The Problem of Evil and Free Will Defense

[SeekingCatholic]

I restrict this discussion to moral evil, and specifically, moral evil leading to damnation. I will show that this remains an unsolved, and in fact, insoluble problem. While there exist logical solutions, they come at the cost of some other tenet of classical theism or Catholicism.

We assume the classical theistic God is omnipotent, omniscient, and omnibenevolent. Relevant to this discussion, God could actualize any logically and metaphysically possible world (omnipotence), He knows the actions of His creatures prior to their occurrence (omniscience), and He does not permit gratuitous (unnecessary) evil (omnibenevolence). We also assume the Christian God Who loves humanity to such an extent He sent His own Son that they might not perish but possess eternal life, but punishes the wicked with eternal damnation, should they choose to reject Him.

We use modal logic, with the distinction between “logically possible” worlds and “metaphysically possible” worlds. A logically possible world entails no contradictories (e.g. there are no squared circles) but it is not necessarily a metaphysically possible world, which is one that is actually possible given the nature of being, which we do not know everything about. (A three-horned horse is logically possible but may be metaphysically impossible.)

The “standard” answer is that, in order for there to exist moral good, there must also be moral evil. But logically there must only exist the potential for moral evil, not its actuality. Why did God not actualize a world in which all are in fact saved, even if it were logically possible for them not to be? There is no good answer. There are only in fact two logically possible answers, the “free will” defense and the “greater good” defense. I’ll first discuss the “free will” defense.

The “free will” defense argues that it is (epistemically) possible (that is, for all we know, it could be the case) that there are no metaphysically possible worlds in which all creatures always choose right, or a fortiori in which all are saved. (This assumes the Molinistic position of Divine scientia media and counterfactuals of freedom in order to preserve Divine omniscience.) This defense succeeds, as far as it goes. I cannot prove to metaphysical certainty, with our limited knowledge of metaphysics and philosophy, that there exists a metaphysically possible world in which all choose right and are saved.

But let’s consider the implications for a moment. In the first place, this is entirely unacceptable from a Catholic point of view; it’s more consonant with Calvinism (and the author of the “free will” defense, Alvin Plantinga, is I believe in some sort of Reformed denomination). Catholicism demands the metaphysical possibility of salvation for all and denies that Christ died for the elect only. And there are other philosophical problems.

Let’s (to simplify the issue, but it doesn’t really change anything) imagine God choosing between two worlds: one in which person A is saved and person B damned, and one in which person A is damned and person B saved. A world in which both A and B are saved is, we presume, metaphysically impossible. Let’s say God chooses the first one, with A saved, since He desires A saved (His motive in creating the world is His creatures’ good, being omnibenevolent as He is). B’s damnation therefore follows as a matter of metaphysical necessity, for given A’s salvation, there are no metaphysically possible worlds in which B is saved. It was metaphysically impossible for B to have chosen otherwise than he did, given the external circumstances. Now it is unjust to punish anyone for acting when it was impossible for him to act otherwise. (This is not, by the way, the same argument as claiming it is logically impossible to act otherwise than how God knows we will act. This is a classic modal fallacy of “if a, then necessarily a”; it is logically possible to so act, there are other logically possible worlds in which we act otherwise, our action is contingent, not necessary. Whereas in the case under discussion B’s actions are metaphysically necessary as there are no metaphysically possible worlds with the same circumstances where B acts otherwise.) Of course the same argument applies if God chooses to instantiate the second world for the sake of B’s salvation; A’s actions then follow by metaphysical necessity. Now to act from metaphysical necessity seems to me to be the antithesis of “free will” - it’s ironic that the “free will” defense should end up, in fact, denying “free will”. Of course some Protestants do, in fact, deny free will.

Now, it may be objected to this that I am assuming A’s (or B’s) salvation to be directly willed by God. Certainly, the argument is airtight if this is the case. There are no metaphysically possible worlds in which A’s or B’s salvation is directly willed by God and yet it doesn’t happen. And salvation must be willed by God, the source of all good in classical theism. But couldn’t God actualize a world in which either A or B would be saved, but then kind of let things “play out”? The answer is “no”, according to classical theism.

Classical theism demands infallible Divine foreknowledge of creatures’ actions in some way, although accounts differ as to exactly how this occurs. Thomist Divine causation was discussed above; according to Molinist scientia media, God knows how each creature would act in a given situation (brute-fact “counterfactuals of freedom”). God actualizes the external circumstances of the world, which means He must decide prior to its instantiation whether it is going to be A or B who is saved.

 

[ateista]

Excellent summary! I can hardly wait to see the replies.

Personally, I see one way out of the dilemma, and that depends on the traditional view of “omniscience”. If you think that it is within the scope of this thread, we can talk about it. If not, then I will just sit back and enjoy the fireworks.

 

[SeekingCatholic]

Excellent summary! I can hardly wait to see the replies.

Personally, I see one way out of the dilemma, and that depends on the traditional view of “omniscience”. If you think that it is within the scope of this thread, we can talk about it. If not, then I will just sit back and enjoy the fireworks.

Certainly I think it is within the scope of the thread. So go ahead.

 

[tobias]

Why is it assumed that in this actual existence that it is not metaphyically possible for both A and B to be saved? A and B simultaneously possess the capacity for moral evil and moral good. Having the capacity for both good and evil in itself is ‘proof’ of free choice of the will. It would be unintelligable to conclude that one is not free to do what one is capable of. As soon as one is not free to do, capacity is definitionally removed.

 What is it that A and B are  being saved from? Or being saved for?  Classical Theism holds that Man is saved from eternal punishment and to be God's people.  Why? Because ( in classic al theism) Man rejects God. Both A and B reject God. The first act of rejection,was a rejection by mankind as a species. A and B are both metaphysically in the same state of capacity, free choice of the will and rejection. Intervention is neccessary from outside the species.  Of course in christianity, the omnipotent one intervenes from within the specie and offers freedom from the bondage of the first rejection, even though further individual rejections are inevitable because capacity has not been altered.

 Maybe the question should be asked; Why would an omnibenevalent God force A or B to loose their capacity for choice? Or perhaps that only applies if one considers choice to be a good. If not, one is abdicating that the good would have been in being automatons, rather than beings with free choice. But then could one be an automaton and give and recieve what is good? Perhaps one could recieve, but could one give?  Man is able to do good by other species, has an animal ever done good by Man that was not first under the direction of Man? We are surrounded by automatons that neither do good nor evil, but do. Why, because they have not the capacity. All that is good is by extension to another.  Were there not 3 persons in the trinity, one could say that God is not omnibenevolent or good at all. The same is true on A and B, were either alone, the capacity for good would not be present. If A or B in this world were alone their whole lives they would not therefore lack the capacity for good and evil because God still is.  

 Could and omniscient God have created a world where both A and B are saved? If A or B chooses to stay in rejection, why would the omnipotent one force them to accept. The intervention was freely given to be freely accepted, and was done for both A and B. Could the intervention have been forced? NO! Just for the greater good? No! But also for the good of A and B, even though one stays in rejection. For one, the good is  seen as evil and the evil as good. Why would the omniscient one choose to save the one who rejects Him for his own,or from eternal seperation? ( in classical theism of course )

 It is not logically possible for God to have created a world where all are saved, rather, only one where its beings would need no salvation, one without human beings.

 

[ateista]

Certainly I think it is within the scope of the thread. So go ahead.

Thanks. I will, but first a question.

How should one understand that something is “logically possible” but not “metaphysically possible”? As far as I understand the only limitation on God’s alleged omnipotence is that he cannot create logically contradictory objects - like married bachelors.

Since believers assert that God can create “miracles”, temporarily suspending the “laws of nature”, how is that different from creating a “horse with 3 horns”? It would be just a minor genetic manipulation. Maybe there is a better example.

 

[SeekingCatholic]

Why is it assumed that in this actual existence that it is not metaphyically possible for both A and B to be saved?

This is the “free will” defense - an attempted answer to the question of why God did not create a world in which both A and B were saved.

A and B simultaneously possess the capacity for moral evil and moral good. Having the capacity for both good and evil in itself is ‘proof’ of free choice of the will.

No, it isn’t. All you have done here is circularly defined “moral good” and “moral evil” as that which comes about by free choice of the will and then claimed evidence of the potential of moral good and evil as evidence of free will. But I’d prefer not to sidetrack this into a discussion of free will if possible.

It would be unintelligable to conclude that one is not free to do what one is capable of. As soon as one is not free to do, capacity is definitionally removed.

No, it wouldn’t be. Many things have potential which are never actualized. You’re again begging the question, assuming what needs to be proved (free will). It’s a rather more difficult philosophical question than you seem to think. But let’s assume free will for the remainder.

The first act of rejection,was a rejection by mankind as a species…

Which only puts the question further back, could God have actualized a world in which mankind did not reject Him as a species. Or at least, actualized a world in which redemption was successful for all.

Maybe the question should be asked; Why would an omnibenevalent God force A or B to loose their capacity for choice?

No, the question should not be asked. This same bogus “refutation” of the POE is attempted time and again, refuted time and again, and attempted time and again anyway (kind of reminds of the 2nd Law of Thermodynamics vs. evolution). The erroneous presumption is made here that if God actualizes a world in which both A and B choose correctly, that he is “forcing” A or B to lose their capacity for choice. This is not the case if worlds in which both A or B, either of them, or none, choose correctly are all metaphysically possible. In this case A and B are under no metaphysical constraint to choose as they do.

Whereas I have in fact shown that if the presumption of the “free will” defense is correct, and given A’s choosing correctly a world in which B also chooses correctly is metaphysically impossible, then B is in fact metaphysically constrained to choose wrongly. This is the case where B could be said to “lose” his capacity for choice.

The same is true on A and B, were either alone, the capacity for good would not be present. If A or B in this world were alone their whole lives they would not therefore lack the capacity for good and evil because God still is.

These two sentences contradict so I don’t know what you mean.

Could and omniscient God have created a world where both A and B are saved? If A or B chooses to stay in rejection, why would the omnipotent one force them to accept.

But a world in which both A and B are saved is one in which they both choose to not stay in rejection, without being “forced” to accept by God. The question remains why God could not have actualized such a world.

Why would the omniscient one choose to save the one who rejects Him for his own,or from eternal seperation? ( in classical theism of course )

The omniscient one does not choose to save one who rejects Him. He chooses to actualize a world in which no one rejects Him. Again the question remains why such a world was not actualized.

It is not logically possible for God to have created a world where all are saved, rather, only one where its beings would need no salvation, one without human beings.

The statement is false, because there is no logical contradiction in a world in which all are saved. Even it were true, the same arguments apply as were made against the “free will” defense, but with even greater force, since now the unsaved person in my hypothetical worlds is now constrained, not just metaphysically, but logically, to act as he does, which is a certain denial of free will and an upholding of an unjust God for punishing.

 

[SeekingCatholic]

Thanks. I will, but first a question.

How should one understand that something is “logically possible” but not “metaphysically possible”? As far as I understand the only limitation on God’s alleged omnipotence is that he cannot create logically contradictory objects - like married bachelors.

Since believers assert that God can create “miracles”, temporarily suspending the “laws of nature”, how is that different from creating a “horse with 3 horns”? It would be just a minor genetic manipulation. Maybe there is a better example.

What I am getting at is that “logically impossible” means violating the laws of logic while “metaphysically impossible” means violating of laws of being (what can exist, how and where it can exist, etc.) You could argue that such laws don’t exist but I am giving the widest possible benefit of the doubt to the POE.

There is a better example than the 3-horned horse. But even the horse with 3 horns can show what I mean. We think that it would be just a minor genetic manipulation. But we don’t know that such a genetic manipulation might have other effects, possibly lethal. The weight of the skull upon the brain would be much larger, etc. You could argue that God could work a miracle to keep such a “horse” alive but then I would say that what I mean by “horse” is an animal which can survive without miraculous intervention. Now such a horse entails no intrinsic logical contradiction in its definition. A three-horned horse is not intrinsically contradictory like a married bachelor or a squared circle. Yet it would be impossible to create, even for God. You could argue that maybe in another world with different physical laws such an animal would be possible. But I would argue that we don’t know this to be the case. It could be that the nature of being is such that a 3-horned horse is simply metaphysically impossible given certain metaphysical constraints on the nature of being.

 

[ateista]

He chooses to actualize a world in which no one rejects Him. Again the question remains why such a world was not actualized.

The question is even more “dire” than you presented. In order for everyone be “saved”, it is not necessary that everyone, always would choose “right”. Everyone can systematically and volitionally choose evil all the time.

It is sufficient if on their death bed they would sincerely repent. At least that is my understanding of the Catholic doctrine. Maybe I am wrong here, if so, please correct me.

 

[SeekingCatholic]

The question is even more “dire” than you presented. In order for everyone be “saved”, it is not necessary that everyone, always would choose “right”. Everyone can systematically and volitionally choose evil all the time.

It is sufficient if on their death bed they would sincerely repent. At least that is my understanding of the Catholic doctrine. Maybe I am wrong here, if so, please correct me.

You are correct, but what I meant by “a world in which no one rejects Him” is “a world in which everyone, at least, sincerely repents before death”.

 

[ateista]

You are correct, but what I meant by “a world in which no one rejects Him” is “a world in which everyone, at least, sincerely repents before death”.

Yes, of course.

What I wanted to point out here is that individual repentance is not contingent on someone else’s repentance. It is not like the assumption of “good, moral acts”, which may be contingent on other people’s actions (and thus it may entail a metaphysical impossibility.

Repentance is obviously not logically impossible. I would say that it is not metaphysically impossible either, since it is not contingent on anything external, only the free will of the individual concerned (and of course the ability of the person to actually think the words: “please forgive my sins”).

 

[tobias]

No, it isn’t. All you have done here is circularly defined “moral good” and “moral evil” as that which comes about by free choice of the will and then claimed evidence of the potential of moral good and evil as evidence of free will. But I’d prefer not to sidetrack this into a discussion of free will if possible.

What exactly do you mean ‘not sidetrack’ the discussion to free will, that is the post title. And how in the world do you divorce free choice from the will? By what vehicle do you imagine free choice to be moved by? I believe that my 9 year old understands that when she knowingly and willfully lies to someone she has sinned ( commited a moral evil ), and that she could have chosen otherwise. The fact that people will act morally different at various times in similar situations points strickingly to existence of free choice of the will. If not, how do you explain the variance of behavior that each individual exhibits from one time to the next.

No, it wouldn’t be. Many things have potential which are never actualized. You’re again begging the question, assuming what needs to be proved (free will). It’s a rather more difficult philosophical question than you seem to think. But let’s assume free will for the remainder.

Are you assimilating matter and energy apart from intelligence with the human mind ( matter, energy and intelligence )? Of course there is matter and energy that never actualizes potential, but then each is powerless to do so. A cigarette cannot choose to light itself. Fire can not choose to light a cigarette. A human mind may choose to use fire to light a cigarette. Of the 3 only the human mind has power to actualize potential. Apart from intelligence there is no potential to actualize. It’s really a pity to not make such a distinction.

Which only puts the question further back, could God have actualized a world in which mankind did not reject Him as a species. Or at least, actualized a world in which redemption was successful for all.

If redemption is part of the equation, then no. Without rejection, where is there need for redemption? Yes God could have actualized a world where man did not reject ( if we were automatons ) but where would the acceptance come from?

No, the question should not be asked. This same bogus “refutation” of the POE is attempted time and again, refuted time and again, and attempted time and again anyway (kind of reminds of the 2nd Law of Thermodynamics vs. evolution). The erroneous presumption is made here that if God actualizes a world in which both A and B choose correctly, that he is “forcing” A or B to lose their capacity for choice. This is not the case if worlds in which both A or B, either of them, or none, choose correctly are all metaphysically possible. In this case A and B are under no metaphysical constraint to choose as they do.

I think the bogus assertion is that you claim this present world holds constraints for some, without even giving analagous example. Why do you insist that it is not metaphysically possible in this world for both the saved and unsaved to have equal capacity for acceptance of God.

Whereas I have in fact shown that if the presumption of the “free will” defense is correct, and given A’s choosing correctly a world in which B also chooses correctly is metaphysically impossible, then B is in fact metaphysically constrained to choose wrongly. This is the case where B could be said to “lose” his capacity for choice.

You have demonstrated no such thing! If A is resigned to accepting God and B is equally resigned to rejecting God, what of C? C is a life long rejector of God who at the last minute drops his rejection and takes on acceptance. D accepts God all his life and at some great loss rejects God, undoing his acceptance. So what was A and D on one side and B and C on the other, now because of actualized potential is now A and C on one side and B and D on the other. These things do happen in this present world! If someone does not actualize their potential, it in no way follows that potential was not there, it merely follows that potential was not actualized.

These two sentences contradict so I don’t know what you mean.

Sorry but I assumed we both understood from the A and B analogy that God was the third party in each equation. There is no contradiction, continuous sentances need not agree to form a unifying thread.

But a world in which both A and B are saved is one in which they both choose to not stay in rejection, without being “forced” to accept by God. The question remains why God could not have actualized such a world.

The Question only remains if your stuck in a hypothetical world. Look around you, the answers are quite apparent.

The omniscient one does not choose to save one who rejects Him. He chooses to actualize a world in which no one rejects Him. Again the question remains why such a world was not actualized.

To be sure the question does remain for those not willing to give in to acceptance. This should be quite obvious. Me and you in our human nature would not will such a world where we would draw all unto ourselves. Or perhaps you will fool youself and say “Yes, I will the man who rapes my sister unto myself, for I will not that any be left out.” or “Yes, I will the one who molests children unto myself for this is the way it should be.” Both you and I could not do this in out human nature. Why do you insist that God could or should have done the same. Yes it is illogical to presume that God could say “Yes, I will the ruler who puts innocent people to death unto myself, for all shall be saved.” or “Yes, I will the man who molests little children unto myself, for this is just.” You know this to be an absurdity for human or divine beings yet you persist in abdicating such knowledge.

The statement is false, because there is no logical contradiction in a world in which all are saved. Even it were true, the same arguments apply as were made against the “free will” defense, but with even greater force, since now the unsaved person in my hypothetical worlds is now constrained, not just metaphysically, but logically, to act as he does, which is a certain denial of free will and an upholding of an unjust God for punishing.

The statement is true because, the logical contradiction is in a world where all the beings free to choose would all choose the good without interference of will.
The whole premise seems silly to me and would need to be followed by a whole host of equally irrelevant questions such as "Why did not God make the world so all had children?’, or “Why didn’t God make this world so all had a Cadillac to drive?” Neither seems to any less pretentious than the first.
For any one who cannot see the capacity of free choice in the self or in their neighbor, I believe is lacking in understanding the human condition.

So far, So good, So what!

 

[SeekingCatholic]

What exactly do you mean ‘not sidetrack’ the discussion to free will, that is the post title.

I mean assume free will for the purposes of the discussion, not engage in philosophical argumentation about the existence of free will. Free will is a very thorny philosophical question.

I believe that my 9 year old understands that when she knowingly and willfully lies to someone she has sinned ( commited a moral evil ), and that she could have chosen otherwise.

You believe this. You don’t know this.

The fact that people will act morally different at various times in similar situations points strickingly to existence of free choice of the will. If not, how do you explain the variance of behavior that each individual exhibits from one time to the next.

Because each individual is not in exactly the same set of circumstances from one time to the next, or it is not the same individual acting. This doesn’t refute a deterministic framework. It’s not nearly as easy to “prove” free will as you seem to think.

Of the 3 only the human mind has power to actualize potential. Apart from intelligence there is no potential to actualize. It’s really a pity to not make such a distinction.

The Divine mind also has power to actualize.

If redemption is part of the equation, then no. Without rejection, where is there need for redemption? Yes God could have actualized a world where man did not reject ( if we were automatons ) but where would the acceptance come from?

The point of contention, yet to be refuted by you (and I hold as irrefutable), is that God could have actualized a world where man did not reject and yet we are not automatons.

I think the bogus assertion is that you claim this present world holds constraints for some, without even giving analagous example. Why do you insist that it is not metaphysically possible in this world for both the saved and unsaved to have equal capacity for acceptance of God.

Because, given the “free will defense”, there is no metaphysically possible world in which all are saved. We also assume God really desires men’s salvation, and not their damnation (from Catholicism), which means He determines which world to actualize with this end in view. And, in classical theism, salvation occurs from the positive (not merely permissive) will of God. Therefore, the salvation of all the elect being willed by God, the rejection by God of the reprobate follows from metaphysical necessity. Given the salvation of the elect, there is no metaphysically possible world in which any of the damned was saved (if there were, God would have actualized it, desiring men’s salvation). Their damnation therefore follows from metaphysical necessity.

You have demonstrated no such thing! If A is resigned to accepting God and B is equally resigned to rejecting God…

Try and follow the argument, please. Why wasn’t a world created in which both A and B are resigned to accepting God?

The Question only remains if your stuck in a hypothetical world. Look around you, the answers are quite apparent.

No, they aren’t.

To be sure the question does remain for those not willing to give in to acceptance. This should be quite obvious. Me and you in our human nature would not will such a world where we would draw all unto ourselves.

Oh, we wouldn’t? We would prefer to torture them for all eternity.

Or perhaps you will fool youself and say “Yes, I will the man who rapes my sister unto myself, for I will not that any be left out.” or “Yes, I will the one who molests children unto myself for this is the way it should be.” Both you and I could not do this in out human nature.

Uh huh. And yet God has willed thieves (St. Dismas), deniers of Christ (St. Peter), murderers (St. Paul), prostitutes (St. Magdalen), and so on, unto Himself. Read the New Testament. It’s all there.

Why do you insist that God could or should have done the same. Yes it is illogical to presume that God could say “Yes, I will the ruler who puts innocent people to death unto myself, for all shall be saved.” or “Yes, I will the man who molests little children unto myself, for this is just.” You know this to be an absurdity for human or divine beings yet you persist in abdicating such knowledge.

Something about seventy times seven comes to mind. You are calling God’s desire to save sinners “absurd”. Back to Catechism 101 for you, my friend.

The statement is true because, the logical contradiction is in a world where all the beings free to choose would all choose the good without interference of will.

There is no logical contradiction. If there is so please point it out, exactly where it is. You can’t, because there isn’t. If there were, it would only make the problem of evil so much greater because now the damned would be constrained, not only metaphysically, but logically, to act as they did.

 

[fhansen]

It would seem that free will must inevitably actualize itself in wrong choices because in order for a being with this quality to always make the right choice, God would’ve had to create the being with His wisdom, i.e., God would’ve had to create another God- a logical contradiction. Creation will always be inferior to its Creator.

 

[SeekingCatholic]

It would seem that free will must inevitably actualize itself in wrong choices because in order for a being with this quality to always make the right choice, God would’ve had to create the being with His wisdom, i.e., God would’ve had to create another God- a logical contradiction. Creation will always be inferior to its Creator.

Wrong - you’re equivocating on the meaning of what the “right” choice is. We’re not talking about “right” in the sense of “correct in every respect”, but “right” in the sense of “moral”.

It doesn’t require infinite knowledge, but only finite knowledge, to make the right choices when “right” means “moral”, which is the sense in which it is meant here. We don’t need to know all the ramifications of our actions to be said to have acted “rightly” or “morally”. They only need to be compatible with the moral law, insofar as we are able to know it. To the argument that we can’t know the moral law perfectly, inculpable ignorance excuses from moral fault.

 

[Camron]

The point of contention, yet to be refuted by you (and I hold as irrefutable), is that God could have actualized a world where man did not reject and yet we are not automatons.

That seems to have been the default position. Indeed, it still happens today.

For example, many babes are baptized without actively “choosing” God. Actually, when one considers how many baptized children perish before reaching the age of confirmation, it would seem to me that, statistically speaking, that vast majority of those “saved” are most likely not in heaven because they chose God. More importantly, God choose them.

And, for the record, in heaven no one will have the “free-will” to sin—and yet they will still have their free-will too.

Then again, I think that “free-will arguments” leave a lot to be desired and generally seem them as a waste of time. There’s no doubt that free-will exists. Exactly how important free-will actually is nonetheless is likewise subject to much debate.

I tend to think some “free-will arguments” are very much overrated and very human centered in their thinking, mostly originating with the Enlightenment. This isn’t about free-will. It’s about God’s will really.

 

[fhansen]

Wrong - you’re equivocating on the meaning of what the “right” choice is. We’re not talking about “right” in the sense of “correct in every respect”, but “right” in the sense of “moral”.

Maybe I’m not understanding your contention and I’m willing to be dissatisfied with mine if it’s unworkable. However, I did mean “right choice” in the moral sense and in any case a right choice is a right choice and the point is that Adam made a choice to disobey God which was a fatally *wrong *choice. But not necessarily eternally fatal, because God apparently had other purposes in mind for the consequences of the fall.

It doesn’t require infinite knowledge, but only finite knowledge, to make the right choices when “right” means “moral”, which is the sense in which it is meant here. We don’t need to know all the ramifications of our actions to be said to have acted “rightly” or “morally”. They only need to be compatible with the moral law, insofar as we are able to know it. To the argument that we can’t know the moral law perfectly, inculpable ignorance excuses from moral fault.

It may not require infinite knowledge but may still require more knowledge than Adam and Eve had-it may have required gaining the knowledge of good and evil in order for them to learn to make the right choice-to choose only the good. We’re talking about Gods’ will and His plan so all this is speculation anyway, but how do we know that, in order to produce the kind of beings He was after, a process wasn’t a necessary step in the finished work of mans’ creation? Perhaps the “deification” of man requires testing/suffering/learning/molding to arrive at a being who will have attained to a higher level-closer to God and farther from an automaton then would be otherwise possible-a being who is one in will with God and no longer rebellious against Him because he’s gained the knowledge experientially that His will is always perfect. In this case, man would still have free will but it would be a will perfected in trial, with man’s participation, rather than a will which is magically improved/removed at admission to heaven.

 

[tobias]

I mean assume free will for the purposes of the discussion, not engage in philosophical argumentation about the existence of free will. Free will is a very thorny philosophical question.

Yes it is a very ‘thorny’ question, it is very painful to many.

SeekingCatholic:

You believe this. You don’t know this.

To use my own experience seemed a little too simple. I could have used my 13 year old as example, because I know without a doubt that she is aware of actualizing moral evil. Evidenced by sudden realization that the event has occured and prompt action to repair what was done, with or without external promptings.
However, I mistakingly assumed that ‘age of reason’ would be understood, given the age of the individual. intelligence with reason is sufficient to actualize potential in the realm of moral evil and good.
I was refering to the age in which capacity for moral evil and moral good comes to full potential. Where the individual begins to be freed from the constraints of parental choice, and truly starts to choose autonomously.

Or, I might point to my alcoholic friend who acknowledges moral evil he has done by pointing to external forces as the causation. Still every so often, personal culpability is known and accepted.

Of these 3 I cannot be certain who is A and who is B at the end, for all are at least intermitantly, aware of choices being freely made, and account for immoral actions.

SeekingCatholic:

Because each individual is not in exactly the same set of circumstances from one time to the next, or it is not the same individual acting. This doesn’t refute a deterministic framework. It’s not nearly as easy to “prove” free will as you seem to think.

Of course you realize that you have assumed circumstances would have to be identical, for an individual to have freely chosen different. That would negate the minds tendancy to experience the mundane as, literally, ‘the same old same old’, such as a task at work. It would also negate sense perception based reactions to things that are identical, such as hearing a song, or viewing a movie at different times.

SeekingCatholic:

The Divine mind also has power to actualize.

The logic of implied extension should have been apparent when I stated seperatly that ‘Apart from intelligence there is no potential to actualize.’

SeekingCatholic:

Because, given the “free will defense”, there is no metaphysically possible world in which all are saved. We also assume God really desires men’s salvation, and not their damnation (from Catholicism), which means He determines which world to actualize with this end in view. And, in classical theism, salvation occurs from the positive (not merely permissive) will of God. Therefore, the salvation of all the elect being willed by God, the rejection by God of the reprobate follows from metaphysical necessity. Given the salvation of the elect, there is no metaphysically possible world in which any of the damned was saved (if there were, God would have actualized it, desiring men’s salvation). Their damnation therefore follows from metaphysical necessity.

It is not metaphysically probable that a world could have been actualized where all are saved, not impossible. It is very hard to see mathematically how the sheer numbers of human beings that have inhabited this world could, given the choice ( the capacity to decide from 2 or more possible outcomes), agree to choose the same. The continual number of beings being added to a specific group makes the outcome less and less likely to reach same potential. When 2 beings capable of actualizing the same potential come together, it is inaccurate to assume they will metaphysically disagree of necessity. If 2 beings may actualize their potential jointly, then why would one assume 3 cannot, or 200 billion? MAYBE GOD JUST MADE TOO MANY OF US! I contend your idea is metaphysically improbable, not impossible.

SeekingCatholic:

Oh, we wouldn’t? We would prefer to torture them for all eternity.

Do you? Do you invite unrepentant rapists and murderers to your home? Or, are you quite content that they remain in a jail cell? Just curious.

SeekingCatholic:

Uh huh. And yet God has willed thieves (St. Dismas), deniers of Christ (St. Peter), murderers (St. Paul), prostitutes (St. Magdalen), and so on, unto Himself. Read the New Testament. It’s all there.

Perhaps if you hadn’t brushed aside the C and D portion of my post you’d have seen that this was already in the argument. ( again, implied extension ) But then it’s better to see you give the answer back to yourself, a list of formerly B people who make it to the A list. Isn’t Catholicism frightening?

SeekingCatholic:

Something about seventy times seven comes to mind. You are calling God’s desire to save sinners “absurd”. Back to Catechism 101 for you, my friend.

Are you familiar with hyperbolie? Again it’s nice to see that you already know the answers to your own initial question. It’s only ‘absurd’ if it is not metaphysically possible in this world for all to choose redemption.

SeekingCatholic:

There is no logical contradiction.

I conceed this statement, it is only logically improbable for God to have actualized a world where all choose redemption.

Efficacous Grace may guide a being toward the right moral choices, but it cannot move a being to right moral decision. If it moved an intelligent being to ‘do’, then it would cease to be effective and become Causative Grace.

Can’t seem to seperate philosiphy from theology.
My will must not be free to choose. Or mabey its just late!!!

 

[john_doran]

The “standard” answer is that, in order for there to exist moral good, there must also be moral evil. But logically there must only exist the potential for moral evil, not its actuality. Why did God not actualize a world in which all are in fact saved, even if it were logically possible for them not to be? There is no good answer. There are only in fact two logically possible answers, the “free will” defense and the “greater good” defense.

there is at least one other answer: the “foreseen but unintended consequence of instantiating a different incommensurable good”. maybe call it the “double effect” argument.

SeekingCatholic:

Let’s (to simplify the issue, but it doesn’t really change anything) imagine God choosing between two worlds: one in which person A is saved and person B damned, and one in which person A is damned and person B saved. A world in which both A and B are saved is, we presume, metaphysically impossible. Let’s say God chooses the first one, with A saved, since He desires A saved (His motive in creating the world is His creatures’ good, being omnibenevolent as He is). B’s damnation therefore follows as a matter of metaphysical necessity, for given A’s salvation, there are no metaphysically possible worlds in which B is saved. It was metaphysically impossible for B to have chosen otherwise than he did, given the external circumstances.

this isn’t the free will defense that plantinga articulates: part of that argument is the premise that both A and B are significantly free with respect to salvation (let’s assume one final, salvific choice is at stake for each). which means that it is not “metapysically impossible” for B to have chosen other than he did: it is in fact a premise of the argument to reject this assertion (how could B be significantly free if it was impossible for him to do otherwise than he did?).

the molinist premise that that there is a possible world where B chooses X, and a possible world were B chooses ~X, and that those possible worlds are identical in all respects up until the time of the choice (that is, W and W’ share a world-segment, S, until the point of the free choice, at which point they differ in respect of including eother X or ~X, as the case may be).

that’s what makes B’s choice free - that’s just what it means to be free. the molinist then makes the further observation that only one of these propositions can be true:

1. if B were free in S, then he would choose X;
2. if B were free in S, then he would choose ~X.

and since only one of these propositions can be true, there is at least one possible world that god cannot actualize: the world containing the false proposition.

in other words, it is B that actualizes the possible world that contains the choice that he makes, and makes ***freely ***(which is why god cannot actualize it) - god actualizes S, and then let’s B make the free choice.

it’s not that it’s “metaphysically impossible” for B to have chosen differently, it’s just that in any given situation of significant freedom, an agent will in fact choose one way or the other - that’s simply a necessary consequence of having a free choice.

SeekingCatholic:

Now it is unjust to punish anyone for acting when it was impossible for him to act otherwise.

true, but, per the above, it was not impossible for B to act otherwise.

 

[SeekingCatholic]

Maybe I’m not understanding your contention and I’m willing to be dissatisfied with mine if it’s unworkable. However, I did mean “right choice” in the moral sense…

OK.

It may not require infinite knowledge…

Then your argument fails, for God does not have to create another God to create someone with the finite amount of necessary knowledge.

…a being who is one in will with God and no longer rebellious against Him because he’s gained the knowledge experientially that His will is always perfect. In this case, man would still have free will but it would be a will perfected in trial, with man’s participation, rather than a will which is magically improved/removed at admission to heaven.

Yes, but then there’s the problem of men never gaining such experiential knowledge.

 

[SeekingCatholic]

there is at least one other answer: the “foreseen but unintended consequence of instantiating a different incommensurable good”. maybe call it the “double effect” argument.

Actually, that’s what I meant by the “greater good” defense.

this isn’t the free will defense that plantinga articulates: part of that argument is the premise that both A and B are significantly free with respect to salvation (let’s assume one final, salvific choice is at stake for each).

All this hinges on the definition of what “significantly free” really means.

Do you agree with the following synopsis of the free will defense?

The free will defense can be viewed as an attempt to show that there some kinds of good that even an all-good, all-powerful, all-knowing God can’t bring about without permitting evil. The version below is modeled (loosely) on what Alvin Plantinga says.

1. Creatures who are significantly free cannot be causally determined to do only what is right.
2. Thus, if God creates creatures who are significantly free, He cannot causally determine them to do only what is right. (from 1)
3. Thus, if God creates creatures who are significantly free, he must create creatures who are capable of moral evil. (from 2)
4. Thus, if God creates a world containing creatures who are significantly free, it will contain creatures who are capable of moral evil. (from 3)
5. If God creates a world containing creatures who are capable of moral evil, He cannot guarantee that there will not be evil in that world.
6. Thus, if God creates a world containing creatures who are significantly free, He cannot guarantee that there will not be evil in that world. (from 4 and 5)
7. A world containing creatures who are significantly free (and freely perform more morally good than evil actions) is more valuable, all else being equal, than a world containing no free creatures at all.
8. Thus, God has good reason to create a world containing creatures who are significantly free. (from 7)
9. Thus, God has good reason to create a world, which He cannot guarantee will not contain evil. (from 6 and 8)

Now obviously here “significantly free” means “not causally determined” - e.g. it merely means libertarian, as opposed to compatibilist, free will. It doesn’t say anything about logical vs. metaphysical possibilities.

If both A and B are “significantly” free does this mean only a logical possibility that A and B both choose rightly? Or also a metaphysical possibility? You claim the latter but with that the free will defense flat-out fails, for step 5) is undermined.

Even if God creates a world with creatures capable of moral evil, He can actualize a metaphysically possible world in which no moral evil is committed (from His omnipotence), if such a world is, in fact, metaphysically possible. Deny this and you deny His omnipotence. Thus He can actualize a world in which both A and B are saved, if such a world is metaphysically possible. The free will defense needs to deny such a world is metaphysically possible in order to maintain premise 5).

which means that it is not “metapysically impossible” for B to have chosen other than he did: it is in fact a premise of the argument to reject this assertion (how could B be significantly free if it was impossible for him to do otherwise than he did?).

Then God could have actualized a metaphysically possible world in which B did choose otherwise than he did. Again, deny this, and you deny His omnipotence.

the molinist premise that that there is a possible world where B chooses X, and a possible world were B chooses ~X, and that those possible worlds are identical in all respects up until the time of the choice…

That’s not a Molinist premise. Given scientia media only one of the two worlds are possible.

(that is, W and W’ share a world-segment, S, until the point of the free choice, at which point they differ in respect of including eother X or ~X, as the case may be).

that’s what makes B’s choice free - that’s just what it means to be free.

Well again the question is whether the inclusion of either X or ~X is only logically possible, or also metaphysically possible. Are all philosophers agreed that free will means necessarily the metaphysical possibility of choosing otherwise, or only the logical possibility?

the molinist then makes the further observation that only one of these propositions can be true:

1. if B were free in S, then he would choose X;
2. if B were free in S, then he would choose ~X.

and since only one of these propositions can be true, there is at least one possible world that god cannot actualize: the world containing the false proposition.

Exactly right! And God cannot actualize that world precisely because it is a metaphysically impossible world. If it were a metaphysically possible world, God could actualize it.

in other words, it is B that actualizes the possible world that contains the choice that he makes, and makes ***freely ***(which is why god cannot actualize it)

Which denies God’s omnipotence. If there are two metaphysically possible worlds, with B choosing one way or the other, then God could actualize either one. The fact that B is choosing “freely” is irrelevant.

• god actualizes S, and then let’s B make the free choice.

But God knows a priori what the choice will be. The choice must therefore be pre-determined (to be distinguished from “caused”) by something in order for God to have that knowledge. In Thomism it’s Divine causation. In Molinism it’s the external circumstances coupled with God’s scientia media knowledge of counterfactuals. If you deny this then you end up in open-view or process theology.

it’s not that it’s “metaphysically impossible” for B to have chosen differently, it’s just that in any given situation of significant freedom, an agent will in fact choose one way or the other - that’s simply a necessary consequence of having a free choice.

Again we have this “significant freedom”, which as you have described it as compatible with a mere logical possibility of acting one way or the other. Try out the “free will” defense with “significant freedom” meaning “metaphysical possibility”. You end up denying God’s omnipotence, His omniscience, or both, to attempt to explain the existence of moral evil.