The Optimist Argument Against the Problem of Evil

[TheTrueCentrist]

Here is what FCCopleston is proposing:
| No free will | yes free will
No sin | possible | impossible
Yes sin | impossible | possible
We can’t sin if we don’t have free will and there is no possible sinless world. If that is the case, then all possible worlds with free will can be categorized as having both sin and free will. In other words, in order to have free will, the world must also have sin.

Here is what I am proposing:
| No free will | yes free will
No sin | possible | possible
Yes sin | impossible | possible
If we have free will, then we could choose never to sin and therefore a sinless world is possible and consistent with free will.

 

[FCCopleston]

No. If there is no possible world with free will where no one sins, then every possible world with free will includes sin. Therefore, in order to have free will we must also have sin.

Either it is possible for the world to be sinless with free will, or it is not. If it is not possible, then sin must *always *accompany free will.

If you say it is possible for them all not to have sinned, then you are admitting that a sinless world is possible.

Why would think that I am unwilling to concede that a sinless world is possible? Not only am I willing to concede it, but I have made this very assertion several times over.

Free will does not necessitate sin, but only the potential to sin. Any actualization of sin is the result of a wrong use of free will (a wrong use which is, once again, potential but not necessary). It was possible for this very world to be sinless had Adam not freely chosen to disobey God and wrongly exert his freedom. The fault and cause of sin resides in the free will of man–a fault which was not necessary in the sense of compulsion (as if sin must logically follow from free will’s existence), but only in the sense of being foreknown (God’s foreknowledge is not a cause of sin).

Moreover, I think we need to clarify another point, namely, that the purpose of creation is not our “happiness,” but is rather the free and perfect union and fellowship between God and His creatures. This union and fellowship God has chosen to given and reveal in His Son, Jesus Christ. Those outside of Christ will suffer eternally; those in Christ will rejoice eternally. Yet, it is not our “happiness” which makes heaven our eudaimonia, but our union with God–our happiness being the product, not the substance, of that union.

FCCopleston

 

[FCCopleston]

Here is what FCCopleston is proposing:
| No free will | yes free will
No sin | possible | impossible
Yes sin | impossible | possible
We can’t sin if we don’t have free will and there is no possible sinless world. If that is the case, then all possible worlds with free will can be categorized as having both sin and free will. In other words, in order to have free will, the world must also have sin.

Here is what I am proposing:
| No free will | yes free will
No sin | possible | possible
Yes sin | impossible | possible
If we have free will, then we could choose never to sin and therefore a sinless world is possible and consistent with free will.

I am not sure who you are arguing with…

Where did you get the idea that I deny the possibility of a world wherein free will and sinlessness co-exist? I have repeatedly argued that our world* is such a world.*

Free will necessitates neither sinlessness nor sin, but only the potential for either sinlessness or sin (the actualization of either of these rests entirely in the will of free will creatures).

FCCopleston

 

[TheTrueCentrist]

Why would think that I am unwilling to concede that a sinless world is possible? Not only am I willing to concede it, but I have made this very assertion several times over.

Ok, so it is possible for a sinless world with free will to exist, therefore free will does not necessitate sin. My dichotomy is not false, but the case outlined in the second table is the actual case.

Moreover, I think we need to clarify another point, namely, that the purpose of creation is not our “happiness,” but is rather the free and perfect union and fellowship between God and His creatures.

So why would God choose to create a world where that purpose is frustrated through sin? He could create a world that is sinless and has free will (i.e. all creatures have perfect union and fellowship with God.)

Now, we have agreed on a definition of “good,” saying that something good is virtuous. Would a virtuous creator knowingly create a purpose then create creatures he knew would be unable to fulfill that purpose?

 

[TheTrueCentrist]

I am not sure who you are arguing with…

Where did you get the idea that I deny the possibility of a world wherein free will and sinlessness co-exist? I have repeatedly argued that our world* is such a world.*

Free will necessitates neither sinlessness nor sin, but only the potential for either sinlessness or sin (the actualization of either of these rests entirely in the will of free will creatures).

FCCopleston

So you say our world is free from sin? I am not saying that every single person is sinful, but simply that our world contains sin.

Either our world contains sin or it does not, and either we have free will or we do not. Those options collectively exhaust the set of all possible worlds, that is what the tables are explaining.

 

[TheTrueCentrist]

Free will does not necessitate sin, but only the potential to sin. Any actualization of sin is the result of a wrong use of free will (a wrong use which is, once again, potential but not necessary). It was possible for this very world to be sinless had Adam not freely chosen to disobey God and wrongly exert his freedom. The fault and cause of sin resides in the free will of man–a fault which was not necessary in the sense of compulsion (as if sin must logically follow from free will’s existence), but only in the sense of being foreknown (God’s foreknowledge is not a cause of sin).

Ok. So now we get back to an earlier issue. God created Adam knowing what choices Adam would make. I am willing to grant that God’s foreknowing does not subvert Adam’s free will. However, IF (God could choose to create the world in which Adam sinned, AND God’s choice is consistent with free will), THEN (God could choose to create a world in which Adam never sinned AND that world would be consistent with free will as well.)

 

[FCCopleston]

**TheTrueCentrist **writes:

So why would God choose to create a world where that purpose is frustrated through sin? He could create a world that is sinless and has free will (i.e. all creatures have perfect union and fellowship with God.)

This will be the last time I answer this question (running over the same ground is only tolerable for a certain extent of time). Here is my final answer:

God eliminating all world’s wherein the potential for sin would be actualized is the functional equivalent to eliminating free will from creation altogether. The reason for this being that free will necessitates, not the necessity of sin, but the necessity of the potential for sin. If there is no potential for sin, then there is no initial free will.

You will then ask: “but what about heaven? Is sin a potential in heaven? If not, then there is no free will in heaven.”

I would reply to this objection by asserting that in heaven, a relationship will exist between the creature and the Creator which transcends all that we know. It is entirely reasonable, however, to posit that our state of permanent sinlessness is due to the eternal love and gratitude at the wonder of the undeserved redemption of infinite worth won for us by Christ. In other words, it may only be because of Christ’s efficacious death and sacrifice on our behalf that we will be able to live without sin.
Precisely *how *free will and our permanent sinlessness work themselves out in heaven, however, I do not know, and I do not claim to know; but I will know it soon enough.

You continue:

Now, we have agreed on a definition of “good,” saying that something good is virtuous. Would a virtuous creator knowingly create a purpose then create creatures he knew would be unable to fulfill that purpose?

Do you believe in objective moral values? What I have heard from you so far is a kind of Humean/utilitarian ethic wherein “values” exist in their either being preferred (Hume) or in their promoting “happiness” (“happiness” meaning the minimization of suffering). You ought to clear this up first, or we cannot really discuss the matter, seeing that any talk of “virtue” will be diseased with equivocation.

Yet, under the assumption that we are both speaking in terms of objective moral values, what is without virtue in God’s action? I suppose it all depends upon how you describe it. From your viewpoint, God is clearly not “good” in our sense of the word, seeing that He created creatures unable to fulfill His purpose.

But has God failed in His purpose? I suppose that depends upon how you define His purpose. Scripture tells us that Christ is the Lamb of God slain before the foundation of the world. Thus, it seems that God’s purpose includes Christ’s death and destruction of sin, and a consequent eternity with those who have received Christ through faith in God’s promise. In light of Scripture, then, and not our own reasonings about what God “should” have done, I fail to see the force of your objection.

FCCopleston

 

[FCCopleston]

So you say our world is free from sin? I am not saying that every single person is sinful, but simply that our world contains sin.

Either our world contains sin or it does not, and either we have free will or we do not. Those options collectively exhaust the set of all possible worlds, that is what the tables are explaining.

*Try *to follow me:

1. I do not argue that our world is without sin.
2. I do argue that our world is one in which there was a true potential for sinlessness
3. I do not argue that God’s foreknowledge causes or necessitates (in terms of compulsion) our sin
4. I do argue that God foreknew our sin (which actualized the necessary potential for evil) and, for this reason, gave His Son for us

 

[FCCopleston]

Ok. So now we get back to an earlier issue. God created Adam knowing what choices Adam would make. I am willing to grant that God’s foreknowing does not subvert Adam’s free will. However, IF (God could choose to create the world in which Adam sinned, AND God’s choice is consistent with free will), THEN (God could choose to create a world in which Adam never sinned AND that world would be consistent with free will as well.)

Then you return to the elimination of possible fallen worlds in favor non-fallen possible worlds, which is functionally equivalent to eliminating free will altogether. God created the world in a purely and incomprehensibly free act of love. He did not consult His chart of possible worlds before He created the world, He created the world in sinlessness, yet with the necessary potential for sin. And He allowed for the truly free act of Adam to disobey and actualize that potential. This was not necessary. God is without fault here. There is nothing morally objectionable about God’s creating a world He knew would fall into sin unless you subvert the purpose of creation to be one human happiness.

God has stated His purposes, and God has promised to fulfill them, and I believe Him when He says it.

 

[TheTrueCentrist]

*Try *to follow me:

1. I do not argue that our world is without sin.
2. I do argue that our world is one in which there was a true potential for sinlessness
3. I do not argue that God’s foreknowledge causes or necessitates (in terms of compulsion) our sin
4. I do argue that God foreknew our sin (which actualized the necessary potential for evil) and, for this reason, gave His Son for us

Then let me revise my tables, the two possibilities are these:
Dichotomy option 1|No potential for sin|Potential for sin
Sin never actualized|Possible|Possible
Sin is actualized|Impossible|Possible

Dichotomy option 2|No potential for sin|Potential for sin
Sin never actualized|Possible|Impossible
Sin is actualized|Impossible|Possible
Now I say that the “potential for sin” as you call it is practically synonymous with free will. If we have the potential for sin, we have free will. If we do not have potential, we do not have free will. If we substitute free will into these tables, they are exactly the same as my earlier tables.

If you chose dichotomy option 2, then all worlds where sin is actualized have the potential for sin obviously, but more importantly all worlds with the potential for sin contain actualized sin. In terms of free will, this is equivalent to saying that all worlds with free will contain sin.

If you choose dichotomy option 1, as it appears that you do, then it is possible for us to have a world with the potential for sin (i.e. with free will) but without actualized sin.

 

[tonyrey]

Why would we choose

In heaven?

 

[FCCopleston]

If you choose dichotomy option 1, as it appears that you do, then it is possible for us to have a world with the potential for sin (i.e. with free will) but without actualized sin.

I hold that there is a world with the equal potential for non-actualization and actualization.

Your table is a mere caricature of the true matter at hand. For instance, they do not take into account God’s own revealed will and purpose in creating the world. And, furthermore, your tables do not account for the actualization of the potential for sin being the sole consequence of free will creatures’ wrong use of freedom, i.e., the tables do not convey that God created a world with the true potential for both the actualization and the non-actualization of sin.

 

[tonyrey]

Yes…and a wonderful point it is…

Your sarcasm with regard to heaven is unseemly for a Christian…

But I am not asking whether or not we have a reason to sin in heaven, I **am **asking whether or not we have the freedom to sin in heaven.

It would be pointless to state that we have no reason to sin in heaven and ask why would we** choose **(which I emphasised) to do so if we had no freedom to sin in heaven…

First answer my question, then I’ll answer yours.

Your turn…

 

[FCCopleston]

tonyrey writes:

Your sarcasm with regard to heaven is unseemly for a Christian…

My sarcasm was not directed at heaven, but at your evasion of my question (which is evident when taken in context).

You continue:

It would be pointless to state that we have no reason to sin in heaven and ask why would we** choose **(which I emphasised) to do so if we had no freedom to sin in heaven…

So, then we do have the freedom to sin in heaven? A simple yes or no will suffice.

You conclude:

Your turn…

After you, sir…

 

[FCCopleston]

Furthermore, tonyrey, I am still waiting for a response to this:

Then how does God know that we will not choose sin in heaven, for all eternity? Since He cannot know this–according to your peculiar view–or even predict it (!!!), why should anyone believe Him when He says it? In fact, you make God a liar, seeing that He is claiming to know and/or predict (that there will be no sin in heaven, and that we will freely choose to live with Him in fellowship for eternity) what He cannot possibly know and/or predict.

As to how God can know a free act after it is performed, my question is: if acts of free will are so elusive and evasive, and God cannot know or predict them even with the knowledge of events which are bound to them, then how does God’s knowledge change after an event of free will has been performed? He already knew the event before the free act was performed. What is it about God’s knowledge that changes after the free act is committed so as to enable Him to know it?

Thanks,
FCCopleston

 

[TheTrueCentrist]

I hold that there is a world with the equal potential for non-actualization and actualization.

Your table is a mere caricature of the true matter at hand. For instance, they do not take into account God’s own revealed will and purpose in creating the world. And, furthermore, your tables do not account for the actualization of the potential for sin being the sole consequence of free will creatures’ wrong use of freedom, i.e., the tables do not convey that God created a world with the true potential for both the actualization and the non-actualization of sin.

Those things are irrelevant. As I have pointed out:
(yes potential for sin) AND (no potential for sin) collectively exhausts the set of all possible worlds. It logically must be. There are no other possibilities. Likewise: (yes actualization of sin) AND (no actualization of sin) collectively exhausts the set of all possible worlds. Either there exists at least one sin in a world, or there does not.

You seem to now be saying that the actualization is irrelevant. Simply having the potential for either is adequate. Therefore, you would conclude that a world with no actualization of sin is equivalent to a world with no actualization of good, so long as they both had the same potentials.

I think you are trying to address my next point before I make it. Indeed, purpose, salvation and revelation will be more relevant then, but not right now.

 

[TheTrueCentrist]

In heaven?

Something made the Devil sin, would we have greater understanding than an angel?

 

[tonyrey]

1. No, I do not know everything about God.
2. Both reason and Scripture tells us that it is possible for an infinite, omnipotent, omniscient being (God) to know all future events and acts (why else was Christ slain before the foundation of the world? )
3. Both reason and Scripture tells us that it is possible for an infinite, omnipotent, omniscient God to know acts free choice ("…He chose us in Him before the foundation of the world" [Ephesians 1:4]; “This same [Christ] being delivered up, by the determinate counsel and foreknowledge of God, you by the hands of wicked men have crucified and slain” [Acts 2:23]; etc.)

Strictly speaking it was not foreknowledge because God transcends time and space.

1. Do I know what is unknowable about God? Hmmm…Yes–wait!..NO! I don’t know what cannot be known, and, therefore, I cannot know what I don’t know because I cannot know it. In other words, I cannot possibly know what is by definition unknowable, for by knowing it it would cease to be unknowable and become knowable, and thereby be possibly known. But we know very well that what is unknowable is impossible to know and what is knowable is possible to know, and therefore I can know for certain that I cannot possibly know the former of these–though the latter may be actually known. But it must be stringently stressed that the sort of unknowableness that we are speaking of is not of the latter kind! Rather we can know with the most certain knowledge that such unknowable knowledge presents itself to us with a complete unknowable unknowableness…

You’ve had fun! The simple fact remains that it is impossible for us to know the limits of what can be known.

So, God had foreknowledge that Peter would deny Him three times (the event), but did not have any foreknowledge (even a predictive knowledge) that Peter would choose to deny Him? In your view, God seems to be fairly clueless, huh? Even open theists concede to God having the ability to at least predict free acts. You don’t even give God that much credit though. He doesn’t even have the ability to know a free act.

Tell me, then, how does God even come to know of the free act? It seems you assume that after the free act occurs that God knows it? Doesn’t this demonstrate that it is possible for God to know a free act, albeit consequently? But if free acts cannot be known, then how can God ever know them?

I specified free choices and decisions, not acts.

Why do you insist on making omniscience a modal property when it is not. God knows every true proposition (not every possible true proposition) and no false proposition (not every possible false proposition).

Again I ask the question, if free will is so elusive to God’s knowledge, even in the event itself, then how does God ever come to know the free act?

You are equating an intangible choice with a physical act. Can you explain what causes a person to choose one option rather than another? It is not sufficient to give a reason for a choice because a person can choose to be unreasonable. Why?

I believe that God created the world He wanted to create: a perfect and sinless world wherein free creatures had the potential to choose evil, but wherein the necessity of evil did not exist. Free creatures then chose to actualize the potential, and a perfect world fell into sin. But God has redeemed the world in Jesus Christ, and will bring it back to perfection on the Last Day, and for eternity–I have not forgotten love: God has demonstrated His love for us in that, while we were yet sinners, Christ died for us (Romans 5:8).

God knows His creatures are liable to temptation and accepts the risk that they may succumb because otherwise they would be incapable of true love. That is why this is the best of all possible worlds. Can you describe a world which is better than a world with free will?

If you accept the meaningless notion of a best of all possible worlds, that’s fine (you can add it to your list of 1) a modal definition of omniscience and 2) a god who can know events which are the result of free will, but cannot know, or even predict, free acts until after they have been performed (even though the free act is bound to the event that results).

You are implying that Leibniz lacked philosophical and mathematical acumen and insight! Do you deny that free will is the best possible gift we can have?

I find no good reason to accept the idea because nowhere in Scripture am I promised that God created the best of all possible worlds. It does say, however, that what God created was “very good”.

There are many truths that are not found in Scripture…

" My views at least have Scriptural support; yours seem to be poorly worked out conclusions drawn entirely from your own cranium–without any consultation of Scripture or the Church Fathers.

“Scriptural support” has led to thousands of different Christian sects… Your interpretation is drawn entirely from your own intellect. (“cranium” is a crude, demeaning word).

And Hume’s formulation of the logical problem of evil is not a very difficult one to combat. All one need show is that the existence of God and evil is not incompatible. If it can be shown that they are not incompatible, then there is no logical problem.

It is not the existence of evil that is the problem but the existence of unnecessary evil - to which Hume adds excessive evil - which implies that this world is far removed from the best possible world. Do you believe the evil in the world is excessive - given the fact of free will?

 

[tonyrey]

Something made the Devil sin, would we have greater understanding than an angel?

There is no guarantee that the Devil was in the presence of God. It is a myth that does not have to be understood word for word.

 

[FCCopleston]

Those things are irrelevant. As I have pointed out:
(yes potential for sin) AND (no potential for sin) collectively exhausts the set of all possible worlds. It logically must be. There are no other possibilities. Likewise: (yes actualization of sin) AND (no actualization of sin) collectively exhausts the set of all possible worlds. Either there exists at least one sin in a world, or there does not.

You seem to now be saying that the actualization is irrelevant. Simply having the potential for either is adequate. Therefore, you would conclude that a world with no actualization of sin is equivalent to a world with no actualization of good, so long as they both had the same potentials.

I think you are trying to address my next point before I make it. Indeed, purpose, salvation and revelation will be more relevant then, but not right now.

Once again, I do not think that you are grasping my position. I am not arguing for a “better” or “best” world. I am arguing that God (a good and holy God) is consistent with a world corrupted by evil. These points summarize my argument:

1. The potential for sin is necessary in free will creatures.
2. The actualization of sin is not necessary in free will creatures.
3. The potential for sin belongs to original creation
4. The actualization of sin belongs to the fall
5. The original creation belongs to the good will of God
6. The fallen creation belongs to the wrong use of free will

Your dichotomies do not capture that there may be *good reasons *for God allowing the actualization of evil. One is that God loves this world. He does not love any other possible world. He loves the actual world, and has given His Son to die for it. God demonstrates His goodness and His love in the event of the cross. Therefore, there is no inconsistency in the existence of both God and evil, nor is there any incoherency in the affirming the goodness of God in the face of such evil.