The Ontological Arguments

[melbourne_guy]

Chlorafill more like bore-afill.

 

[john_doran]

Hitetlen:

Yes, I gather that, but what is “possible”? Whatever we can imagine? I can imagine a world where there are no set laws of physics (for example). I can imagine a world where there are fairies, dragons and magicians. Are these worlds possible? M. C. Escher has created fabulously detailed pictures of worlds where there is no “up” or “down”, are those worlds “possible”? I can imagine a world where the laws of logic do not apply, so is such a world “possible”?

yes to all except the last one: “possibility” in its most general sense means logically possible.

 

[precious_roy]

adamlsp:

You are refering to a being with the property of non-existence. This is clearly self-contradictory. You are saying nothing just is and that no properties can be ascribed to it. But actually nothingness just isn’t, that is why no properties can be ascribed to it. Not because of our lack of ability but because there is nothing to describe. Nothingness does not exist by its very definition. Thus the entire idea of nothingness is but a concept with no actualization in reality. God has infinite properties of perfection. Thus he is infinitely greater than nothingness. Just as infinity is infinitely greater than 0. This is on an absolute scale without negatives.

Adam

I Disagree.

Because again you are trying to say something is better than nothingness, which like I stated above, you can say but you have to state as an axiom with which one may not agree (such as myself). I cannot mentally justify that being is greater than not being so I may be inclined to reject that axiom (or at least reserve judgement).

And the examply of infinity being greater than zero does not suffice because zero is still a concept (the absence of a positive or negative value). Nothingness isn’t even a concept really.

Sorry, I cannot explain this very effectivly; I’m not a philosopher. I would suggest the following readings if you are interested:

John Paul Sartre: Existentialism and Human Emotions
Anything by Nietzsche
Kierkegaard: Sickness unto Death

 

[precious_roy]

melbourne_guy:

Chlorafill more like bore-afill.

No I will not make out with you!
I’m trying to learn and this girl is just talking about making out. I’m here to learn, everybody, not to make out. Go on with the lesson.

 

[Hitetlen]

john doran:

yes to all except the last one: “possibility” in its most general sense means logically possible.

OK, thanks. Now I can start to argue. We agree that the phrase “in all possible worlds” incorporates every world which does not contain a logical contradiction. (Side remark: that definition also proves that God is limited by the laws of logic.)

Now one of all the possible worlds is exceptional (and contains no logical self-contradiction), and that is the NULL-world, the one which contains nothing, which is empty.

That world, since by definition does not contain anything also cannot contain the “maximally great being”, since that would be a logical contradiction. Therefore there is no such thing as necessary existence, since it is defined as having existence in all the possible worlds. Therefore the ontological arguement as stated - is false.

Q. E. D.

 

[john_doran]

Hitetlen:

OK, thanks. Now I can start to argue. We agree that the phrase “in all possible worlds” incorporates every world which does not contain a logical contradiction. (Side remark: that definition also proves that God is limited by the laws of logic.)

Now one of all the possible worlds is exceptional (and contains no logical self-contradiction), and that is the NULL-world, the one which contains nothing, which is empty.

That world, since by definition does not contain anything also cannot contain the “maximally great being”, since that would be a logical contradiction. Therefore there is no such thing as necessary existence, since it is defined as having existence in all the possible worlds. Therefore the ontological arguement as stated - is false.

Q. E. D.

well, no. unless the very concept of “necessary being” is self-contradictory, then every possible world has at least one thing: a necessary being.

but what is the “null world” supposed to be, anyway? by definition it is nothing, not even a “world”. it is not like the null set, a putative set-theoretic entity which is something (a set) that is just empty - possible worlds aren’t like containers that can be more or less full: possible worlds are (at the very least) ways of thinking about propositions. which means, of course, that there will be at least one (kind of) thing in what you’re calling the “null world”: propositions ***about ***it. for example, the proposition “nothing exists” will be false at the null world (because there is at least one thing existing there: that proposition).

 

[Hitetlen]

john doran:

well, no. unless the very concept of “necessary being” is self-contradictory, then every possible world has at least one thing: a necessary being.

The concept of necessary being is not a primary definition, it is the derivative of a form of existence. You cannot argue that the null-world is impossible - because it does not contain a necessary being. I did not deviate from your proposed concept of a world, anything except a self-contradiction. Emptiness or nothingness are not self-contradictory, therefore they exist as a world.

The concept of “necessary being” does not have to be self-contradictory - it is merely uselss.

You cannot redefine the concept of a “world” and say that a world cannot be empty, it must contain at least one element (which moreover has to be conscious and omnimax). That contradicts your proposed definition.
john doran:

but what is the “null world” supposed to be, anyway? by definition it is nothing, not even a “world”. it is not like the null set, a putative set-theoretic entity which is something (a set) that is just empty - possible worlds aren’t like containers that can be more or less full: possible worlds are (at the very least) ways of thinking about propositions. which means, of course, that there will be at least one (kind of) thing in what you’re calling the “null world”: propositions ***about ***it. for example, the proposition “nothing exists” will be false at the null world (because there is at least one thing existing there: that proposition).

Propositions do not “exist” as entities, they are the verbal equivalents of mental constructs. And if there are no entities in an empty world, then there are no thinking entities either, therefore there are no propositions.

One possible world would be the one with no life in it. That world would not contain any propositions either.

Actually the “world” is a contanier combined with all of its contained elements. Just like the concept of a mathematical set. Allegedly our world was an almost empty one, before God created the physical world.

 

[Mike_O]

Hitetlen:

Emptiness or nothingness are not self-contradictory, therefore they exist as a world.

Spectacular logical error.

In essence you just said “Non-existence exists.” Have fun with the proof of that statement.

You cannot redefine the concept of a “world” and say that a world cannot be empty, it must contain at least one element (which moreover has to be conscious and omnimax). That contradicts your proposed definition.

Again, incorrect.

We speak of the world as subjects of time and space, conditioned to change, physical decay, etc. The Being we acknowledge–not propose–exists outside of time and space and is not dependent/contingent/caused by the existence or non-existence of any world but Itself BRINGS INTO EXISTENCE the entities of worlds.

 

[adamlsp]

Krebsbach:

Mornin Adam,

Anselm’s definition of God, that than which none greater can be conceived, ends up being totally abstract. But the definition, while entailing necessary existence, does not entail that God is necessarily actualized in any particular way. But he is necessarily actualized in some way. To use your analogy, God must be triangular but not necessarily an equilateral triangle with sides of 5.2314 inches or any other particular triangle.

I don’t see this as a problem. Attributing ultimate greatness to God does not preclude him from having more specific properties (e.g. all-knowing, etc.). We just can’t say that any one must be actualized in any specific way. It just has to surpass any other being’s actualization of that attribute.

I agree, provided we are talking about mere existence. But the argument in Proslogian III is talking about necessary existence verses contingent existence. It is proper to ascribe the property of necessarily existing to God. He alone, of all existing beings, has this property.

kordially,

karl

Understanding the words that make up a definition does not mean that we can imagine that the being exists. I can say to you imagine a square-circle. This concept of a shape that is both square and circular is nonsense. You may imagine a shape that has some of the properties of each but not all of both. Understand the language of that which no greater can be conceived does not mean that you can conceive of what is described. Though I believe mystics can conceive of God and the fact that his properties are noncontradictory also allows for the possibility of his existence.

Your discription still states existence as a property with nonexistence at the bottom contigent at the center and necessary being the fullest. If something is non-existent it can have no other properties. THus existence is not on parallel with the other properties. I think existence is not a property in the sense of the others but the sum of all the properties. Of which God has infinite properties entailed to infinite amounts. The fact that God is infintie in all of these realms gives him the fullest necessary existence because all of these properties describe being and he “be’s” the best. Existence is what we are trying to describe by the these properties. And God fits the discription.

These are just my thoughts. Probably a few errors but I hope some of it is good.

Adam

 

[adamlsp]

Krebsbach:

Like Anselm, Plantinga begins with a definition, not of God, but of maximal greatness. Maximal greatness means maximal excellence (omnipotence, etc.) in every possible world.

So he begins by defining a property. Then he starts supposin’. Given our definition of maximal greatness, let’s entertain the possibility that a maximally great being exists “in some world.”. However, as soon as we do so, we realize it must exist in every world.

It seems that no matter what version of the OA is being discussed, the objection can be raised: Just because a greatest conceivable being or maximally great being must be thought of as existing, does that mean that He really exists? How in the heck can we go from an idea to reality, necessarily?

I think the answer was implicit in Anslem all along. God is in a category all by Himself. He is the only necessarily existing being.

Those who object really are maintaining that there is no such thing as necessary existence. All existnece is contingent, they say. Why must that be true?

In this post I think you’ve defined the ontological arguments. I don’t think I could tell you right now all of the specific differences between each one. And you’re right some people do not believe in necessary existence. Why do you think necessary existence is possible?

 

[adamlsp]

Vietnatalians:

What about nature, or matter, or the smallest parts of matter. I have a feeling people might say the smallest parts of matter (whatever they truly are) necessarily exist because without them there would be no existence. They may change form for eternity, but their existence is necessary for eternity.
~Steve~ (I got a new screen name)

You could say that the universe necessarily exists but then you’d be equating the universe with God. Pantheism is a whole different matter. Only if you equated the universe with God in some sense of the word would this hold. Otherwise you cannot say matter needs to exists. Also all matter is made of energy so you might want to shoot for energy necessarily exists instead. The reason you could belive the universe does not need to exist is because it could have been different, things didn’t have to exist the way they do now. If you believe they did have to exist the way they do now then that goes into fate and destiny. Also a whole different topic.

Adam

 

[adamlsp]

Hitetlen:

Yes, I gather that, but what is “possible”? Whatever we can imagine? I can imagine a world where there are no set laws of physics (for example). I can imagine a world where there are fairies, dragons and magicians. Are these worlds possible? M. C. Escher has created fabulously detailed pictures of worlds where there is no “up” or “down”, are those worlds “possible”? I can imagine a world where the laws of logic do not apply, so is such a world “possible”?

In other words, what kind of extrapolations can we make from our existing world - the only one we know - into these imaginary worlds? It is the word: “possible” that would like to be clarified, not the phrase: “necessary existence”.

Can you imagine a world where logic doesn’t exist? What exactly are you imagining then? To say you can imagine that there is a world where 2+2=3 is hard to believe. We understand the language but this concept is not imaginable. Maybe it is. Maybe I have a limited imagination. If you can imagine it explain it to me so I can too please.

Adam

 

[adamlsp]

precious_roy:

I Disagree.

Because again you are trying to say something is better than nothingness, which like I stated above, you can say but you have to state as an axiom with which one may not agree (such as myself). I cannot mentally justify that being is greater than not being so I may be inclined to reject that axiom (or at least reserve judgement).

And the examply of infinity being greater than zero does not suffice because zero is still a concept (the absence of a positive or negative value). Nothingness isn’t even a concept really.

Sorry, I cannot explain this very effectivly; I’m not a philosopher. I would suggest the following readings if you are interested:

John Paul Sartre: Existentialism and Human Emotions
Anything by Nietzsche
Kierkegaard: Sickness unto Death

Nothingness is empitness. Lack of everything. It therefore cannot be greater than anything but less then all. 0<5 is what I mean by greater than less than in case you didn’t get that. Which I said earlier. What is nothingness to you? Explain your understanding of it. I’ve read Nietzsche, Keirkegaard, and existentialist philosophers. Thank you for the reference.

Adam

 

[john_doran]

Hitetlen:

The concept of necessary being is not a primary definition, it is the derivative of a form of existence. You cannot argue that the null-world is impossible - because it does not contain a necessary being.

but i can and did…

what’s wrong with the argument? there are all kinds of necessary beings: abstract objects like numbers and propositions and types and sets and…which means that there is no world that does not contain them.

what’s more, as i said, at the very least there will be propositions about each world that will be true and false at those worlds. which means that no world is “empty”.

Hitetlen:

I did not deviate from your proposed concept of a world, anything except a self-contradiction.

there is far more to possible world semantics than my one line oversimplification of it, so it’s premature to dismiss an argument relying on them based on less than all the facts.

there are all kinds of online resources for coming to grips with the details of the philosophy of modality - if you want to familiarize yourself with the main contours of thought on the topic then maybe you can present a tighter, more thoroughgoing criticism.

Hitetlen:

Emptiness or nothingness are not self-contradictory, therefore they exist as a world.

in the manner you present them, they are: nothingness can’t “exist” - that would make it something. and ~(A&~A)…

Hitetlen:

The concept of “necessary being” does not have to be self-contradictory - it is merely uselss.

i don’t know what this means. is this a serious objection? why present any arguments for anything at all? anytime you are confronted with a position with which you disagree, all you have to do is say, “i don’t have to demonstrate a flaw in your reasoning, it’s merely useless”.

Hitetlen:

You cannot redefine the concept of a “world” and say that a world cannot be empty, it must contain at least one element (which moreover has to be conscious and omnimax). That contradicts your proposed definition.

i’m not redefining anything.

Hitetlen:

Propositions do not “exist” as entities, they are the verbal equivalents of mental constructs. And if there are no entities in an empty world, then there are no thinking entities either, therefore there are no propositions.

well, that’s certainly the position that some take, but it is highly contentious. if you believe that propositions are concrete entities (brain states?), then there are a number of problems that require explanation:

• how different utterances, using different words in different languages, can all express the same meaning - what is it that is expressed by sentences?;
• said in another way: if propositions are your thoughts, then how can the brain-state that is your thought, say, that “it is raining” mean the same thing as the pen-marks on a page that forms the sentence “it is raining”?
• there are a finite number of concrete objects, but an infinite number of truths (there are truths that no one is thinking now or ever will think).
• if propositions are thoughts, then there are no propositions when there is no thinking. but even if there are no thinking things, isn’t “there are no thinking things” true?
• there are no necessary truths, since there is nothing true in every possible world.

Hitetlen:

Actually the “world” is a contanier combined with all of its contained elements. Just like the concept of a mathematical set. Allegedly our world was an almost empty one, before God created the physical world.

not really - it was full of angels and god and abstract objects - an infinite number of them.

 

[adamlsp]

Hitetlen:

OK, thanks. Now I can start to argue. We agree that the phrase “in all possible worlds” incorporates every world which does not contain a logical contradiction. (Side remark: that definition also proves that God is limited by the laws of logic.)

Now one of all the possible worlds is exceptional (and contains no logical self-contradiction), and that is the NULL-world, the one which contains nothing, which is empty.

That world, since by definition does not contain anything also cannot contain the “maximally great being”, since that would be a logical contradiction. Therefore there is no such thing as necessary existence, since it is defined as having existence in all the possible worlds. Therefore the ontological arguement as stated - is false.

Q. E. D.

Logic is in the nature of God. God is not “bound” by it but rather would not act otherwise. Just like he would not act idiotically or evil. God has not limitations. He is his own standard.

Adam

 

[adamlsp]

Hitetlen:

The concept of necessary being is not a primary definition, it is the derivative of a form of existence. You cannot argue that the null-world is impossible - because it does not contain a necessary being. I did not deviate from your proposed concept of a world, anything except a self-contradiction. Emptiness or nothingness are not self-contradictory, therefore they exist as a world.

The concept of “necessary being” does not have to be self-contradictory - it is merely uselss.

You cannot redefine the concept of a “world” and say that a world cannot be empty, it must contain at least one element (which moreover has to be conscious and omnimax). That contradicts your proposed definition.

Propositions do not “exist” as entities, they are the verbal equivalents of mental constructs. And if there are no entities in an empty world, then there are no thinking entities either, therefore there are no propositions.

One possible world would be the one with no life in it. That world would not contain any propositions either.

Actually the “world” is a contanier combined with all of its contained elements. Just like the concept of a mathematical set. Allegedly our world was an almost empty one, before God created the physical world.

In the last sentence of your first paragraph you say nothingness exists. I think you might be mistaken. What are you imagining by nothingness, a vacuum with no energy? That still is not nothing but I think that is what most people would imagine. Just my little thought, sorry.

Adam

 

[Hitetlen]

Mike O:

In essence you just said “Non-existence exists.” Have fun with the proof of that statement. Again, incorrect.

Obviously you are not a mathematician. The concept of empty set is quite a simple one, so is the concept of zero.
Mike O:

We speak of the world as subjects of time and space, conditioned to change, physical decay, etc.

Yes? Really? Check out those pictures of Escher which john doran said constitute a “possible” world.

The idea of a null-world does not present a problem for the mathematically inclined.
Mike O:

The Being we acknowledge–not propose–exists outside of time and space and is not dependent/contingent/caused by the existence or non-existence of any world but Itself BRINGS INTO EXISTENCE the entities of worlds.

If the “world” is defined according to your previous sentence (time and space and physical existence), then God is manifestly NOT part of it. But why bring it up again? This thread is not about God, it is about one specific argument, which is supposed to substantiate God’s existence, and which fails (to borrow to your wording) in a spectacular manner.

 

[Hitetlen]

adamlsp:

In the last sentence of your first paragraph you say nothingness exists. I think you might be mistaken. What are you imagining by nothingness, a vacuum with no energy? That still is not nothing but I think that is what most people would imagine. Just my little thought, sorry.

No, vacuum would still presuppose “space”, and nothingness is without space either. It means no space, no time, no matter, no energy, no dimensions - a mathematical point.

 

[adamlsp]

Hitetlen:

No, vacuum would still presuppose “space”, and nothingness is without space either. It means no space, no time, no matter, no energy, no dimensions - a mathematical point.

A point is nothingness in your definition then? Just so I’m clear. An infinite number of points make a line, correct? What is it that you mean by space? Have you heard of the hierarchy of the sciences? Math>Physics>Chem>Bio>Psych. It’s very interesting to see how the latter derives from the former or is an application of the former. This is how our world was fromed, correct? Oh and time doesn’t exist without space, is this correct? Wha about the others demensions? I was under the impression there is a theory of ten in some circles. Strings?

Adam

 

[precious_roy]

adamlsp:

Nothingness is empitness. Lack of everything. It therefore cannot be greater than anything but less then all. 0<5 is what I mean by greater than less than in case you didn’t get that. Which I said earlier. What is nothingness to you? Explain your understanding of it. I’ve read Nietzsche, Keirkegaard, and existentialist philosophers. Thank you for the reference.

Adam

Hmmm. Well, if those books were not so convincing I don’t know that I can do much better. Like I said I’m not much of a philosopher.

Oh, have you read any Heidegger? He’s also an excellent read.

Nothingness is not anything. What I was really trying to get at, maybe not so clearly, is that I don’t think you can make any sort of comparisons to nothingness. Like saying something is better than nothing. That sort of thing would imply an ordinal numbering like

…
100. something
…
12321. nothing

Which would be saying something about nothing, not something that I believe you can do. What is being stated (basically) is that a maximal being has the best possible properties and is thus better than anything, but not necessarily nothing.

Was that more clear or less clear?