The Ontological Argument of St. Anselm

[Charlemagne_II]

R Daneel

*This argument comes up every couple of months. Every time it is refuted. Yet it does not die out. Shame, shame! *

There is no shame in trying to resolve a logical difficulty. Even Bertrand Russell admitted it was difficult to find exactly where the error was in Anselm’s argument, and Russell was a great logician, even if he wasn’t always logical.

 

[R_Daneel]

R. Daneel, I am somewhat of a skeptic on the argument as I’ve said earlier because of my concern about the warrant for premise one. But I do not think the objections that you propose are particularly strong ones.

1). You suggest that one problem is premise one (which is the key premise anyway), is that the notion is incoherent because it is subjective and propose the example of a maximally excellent dinner. You are correct that a maximally excellent dinner is incoherent, because it is subjective. But here is nothing subjective about the idea of a maximally excellent being. Such a being is morally perfect, omnipotent, metaphysically necessary, omniscient etc. All these terms have clear, objective meanings. There is nothing subjective about any of this. For the skeptic to be successful, he must show that the existence of such a being is incoherent, but so far, you have not done so.

Well, “morally perfect” is just another undefined category, since morality is just another subjective idea. Remember: “one man’s terrorist is another one’s freedom fighter and self-sacrifical hero”. Metaphysical necessity is nonsense. Omnipotent (and the other omnimax attributes) are undefined and incoherent. No, my friend, none of these have “clear, objective meanings”. They are the exaggerations of what we find valuable in humans, to an absurd level. The subjectivity part come in when you make a selection about the “sub-attributes” of “greatness”. Why these, and not others? Why is not a “maximally great” being also maximally funny? Or tasty? Or good-looking? Or maximally anything that we can come up with?

2). You suggest that a maximally excellent being should be able to will itself into and out of existence. This is absurd. To will itself into existence from nothing would mean that it would have to exist prior to itself, which is metaphysically impossible. The idea you propose is incoherent.

I am being facetitious - somewhat. Let’s just say that it is a “mystery”, a phrase so well-beloved and used by Catholics when confronted with obvious contradictions (like the Trinity). Actually it does not mean that it must exist “prior” to itself, since time has no meaning for this being, and it is completely independent from causation - as we understand causation. What I propose seems to be impossible to our feeble, time-ridden intellect, and our human logic, but it is not a constraint for this incerdible super-being. Again, I am using Catholic-type of reasoning here, repeated ad-nauseam when God’s incoherent attributes are discussed.

But here is another possibility, which is logically coherent even to us: God is not supposed to do anything “evil”. I can imagine a super-God, who is able to do evil actions, but volitionally decides not to do them. Clearly superior to God, who is unable to do evil acts.

3). There is no reason to think that moral perfection, omnipotence, and omniscience could not manifest themselves in one being. You need to give some reason to think this is the case if you challenge it.

Again, you just cherry-picked a few “usual” attributes. But I have to point out that “omnipotence” and “omniscience” are mutually exclusive. If that super-being knows “everything that can be known” and can do “everthing that can be done” (the usual defintions, which are pretty shallow, by the way), then it cannot do anything it already knows it will do. And cannot do anything it does not know it will do.

4). I disagree that step 3 of the argument is a word game. It is simply a useful step in laying out very clearly that if it is possible for God to exist, then he exists. Of course premise 3 is obvious. premises 2-5 are all regarded as pretty uncontroversial. Premise one is the kicker.

No way. One cannot define anything into existence by stipulating that its existence is “necessary”. As a matter of fact, there is no such thing as “necessary” existence. It is a mathematical nonsense. We can imagine two possible worlds (thought experiments) which have nothing in common, so necessary existence goes out the window. For example, one world contains one quark of a special “flavor”, and the other one contains another quark of a different “flavor”? The intersection of these two possible worlds is a null-world, so there is no “necessary existence”.

 

[danserr]

1). Morally perfect is neither an undefined category nor subjective. Quite simply some things are right and wrong regardless of perception. To try to exterminate the Jews is wrong whatever society says. To round up and cage homosexuals would be wrong regardless of social perception; same with rape and murder. To suggest these rest on societal perception is evidently nonsense.
Omnipotence and Omniscience have clear meanings as well. Omnipotence means the ability to actualize any potentiality. (Or if you prefer, to do anything possible). Omniscience, is probably ok to define as knowing everything knowable.
How is knowing eveything or being able to do everything possible an absurd exaggeration of a human trait? And by absurd, I don’t mean that you personally find it weird, I mean philosophically incoherent.
The reason these traits and not others, is as you intuitively guess regarding a maximally excellent dinner. Other traits are subjective, such as your example of maximally funny.
So there is nothing incoherent about a maximally excellent being who is omnipotent, omniscient, morally perfect, and metaphorically necessary.
2). Simply saying it’s a mystery that a maximally excellent being should be able to will itself into and out of existence is unsatisfactory. I might as well claim that a square circle exists, and then claim it is simply a mystery when you claimed it was an incoherent idea. The trinity is a topic for another thread.
A “super-God” who could do evil but decides not to… (see no.3)
3). That is not cherry picking attributes, as I say above, those attributes that would be proper to a maximally excellent being and are traditionally how one has been conceived. saying “it can’t do anything, it doesn’t know it will do” is like when people ask the silly question “could God do something evil.” No. not because he is not maximally excellent, but because he is. To do evil would suppose a defect in God, and he is without defect. To do something he didn’t know he would do falls into this category.
4). Your objection here seems to be mainly because you disagree with the idea of metaphysical necessity. This is a radical view rejected by most philosophers. In your two world’s for instance, would the number 7 exist? Can you conceive of it not existing? If not, then it exists, if so, then you are really conceiving it anyway and it exists. Numbers and abstract objects thus may be a candidate for necessary beings, ie, they exist in every possible world. If a maximally excellent being exists, then necessary existence would be one of its qualities. You being able to imagine it not existing is irrelevant, since if it exists, then necessary existence is one of its qualities.

 

[R_Daneel]

I don’t really have the time to go into all the details here, and it would also derail the thread. So, only a few comments.

1). Morally perfect is neither an undefined category nor subjective. Quite simply some things are right and wrong regardless of perception. To try to exterminate the Jews is wrong whatever society says. To round up and cage homosexuals would be wrong regardless of social perception; same with rape and murder. To suggest these rest on societal perception is evidently nonsense.

Since we are unable to agree on what “morality” is, this line does not lead anywhere. Besides all the murders, mayhems, rapes and genocides are perfectly “moral” (according to Christians) if committed, or ordered by God.

The reason these traits and not others, is as you intuitively guess regarding a maximally excellent dinner. Other traits are subjective, such as your example of maximally funny.

All the traits are dependent on our perception. If you are familiar with the world of Larry Niven, you can contemplate the alien races of the Kzinti and the Pierson Puppeteers. The Kzinti are a feline race, who value personal bravery, honesty and ferocity, while the Pierson Puppeteers are herbivors, for whom the highest virtue is cowardice. Their “maximally great” being would reflect those traits.

2). Simply saying it’s a mystery that a maximally excellent being should be able to will itself into and out of existence is unsatisfactory. I might as well claim that a square circle exists, and then claim it is simply a mystery when you claimed it was an incoherent idea. The trinity is a topic for another thread.

Actually the “logic” is the same. If contradictory, declare it a “mystery” and pretend there is no problem.

3). That is not cherry picking attributes, as I say above, those attributes that would be proper to a maximally excellent being and are traditionally how one has been conceived.

Tradition does not count.

4). Your objection here seems to be mainly because you disagree with the idea of metaphysical necessity. This is a radical view rejected by most philosophers. In your two world’s for instance, would the number 7 exist? Can you conceive of it not existing? If not, then it exists, if so, then you are really conceiving it anyway and it exists. Numbers and abstract objects thus may be a candidate for necessary beings, ie, they exist in every possible world. If a maximally excellent being exists, then necessary existence would be one of its qualities. You being able to imagine it not existing is irrelevant, since if it exists, then necessary existence is one of its qualities.

I most certainly disagree with “abstract objects”. Abstractions only exist in our mind, and since there are no minds in those worlds I propsed, there are no abstractions either. Mind you, the definition of a possible world is: a state of affairs without a contradiction. (As a matter of fact, the null-world - which does not contain anything at all - is also a possible state of affairs. All the “possible worlds” are mental abstractions, and there is no minimum amount of existing entities, which need to be there, in order to qualify a “possible world”.) And those worlds do not contain a contradiction, therefore they are possible worlds. As such there is no “necessary” existence. What “most” philosophers say is of no consequence.

 

[R_Daneel]

Omnipotence means the ability to actualize any potentiality. (Or if you prefer, to do anything possible).

A short addition to this. God is not supposed to be able to commit evil acts - which go against his nature. Therefore God has no singificant “free will”. My proposed super-god is able, but unwilling to commit evil acts. Therefore, he has significant free will. And a being with free will is clearly superior to the one, who lacks it. So, even if Anselm’s argument would succeed (which it does not) it would not lead to the God of Christianity.

 

[danserr]

You are starting to go off topic (as with your gratuitous and irrelevant remark about the atrocities committed in God’s name). So let me try to focus only on the stuff relevant to the argument, namely, is the notion of God coherent. (ie. is saying “God exists” the same as saying “a square circle exists.”)

One note first: you supposed super-God who could do evil but would choose not too is actually the God of the medieval Occamists, a substantial, though minority group of Christian theologians who distinguished between God’s absolute power and his ordained power. They said the former allowed him to do anything not contradictory including evil, but the latter meant that he would not. I reject this and prefer the Thomistic view.

so you raise several objections:
1). The notion of a maximally excellent being is incoherent because relative.
2). If God’s omnipotence and moral perfection are contradictory, so the notion of God is incoherent.
3). The notion of necessary existence is incoherent.
4). The notion of moral perfection is incoherent because morality is relative.

These are the only ones you raise relevant to the coherence of the notion of a maximally excellent being.

1). I do not understand your insistence that the traits of maximal excellence are relative. There is nothing relative about the notion of omnipotence or omniscience under the definition we are going by. On morality, see no.4. Those traits are not subjective. You then try to change the question and try to claim that the traits that make up maximal excellence are relative, despising the traditional conception. A being without those traits would not be maximally excellent. To imagine a being with maximal cowardice, and maximal humor (as a thought experiment). Such a being would not be maximally excellent because it would have evident defects (in courage, for instance). For maximal excellence to be a coherent idea, then it must have certain traits, and there is no reason to doubt the common conception of a maximal being as omnipotent, omniscient, morally perfect, and metaphysically necessary.
2). There is no contradiction between God’s omnipotence and his moral perfection. This is an old objection, but easily answered when you understand that the notion of God requires that he be without defect. To do evil would be a defect. Saying “God can’t do evil, so he can’t be omnipotent,” is just a word trick, using the words “God can.” What you are really saying is “a being without defect cannot do evil.” To which the theist need only reply, “of course.” Not because the being is not perfect, but because he is. Some people might also add that doing evil is not a trait proper to a maximally excellent being.
Further note: God’s freedom is different from human freedom. His freedom consists in that he is compelled by no force outside himself (and can perfectly choose goodness).
3). If you want to say that necessary existence is impossible, you need to demonstrate this or offer some reason to think it is impossible. Your example about a possible world with only a quark is question-begging, because you simply assume this is possible, but if the concept of God is coherent, then he would exist in that possible world as well. Simply saying you can imagine such a world is irrelevant. (note: I should have been clearer that this was my point above, I also agree that conceptualism or nominalism is probably the case).
4). If you want to say that the concept of a morally perfect being is impossible because morality is relative, then you must demonstrate this and offer some reason to think it is the case. There is nothing strictly contradictory about the idea of moral perfection and all the argument requires is that is be possible. If you think it impossible, you must demonstrate this.

 

[R_Daneel]

One note first: you supposed super-God who could do evil but would choose not too is actually the God of the medieval Occamists, a substantial, though minority group of Christian theologians who distinguished between God’s absolute power and his ordained power. They said the former allowed him to do anything not contradictory including evil, but the latter meant that he would not. I reject this and prefer the Thomistic view.

I can only draw one conclusion from this. Even Christians cannot agree on God’s attributes. Therefore God is a basically undefined, or loosely defined concept. Of course there is nothing new about this. In many threads some of the attributes of God have been confirmed and in others they were discarded - moreover, both stances were “supported” by excerpts from the Cathecism.

so you raise several objections:
1). The notion of a maximally excellent being is incoherent because relative.
2). If God’s omnipotence and moral perfection are contradictory, so the notion of God is incoherent.
3). The notion of necessary existence is incoherent.
4). The notion of moral perfection is incoherent because morality is relative.

Excellent summary.

Now, let’s settle something here. These concepts (like maximal excellence, moral perfection, necessary existence, etc…) must be defined independently from God. If these ideas can only be defined if God is assumed to exist, and has these attributes, then there is nothing to talk about - since then the whole argument would be a circular one. After all the whole point of the ontological argument is to start from a fully secular, materialistic standpoint, and create a logical set of arguments, which will point to some non-materialistic, supernatural or transcendent being. If and only if this line is successful, then the next part can commence, and then the theist must show that this “maximally excellent” being is actually the God of Christianity.

Do you agree with this framework? If you do, then I will return to your specific arguments. If you don’t, then so be it. I am not interested in a discussion which presupposes what it wants to achieve.

 

[danserr]

I can only draw one conclusion from this. Even Christians cannot agree on God’s attributes. Therefore God is a basically undefined, or loosely defined concept.

not at all, don’t confuse disagreement with God’s attributes (whether he is omniscent or not) with the precise understanding of those attributes (whether this involves seeing the future or not, or future contrafactuals). His attributes are well and consistently defined, it is the precise understanding of them that is sometimes debated, and this is a very different thing.

I don’t fully understand your second point, certainly I agree we can’t assume the existence of something that we are trying to prove. I warn you though of the same thing, you can’t for instance, infer that from your secular standpoint, necessary existence doesn’t exist, therefore God can’t exist necessarily, since this would also be question begging. Remember, you are trying to refute the ontological argeument by saying that the concept of God is incoherant. This is a very bold step and there is a substantial burden of proof on you to show that no coherant understanding of God and his attributes is even possible. Why not give your objections, so we can see what you mean.

 

[R_Daneel]

not at all, don’t confuse disagreement with God’s attributes (whether he is omniscent or not) with the precise understanding of those attributes (whether this involves seeing the future or not, or future contrafactuals). His attributes are well and consistently defined, it is the precise understanding of them that is sometimes debated, and this is a very different thing.

What can I say? I am baffled. So there are some attributes (mainly the so called omnimax ones) which are “not understood” precisely. In other words, they are loosely or imprecisely defined. It reminds me to that famous utterance by one of the US Supreme Court justices, who said about pornography: “I cannot define it, but I know it when I see it”. Which translates into unadultenated BS in my book. These attributes (just like pornography) are all human concoctions, and if they are loosely defined, then there is no reason to entertain them.

I don’t fully understand your second point, certainly I agree we can’t assume the existence of something that we are trying to prove.

That is good news.

I warn you though of the same thing, you can’t for instance, infer that from your secular standpoint, necessary existence doesn’t exist, therefore God can’t exist necessarily, since this would also be question begging.

Would it now? If the concept of “necessary existence” would turn out to be bogus, then it cannot be applied to anything, God included. Where is the question begging in that? It is as straightforward a syllogism as it can be.

1. There is no entity that exist “necessarily”.
2. God is an entity.
3. Therefore God does not exist “necessarily”.

The logic is valid. If the first premise would turn out to be true, then it is not just a valid syllogism, but also a sound one. There is no question begging in that. Everything depends on the validity of the first premise.

Remember, you are trying to refute the ontological argeument by saying that the concept of God is incoherant. This is a very bold step and there is a substantial burden of proof on you to show that no coherant understanding of God and his attributes is even possible. Why not give your objections, so we can see what you mean.

Indeed, the onus is on me. Of course, your opening paragraph would give me some pretty strong ammunition, since you, yourself agreed that at least some of God’s attributes are not precisely defined, and I suspect that they cannot be precisely defined. But I will not go that route, at least for the time being. The concept of “necessary existence” will be sufficient. After all this concept does not suffer from the ambiguities of the omnimax attributes.

We start with the definiton of a possible world. By definition, a possible world is a state of affairs, which is different from our world, to some degree. The level of difference is not defined, the only requirement is that the hypothesized world is without physical and logical contradictions. That is all.

Now, you could try to show that there is some “necessary” existence. In order to do that, you have to examine ALL the possible worlds, and show that there is “something specific” which exists in each and every one of them, and so that “something” would exist “necessarily”. However, since the number of possible worlds is infinite, that task is “daunting”, to say the least. Mine is much simpler. All I have to do is show two possible worlds, which have nothing in common, and necessary existence is out into the never-never land.

One possible world would be identical to ours, except it would be composed of anti-matter, (positrons instead of electrons, anti-protons instead of protons, etc.). Obviously there is no ontological entity which would be (or even could be) in both worlds. But there are other examples.

For example, if the Milky Way would be removed from our world, the rest would still be a possible world (let me call this W1). Conversely, if all the other galaxies would be removed, and only the Milky Way remained, that would also be a possible world (let’s call it W2). There is no logical necessity that there would be a physical or logical contradiction if some of the galaxies would not be present.

Now, if we look at the intersection of these two possible worlds (W1 and W2), denoted by W1 * W2 (where the “*” sign is the logical intersection), the result is a null world. Whatever exists in W1, does not exist in W2, and vice versa. At the first approximation we can conclude that there is no entity which would exist in both W1 and W2. But you could make an objection to this. After all the entities in W1 and W2 are not simple entites, they are complex ones, composed of smaller entites. And those smaller entities (atoms, electrons, quarks, etc…) do exist in both W1 and W2. And thus looking at the basic level, there are “things” which appear in both W1 and W2. Not the “same” particles, for sure, but atomic and sub-atomic particles cannot be “told apart”, one carbon atom is the same as any other carbon atom.

We have to dig deeper, and contemplate truly elementary entities, which are - by our current knowledge - the quarks.

So let’s consider the previously mentioned two “mini-worlds”, each containing one quark, of a different flavor. None of these worlds contain anything else, therefore there is contradiction in them, physical or “logical”. They are different from our existing world, but since they contain no contradiction, they are possible worlds - according to the definition of “possible worlds”. Their intersection is the null-world. Besides, the null-world is also a possible world, for the same reasons. Therefore the concept of “necessary existence” is null and void.

 

[danserr]

Your argument is essentially a slightly longer version of the one that I responded to above.
Essentially, you argue that you can conceive a world where nothing necessary exists, therefore nothing exists necessarily, therefore necessarily existence is “null and void.”

I note that you conclude that necessary existence is “null and void” but not incoherent or contradictory, which is interesting, since the issue is whether or not the concept of necessary existence contradictory (like a married bachelor).

Still the theist might reasonably reply to your argument that you have essentially said “it is possible God (a necessary being) does not exist, therefore he does not exist.” The theist could reply (with the ontological argument) that "It is possible such a being (a necessary being) exists, therefore he exists. (I could as easily imagine a possible world where a necessary being exists, and then infer that since he exists in this possible world he exists in all possibly worlds, and therefore exists).

We are then something at a stalemate where you leave us, unless we can establish reasons for thinking that it is either possible that such a being exists or possible that he doesn’t. Understand, I do not mean epistemic possibility and metaphysical impossibility. I am not asking if you or I are personally unsure, but whether such a being is metaphysically possible.

So what warrant have we for thinking that such a being is metaphysically impossible? Your imagining a world where such a being does not exist, does not suffice. All you prove by this is that such an idea has epistemic entertain-ability, but that does not suffice to establish metaphysical entertain-ability. You have to go further and show that the concept of a metaphysically necessary being is itself incoherent, like the concept of a married bachelor. That would suffice to establish the notion of a necessary being as metaphysically impossible. But you can not do this by claiming that you can imagine two worlds with nothing similar in them, since this only sufficed to show the epistemic-entertain-ability of such a notion. Yet it is clear, given what we understand by the term married bachelor, that such a thing is metaphysically impossible. By contrast, the concept of a necessary being is not at all incoherent. And this alone, suffices to provide some a priori warrant for believing the first premise of the ontological argument.

 

[R_Daneel]

Your argument is essentially a slightly longer version of the one that I responded to above.
Essentially, you argue that you can conceive a world where nothing necessary exists, therefore nothing exists necessarily, therefore necessarily existence is “null and void.”

Close, but not precise. I am doing much more, than just “conceive” or “imagine”. But it is true, that I did not write out the whole line of thought, which leads there. So let’s get into the details.

1. Premise: this world exists, therefore it is a possible world.
2. When starting from any possible world, you can always add a new element to it, if that new element is the end result of an existing causal chain, or if that element is really new, but does not create a contradiction. (Example: a couple decides to have children, and goes on with the procreating process.) By the way, I only mention this for the sake of completeness, it is not utilized in the following line of argument.
3. When starting from any possible world, you can always “delete” an element, if it is the end point of a causal chain. (Example: the last descendant of a family can be “deleted”, if some parents would happen not to procreate.)
4. However, we cannot delete an intermediate element from a causal chain. In the case of a “grandparent → parent → child” chain the “parent” cannot be removed (and the child kept), since then the child would be left “hanging in the air”, so to speak. (But we can delete both the parent and the child.) The parent is “possible” when related to the grandparent, but “necessary” if related to the child.
5. You can always delete an element, which is independent (does not form the middle of a causal chain), since such a deletion does not lead to contradiction.
   The point is that this deletion process can never lead to a contradiction, as long as causal chains are not violated, by removing their “middle”.

Now, based upon this process, we can start from our existing world, and keep on “deleting” causal chains from it. For example, we could “delete” all the galaxies, and keep only the Milky Way. Since there is no logical necessity that all those other galaxies “must” exist, the remaining “smaller” world is also possible.

Now we can delete all the other Solar systems, and keep only ours. Again, there is no logical necessity that we “must” have all those other Solar systems. Then we can “delete” all the planets, and keep only the Sun. The we can “delete” the outer layers of the Sun, all the way until just one hydrogen atom remains. Then we can “delete” all the pieces of this sole atom, until just one quark remains.

You see, none of the “deleted” elements are “necessary” in the sense that they all must be present, in order have a system without contradiction. At the end point you have a minimal system (one element only) without a contradiction → which is a possible system. Moreover, you can do this in a way that a different quark will remain at the end. Again, the quarks are independent from each other. By examining the resulting two “mini-worlds” we can look at their intersection, and see the “null-world”, without any elements. Therefore the concept of “necessary” existence is refuted.

I note that you conclude that necessary existence is “null and void” but not incoherent or contradictory, which is interesting, since the issue is whether or not the concept of necessary existence contradictory (like a married bachelor).

You are absolutely correct. The idea of an entity, which appears in all possible worlds is not incoherent, and it does not lead to a contradiction. Except, based upon the logical argument above, there is no such entity.

Let’s look at an analogy. There is no logical impossibility in the following assumption: “let’s imagine that there are two positive integers ‘p’ and ‘q’ for which the ratio of p/q precisely equals the square root of 2”. However, this assumption is false, even though it is “metaphysically possible” to have such two intergers. The above assumption (p/q = sqrt(2)) is not logically self-contradictiory, but it is mathematically impossible. Just like the concept of “necessary” existence, which is not “metaphysically” impossible, but it is physically and logically impossible.

Still the theist might reasonably reply to your argument that you have essentially said “it is possible God (a necessary being) does not exist, therefore he does not exist.”

But that is not what I am saying, and it should be clear from the argument above.

The theist could reply (with the ontological argument) that "It is possible such a being (a necessary being) exists, therefore he exists. (I could as easily imagine a possible world where a necessary being exists, and then infer that since he exists in this possible world he exists in all possibly worlds, and therefore exists).

Where is your starting point? Where is your inference? I see no logical line of reasoning here. The truth is that you cannot even point to any entity in this world, and say: “look, that entity is necessary”. So the ontological argument does not even get off the ground, by pointing to one existing element is this actual (therefore possible) world, and show its “necessity”. It is truly an empty speculation. Remember, you cannot point to a hypothetical God, since God is supposed to be the final result of the ontological argument, not one of the premises.

By the way, this is not a refutation of God’s existence, and should not be taken as such. It simply points to the fact that the ontological argument is untenable. God may or may not exist, but one cannot infer his existence by “observing” this actual and all the other possible worlds.

 

[danserr]

Close, but not precise. I am doing much more, than just “conceive” or “imagine”. But it is true, that I did not write out the whole line of thought, which leads there. So let’s get into the details.

Reading over your reply and comparing it to your first, I actually don’t think that I misunderstood your argument at all, but I do appreciate the greater clarity this time.
Your procedure is to imagine the present world and then observe that any of the elements can be deleted from it, and then to infer that necessary existence does not exist.

The problem is that by assuming the you can subtract anything from this world, you are already assuming that nothing exists necessarily. Because if something did, God, for instance, you could not subtract it. If God existed (I am not assuming he does, I am simply not assuming he doesn’t, like you are), then you could not subtract him. In other words, the only reason you believe you can subtract everything from this world, is because you believe there is nothing necessary in it. You have begun by begging the question. It might be that a necessary being exists, you may not begin by assuming it does not.

Consequently, your admission that your argument does not show that the concept of a necessary being is incoherent is really very important. Your current argument begs the question; the only way you could dispute necessary existence to show that the idea is internally incoherent or contradictory, but you freely admit your argument does not do this. So there is no justification to conclude that a necessary being does not exist.

You ask my own starting point to imagine that a maximally great being exists. An excellent question, and as I have said several times, the key one for the Ontological argument. Do we have warrant for believing the first premise, that it is possible a maximally excellent being exists? This is really a pretty modest first step, but the one on which the whole argument turns. I have given two reasons above. 1). the concept of a maximally excellent being is not incoherent. and 2). Other arguments, may strengthen the first reason, and give us some additional warrant for thinking the existence of a maximally excellent being is possible.

 

[R_Daneel]

Your procedure is to imagine the present world and then observe that any of the elements can be deleted from it, and then to infer that necessary existence does not exist.

A minor correction: I am not “imagining” the present world, I am “observing” it.

The problem is that by assuming the you can subtract anything from this world, you are already assuming that nothing exists necessarily.

No, I do not assume anything. We know that this world exists, therefore it is possible. We know that logically we can remove a causal chain without “disturbing” the validity of this world. Just look back at my previous post. Do you think that removing all the other galaxies would introduce some logical contradiction? Or removing all the other Solar systems would somehow lead to a logical contradiction? Surely not. None of these entities are logically necessary. The precoess leads to those mini-worlds and thus we prove that there is nothing that would be “necessarily” existing.

Because if something did, God, for instance, you could not subtract it. If God existed (I am not assuming he does, I am simply not assuming he doesn’t, like you are), then you could not subtract him.

Correct. But that is what would be the end result, if the argument would be successful. You cannot assume that God exists, and that God exists necessarily, and therefore you cannot remove him. That is the qunitessential circular argument. If one would start with the idea that God exists, and his existence is necessary, then what is the point of the whole ontological argument? There would be no point.

In other words, the only reason you believe you can subtract everything from this world, is because you believe there is nothing necessary in it. You have begun by begging the question. It might be that a necessary being exists, you may not begin by assuming it does not.

But of course I can. That is the whole point. The existence of a necessary entity can only be posited as a hypothesis. During the process of examining this world it turns out that the hypothesis is incorrect. No big deal.

Consequently, your admission that your argument does not show that the concept of a necessary being is incoherent is really very important. Your current argument begs the question; the only way you could dispute necessary existence to show that the idea is internally incoherent or contradictory, but you freely admit your argument does not do this. So there is no justification to conclude that a necessary being does not exist.

Look at the other example I gave you. There is no a-priori reason to assume that there cannot be two positive integers for which the ratio of “p/q” cannot be precisely equal the square root of two. Logically and metaphysically speaking such two numbers could exist. But in reality they cannot. The same principle is at work here. We can posit a hypothesis of “something”, which does not involve a metaphysical impossibility per se, and yet this “something” will lead to an absurdity.

You ask my own starting point to imagine that a maximally great being exists. An excellent question, and as I have said several times, the key one for the Ontological argument. Do we have warrant for believing the first premise, that it is possible a maximally excellent being exists? This is really a pretty modest first step, but the one on which the whole argument turns. I have given two reasons above. 1). the concept of a maximally excellent being is not incoherent. and 2). Other arguments, may strengthen the first reason, and give us some additional warrant for thinking the existence of a maximally excellent being is possible.

I am not against going back and re-examining the concept of “maximal greatness”. But since you yourself postulated that it includes “necessary existence”, and I have proved that “necessary existence” is an invalid assumption, there is no real need to start from square one again. If the idea of necessary existence is an integral part of maximal greatness, and necessary existence turns out to be bogus, then the whole maximal greatness is bogus as well. I really don’t see what else can be said about this.

 

[danserr]

An interesting reply, you accuse me of a circular argument, which I do not make, but then almost freely confess that you make one yourself. Let me specify.

You have given up trying to disprove the concept of necessary existence (ie that it is internally contradictory or incoherent), instead you are trying to construct an argument that nothing exists necessarily. (this means we are hardly even still discussing the ontological argument and have gone off topic again).

Your argument is:
1). If one can subtract anything in existence from the present world, then nothing exists necessarily
2). One can subtract anything in existence from the present world
3). therefore nothing exists necessarily.
[4). If nothing exists necessary, a necessary being (God) does not exist. (because if God exists, he exists necessarily). ]

For this argument to hold, you have to prove premise 2. On the surface, this seems fine as long as you can prove premise 2, but on further investigation, the argument is clearly circular. Your last answer to me on this was very unsatisfactory. You try to sustain premise two by examining the present world and observing anything can be subtracted from it. Certainly this is true of anything physical, which is what you are observing, but why assume that the physical is all there is? I insist that you can not make the assumption that God does not exist, because that is what you are trying to prove.

You reply, “But of course I can.” That is you freely admit that the success of your argument depends on assuming that God does not exist. Yet this is precisely what your argument purports to prove. Only by assuming in advance that a necessary being (God) does not exist, are you able to come to the conclusion that a necessary being (of which God would be one), does not exist. This is the very definition of circularity.

Put it another way, premise two only holds up, if you assume God does not exist. that is, you really have an implied premise 1b. God does not exist (by your own confession, you admit this). your argument really is:
1). If one can subtract anything in existence from the present world, then nothing exists necessarily
1b). God does not exist
2). One can subtract anything in existence from the present world
3). therefore nothing exists necessarily.
[4). If nothing exists necessary, a necessary being (God) does not exist. (because if God exists, he exists necessarily). ]

1. only works because you assume 1b. So you assume that God does not exist, and then conclude that he does not. (it is not an answer for you to protest and say you are only proving that a necessary being does not exist, since that would include God, which is your point anyway).

You said in an earlier post that you had no interest in discussing an argument, which assumes what it professes to prove. I concur, but you have done precisely that.

Note 1: we are not discussing the ontological argument anymore. We are discussing an independent argument against theism. The ontological argument rests on the possibility that a maximally excellent being exists. The way to refute this would be to show that the concept of God or any of his attributes is incoherent. This you have not done. The ontological argument shows that as long as it is possible for God to exist, that he exists.

Note 2:

There is no a-priori reason to assume that there cannot be two positive integers for which the ratio of “p/q” cannot be precisely equal the square root of two. Logically and metaphysically speaking such two numbers could exist. But in reality they cannot.

you are mistaken. 2 such integers either exist or they do not. If they exist, then they exist in every possible world and thus necessarily. Mathematical truths are necessarily true. 2+2=4 is necessarily true. That is, it is true in every possible world and there is no possible world, or state of affairs in which it cannot be true. To say that 2+2=5 is incoherent, when you understand what is meant by 2, by 5, and by addition.

 

[R_Daneel]

Certainly this is true of anything physical, which is what you are observing, but why assume that the physical is all there is? I insist that you can not make the assumption that God does not exist, because that is what you are trying to prove.

We are still not on the same page. I am not trying to prove that God does not exist. God is not even in the picture. I am not even arguing against the maximally great being. I am simply arguing against the concept of necessary existence, nothing more.

The concept of a possible world is very simple. A possible world is a hypothetical state of affairs, which differs from ours, and which does not contain a logical contradiction. That is the definition. The proposed hypothetical mini-worlds fulfill those criteria. As a matter of fact, the null-world (which is empty) is also a possible world. They do not and cannot contain a logically contradictory state of affairs, because in a world, which only contains either none or just one entity, there nothing to contradict. That is the mathematical proof that there is no necessary existence.

You say that I utilize the assumption that there is no necessary existence. I do not utilize it. I simply start from the definiton of a “possible world” and let the chips fall where they may. Your argument is that a possible world is “a state of affairs, which is different from the existing one, which does not contain a contradiction, and which also contains a necessary being”. You change the definition to suit your needs, which is of course “begging the question”.

 

[danserr]

We are still not on the same page. I am not trying to prove that God does not exist. God is not even in the picture. I am not even arguing against the maximally great being. I am simply arguing against the concept of necessary existence, nothing more.

Arguing the concept would be to show it is incoherent. You do not, as you admit. You argue against the concept only by trying to argue against the existence of a necessary being. So you are not arguing against the concept. You are arguing that nothing exists necessarily and this is a very different thing.

Your argument is that a possible world is “a state of affairs, which is different from the existing one, which does not contain a contradiction, and which also contains a necessary being”

I have no idea where you are pulling this from. I have explicitly told you I do not assume a necessary being exists. *I assume neither that it does or doesn’t. *
On the contrary, by your own admission, your argument assumes that God does not exist. This makes your own argument circular, since you assume a necessary being, (God) does not exist, then use this unwarranted assumption to “prove” that nothing exists necessarily. Assuming in advance that God does not exist is question begging.

This means the questions I raise in my last post are still valid and you still need to answer them or give up arguing against necessary existence.

We are getting no where and can’t get anyway as long as you insist on assuming as a starting point that God does not exist.

 

[R_Daneel]

Arguing the concept would be to show it is incoherent. You do not, as you admit. You argue against the concept only by trying to argue against the existence of a necessary being. So you are not arguing against the concept. You are arguing that nothing exists necessarily and this is a very different thing.

No, we are not getting anywhere. I simply say that the concept of “necessary existence” is an empty concept - which is different from “incoherent”. And I do that by showing that there is no necessary being. These are the same thing.