The Ontological Argument

[Ace86]

St. Anselm uses an “a reductio ad absurdum” argument. In other words, in order to prove the existence of God, assume that God doesn’t exist. Then show that the non-existence of God leads to a contraction. Therefore we would know that our assumption must be false. Therefore, it must be the case that God exists.

St. Anselm

1. By definition, God is a Being than which nothing greater can be conceived.
2. If God exists only in the understanding, then there is (could be) a being other than God.
3. Suppose that God exists only in the understanding.
4. Therefore there is (could be) a being greater than God.
5. But it is not possible for there to be a being greater than God (the being than which nothing greater can be conceived).
6. Therefore, it is not the case that God exists only in the understanding.
7. If God exists not just in the understanding then God must exist in the real world as well.
8. Therefore, God must exist in the real world as well.

 

[jemfinch]

I never really found the ontological argument compelling. Substitute “Perfect Island” for God and you’ll see the problem: an ontological argument could be made that the “Perfect Island” must exist, but hardly anyone would find that compelling.

Jeremy

 

[Gilbert_Keith]

St. Anselm’s argument is not compelling for the simple reason that almost everyone feels the sense of a circular argument when listening to it.

I think Anselm was ultimately wrong, but I think he raised an interesting question for atheists to have to contend with. God is conceived as the being beyond which no being greater can be conceived.** If** such a Being exists, then this Being does not require a creator. This will irritate atheists because their stock argument is that the principle of causality must be endless.

“Who is God’s daddy?” they like to taunt.

Well, God by definition cannot have a daddy, and that is Anselm’s point. God created everything, including the principle of causality, and therefore is not subject to causality, or else He would not be the Being of which no Being greater can be conceived.

Again, no proof, but Anselm puts a monkey on the atheist’s back. And the monkey will not get off.

 

[Ace86]

I agree it’s not compelling because it goes in a circle. But it very famous.

 

[Gilbert_Keith]

It certainly is famous. It was the first proof for the existence of God I ever heard. My high school English teacher showed it to me and I haven’t been the same person since.

 

[RobNY]

I never really found the ontological argument compelling. Substitute “Perfect Island” for God and you’ll see the problem: an ontological argument could be made that the “Perfect Island” must exist, but hardly anyone would find that compelling.

Jeremy

I don’t think Gaunilo’s objection is quite adequate: he is not talking about a perfect one of one type of being, but of all being. I.e., he is not saying, conceive of the most perfect God, but the most perfect being. Plus, a perfect island would not necessarily have being as part of its essence as would God (I think).

Kant’s objections seem to hit home, though. If existence is not a perfection, it makes the argument much more difficult.

For fun, check out the modern versions of the ontological argument (i.e., Alvin Plantinga).

-Rob

 

[batteddy]

Yeah, Aquinas didn’t like the ontological argument either.

Basically, it says “If God exists, then He must exist”…well, duh…

Not addressing Kant for a moment, what Anselm said amounts to: “To truly be perfect, God would have to exist for real and not just in the mind. Because really existing is better than just in the mind.”

But that says nothing about actual reality. It’s like saying, “10000 plus 213 HAS to equal 10213!” But that says nothing about those quantities existing in the real world.

Well, yes, if we were to hypothetically dream up the perfect being…it would have to hypothetically be a being!

It comes down to saying “If God were real, God’s existence would be His essence”…but “would be” is not the same as being for sure. Yes, “If God is, He has to be”…but that doesn’t say anything about whether He is in the first place…

At the same time, this reminds me of another interesting question.

Are we allowed, in writing, to create worlds where there is no God? If, as Catholics, we are convinced that God’s existence is naturally evident (by contingency, causality, etc) is it even possible for us to write about “alternate realities” where there is no God? A different mythology I could understand (God could have simply “done things differently”) but is it even logically possible to write about a world where a basic premise stated at the beginning of the work is that, in the fantasy world there is no God?

 

[Krebsbach]

Hey y’all, specially those who pooh pooh St. Anselm,

There are actually two versions of the OA in the Proslogiun (sp?). The weaker version, outlined above, appears in Prosl. II, and the stronger is Prosl. IV. The stronger version, most recently defended by Malcolm and Hartshorne in the last centruy, is called the modal version. To my weak mind, it is unrefutable. There are two modes of existence: necessarily existing and contingently existing. It is greater to exist necesarily. If God is the greatest conceivable being, then he must be necessarily existing.

kordially

Karl

 

[FurmanTM]

Kant is right in asserting that existence is not a predicate. Hence, the ontological argument fails in that regard. BUT, necessary existence is a proper predicate, in which case the argument goes through such as it does. BUT we can imagine a parallel argument:

1. By definition, God* is an evil Being than which nothing greater can be conceived.
2. If God* exists only in the understanding, then there is (could be) a being greater than God*.
3. Suppose that God* exists only in the understanding.
4. Therefore there is (could be) a being greater than God*.
5. But it is not possible for there to be a being greater than God* (the evil being than which nothing greater can be conceived).
6. Therefore, it is not the case that God* exists only in the understanding.
7. If God* exists not just in the understanding then God* must exist in the real world as well.
8. Therefore, God* (an evil Being than which nothing greater can be conceived) must exist in the real world as well.

in which case we can see that there must be a problem with the argument somewhere.

RE: The modal version of the argument: The modal version of the argument depends on assumptions made in S5, which most logicians reject. Moreover, even if we accept S5, the above strategy can be adapted to destroy the modal version of the argument as well.

Finally, the version of the argument above seems very familiar to me, anyone in this thread from LC. LA?

FurmanTM

 

[batteddy]

It is greater to exist necesarily. If God is the greatest conceivable being, then he must be necessarily existing.

Yes. IF God were the greatest concievable being, he would necessarily exist.

But that doesnt say anything about him actually existing, only hypothetically. IF God is, He must necessarily be. But that doesn’t prove the first assumption; Him being in the first place.

The greatest being we can imagine WOULD have to exist IF it existed at all. But does it? I believe so, but the OA is no help there…

The greatest possible being WOULD have to be IF it was at all. But who’s to say that the greatest being in reality is the greatest POSSIBLE being. Certainly, many things are possible which are not real.

 

[RobNY]

Kant is right in asserting that existence is not a predicate. Hence, the ontological argument fails in that regard. BUT, necessary existence is a proper predicate, in which case the argument goes through such as it does. BUT we can imagine a parallel argument:

Fascinating.

1. By definition, God* is an evil Being than which nothing greater can be conceived.
2. If God* exists only in the understanding, then there is (could be) a being greater than God*.
3. Suppose that God* exists only in the understanding.
4. Therefore there is (could be) a being greater than God*.
5. But it is not possible for there to be a being greater than God* (the evil being than which nothing greater can be conceived).
6. Therefore, it is not the case that God* exists only in the understanding.
7. If God* exists not just in the understanding then God* must exist in the real world as well.
8. Therefore, God* (an evil Being than which nothing greater can be conceived) must exist in the real world as well.

in which case we can see that there must be a problem with the argument somewhere.

This seems to be the difference. The ontological argument says, “being” where you say “evil being.” In my mind this is similar to subsittuting “island” for ‘being’ because we aren’t speaking of specific types of being but of being in general. IT seems to me that, perhaps, this is like Gaunilo’s objection, but of course, even more interesting.

“Evil” would have to be in the part of the definition that is tacked onto being, “conceive of a being such that… and this is the part.” So, “conceive of a being such that *no greater can be conceived” *is like the traditional formulation. To parallel it, “conceive of a being such that is evil and no greater can be conceived.” It seems to me that such a thing is very much different than the original. The original merely gives it all perfections, whereas this one makes it a specific type of being (an evil type). Besides, most theists could probably say anyway, ‘evil’ is not a perfection, but rather the privation of a perfection.

Does this make sense? Please be kind.

RE: The modal version of the argument: The modal version of
the argument depends on assumptions made in S5, which most logicians reject. Moreover, even if we accept S5, the above strategy can be adapted to destroy the modal version of the argument as well.

Finally, the version of the argument above seems very familiar to me, anyone in this thread from LC. LA?

FurmanTM

Could you explain to me why S5 is not accepted by most logicians, and also what versions of modal logic tend to be the ‘accepted’ ones?

-Rob

 

[john_doran]

BUT we can imagine a parallel argument:

1. By definition, God* is an evil Being than which nothing greater can be conceived.
2. If God* exists only in the understanding, then there is (could be) a being greater than God*.
3. Suppose that God* exists only in the understanding.
4. Therefore there is (could be) a being greater than God*.
5. But it is not possible for there to be a being greater than God* (the evil being than which nothing greater can be conceived).
6. Therefore, it is not the case that God* exists only in the understanding.
7. If God* exists not just in the understanding then God* must exist in the real world as well.
8. Therefore, God* (an evil Being than which nothing greater can be conceived) must exist in the real world as well.

in which case we can see that there must be a problem with the argument somewhere.

the problem is with your phrase “an evil being greater than which nothing can be conceived”: the greatest conceivable being cannot be evil, since those are mutually exclusive properties (like “round” and “square”).

FurmanTM:

RE: The modal version of the argument: The modal version of the argument depends on assumptions made in S5, which most logicians reject.

i’d like to see you back up this claim.

FurmanTM:

Moreover, even if we accept S5, the above strategy can be adapted to destroy the modal version of the argument as well.

i’d also like to see your backup for this…

 

[Ace86]

Finally, the version of the argument above seems very familiar to me, anyone in this thread from LC. LA?

FurmanTM

See you in class!

 

[Krebsbach]

Hey GK,

Anselm certainly put the burden on the atheist. He conclusively reduced the logical possibilities to two: either God exists necessarily or the very idea of God is nonsense.

 

[Krebsbach]

And I have yet to have anyone show me that the defninition of God as the greatest conceivable being is nonsense.

 

[Krebsbach]

Hey Bat Ted,

The greatest being we can imagine WOULD have to exist IF it existed at all. But does it? I believe so, but the OA is no help there…

The greatest possible being WOULD have to be IF it was at all. But who’s to say that the greatest being in reality is the greatest POSSIBLE being. Certainly, many things are possible which are not real.

It is nonsensical to entertain the thought of the GCB, who by inference necessarily exists, as not existing. That’s Anselm’s point. Either you buy the idea of a GCB or you conclude it is nonsense. If you think the idea of the GCB is meaningful, then you can’t entertain the possibility of its nonexistence.

 

[batteddy]

Aquinas didn’t buy that argument and niether do I.

But I somewhat agree with this:

He conclusively reduced the logical possibilities to two: either God exists necessarily or the very idea of God is nonsense.

But still, I don’t think Anselm’s hypothetical proves anything abour reality. God WOULD have to exist IF he existed at all. That doesn’t prove he does, only that IF he did, it would be of necessity.

A triangle, a polygon with three-sides on a plane, WOULD have to have 180degrees total IF it existed at all. That doesn’t prove that any triangle actually exists anywhere.

 

[FightingFat]

I like to look at it this way, this is how I see the Church’s position on it:

The question of human existence is as important for theology as is the question of God. If theology is born out of a questioning of who God is and the attempt to understand him, it is appropriate that we begin its study with a questioning of who we are and attempt to understand what we are.

We enquire about God because we seek the deepest meaning of our being. We enquire about Christ because we seek a solid, personal and historical foundation for the God we find deep in our being and we enquire about the Church because we seek to institutionalise and communicate our understanding of Christ.

 

[HailMary]

This has some interesting reads on the existence of God

 

[Huiou_Theou]

Hmm,

Yes: Thomas Aquinas appears to not have liked the ontological argument,

Yet the church has called Anselm’s proof ‘venerable’.
In fact, the only thing that one is required to believe is that starting from motion – God’s existence can be proved. (St. Thomas’ proof is not explicity endorsed as ‘THE ONLY proof from motion’ although many think that it is. As an alternate: consider the body of Greek thought invoked by St. Paul (poetry), which appears to refer to the intellectual capability of man as the descendant of deity moving and ordering everything: the divine logic.)

As an aside, Thomas Aquinas also appears to provide a proof which is equivalent to the ontological argument, although I don’t have a precise understanding of it: for Aquinas says that the greatest of any genus is the CAUSE of that genus.

1. Suppose that God exists only in the understanding.
2. Therefore there is (could be) a being greater than God.

Understanding is grasping the existence of something: under (sub) standing (stance). If God is understood – then he has substance and exists.

An idea has existence – in the mind. Yet this reality is subject to the whim of the thinker. An existence beyond the imagination is intuitively a reality because it does not draw its existence from a purely shadowy thought. That is: it exists whether or not one wants it to, and is discernable by others. The more real something is – the more independent and enduring it is.

If God exists only in thought – then anything which is not a creation of the imagination would be greater by the measurement of not being controlled by the mind. eg. Any of these realities would be greater than the imagined God since they are all real. That is the absurdity of the atheist position – trying to say that the greatest existing thing is a figment of the imagination.

If God exists only in the understanding – then he is a shadowy idea – and there ARE other things greater than him. eg. the thinker. Hence the Atheist who claims that the Greatest existing thing is a thought – proudly exalts his imagination above reality.

A greatest Island fails: for we know that the world consists of more than islands: eg. the intellectual man is greater than an island – he may even build an imaginary island (or real).

Even the very exercise of an imaginary world of islands is forcing one to retreat into the athiestic absurdity of an imagination being greater than the world. (And Ironicly claiming that the world evovled the mind.) Anselm wants one to see the world as it is – not reducing it to a pretend world which does not accurately reflect reality. An imaginary Island can only defeat an imaginary God.

Also, in Catholoc theology – evil is a privation. It is not a thing but the absence of something, hence an ‘evil God’ is a contradiction in terms.