The Ontological Arguments

[Krebsbach]

Hey Roy,

Are we ever rigorous about anything in this thread?

How about this: Existence means “somehow actualized.”

 

[Krebsbach]

But what is actual? Concrete, I suppose. Fully specified and determined. As opposed to abstract.

 

[Krebsbach]

Hey Hittite,

Don’t know much bout suppositories. I try and eat lots of fiber.

But back to the heavy subject at hand. Is it true that something must exist?

 

[Hitetlen]

Krebsbach:

But back to the heavy subject at hand. Is it true that something must exist?

The universe exists. We know that. Could it be that it did not exist? Maybe, but in that case we would not have this conversation.

 

[precious_roy]

Hitetlen:

The universe exists. We know that. Could it be that it did not exist? Maybe, but in that case we would not have this conversation.

But because something does exist, does that mean it must exist?

Also, how do we know that we are having this conversation? Must sensory (name removed by moderator)ut exist? Must we trust our own thoughts?

 

[Hitetlen]

precious_roy:

But because something does exist, does that mean it must exist?

I don’t think so.

precious_roy:

Also, how do we know that we are having this conversation? Must sensory (name removed by moderator)ut exist? Must we trust our own thoughts?

The opposite assumption leads to the so-called “universal skepticism”, which is untenable.

 

[precious_roy]

Hitetlen:

The opposite assumption leads to the so-called “universal skepticism”, which is untenable.

That is why I was asking if you guys defined a rigorous definition of existence. Could we be here talking and at the same time not exist?

 

[Krebsbach]

Mornin Hittite and Roy,

Quote:
Originally Posted by Krebsbach
But back to the heavy subject at hand. Is it true that something must exist?

Quote:
Originally Posted by Hitetlen
The universe exists. We know that. Could it be that it did not exist? Maybe, but in that case we would not have this conversation.

karl again: This universe exists. We all exist and are having this conversation. Let’s take that for granted.

That this universe could have happened differently seems possible. That the Big Bang might not have happened at also seems possible. That the universe could end certainly seems possible. But the scope of my question goes beyond this created universe. Is it true that some thing or other (whatever it may be) must exist? The other two alternatives aren’t very satisfying. To say that everything must exist is nonsense and would deny the general contingency we observe in our universe. To say nothing must exist, however, is nonsense in one respect (nothing could every come into being), because we know we exist. The only way this statement could be true is in this sense: All things presently or potentially existing could stop existing. But this has never been proven to my knowledge and ought not be taken as a given.

 

[Krebsbach]

Roy axed:
Quote:
Originally Posted by precious_roy
But because something does exist, does that mean it must exist?

To which Hitman correctly responded: “I don’t think so.”

But my question still is: Because we know something does exist, does that mean some thing or other (not necessarily our unvierse) must exist? It seems very counterintuitive to deny this.

 

[Krebsbach]

But wait a minute…If we acknowledge that something exists, it must be true that this something always existed or it came into being at some point. If it came into being, then it must have been caused by some odder thing. **So it must be true that someting or odder must always exist. **

Therefore it is inconceivable that nothing (nada, gar nichts, zippo, no space/time, no matter…) could exist. Can we now take this as a given?

 

[Krebsbach]

(karl still talking to himself): I tink so.

This sets the stage for Anselm who defines God as that which none greater can be conceived. IOW, looking at that which does exist or could conceivably exist (and there must always be some ting or odder), is there some X which exhibits ultimate greatness? Is there something maximally great, unsurpassable, etc. ? Does ultimate greatness exist? He says yes, and its defining and unique characteristic is its necessary existence. This is because contingent existence, the only alternative, is defective in comparison. Looking at necessarily existing X (and we now know that there must be some such X) and comparing it to contingent Y, X is obviously greater.

That’s why I think God must exist. He is the only being who exists necessarily.

 

[Krebsbach]

[karl still talking to himself]

Hold on Krebsman! back in 188 you sed:

But wait a minute…If we acknowledge that something exists, it must be true that this something always existed or it came into being at some point. If it came into being, then it must have been caused by some odder thing. **So it must be true that someting or odder must always exist. **

Therefore it is inconceivable that nothing (nada, gar nichts, zippo, no space/time, no matter…) could exist. Can we now take this as a given?

If something didn’t always exist and it came into being at some point, that doens’t necerarily mean that it must continue to exist. So we still can’t take for granted that someting or odder must always exist.

Let’s ponder this sum more, then. We begin knowing that something exists. We hypothesize that whatever exists now had a beginning and that before that there was absolute nothingness. But, as Pete said in O Brother Where Art Thou, “Dat don’t make no sense!” Something can’t come from nothing. So there must have been soemthing there all along. So if the something which we perceive as existing now were to cease to exist, then the preexisting soemthing which caused in the first place would still be there. So the conclusion still holds: Someting or odder must always exist.

 

[Krebsbach]

[karl still talking to himself]

Ok, Krebsbaby, we’ll take that for granted for the time being but we reserve the right to revisit the subject. So why does the fact that someting or odder must always exist help out the OA?

Well, it rules out a state of absolute nothingness as ever being conceivable. There’s always gotta be sumptin. All the OA needs to do now is show that, of that which exists, God (in the religious sense) must necessarily exist therein.

 

[Krebsbach]

[karl still talking to himself]

So, Krebsman, begin with yer religious definition of God.

OK. God is the One We Worship. He is the all-worshipful one. The logic of worship requires us to worship that reality whichis the bestest or the greatest conceivable. It is irrational to worship a lesser being or thing. The object of true worship is the greatest conceivable, the truly maximally great being.

If such greatness exists, then in what mode must it exist? Well, there are two ways of existing, necessary and contingent. Greatness is only compatible with necessary existence. So God is that which exists necessarily. God in the religious sense must exist.

 

[Krebsbach]

[karl still talking to hisself]

Krebster,

So how does admitting that someting or odder must always eixst help out the OA? Doesn’t the OA stand by itself?

Probbly, but ruling out absolute nothingness makes it work a little easier, in my little mind anyway.

I think admitting that sumting or odder must always exist also disarms the objections of J N Findlay and the so-called Findlay paradox.

 

[Krebsbach]

Findlay’s paradox?

JN Findlay was a guy in the last century who agreed with Anselm that the only satisfactory object of worship would be that which none greater than be conceived. God, if he is to be God, must have unsurpassable supremacy along all avenues. He must be all-comprehensive with no alien object surrrounding him which owed him no allegiance or set limts to his influence. And even more importantly, it is inconceivable that God could merely happen to exist. Nay, he must exist.

Yay, right? Wrong! says Findlay. While he agrees that unsurpassable greatness must be ascribed to God and this attribute necessarily entails necessary existence, Findlay finds the theist in a quandary. He has proposed a definition from which which has led him into a trap from which there is no escape. The trap is this: One cannot propose an abstract definition and then deduce therefrom the particular existence of something. He therefore concludes that the whole definition is nonsense and that we really have no definition of God after all.
Stated differently, Findlay grants that an implication of the idea of God is necessity; but since the idea also implies concreteness or actuality and contingency (which cannot be necessary), the whole idea is illogical.

But! Findlay misses the possiblity that there is a distinction between existence and actuality. We can posit the unique case of the divine reality in which something exists necessarily in some particular way or other. That it exists is necessary, but the how of its existence (i.e. how it is actualized) is contingent. Necessarily actualized somehow, IOW. But wait a minute, haven’t we already granted that such a mode of existence is possible (necessary?) when we granted that someting or odder always gotta exist?

You know, it’s amazing what can be proven when there’s no one to disagree with you.

kordially,

karl

 

[Krebsbach]

[karl still talking to hisself]

Hey Krebster,

Ah don git dis Findlay paradox. splain it again.

OK. A merely contingent being wouldn’t deserve to worshipped, cuz we would be adoring and revering at most a big and wunnerful accident. But OTOH, mere abstractions like “all worshipful” or “the unsurpassable one” cannot necessitate a particular concrete actuality.

But must we choose between taking diviinty as a candidate for contingent existence and supposing that necessary existence means requiring a particualar concrete actuality?

No. There is another mode of existence, necessarily actualized somehow., which avoids the dilemma.

 

[Krebsbach]

Krebster:

This is all very good and all, but what about what the Hittite said back in 167:

“A logical analysis can never adequately establish the existence of anything, except whatever is a logical corollary of the axioms.”

IOW, even granting the result of yer logical analysis (this unique divine mode of existence of necessarily actualized somehow), is itself a product of logical analysis. So yer conclusions, even if logical and all, are just based on artificial assumptions and axioms and can’t possible be necessarily descriptive of reality.

What that about that huh?

I’ll have to ponder that.

 

[Krebsbach]

“A logical analysis can never adequately establish the existence of anything, except whatever is a logical corollary of the axioms.”

IOW, you can only really prove the existence of some thing empirically, never logically. The OA is a fruitless exercise.

I would agree that many propositions which affirm the existence of some X are only provable through empiricial means. Does X exist? Go look out the window or under a microscope. But must all such propositions be only provable empirically and not logically?

I am really spishus of that kind of thinking. Besides, it does seem that the higher up we go on the ladder of abstraction the more logical and less empirical the proof must be. When it comes to proving that God exists, it seems we have arrived at the highest degree of abstraction where logic would be the only possible proof.

 

[Krebsbach]

“A logical analysis can never adequately establish the existence of anything, except whatever is a logical corollary of the axioms.”

Still pondering.

Let’s say that Hittite is correct. So our conclusion depends not only on reasoning flawlessy from it but also the truth of our axioms. Since axioms are taken to be self-evident, they had better be right. But, assuming flawless reasoning, if we are still skeptical about our conclusion, then we must be dubious of our starting point. But must we doubt all of our presupposition? As a practical matter, no, and none of do. But in theory, might all presupposition be wrong?
I find it hard to say thus.

I guess I am willing take “Something exists” as aximomatic. (In the world of flofsy that is probably a dangerous thing to do, but it sure seems reasonable to me.] From that axiom I (naively perhaps) think it is logical to categorize stuff either as existing necesarily or contingently. I observe the general contingency of things in my experience of the world, so that seems a given, and I can reason to the point where I can establish that some things exist necessarily. Then, employing the OA I prove that God exists.

What’s the prob?