though some certainly will be. But this much we know for sure: At the highest level of abstraction, the whole of reality will be unsurpassably and uniquely great.

 

[Spock]

For heaven’s sake, haven’t you realized yet that in speaking of a being with most possiblities actualized we are speaking about objectively quantifiable properties?
“A great meal” and a “great movie” both fail to be objectively quantifiable. But surely enough you won’t indulge in such a wild reasoning as to claim that 2 isn’t more than 1(numbers being objectively quantifiable)? Look, as I already posted two times now, and post now again: every proposition that can be possibly known belongs to the realm of the objectively quantifiable(it’s like with the numbers - if you know two propositions instead of one you obviously know more; and if you know every proposition that is possibly to be known you’ve reached most that could possibly be known, that is, omniscience); every possible action or thing that could happen also belongs to this realm…

So you say that the definition of “greatness” is to be restricted to “knowing” and “acting”. In other words you set up a meta-relationship among the possible definitions of “greatness”, and chose these two particular attributes as measures of “greatness”. This is also a subjective evaluation. There is no logical necessity which would establish that.

Also, why exclude other possible quantifyable attributes? And exclude non-quantifyable attributes, like “love”?

The Ontological Argument says not the least about subjective qualifications like a great movie or a great meal.

The argument simply speaks about “greatest conceivable being”. Your definition of greatness is only one among the possible ones, be they quantifyable or not.

And if you would have showed the simple politeness to read my posts in a less superficial manner, or if would have taken the pain to read Anselms answer to Gaunilo, you would already have known as much.

Being rude does not help you. I overlooked it twice, will not overlook it again.

I really wonder if it’s any use arguing with you at all - sorry, but I feel very much like I’m wasting my time.

Up to you buddy.

 

[Spock]

With regard to what is greater, I have proposed that the whole of reality is the A which is always greater than any B. For now let us assume that The Whole of Reality (every thing that exists considered as a totality) is a “whole.” Given that, it is inconceivable that any fragment of the whole of reality could surpass the whole. When comparing the WOR to any of its parts, the whole contains that part and all the value inherent therein PLUS everything else.

Now I am not saying that all concrete comparisons between the WOR and any of its parts in terms of any R will be meaningful, though some certainly will be. But this much we know for sure: At the highest level of abstraction, the whole of reality will be unsurpassably and uniquely great.

But it does not mean that the currently existing WOR is the “maximum” of all possible WOR’s.

 

[1holycatholic]

So you say that the definition of “greatness”…

Verbal gymnastics isn’t going to help you. The definitions for the subject at hand were defined over 2,300 years ago.

 

[Kilbourne]

But it does not mean that the currently existing WOR is the “maximum” of all possible WOR’s.

That is true. So if the idea of greatness is going to work for the ontological argument, an ambiguity must be recognized. There are two ways a being can be ultimately great or unsurpassable. One can be unsurpassable by any other being and even unsurpassable by oneself. This is the traditional Christian approach, which ascribes a changeless perfection to Deity. Another way to look at it, which still preserves God’s unique greatness, is to assert that God, being the whole of all that exists, will always be greater than any other being, but concede that God can surpass himself in a future state. In other words, concede that God can change, but only for the better.

So I would offer that as a resolution of the objection you raise. I still think we have meaningful conception of greatness.

 

[Spock]

That is true. So if the idea of greatness is going to work for the ontological argument, an ambiguity must be recognized. There are two ways a being can be ultimately great or unsurpassable. One can be unsurpassable by any other being and even unsurpassable by oneself. This is the traditional Christian approach, which ascribes a changeless perfection to Deity. Another way to look at it, which still preserves God’s unique greatness, is to assert that God, being the whole of all that exists, will always be greater than any other being, but concede that God can surpass himself in a future state. In other words, concede that God can change, but only for the better.

So I would offer that as a resolution of the objection you raise. I still think we have meaningful conception of greatness.

Well, there still a few problems to be resolved.

1. The traditional view of God is not equivalent the “WOR”. God is separate for the physical universe. Also you substituted the word “perfection” for “maximum greatness”. Sorry, that is just the same undefined category. The “perfection” does not include “maximum adaptability”, or “maximum evilness”, for example. So the phrase “perfection” is just another cherry-picked set of individual attributes that are assigned to God, while other attributes are arbitrarily “left off”.
2. If God is viewed as the “WOR”, including the actual physical world, then God is a dynamic entity, since the physical world is in constant change. In this scenario it is not true that God can change only for the better. There are natural events (tsunamis, tornadoes, earthquakes, wildfires, landslides) which change the physical world for the “worse”. So the WOR is not “greatest possible” existence, with or without God.
3. I find it interesting that the particular form of “greatest conceivable being” is supposed to have a well-defined meaning, while the generalized “greatest conceivable X”, where “X” is any entity (dinner, entertainer, athlete, whatever… you name it) cannot be meaningfully defined. There is nothing so special about the term “being” that allows it to be substituted into the “X” of “greatest conceivable X” - in a meaningful fashion, while no other entities can be substituted.

One more observation before we continue. The ontological argument is based on the concept of necessary existence (which means the existence in any hypothetical possible world). This concept is false. There no entity, which would exist in every possible world. So even if we could come to a coherent definition of “greatest conceivable being”, acceptable to everyone, the second part of the argument still fails. As stated in the OP, God either exists necessarily or is impossible. Since there is no “necessary” existence, the ontological argument proves that God is impossible. The only way out of this problem is to discard the ontological argument itself.

And that is what I suggest.

 

[Kilbourne]

Greetings Spock,

You raise good points. Let’s looks at one of them, namely that there is no necessarily existing being. In other words, all existence is contingent. Some where along the I way I’ve grown wary of such absolute statements.

If all beings in existence did not exist at one time, might not have come into existence or conceivably might go out of existence, then it is conceivable that absolutely nothing could exist (everything could simply cease to be). That seems to be a truly impossible “state of affairs.” Try to imagine complete nothingness. I can’t do that. Can you?

So I conclude that some thing exists necessarily.

 

[Touchstone]

Greetings Spock,

You raise good points. Let’s looks at one of them, namely that there is no necessarily existing being. In other words, all existence is contingent. Some where along the I way I’ve grown wary of such absolute statements.

You’re excluding the middle here. We can deny the necessary truth of this statement:

1. All existence is contingent.

And simultaneously deny the necessary truth of this statement:

1. There is a necessarily existing being.

Denying 1) and 2) doesn’t mean that 1) or 2) might be the case. It just means we do not have a warrant for saying that either is necessarily true. I might say “I’m agnostic on the matter”, and allow that ultimately, all existence may be fully contingent, or there may be some kind of being whose existence is necessary for reasons we aren’t aware of at this time.

If all beings in existence did not exist at one time, might not have come into existence or conceivably might go out of existence, then it is conceivable that absolutely nothing could exist (everything could simply cease to be). That seems to be a truly impossible “state of affairs.” Try to imagine complete nothingness. I can’t do that. Can you?

Why would that matter? Do you suppose reality depends on what you can imagine? “Seems” is a pronounced weakness in your statement(s), there. If I say, “That seems quite possible”, then what? Battling “seems”?

That’s not a fruitful epistemic strategy, is it?

So I conclude that some thing exists necessarily.

Odd that your wariness of absolutes has driven you to embrace such an absolute.

-TS

 

[Spock]

Greetings Spock,

You raise good points. Let’s looks at one of them, namely that there is no necessarily existing being. In other words, all existence is contingent. Some where along the I way I’ve grown wary of such absolute statements.

If all beings in existence did not exist at one time, might not have come into existence or conceivably might go out of existence, then it is conceivable that absolutely nothing could exist (everything could simply cease to be). That seems to be a truly impossible “state of affairs.” Try to imagine complete nothingness. I can’t do that. Can you?

So I conclude that some thing exists necessarily.

I will approach it from a different angle than Touchstone. The phrase “necessary” existence is not the opposite of “contingent” existence.

The concept of necessary existence comes from contemplating other “possible” worlds. A logically possible world is another world, which differs from ours to a certain degree. Suppose you have an oak tree in your back yard. In another possible world there might be pine tree there, or no tree at all. The only requirement is that the world cannot contain a logical contradiction.

Now when considering all the possible worlds, it might happen - theoretically - that there will be at least one entity which exists in all of them. If that is the case, then we say that that entity exists “necessarily”, because it appears in all the possible worlds. If there is no such entity, then there is no necessary existence. I hope we are in synch so far.

Now let’s consider a few possible worlds.

One possible world is a null-world, where there are no entities at all. This would be the philosophical equivalent of the number zero or the emtpy set in mathematics. Since the null-world is free of logical contradictions, it is a possible world - regardless of the fact that we cannot visualize it. Therefore there is no entiity which would appear in all the possible wolrds.

Now, many peopple dismiss this saying that the null-world is just an abstraction. Of course the concept of a “possible world” is also an abstraction, they say that it is not “really” a possible world. Nevertheless, we can examine other, non-null worlds and get to the same conclusion.

Let’s call one-world another possible world, which has exactly one entity in it. There are many of these one-worlds, for example one of them would contain exatcly one electron and nothing else. Another one would contain one photon, and nothing else.

Therefore these one-worlds are disjunctive, there is no “overlap” between any two one them, which leads to the conclusion that there is no necessary existence.

 

[cpayne]

Hey, everybody. I told myself and told myself I wasn’t going to jump into this discussion, but— Here we go, anyway.

I agree that the concept of the “null-world” and God are mutually exclusive. But all that means is, given the definition of God as the Supreme Being, the concept of the “null-world” becomes meaningless. How could a Supreme Being not exist in all possible worlds?

Maybe the problem is the word “in.” What would it mean for God to exist “in” a possible world? I mean, in one sense, God does not exist “in” any naturally constituted worlds, right? At least not in the sense of “spatially” “in.”

So if what you mean is “spatially in,” I agree; God does not exist “in” the null-world. But this takes away nothing from the classical conception of God. The null-world would have to contain at least one “thing” or relationship: namely, the cause of its existence. If it has no cause of its existence, then it does not exist and we don’t have to worry about it. (The same is true of the one-electron world, and the others.)

If the null-world does have a cause of its existence, at least it “contains” the cause.

 

[Kilbourne]

Greetings Touchstone,

We can lay out the choices this way:

1. All existence is necessary.
2. Some existence is necessary.
3. No existence is necessary (it is all contingent).

#1 is obviously false, so our logical choices boil down to 2 and 3. I have suggested that #3 implies that absolute nothingness is conceivable, but I think absolute nothingness is impossible. So that eliminates #3, leaving only #2 standing.

Why is absolute nothingness inconceivable and impossible? As a starting point, we know that something exists now. If there was a “time” when there was absolutely nothing, then how did the present something come to be? Can something come from nothing? So there always must have been something. If someting exists now and always existed, then why would we think absolute nothingness is a possible future “state of affairs”?

So absolute nothingness doesn’t seem like a very viable concept to me. Maybe you can make a case for it.

Given all this, I think we have more warrant to claim that some existence is necessary than to claim that all existence is contingent.

 

[Kilbourne]

Greetings Spock:

Is a null world a something or nothing? Sounds like a nothing and an absolute nothing at that.

 

[Kilbourne]

Spock:

I am trying to think of “possible worlds” in terms of my “Whole of Reality.” The Whole of Reality presently is what it is. We can conceive of the WOR actualized in different states (other possible WOR’s). However, I cannot conceive of a WOR which is absolutely nothing. I can conceive of the WOR being some being which is empty of everything except himself.

 

[Shike]

A logically possible world is another world, which differs from ours to a certain degree. Suppose you have an oak tree in your back yard. In another possible world there might be pine tree there, or no tree at all. The only requirement is that the world cannot contain a logical contradiction.

So the laws of logic are necessary in every possible world? By the way you have been writing I’m led to believe they rather transcend (which includes in as well) all possible worlds. They’re real are they not…

Perhaps necessary existence of God is in this latter sense of transcendence?

 

[Touchstone]

Greetings Touchstone,

We can lay out the choices this way:

1. All existence is necessary.
2. Some existence is necessary.
3. No existence is necessary (it is all contingent).

#1 is obviously false, so our logical choices boil down to 2 and 3. I have suggested that #3 implies that absolute nothingness is conceivable, but I think absolute nothingness is impossible. So that eliminates #3, leaving only #2 standing.

OK, I see where you are going, here. I don’t object, but I think an important qualifier is being left out – the necessity factor. For example, which of those three are necessary true? Not just conditionally true, but necessarily true? I think we can say #2 is necessarily true, on a transcendental basis; we would not be here to discuss this, if not (and even if one of us is imaginary, one mind must necessarily not be). So I think #2 is true, and necessarily true. To be explicit:

2’) It is necessarily true that some existence is necessary.

That’s a subtle difference from your 2), but an important one, here, I think.

Why is absolute nothingness inconceivable and impossible? As a starting point, we know that something exists now. If there was a “time” when there was absolutely nothing, then how did the present something come to be?

This sounds flip, but it’s not: who cares? Why do suppose that you must have a how at all, or have a how that you must be able to grasp here. Perhaps there was nothing, nothing at all, a “null-reality”, then there was Something, a brute-fact-something, self-existent, perfectly without external cause. Why not?

I’m using “then” and “was” advisedly, and admittedly in a problematic fashion, here. “Then” implies some temporal context which unifies “null-reality” and “brute-Something”. That’s the invidious Aristotelian/Thomist intuitions of time, creeping in, tempting us toward error.

An analogy I like here is “100 degrees North”. What’s 10 degrees North of the North Pole? That’s precisely what we are doing when we use terms like “then” and “was” and “before” in this conversation. Humans have a very difficult task in conceptualizing this problem, and the illusory sense of time as an abstract medium, not an inextricable feature of space, is very hard to resist.

When you say “how did [something, anything] come to be”, then, I suggest that is like asking me what is 10 degrees north of the North Pole?. It’s thoroughly confused in its terminology. “Being” is only meaningful in the context of a context. There was no “before” t=0 for us, as “before” only derives semantic value from t=0 forward. To speak of it as we have, and as is done in even serious philosophy often is just an exercising in debasing the language we are using.

Can something come from nothing?

It must, or else you must embrace infinite regress. There are no other options. A Christian affirms something comes from nothing, and calls it God. That somehow satisfies the intuition, that a something can come from nothing, it’s a smart, personal Something.

Something exists. Either it always existed, eternally, or Something can to exist perfectly out of nothing, for no cause at all.

So there always must have been something. If someting exists now and always existed, then why would we think absolute nothingness is a possible future “state of affairs”?

Doesn’t follow. How did you dismiss Something occurring out of Nothing, without any causal factors outside itself?

So absolute nothingness doesn’t seem like a very viable concept to me. Maybe you can make a case for it.

My position is that we have no choice but to remain agnostic on that issue. We don’t know, and can’t know. Anything beyond that is just caprice. Perhaps Something exists without any cause at all. Perhaps Something has always existed. These are logical possibilities that cannot be dismissed with warrant, I say. So we remain aloof, uncommitted, if we want to hold to reason. When we choose to say ‘everything must have a cause’, we are simply letting our intuitions run roughshod over logical reasoning. We affirm that out of desire, rather than principle. If I’m wrong, I’d like to know the principle.

Given all this, I think we have more warrant to claim that some existence is necessary than to claim that all existence is contingent.

The important insight here is that you are neither obligated or epistemically qualified to say one way or the other. You don’t have any functional warrant either way, and this looks like “warrant” being used as a euphemism for raw intuition. For some, that might qualify as warrant. On this question, I think intuition is less than useless as epistemic warrant.

-TS