TheTrueCentrist writes:
However, when good is defined this way, to say that “God is good” tells us nothing about God. It is as informative as saying “God is God.” Good defined in this way could mean something different tomorrow than it does today.
First, to be precise, I said that God’s *nature *defines the good. Thus, I am speaking of God’s essential properties, i.e., His attributes. Another attribute of God is immutability. Thus, the good is objective and immutable, and therefore cannot “mean something different tomorrow than it does today.” God is the same yesterday, today, and forever.
You continue:
Secular definitions of good tend to involve “minimization of suffering.” In that case, the answer to “why is x good” would be “because x minimizes suffering.” Why would minimizing suffering be good? Because it is universally acknowledged that suffering is undesirable, therefore eliminating it wherever possible will be the good thing to do.
How does our universal acknowledgment (assuming this to be the case–which I do not believe it is) that suffering is undesirable lead to the conclusion that the minimization of suffering is good? Unless, that is, you equate
desirable with
good? In that case, what if the world were suddenly to reverse their conclusion, and universally acknowledge the maximization of suffering as desirable? (We could justify it in the same way as our previous position.) It seems that your view is the one in danger of meaning something different tomorrow than what it does today…
It is also an is/ought fallacy, deriving a statement of value (the minimization of suffering is good) from a statement of fact–and a questionable fact at that (the minimization of suffering is universally recognized to be desirable).
You go on:
- God sent Jesus because of original sin. Is original sin inevitable across all possible worlds? I do not think so. Therefore, God could have created a world where man never fell so mankind never needed to be redeemed. Does the whole process of Christ’s forgiveness make this world a better place than one in which no one needs forgiveness?
- Assume that a world with Jesus’ forgiveness is superior to one without any transgressions to be forgiven. If we think this way, then how could we consider original sin as anything but a similar, if not greater, sacrifice. After all, Adam sacrificed himself to eternal punishment, but Jesus just experienced some temporary physical discomfort. They were both equally necessary, however, to create the forgiveness in the world. Also, would we be better off if everyone spent the beginning of their lives sinning so that they can experience more forgiveness later in their life? Essentially, taking this position seems to me to say that “forgiveness makes evil into good.”
First of all, I would have to take issue with your entire presentation and comparison of Adam’s fall and Christ’s passion. This illustrates to me that you have done no serious theological research into the matters you are discussing, and makes it very difficult for me to take what you are saying seriously.
For instance, your contention that, in comparison to Adam’s “noble sacrifice to eternal punishment,” Christ “merely suffered some physical discomfort for a few hours–
no big deal”.
Christ took upon Himself–that is, in His body–the sins of the whole world.
The entire wrath of God was poured out upon Christ, the sinless One Who bore the sins of all. The act of Christ on our behalf is immeasurably greater than Adam’s, seeing that Adam’s act was
sinful (though he was not deceived into sinning, but willingly and knowingly sinned). Christ’s death includes in it Adam’s sin as well.
Secondly, what needs to be kept in mind here is
the reality of freewill. For God to have eliminated all possible fallen worlds in preference of one that was not fallen is functionally equivalent to eliminating freewill from creation. It also suggests something intuitively immoral about God.
For example, a couple who acquires “perfect” offspring through the destruction of embryos foreknown to have unwanted characteristics is generally regarded to be immoral, or at least unloving. That is, they do not love their child because it is
their child, they love their child because the child is a reflection of
their desires of what their child ought to be. Contrariwise, a couple who knowingly and willingly has a child who will possess unwanted characteristics, and yet does everything for that child out of love is generally regarded to be moral, or at least loving. That is, they love their child, not because the child is everything they desire a child to be, but because it is
their child whom they love
without condition.
How much more, then, has God given us in Christ, namely, forgiveness of our sins and an entire reparation of our fallenness in the redemption of the cross. And God does not simply speak a magic word from His throne in heaven to save us, but rather He exits His throne and enters into the world through the Virgin Mary; He suffers for us, He dies for us, and He rises for us. *There is no love greater than this. *
Is this the best possible world? Probably not.
Is this the world of a perfect God Who has created us in original perfection, seen us fall from that original perfection, and yet has not seen it unfit to love us and give His only begotten Son for us?
Amen; which means:
it is certainly true.
In Christ,
FCCopleston
