The Optimist Argument Against the Problem of Evil

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But the “exists”/“does not exist” distinction is one which is determined by time, is it not? That is, a free decision–in your view–does not exist, and cannot be known, until it occurs.
Is the existence of spiritual beings and the exercise of free will determined by time? Do you think we are entirely natural beings? Do you think nothing occurs in heaven? Is existence static or dynamic?

BTW I am deleting all your irrelevant remarks which do not befit a philosophical discussion.
By “incoherent” I mean* internally contradictory*, or illogical. There is no such thing as “the best of all possible worlds” because “the best of all possible worlds” can always be made “better.”
Of course it can. But here and now it is the best possible world.
A world is simply not something which can be thought of in terms of best and worst, but only in terms of good or bad, better or worse. I have already named several ways in which the world could be “better”: one more act of virtue, one less act of vice.
Both of which depend on an act of free will. You are implying God should override our exercise of free will, thereby defeating the purpose of giving us free will…
The fact that this world is not “better” is the result of human free will. God created a world without sin, and we ruined it.
You are implying that God should not have given us free will. Do you believe that?
God’s foreknowledge of our sin erases neither our responsibility nor His goodness.
It is incompatible with His goodness if the world is not “better” as the result of human free will
I do not think that I “refuted” the aforesaid arguments. I simply showed that it is not logically inconsistent for God and evil to exist, and that it is entirely probable that God has good reasons for allowing evil in the world.
Please specify those reasons.
 
I do not think that I “refuted” the aforesaid arguments. I simply showed that it is not logically inconsistent for God and evil to exist, and that it is entirely probable that God has good reasons for allowing evil in the world.
This conclusion of yours rests on the assumption “there may be good reasons for God to allow evil to exist.” You have provided no evidence for that assumption, making it not so much a demonstration as a statement.

You also attempted to “demonstrate” this by claiming “God defines good” which is a circular definition. That definition renders all God’s decisions good by default and does not explain why evil exists. In other words the argument is: God chose to allow evil, God’s choices are good (by definition), therefore the allowance of evil is good. That argument is equivalent to saying: God chose to allow evil, God’s choices are his choices, therefore allowing evil was God’s choice. A tautological argument.
 
**tonyrey **writes:
Is the existence of spiritual beings and the exercise of free will determined by time? Do you think we are entirely natural beings? Do you think nothing occurs in heaven? Is existence static or dynamic?
I did not say that the existence of spiritual beings and the exercise of free will were determined by time. I said that your assertion that God does not know free will decisions until they exist, and thus your distinction between “does not exist/exists” in God’s knowledge of these decisions to be determined by time.

BTW, I am deleting all your remarks that say you are deleting all my irrelevant remarks which do not befit a philosophical discussion. Personally, I find them to be very offensive…
Of course it can. But here and now it is the best possible world.
So, this world is the best possible world even though it is possible for it to be better?
Both of which depend on an act of free will. You are implying God should override our exercise of free will, thereby defeating the purpose of giving us free will…
If your point is to say that “this is the only way that the world can be,” then why are you defending that this world is the best possible world?

How about, instead of free acts, the world has one less natural disaster, or one more natural resource? This would provide more opportunities for the exercise of free will in accordance with virtue.
You are implying that God should not have given us free will. Do you believe that?
I am saying that it is because of our wrong use of free will that our world is corrupted by sin and death, and thus, not as good as it originally was (we had free will then too).
It is incompatible with His goodness if the world is not “better” as the result of human free will
“Better” than what?
Please specify those reasons.
The first step is to distinguish evil from suffering (seeing that not all suffering is inherently evil). For instance, take the analogy of fatherly discipline. The role of discipline is love. While there may be an immediate suffering for the son who is being disciplined, the final aim is to correct the son as to how he ought to act so as to be a good person. If the father did not discipline the son and simply let him do whatever he pleased, then the father would not truly love him.

As to why God allows evil, we must first properly define evil’s origin and end. Evil’s origin is to be found in the will of free will creatures. Evil’s end is to be found in the gracious redemption of Christ and His return to earth to Judge both the living and the dead; on this Last Day all evil will be destroyed and goodness will abide forever. Therefore, seeing that, as free will creatures we are responsible and a part of evil, it is not possible for us to conceive of the problem of evil as a matter of detached reason. Being that we are involved in the problem of evil (in the “fish bowl” so to speak), we cannot see the matter accurately, as the plank of our own sin blinds us.

We also know, given the revelation of God in Jesus Christ, that God is a good and loving God. He is a God Who mercifully forgives, and Who mercifully saves.

Therefore, given that we are incapable of detaching our reason from involvement in the problem of evil, and given our knowledge of God in Christ, and given that, in the end, God will defeat all evil and reign and righteousness and purity forever, it is not unreasonable to think that God has good reasons for allowing evil.
 
**TheTrueCentrist **writes:
This conclusion of yours rests on the assumption “there may be good reasons for God to allow evil to exist.” You have provided no evidence for that assumption, making it not so much a demonstration as a statement.
I have listed some reasons for thinking that God may have good reasons for allowing evil at the end of my post above (to tonyrey).
You also attempted to “demonstrate” this by claiming “God defines good” which is a circular definition. That definition renders all God’s decisions good by default and does not explain why evil exists. In other words the argument is: God chose to allow evil, God’s choices are good (by definition), therefore the allowance of evil is good. That argument is equivalent to saying: God chose to allow evil, God’s choices are his choices, therefore allowing evil was God’s choice. A tautological argument.
I have said that God’s nature defines the good because it is the good. I have not said that God’s will is arbitrary (as if God could will anything and it would thus be “good” by definition), but that God’s will is a necessary expression of His nature; and His nature is such (the Good) that it is impossible for God to will–for example–lying, murdering, and thieving as morally good and/or obligatory.
 
I have said that God’s nature defines the good because it is the good. I have not said that God’s will is arbitrary (as if God could will anything and it would thus be “good” by definition), but that God’s will is a necessary expression of His nature; and His nature is such (the Good) that it is impossible for God to will–for example–lying, murdering, and thieving as morally good and/or obligatory.
The frequently overlooked solution to Euthyphro’s dilemma!
 
But the “exists”/“does not exist” distinction is one which is determined by time, is it not?

That is, a free decision–in your view–does not exist, and cannot be known, until it occurs. I said that your assertion that God does not know free will decisions until they exist, and thus your distinction between “does not exist/exists” in God’s knowledge of these decisions to be determined by time.
That objection can be raised about events in heaven. We use the term “until” because we have no other way of distinguishing the transition from existence to non-existence. That is why I asked whether you think spiritual existence is static or dynamic? Do God’s decisions occur in time? If not, our acts of free will do not occur in time because they too are supernatural.

Thank you for your proviso. You have not proved that God’s knowledge of free will decisions is determined by time. His knowledge is certainly of the consequences of those decisions but we do not and cannot know whether non-existent decisions are knowable. We would need God’s insight to have that knowledge…
Of course it can. But here and now it is the best possible world.
So, this world is the best possible world even though it is possible for it to be better?

You are assuming that it is possible for it to be better** here and now**.
If your point is to say that “this is the only way that the world can be,” then why are you defending that this world is the best possible world?
My point is that this world is the best possible world given the fact of free will.
How about, instead of free acts, the world has one less natural disaster, or one more natural resource? This would provide more opportunities for the exercise of free will in accordance with virtue.
How could God arrange events to prevent a disaster? You are implying that He should not have permitted all the disasters that have occurred.
I am saying that it is because of our wrong use of free will that our world is corrupted by sin and death, and thus, not as good as it originally was (we had free will then too).
Did death not exist in the world before man sinned?
It is incompatible with His goodness if the world is not “better” as the result of human free will
“Better” than what?

Better than it could be. If this isn’t the best possible world at this very moment God must have failed in some respect. If He hasn’t failed up to now it must be best possible world up to now.
The first step is to distinguish evil from suffering (seeing that not all suffering is inherently evil). For instance, take the analogy of fatherly discipline. The role of discipline is love. While there may be an immediate suffering for the son who is being disciplined, the final aim is to correct the son as to how he ought to act so as to be a good person. If the father did not discipline the son and simply let him do whatever he pleased, then the father would not truly love him.
All suffering is generally regarded by philosophers as a physical evil because God could have created a world without suffering.
As to why God allows evil, we must first properly define evil’s origin and end. Evil’s origin is to be found in the will of free will creatures. Evil’s end is to be found in the gracious redemption of Christ and His return to earth to Judge both the living and the dead; on this Last Day all evil will be destroyed and goodness will abide forever. Therefore, seeing that, as free will creatures we are responsible and a part of evil, it is not possible for us to conceive of the problem of evil as a matter of detached reason. Being that we are involved in the problem of evil (in the “fish bowl” so to speak), we cannot see the matter accurately, as the plank of our own sin blinds us.
Do you believe all physical evil is due to moral evil? Didn’t disease, disasters and deformities occur before man sinned?
We also know, given the revelation of God in Jesus Christ, that God is a good and loving God. He is a God Who mercifully forgives, and Who mercifully saves.
Therefore, given that we are incapable of detaching our reason from involvement in the problem of evil, and given our knowledge of God in Christ, and given that, in the end, God will defeat all evil and reign and righteousness and purity forever, it is not unreasonable to think that God has good reasons for allowing evil.
Your explanation presupposes belief in God. How would you justify evil otherwise? Or do you think it is not possible?

BTW Wouldn’t you find this statement offensive:
I am beginning to think that you are making this all up as you go along, fccopleston.
?
 
tonyrey writes:
That objection can be raised about events in heaven. We use the term “until” because we have no other way of distinguishing the transition from existence to non-existence. That is why I asked whether you think spiritual existence is static or dynamic? Do God’s decisions occur in time? If not, our acts of free will do not occur in time because they too are supernatural.
So God does know our the actualization of our acts of free will, but not the non-existent acts of our free will???
Even if one was to grant that our acts of free will do not occur in time, why does this entail that God does not have knowledge of them?
Thank you for your proviso. You have not proved that God’s knowledge of free will decisions is determined by time. His knowledge is certainly of the consequences of those decisions but we do not and cannot know whether non-existent decisions are knowable. We would need God’s insight to have that knowledge…
Please define what you mean by “non-existent decision.”

It is clear that you are unwilling to accept the non-modal nature of omniscience. You also seem to think that you have somehow solved the problem regarding the relationship between God and free will by reducing God’s knowledge. You have not, however. Instead, you have only made God* smaller*. We could also solve the problem of the aforesaid relationship by saying that God is not really omniscient (that is, according to the orthodox, non-modal definition of omniscience–which is virtually equivalent to what you are saying with your revised definition), or that God is not really omnipotent (that is, He cannot know our the decisions of our free will because it is beyond His power–and, by the way, omnipotence * is* a modal property).

What I gather from all of your posts is that, since we cannot imagine what it is to be God and to know what He knows, therefore we cannot say that God knows our decisions of free will. But how do we know what God does not know? It seems that, rather than speculating about the extent of God’s knowledge in order to solve some logical problem, we ought instead to confess our ignorance and seek a source which can provide an answer that exists beyond our limited sphere of incompetence: Scripture. While Scripture does not, by any means, solve the problem of the relationship between God’s knowledge and free will, it does unmistakably affirm God’s knowledge of our free decisions. I have yet to hear a single word of Scripture to support your position.
You are assuming that it is possible for it to be better** here and now**.
If you are saying that we cannot look beyond the here and now to the possible, then you are no longer talking about the best possible world.
Did death not exist in the world before man sinned?
Sin entered the world through one man, and death through sin (Romans 5:12).
Better than it could be. If this isn’t the best possible world at this very moment God must have failed in some respect. If He hasn’t failed up to now it must be best possible world up to now.
This assumes that God was obligated to create the impossibility of the best of all possible worlds. The best of all possible worlds is incoherent. God can no more create the best of all possible worlds than He can create a square circle.

If free will cannot make the world better than it is, then free will is not truly free is it? It is determined to do what it will do, and no matter what it does is the best. Free will, according to your use of the term, is good by definition–even when it is used for sin. It sounds more like you have substituted the word “free will” for “God.” Tell me, is our free will fallen?
All suffering is generally regarded by philosophers as a physical evil because God could have created a world without suffering.
I thought you said that suffering is necessary to the point of even existing in heaven?..

Not all suffering is an evil, though it may be necessary as a consequence of evil. For instance, God would not need to discipline us if we had not fallen away from Him. Yet, because He disciplines us on account of our sin, this does not make His discipline evil.
Do you believe all physical evil is due to moral evil? Didn’t disease, disasters and deformities occur before man sinned?
Ultimately, yes. All evil is the result of sin, which entered the world through man’s free will. If evil is not the result of sin, then what is it the result of?
Your explanation presupposes belief in God. How would you justify evil otherwise? Or do you think it is not possible?
Of course it does. I am stating that, given the existence of God and His revelation–which can both be demonstrated to be rationally believed–it is not unreasonable to suppose that God has good reasons for allowing evil.

Apart from an immediate presupposition of God, I would first point out that the existence of evil presupposes objective moral values. If objective moral values exist then God exists. Objective moral values do exist (evil). Therefore, God exists. From here we demonstrate the reliability of revelation. Then we can discuss the reasons for believing why it is not unreasonable to suppose that God has good reasons for allowing evil.
 
I have said that God’s nature defines the good because it is the good. I have not said that God’s will is arbitrary (as if God could will anything and it would thus be “good” by definition), but that God’s will is a necessary expression of His nature; and His nature is such (the Good) that it is impossible for God to will–for example–lying, murdering, and thieving as morally good and/or obligatory.
If you define God’s nature as good, and God’s nature is to lie, or murder, or make completely random decisions, then any of those decisions are necessarily good. In other words, unless you make a definition of good that does not involve God (e.g. goodness consists of not lying) then saying “goodness is defined by God’s nature” is actually meaningless.

This is why I challenged you to define goodness some other way. You said that goodness is related to virtue. Now I say: allowing evil to exist does not seem virtuous.

I suspect you may wish to respond “God’s nature defines virtue” in which case your reasoning is once again circular.
 
The first step is to distinguish evil from suffering (seeing that not all suffering is inherently evil). For instance, take the analogy of fatherly discipline. The role of discipline is love. While there may be an immediate suffering for the son who is being disciplined, the final aim is to correct the son as to how he ought to act so as to be a good person. If the father did not discipline the son and simply let him do whatever he pleased, then the father would not truly love him.
So why does God let us do whatever we please by allowing evil to exist? Does he not truly love us?
As to why God allows evil, we must first properly define evil’s origin and end. Evil’s origin is to be found in the will of free will creatures. Evil’s end is to be found in the gracious redemption of Christ and His return to earth to Judge both the living and the dead; on this Last Day all evil will be destroyed and goodness will abide forever. Therefore, seeing that, as free will creatures we are responsible and a part of evil, it is not possible for us to conceive of the problem of evil as a matter of detached reason. Being that we are involved in the problem of evil (in the “fish bowl” so to speak), we cannot see the matter accurately, as the plank of our own sin blinds us.
But you have said that free will does not require the actualization of evil. Also, in this formulation, evil serves no purpose, it is just a interim period before the world is returned to goodness. Why have it at all?

To say “we sin therefore we cannot understand sin” sounds foolish to me. Would you say that because we eat we cannot reason about eating in a detached way? Is a swimmer incapable of reasoning about swimming in a detached way? Since you believe in the goodness God, I therefore claim your reasoning about the goodness of God is just as invalid as you claim our reasoning about sin is.
We also know, given the revelation of God in Jesus Christ, that God is a good and loving God. He is a God Who mercifully forgives, and Who mercifully saves.
That is like trusting someone simply because they say to you “I am trustworthy.”

Say that some evil is actually necessary. In such a scenario, why wouldn’t God make a world where everyone ends up repenting of their sinful ways?
Therefore, given that we are incapable of detaching our reason from involvement in the problem of evil, and given our knowledge of God in Christ, and given that, in the end, God will defeat all evil and reign and righteousness and purity forever, it is not unreasonable to think that God has good reasons for allowing evil.
So you are saying that the reasons for believing the goodness of God is compatible with the existence of evil are:
  1. We can’t understand the problem of evil.
  2. God told us he is good.
  3. Evil is going to end eventually.
 
**TheTrueCentrist **writes:
So you are saying that the reasons for believing the goodness of God is compatible with the existence of evil are:
  1. We can’t understand the problem of evil.
  2. God told us he is good.
  3. Evil is going to end eventually.
I am not going to waste my time responding to you if this is the way you are going to argue. You here exemplify my consistent complaint throughout our discussion, namely, that you are either unwilling or unable to engage my position other than to construct straw men and misrepresentations of it.

Is “we can’t understand the problem of evil” the most fair way to express what I was arguing for. Don’t tell me to explain what I was arguing for. If you want to know: read my post. If you don’t want to know: why are you posting?

Likewise, “God told us He is good,” does not fairly represent what I said. If you read my post you will discover that God has not only told us that He is good, but He has shown us as well.

Lastly, “evil is going to end eventually,” implies a passive and uncaring attitude toward the problem and reality of evil. Read my post. I am able to take the reality of evil seriously because I believe that there is such a thing as objective evil. I do not know that you can say the same thing.

If you want to discuss these things, I am more than willing, but on the condition that you do so honestly.
 
If you define God’s nature as good, and God’s nature is to lie, or murder, or make completely random decisions, then any of those decisions are necessarily good. In other words, unless you make a definition of good that does not involve God (e.g. goodness consists of not lying) then saying “goodness is defined by God’s nature” is actually meaningless.

This is why I challenged you to define goodness some other way. You said that goodness is related to virtue. Now I say: allowing evil to exist does not seem virtuous.

I suspect you may wish to respond “God’s nature defines virtue” in which case your reasoning is once again circular.
If you want to understand the issue better, I suggest you get some reading material. Try Plantinga’s God, Freedom, and Evil.

Other than that…
 
**TheTrueCentrist **writes:

I am not going to waste my time responding to you if this is the way you are going to argue. You here exemplify my consistent complaint throughout our discussion, namely, that you are either unwilling or unable to engage my position other than to construct straw men and misrepresentations of it.

Is “we can’t understand the problem of evil” the most fair way to express what I was arguing for. Don’t tell me to explain what I was arguing for. If you want to know: read my post. If you don’t want to know: why are you posting?

Likewise, “God told us He is good,” does not fairly represent what I said. If you read my post you will discover that God has not only told us that He is good, but He has shown us as well.

Lastly, “evil is going to end eventually,” implies a passive and uncaring attitude toward the problem and reality of evil. Read my post. I am able to take the reality of evil seriously because I believe that there is such a thing as objective evil. I do not know that you can say the same thing.

If you want to discuss these things, I am more than willing, but on the condition that you do so honestly.
Here is my position in simplest form:
  1. Knowingly allowing evil to occur is not consistent with our understanding of good.
  2. God knowingly allowed evil to occur by creating this world.
  3. Therefore, God’s decisions are not always consistent with our understanding of good.
  4. God’s decisions are also not consistent with our understanding of evil (repeat 1-3 but swap good and evil.)
  5. Therefore, God’s decisions are not always consistent with our understanding of either good or evil.
  6. Assuming that God’s nature is immutable and that God’s decisions always reflect his nature
    a. God’s nature is not described by our understanding of good or evil
    b. God’s nature must involve either on no rules (actually random) or on a set of rules of which we are ignorant (apparently random.)
Your objections have primarily focused on #1.
Your principal objection there, as I understand it after reading your posts is:
“God may have had a reason to allow evil that is consistent with our understanding of goodness.”
Your evidence for this statement is:
“God has done good things in the past (e.g. Bible stories)”
“God has explicitly told us his nature is good (in the Bible)”
“We are unable to understand God’s goodness because we commit evil.”

However I think you must see that I am not denying that God has ever done anything good. In other words, examples of God doing good at one point or another do not invalidate my argument. Also, my position is consistent with a God who has told us he is good.

In my experience, people who object to a simple statement of their position are those whose positions are shaky, and wish to hide it behind complex justifications. Why didn’t you correct my misunderstanding and provide a more accurate list summarizing your reasoning up to this point?
 
Here is my position in simplest form:
  1. Knowingly allowing evil to occur is not consistent with our understanding of good.
  2. God knowingly allowed evil to occur by creating this world.
  3. Therefore, God’s decisions are not always consistent with our understanding of good.
  4. God’s decisions are also not consistent with our understanding of evil (repeat 1-3 but swap good and evil.)
  5. Therefore, God’s decisions are not always consistent with our understanding of either good or evil.
  6. Assuming that God’s nature is immutable and that God’s decisions always reflect his nature
    a. God’s nature is not described by our understanding of good or evil
    b. God’s nature must involve either on no rules (actually random) or on a set of rules of which we are ignorant (apparently random.)
Your objections have primarily focused on #1.
Your principal objection there, as I understand it after reading your posts is:
“God may have had a reason to allow evil that is consistent with our understanding of goodness.”
Your evidence for this statement is:
“God has done good things in the past (e.g. Bible stories)”
“God has explicitly told us his nature is good (in the Bible)”
“We are unable to understand God’s goodness because we commit evil.”

However I think you must see that I am not denying that God has ever done anything good. In other words, examples of God doing good at one point or another do not invalidate my argument. Also, my position is consistent with a God who has told us he is good.

In my experience, people who object to a simple statement of their position are those whose positions are shaky, and wish to hide it behind complex justifications. Why didn’t you correct my misunderstanding and provide a more accurate list summarizing your reasoning up to this point?
There is a world of difference between a “simple statement” of one’s position and a “deliberate misrepresentation” of it.

And in my experience, those who deliberately misrepresent statements are not willing to engage in honest discussion.

I have attempted to show that the existence of God and evil are not inconsistent, and that there are good reasons to suppose that God has good reasons for allowing evil.

You do not think that there are good reasons for God to allow evil.

Okay.

Unless you have something new to contribute, I don’t see the point in discussing this further.

In Christ,
FCCopleston
 
There is a world of difference between a “simple statement” of one’s position and a “deliberate misrepresentation” of it.

And in my experience, those who deliberately misrepresent statements are not willing to engage in honest discussion.

I have attempted to show that the existence of God and evil are not inconsistent, and that there are good reasons to suppose that God has good reasons for allowing evil.

You do not think that there are good reasons for God to allow evil.

Okay.

Unless you have something new to contribute, I don’t see the point in discussing this further.

In Christ,
FCCopleston
You again claim mischaracterization but provide no correction.

I think you finally understand the gravity of the “problem of evil.” It has come down to a question of faith. Do you believe there is enough evidence of God’s goodness to give him the benefit of the doubt with regards to evil? There is no empirical answer. The question of evil can’t and shouldn’t be idly brushed aside, its resolution requires an actual statement of faith.
 
You again claim mischaracterization but provide no correction.

I think you finally understand the gravity of the “problem of evil.” It has come down to a question of faith. Do you believe there is enough evidence of God’s goodness to give him the benefit of the doubt with regards to evil? There is no empirical answer. The question of evil can’t and shouldn’t be idly brushed aside, its resolution requires an actual statement of faith.
Where I have “idly brushed aside” the issue of the problem of evil? If I have brushed anything aside it is your absurd conclusion that all of God’s activities are totally* random*–which is neither reasonable nor logical.

The fact that we have a* limited *knowledge of the good does not mean that we have *no *knowledge of the good. The fact that some of God’s actions seem to contradict our limited knowledge of the good does not mean that we have *no basis *for thinking that God is the good.

If anyone has “idly brushed aside” any issue, I would assert that it is your outright dismissal of the fall and its consequences, as well as your inability to acknowledge the existence of objective moral values and to adequately account for their existence apart from God. Furthermore, you are unable to provide any good reasons for denying the reliability and veracity of the New Testament documents, which testify and witness to the risen Christ, who is eternal God made man, and who rose again from the dead, proving Him to be so (the only way that this does not follow is if you treat each and every miracle of Christ and claim that He was God as arbitrary miracles and claims, and there is simply no reason to do this).

What you do not understand is the distinction between the fides quae creditur (the faith which is believed) and the *fides qua creditur *(the faith by which it is believed). The former is objective, the latter is subjective. The former deals with the reasons for believing–which necessarily deal with probability and argumentation. The latter deals with the certainty of believing, trusting that your faith in the sure promises of God is itself a divine gift. Grace is inexplicable, and if you think that you can explain it, then you are only deceiving yourself. However, Christianity is not a religion of pure philosophy, but rather is an historical religion which makes truth claims that can be tested for their truthfulness. If Christ has not risen from the dead, the our faith is in vain. And so, when we deal with the reasons for accepting the historical event of Christ’s resurrection, we do not do so under the delusion that our faith rests upon argumentation or the probability of its truth, but rather all evidence which supports our faith only serves as a further confirmation.

I suggest that you do some study into the Christian religion. You seem to think you know quite a bit more than you, in fact, do.

And again, you are trying to alter my own stated objectives, namely, to demonstrate that God and evil are not logically incompatible, and to show that there may be good reasons for which God allows evil. I have not set out to demonstrate the unreasonably lofty goal of proving that God has good reasons for allowing evil, or of proving that Christ rose from the dead. Here is where the previous distinction I have made above comes into play:

**I believe with certainty (fides qua creditur) that Christ rose from the dead (fides quae creditur). **

I also think, through abductive inference to the best explanation, that both the Old and New Testament documents are reliable, that Christ’s resurrection is a highly probable historical event (no alternative explanation comes close to accounting for the facts surrounding the event), and that, given the truthfulness of Scripture and Christ’s resurrection, we can believe that God is good despite the existence of evil. Furthermore, I also think that there are good reasons from purely rational arguments for both God’s existence and His being the source of objective moral values. There is much that we can learn about God from natural theology apart form special revelation, but natural theology is also extremely limited if we are to expect to understand the truth of God’s essential nature. This is not to say that we cannot consider God to be the good apart from special revelation–many great thinkers (including non-Christians) have come to this conclusion, and, as I have said, I think a good argument can be made given the existence of objective moral values. What I am saying is that natural theology does not reveal to us to the same extent the true heart and disposition of God toward mankind. Nature and reason tell us about God (He is judge, Creator, etc.). Scripture tells us about Who God is *for us * in Jesus Christ (Redeemer, Justifier, and Forgiver).

I know that you do not believe any of this, and that you do not want to believe. That’s fine.

I have offered my reasons for thinking that God and evil and not incompatible and that God may have good reasons for allowing evil to exist. Beyond this, I would say that I am satisfied with ending our discussion, unless you have something new to contribute.

In Christ,
FCCopleston
 
So God does know the actualization of our acts of free will, but not the non-existent acts of our free will???
Yes.
Even if one was to grant that our acts of free will do not occur in time, why does this entail that God does not have knowledge of them?
God doesn’t initiate our free choice. It is solely and entirely ours. God does not do things by halves. His gift of free will is absolute and irrevocable. Free will is** a participation in God’s power** which enables us to reject Him forever and to set up a rival kingdom of our own. This is one of the main reasons we are made in His image and likeness. Both our power of reason and our capacity for love presuppose free will which is an inscrutable attribute of God
Please define what you mean by “non-existent decision.”
A decision which has not been created.
It is clear that you are unwilling to accept the non-modal nature of omniscience. You also seem to think that you have somehow solved the problem regarding the relationship between God and free will by reducing God’s knowledge. You have not, however. Instead, you have only made God smaller.
On the contrary. The fact that God shares His power is proof of His infinite love for us. Like Jesus on the Cross He makes Himself vulnerable to abuse, hatred and rejection. Why? Because He knows that without free will we cannot love.
We could also solve the problem of the aforesaid relationship by saying that God is not really omniscient (that is, according to the orthodox, non-modal definition of omniscience–which is virtually equivalent to what you are saying with your revised definition), or that God is not really omnipotent (that is, He cannot know our the decisions of our free will because it is beyond His power–and, by the way, omnipotence is a modal property).
God is omniscient because He knows everything that can be known.
But how do we know what God does not know?
We don’t but neither do we know what He does know!
While Scripture does not, by any means, solve the problem of the relationship between God’s knowledge and free will, it does unmistakably affirm God’s knowledge of our free decisions. I have yet to hear a single word of Scripture to support your position.
It does not affirm God’s knowledge of our non-existent, free decisions.
BTW There are many spiritual truths that cannot be found in Scripture.
If you are saying that we cannot look beyond the here and now to the possible, then you are no longer talking about the best possible world.
The demand for instant coffee and instant photos now extends even to an instant best of all possible worlds! Which of course is an impossible demand because life is not valued solely by its final outcome but by what happens at every moment. Can we become as perfect as God wants us to be instantly? Of course not. But we can be the best possible persons we are capable of being right now! So this must be the best possible world because each one of us has that opportunity. What has God failed to do in creating us and the world? If your answer is “Nothing” there is only one possible conclusion… 🙂
Sin entered the world through one man, and death through sin (Romans 5:12).
Spiritual death:
“And do not fear those who kill the body but cannot kill the soul. Rather fear him who can destroy both soul and body in hell…”
God can no more create the best of all possible worlds than He can create a square circle.
You need to justify that assertion.
If free will cannot make the world better than it is, then free will is not truly free is it?
Of course it can make the world better, has done so and will do so. The best of all possible worlds is not static but dynamic.
It is determined to do what it will do, and no matter what it does is the best.
It is the other way round. We are not determined but capable of self-determination and we progress by using that power.
Free will, according to your use of the term, is good by definition–even when it is used for sin.
You are equating free will with the abuse of free will.
It sounds more like you have substituted the word “free will” for “God.”
Free will** is** a divine attribute!
Tell me, is our free will fallen?
Free will cannot fall because it is participation in God’ power. We can neglect and abuse it but that is not because it is a defect.
I thought you said that suffering is necessary to the point of even existing in heaven?
I specified suffering as a physical evil. Mental suffering is inevitable in heaven because it presupposes compassion.
Not all suffering is an evil, though it may be necessary as a consequence of evil.
If evil is not the result of sin, then what is it the result of?
Physical evil is the result of physical laws. Moral evil is due to the abuse of free will.
I am stating that, given the existence of God and His revelation–which can both be demonstrated to be rationally believed–it is not unreasonable to suppose that God has good reasons for allowing evil…
If objective moral values exist then God exists…
Then we can discuss the reasons for believing why it is not unreasonable to suppose that God has good reasons for allowing evil.
I’m pleased to say I agree with you. 🙂
 
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